CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. V, 400 U.S. 932 (1970)
U.S. Supreme Court
CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. V , 400 U.S. 932 (1970) 400 U.S. 932The CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS &
TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. et al.
v.
UNITED STATES et al.
No. 593.
Supreme Court of the United States
December 7, 1970
The judgment is affirmed.
Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting.
The Court today affirms the District Court in a case involving the relationship of various factors in determining a 'just and reasonable' charge under 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act. [Footnote 1] Because I think the court below was clearly in error, I would reverse and remand the case to the Interstate Commerce Commission for further consideration.
The appellants, various railroads operating in the southern United States, submitted to the ICC in 1967 a tariff proposing a $22 per car transit charge for cotton and molasses. [Footnote 2] The Commission, on protests from shippers, ordered appellants to refrain from imposing
the new charges pending a hearing under 15(7) to determine if the new charge was 'just and reasonable.'
A hearing was held in 1968, and after receiving testimony from appellants and the protesting shippers the Examiner concluded that (a) the appellants had the burden of proving the charge was just and reasonable by 'clear and convincing' evidence, (b) the $22 charge was not shown to approximate the actual costs involved in transiting a freight car, (c) the existing line haul rates returned more than out-of-pocket costs for all services performed, including transit, and made a contribution to overhead as well, (d) the likely effect of the charge would be to divert traffic to motor carriers and thus reduce the railroads' overall revenue. 'All things considered,' the Examiner concluded, appellants had failed to show that the charge was just and reasonable. The Commission adopted the findings and conclusions of the Examiner without change. Transit Charges, Southern Territory, 332 I.C.C. 664 (1968).
On review, the three-judge District Court3 found that the
Examiner and thus the Commission had misstated the law in holding
that the carriers had a burden of showing the charge was just and
reasonable by 'clear and convincing evidence.' Had the court
stopped there and simply remanded the proceedings to the Commission
with directions to apply what the court deemed to be the proper
standard of proof, there would be no need to review this case.
However, the court went on to discuss the Commission's findings on
the merits. It concluded that the Commission had not justified its
conclusions that (a) the $22 charge was not shown to approximate
transit costs and (b) the line haul rate was sufficient to cover
the costs involved. The court then found that the Commission's
conclusion that the new charge would [400 U.S. 932 , 934]
U.S. Supreme Court
CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. V , 400 U.S. 932 (1970) 400 U.S. 932 The CINCINNATI, NEW ORLEANS & TEXAS PACIFIC RAILWAY CO. et al.v.
UNITED STATES et al.
No. 593. Supreme Court of the United States December 7, 1970 The judgment is affirmed. Mr. Justice WHITE, dissenting. The Court today affirms the District Court in a case involving the relationship of various factors in determining a 'just and reasonable' charge under 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act. [Footnote 1] Because I think the court below was clearly in error, I would reverse and remand the case to the Interstate Commerce Commission for further consideration. The appellants, various railroads operating in the southern United States, submitted to the ICC in 1967 a tariff proposing a $22 per car transit charge for cotton and molasses. [Footnote 2] The Commission, on protests from shippers, ordered appellants to refrain from imposing Page 400 U.S. 932 , 933 the new charges pending a hearing under 15(7) to determine if the new charge was 'just and reasonable.' A hearing was held in 1968, and after receiving testimony from appellants and the protesting shippers the Examiner concluded that (a) the appellants had the burden of proving the charge was just and reasonable by 'clear and convincing' evidence, (b) the $22 charge was not shown to approximate the actual costs involved in transiting a freight car, (c) the existing line haul rates returned more than out-of-pocket costs for all services performed, including transit, and made a contribution to overhead as well, (d) the likely effect of the charge would be to divert traffic to motor carriers and thus reduce the railroads' overall revenue. 'All things considered,' the Examiner concluded, appellants had failed to show that the charge was just and reasonable. The Commission adopted the findings and conclusions of the Examiner without change. Transit Charges, Southern Territory, 332 I.C.C. 664 (1968). On review, the three-judge District Court3 found that the Examiner and thus the Commission had misstated the law in holding that the carriers had a burden of showing the charge was just and reasonable by 'clear and convincing evidence.' Had the court stopped there and simply remanded the proceedings to the Commission with directions to apply what the court deemed to be the proper standard of proof, there would be no need to review this case. However, the court went on to discuss the Commission's findings on the merits. It concluded that the Commission had not justified its conclusions that (a) the $22 charge was not shown to approximate transit costs and (b) the line haul rate was sufficient to cover the costs involved. The court then found that the Commission's conclusion that the new charge would Page 400 U.S. 932 , 934 have diverted traffic to motor carriers was based on substantial evidence. On the basis of the last finding, the court upheld the ICC's action and entered an order denying relief to appellants. It has been settled law since the first Chenery case that 'an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon which its action can be sustained.' SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). Thus, when the reviewing court here determined that the agency applied an erroneous standard of proof in its determination, it was barred from going on to consider whether the agency's action was supported by substantial evidence. The court compounded the error by upsetting two of the agency's findings as to reasonableness and upholding the agency solely on the basis of the third finding. The Examiner's report, adopted by the Commission, explicitly states that the conclusion was based on 'all things considered,' not merely the finding of diversion. Finally, the applicable statute provides: