IN August Session 1801, of the Court of Quarter Sessions, the
grand jury of Luzerne county presented the following
indictment:
'Luzerne county ss.
'The Grand Inquest for the body of
the county of Luzerne, upon their oaths respectively do present,
that John Franklin, Elisha Satterlee, and John Jenkins, all late of
the said county, yeomen, on the first day of August, in the year of
our Lord one thousand eight hundred and one, at the county
aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, unlawfully
did combine and conspire, for the purpose of conveying, possessing,
and settling, on certain lands within the limits of the county
aforesaid, under a certain pretended title not derived from the
authority of this commonwealth, or of the late proprietaries of
Pennsylvania before the revolution, to the evil example of all
others in like manner offending, contrary to the form of the act of
general assembly of this state in such case made and provided, and
against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
&c.
'And the Jurors aforesaid, upon their
oaths aforesaid, do further respectively present, that the said
John Franklin, Elisha Satterlee, John Jenkins, and Joseph Biles,
all late of the county aforesaid, yeomen, on the first day of
August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and one,
at the county aforesaid, did combine and conspire for the purpose
of laying out townships, by persons not appointed or acknowledged
by the laws of this commonwealth, to the evil example of all others
in like manner offending, contrary to the form of the act of
assembly of this state in such case made and provided,
Page 4 U.S.
255, 256
and against the peace and dignity of the commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.
'JOSEPH B. M'KEAN,
'Attorney-General.'
A certiorari issued at the instance of the defendants, to remove
the indictment from the Quarter Sessions into the Circuit Court;
directed, however, to the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas of
the county; requiring the return of an indictment against the four
persons named in the second count, for both offences; and actually
returned by the associate Judges of the Common Pleas.
On the trial of the indictment, in the Circuit Court, as a
session held at Wilkesbarre, Luzerne county, in Mau 1802, the Jury
found a special verdict, in these terms:
'And now a Jury of the county being
called, came, to wit, Thomas Duane, Lazarus Denison, Peter Grubb,
John Cary, Nathan Beach, Thomas Wright, Ebenezer Slocum, Nathan
Waller, Abel Pierce, Jacob Bedford, Timothy Beebe, and Abiel
Fellows, who being duly impanelled, elected, sworn, and affirmed,
to try these issues, on their oaths and affirmations, do find that
the defendants, John Franklin and John Jenkins, did, after the 11th
of April 1795, at the county of Luzerne, conspire and combine for
the purpose of conveying, possessing, and settling, on lands within
the said county, under a pretended title not derived from the
authority of this commonwealth, or of the late proprietaries of
Pennsylvania before the revolution, contrary to the form of an act
of general assembly of this commonwealth, passed the 11th of April
1795, entitled an act to prevent intrustions on lands within the
counties of Northampton, Northumberland, and Luzerne. And the
Jorors aforesaid, on their oaths and affirmations aforesaid, do
further find that the said John Franklin and John Jenkins, after
the 11th of April 1795, at the county aforesaid, did conspire and
combine for the purpose of laying out townships in the said county
of Luzerne, by persons not appointed or acknowledged by the laws of
this commonwealth, contrary to the form of the act of the general
assembly aforesaid; but whether the said defendants are guilty in
manner and form as they stand indicted, they know not, and pray,
therefore, the opinion of the Court. And if the Court here should
be of opinion that the said act of general assembly is not contrary
to the constitution of the United States, or of the state of
Pennsylvania, then they find the said defendants guilty in manner
and form as they stand indicted, but if the Court should be of
opinion that the said act of geneneral assembly is contrary to to
the constitution of the United States, or of the state of
Pennsylvania, then they find the said
Page 4 U.S.
255, 257
defendants not guilty in manner and torm as they stand indicted.
And the said Elisha Satterlee and Joseph Biles they find not guilty
in manner and form as they stand indicted.' Upon this finding of
the jury, the defendant filed the following reasons in arrest of
judgment: 1st. The law on which this indictment is grounded, is
unconstitutional. 2d. The offences charged are not described with
convenient and legal certainty. 3d. No act is stated, in either
count, to have been committed in pursuance of the combination and
conspiracy. 4th. Two, different crimes are charged in the first
count of the indictment. 5th. It is not stated in the second count,
that the combination and conspiracy was to lay out townships within
Luzerne county, or elsewhere, nor are the townships in any wise
described. 6th. The cause was never pending in the Circuit Court.
7th. The certiorari is to remove an indictment against four
persons, for two offences; and there is no such indictment.(a) The
act of assembly, to which the indictment and proceedings refer, was
passed on the 11th of April 1795; 3 State Laws, 703. Dall. edit.
and the sections material, in the present case, were the following:
Sec. 1. 'Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives
of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in general assembly met, and
it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same, That if any
person shall, after the passing of this act, take possession of,
enter, intrude, or settle on any lands, which the limits of the
counties of Northampton, Northumberland, or Luzerne, by virtue or
under colour of any conveyance of half share right, or any other
pretended title, not derived from the authority of this
commonwealth, or of the late proprietaries of Pennsylvania before
the revolution, such person, upon being duly convicted thereof,
upon indictment in any Court of Oyer and Terminer, or Court of
General Quarter Sessions, to be held in the proper county, shall
forfeit and pay the sum of two hundred dollars, one half to the use
of the county, and the other half to the use of the informer; and
shall, also, be subject to such imprisonment, not exceeding twelve
months, as the Court, before whom such conviction is had, may in
their discretion direct. Sect. 2. 'And be it further enacted by the
authority aforesaid, That every person who shall combine or
conspire for the purpose of conveying, possessing, or settling on
any lands within (a) The 6th and 7th exceptions were filed, at a
subsequent stage of the cause, after the 1st exception had been
over-ruled.
Page 4 U.S.
255, 258
the limits aforesaid, under any half share right or pretended
title as aforesaid, or for the purpose of laying out townships by
persons not appointed or acknowledged by the laws of this
commonwealth, and every person that shall be accessary thereto,
before or after the fact, shall, for every such offence, forfeit
and pay a sum not less than five hundred, nor more than one
thousand dollars, one half to the use of the county, and the other
half to the use of the informer; and shall, also, be subject to
such imprisonment at hard labour, nor exceeding eighteen months, as
the Court in their discretion may direct.'
It was agreed by the attorney-general, and the counsel for the
defendants, that the leading question, whether the act of assembly
was constitutional, or not, should be argued in the Supreme Court,
before all the Judges. Notice was regularly given to the attorney
of the defendants, that the case would be argued at the present
term; but they did not appear, nor apply to counsel to appear for
them, till the argument had actually commenced; and then, upon
being refused a term's delay, their counsel ( Lewis) for want of
preparation, declined entering into the discussion.
The case was opened, and argued, by Duncan, for the
commonwealth. He traced the history of the Wyoming controversy, and
referred to the decree of Trenton, (30th December 1782. 8 vol.
Journ. Cong. 83, 4.) as finally terminating the question of
boundary and jurisdiction, between the states of Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, in favour of the former. From that period, every
settler under a Connecticut title, must be regarded as a wilful
trespasser. 2 Dall. Rep. 306. The ordinary process of the law,
however, was not sufficient to restrain, or repel, the intrusions
upon our territory; the legislative attention was imperiously drawn
to the subject; and an act was passed, on the 11th of April 1795,
to punish, as criminal offences, the taking possession of lands, or
conspiring to convey, possess, or settle, them, in the counties of
Northampton, Northumberland, or Luzerne, under any title not
derived from Pennsylvania. 3 vol. State Laws, 703. Dall. edit. Upon
the first and second sections of this act, the present indictment
is founded; and a constitutional objection is raised, to quash the
indictment, and defeat the beneficial operation of the act. This
constitutional objection has, on other occasions, been branched
into various points.
1st. The act has been said to be a violation of the first
section of the ninth article of the state constitution, which
declares, 'that all men are born equally free and independent, and
have certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which are
those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property and reputation, and of pursuing
their own happiness.'-
Page 4 U.S.
255, 259
We answer: Property is a creature of society; and the right, in
all its modifications, of acquisition, possession, and transfer, is
regulated by positive law. 2 Bl. Com. 2. 3 Dall. Rep. 391. 394.
From the very nature of the right of property, it is a perfect and
exclusive right. The moment, that it was established, that the
boundaries of Pennsylvania embraced the Wyoming district of
country, the right of property became absolute and exclusive in the
state; it would be absurd to suppose that Connecticut could, also,
possess an exclusive right of property in the same land; and, yet,
without such a supposition, by what principle of general law, what
positive statute, what express, or implied, contract, can her
grants confer a possessory, or usufructuary, interest in the land?
No man could obtain from Connecticut a legitimate right to acquire,
possess, and protect, property, which belonged to Pennsylvania; and
the constitution could only intend to recognise and sanction a
legitimate right, for those purposes.
2d. The act has been said to be a violation of the constitutions
of the United States and of Pennsylvania, inasmuch as it creates a
new offence; punishes, ex post facto, the exercise of a claim,
legal in its origin; and impairs the obligation of contracts.
We answer: The intrusion, forcible or clandestine, upon the
territory of a sovereign power, is an offence malum in se. It is an
attack, not only upon the national property, but upon the national
sovereignty. If done by individual citizens of another state, it is
a high misdemeanor; and if done with the sanction of their
government, it would be a just cause of war. But it is adding
insult to outrage, when the citizens of the state itself, deny her
right and authority, and parcel out her lands, under the authority
of another government. The offence is flagrant, against every
principle of political economy; and always has been held
indictable. 2 Hawk. P. C. 210. 4 Bl. Com. 128. 32 H. 8. c. 9. Long,
however, before the Connecticut claim began to operate,
Pennsylvania (in 1729-30) had introduced a similar law, to prevent
purchases of land from the Indians; to annual all contracts for
that purpose; and to extend the English statutes of forcible
entries and detainers, to the case of entry upon lands, not
located, or surveyed, by some warrant, or order, from the
proprietary. 1 State Laws, 248. Dall. edit. And even in the year
1700, ( which law was inforced by additional sanctions in 1769,
Ibid. 503.) it had been declared, 'that if any person presume to
buy any land of the natives, within the limits of this province and
territories, without leave from the proprietary thereof, every such
bargain, or purchase, shall be void, and of no effect.' Ibid. 5.
Say, then, that the Connecticut title, originated in July 1754 (as
it is alleged) in a purchase from the Indians: by a positive
subsisting law, the purchase was void; it could afford no lawful
ground for subsequent contracts; and, of course, no
Page 4 U.S.
255, 260
contract could, in this point of view, be impaired by the act
against intrusions. Say, that the contract, is only to be regarded
as between Connecticut and her grantees: the contract is neither
annulled, nor impaired, if the subject of it belonged to
Connecticut; but surely a contract with Connecticut could give no
right to enter upon lands that belonged to Pennsylvania. The
obligation of the contract lies exclusively upon Connecticut; and
Pennsylvania does not, in any degree, impair it, when she merely
says, that it shall not be forcibly transferred to her. If,
therefore, Pennsylvania had a right to legislate for the protection
of her property, for the vindication of her sovereignty, is there
in the manner of legislating, any violation of a constitutional, or
established, principle of jurisprudence? No: the offence is
defined, and the punishment prescribed, not ex post facto, in
reference to past intrusions and conspiracies; but expressly
contemplating those which shall occur, after the enacting of the
law.
3d. The act has been said to be a violation of the state
constitution ( art. 9.s. 1.) by destroying an equality of rights;
inasmuch as its provisions do not apply to the whole state, but to
a particular district, composed of three counties.
We answer. The grievance is local, and the remedy ought,
therefore, to be locally applied. The usurpation and intrusion
prevailed only in the counties of Northampton, Northumberland, and
Luzerne; and the proceeding against the intruders by eviction and
restitution, is not a novelty in our law. In criminal cases, the
award of restitution always follows a conviction; and in cases of
forcible entry and detainer (when, too, the public dignity is not
involved) restitution is the appropriate execution of the judgment,
in favour of a prosecutor.
4th. The act has been said to be a violation of the
constitution, because it destroys, or suspends, the right of
entry.
We answer. It cannot be seriously supported, as a legal
proposition, that it is unconstitutional to deny a right of entry
on lands in one state, under an authority derived from the
government of another state. Even as to estates derived from
herself, or as to estates belonging to her citizens, the state may,
and positively does, by an act of limitation, destroy the right of
entry. 2 State Laws, 281, 2. Dall. edit. But the act of assembly,
in discussion, if fairly construed, does not affect a right of
entry, to prevent the bar of the act of limitation, or to seal a
lease, for the purposes of an ejectment: but only an entry for the
purpose of intruding and settling upon the lands, in pursuance of
the spurious title of Connecticut.
5th. The act has been said to be a violation of the state
constitution, because it exercises a power, in its nature judicial,
and not legislative.
Page 4 U.S.
255, 261
We answer. The act neither undertakes to investigate facts, nor
to pronounce a judgment. It prohibits the doing of certain acts;
and if the acts are done, it leaves to the Courts of justice, the
exclusive province of trying and deciding upon the case.
6th. The act is said to be a violation of the second section of
the third article of the constitution of the United States, so far
as it provides, that the judicial power shall extend to
controversies between citizens of the same state claiming lands
under grants of different states.
We answer. The Federal Courts have no criminal jurisdiction,
except in the cases expressly authorised by the constitution and
laws of the United States; and the present case, considered as a
criminal one, is clearly not included in the delegated authority of
the constitution or laws. Considered as a civil case, it is
necessary, for the claim of federal cognizance, to show that
Connecticut had actually issued grants, for the lands granted by
Pennsylvania, which has never yet been pretended. For, the 9th
article of the confederation had taken cognizance of 'all
controversies, concerning the private right of soil, claimed under
different grants of two, or more states, whose jurisdiction, as
they may respect such lands and the states, which passed such
grants, are adjusted, the said grants, or either of them, being at
the same time claimed to have originated antecedent to such
settlement of jurisdiction.' And the existing federal constitution,
also, calls, expressly, for a claim of lands, under grants of
different states, before the case of federal cognizance can arise.
That the word grant is thus used in its legal, technical, sense; 2
Bl. Com. 317. and that no such grant was ever made by Connecticut
prior to the decree of Trenton, will satisfactorily appear from the
journals of congress: 8 vol. 74. 9 vol. 156. 10 vol. 294. to 299.
After all, the constitution of the United States only secures the
right of action, which may subsist without the right of entry, and
is not destroyed, or impaired, by the act of assembly; an act of
public police, for the purposes of internal, self government.
Dallas, in concluding for the commonwealth, divided the
consideration of the general question (whether the act was
constitutional?) into an inquiry, 1st. Whether the subject of the
law, was constitutionally proper? And, 2d. Whether there was any
departure from constitutional principles, in the regulations, for
carrying the law into effect?
1st. It is the duty of every government to protect the rights of
property, and to preserve the public peace. An evil subversive of
those rights, fatal to that peace, existed in Pennsylvania at the
period of passing the act. The state laws, then in force, were
incompetent to a cure of the evil. The federal government could not
interpose, either with its legislative, or judicial, power. And
Page 4 U.S.
255, 262
unless the state could administer to her own relief, the case
was desperate and dreadful.
What was the evil that existed? By the decree of Trenton, it was
settled, that Pennsylvania had the exclusive right of soverignty,
soil, and pre-emption, as to the lands in question; by a
retrospective recognition of the boundaries, described in the
charter from Charles the second to William Penn. The laws of
Pennsylvania must, therefore, be applied to every transaction
respecting those lands; and in the years 1700 and 1729, it had been
made unlawful to purchase any part of them from the Indians. 1
State Laws, 5. 248. Yet, in July 1754, the Susquehanna and Delaware
companies, in defiance of the laws, made a purchase from the
Indians; and without a grant from Connecticut, or a grant from
Pennsylvania, but merely under colour of a grant from the Indians
(which the acts of assembly declared to be null and void) they, and
persons succeeding to their pretensions, have continued, from that
time to the present, to annoy the peace, and to insult the
government of Pennsylvania, by the most flagrant acts of outrage,
usurpation, and contumacy; insomuch that even an attempt was made
to erect an independent state within her territory. 2 vol. State
Laws, 82. Reviewing, however, the transactions only subsequent to
the final decree of Trenton (30th December 1782) we find, that the
district of country, called the Seventeen Townships, was all that
the Connecticut claimants then occupied. But, still, as
Pennsylvania had previously issued grants for the same land, she
was bound to sustain the rights of her grantees. Every pacific and
conciliatory instrument was employed, for that purpose, before the
state resorted to force, or to denunciation. Commissioners were
appointed to negotiate a compromise between the adverse claimants;
and an act was passed on the 13th of March 1783, to suspend all
process against the Wyoming settlers during the negotiation: 2 vol.
State Laws, 146. Hall & Sellers's edit. but the commissioners
were spurned, baffled, and defeated; and the suspending law was
repealed, on the 9th of September 1783, because it was evident,
that the clemency and moderation of the legislature 'had been
mistaken and treated with neglect.' Ibid. 197. The spirit of
conciliation was, nevertheless, indulged much longer. An act was
passed on the 15th of September 1784, 'for the more speedy
restoring the possession of certain messuages, lands, and
tenements, in Northumberland county, to the persons who lately held
the same,' and had been violently evicted. Ibid. 391. An act of
oblivion and pardon was, also, passed, on the 24th of December
1785, as to all crimes and offences committed on or before the 1st
of November preceding, under colour of the Wyoming controversy; but
the supreme executive council was, at the same time, authorised, to
employ a competent body of the militia, in support of the
magistrates. To gratify the inhabitants, a part of
Northumberland
Page 4 U.S.
255, 263
was erected into a new county, and called Luzerne, on the 25th
of September 1786. 2 vol. 465. 486. Dall. edit. But the great
effort for the restoration of harmony and order, was the act,
usually styled 'the confirming law,' passed on the 28th of March
1787. This act recites, that 'the interfering claims have
occasioned much contention, expense, and bloodshed; and the
assembly being desirous of putting an end to those evils, by
confirming such of the Connecticut claims, as were acquired by
actual settlers prior to the termination of the dispute [by the
decree of Trenton] agreeably to the petition of a number of the
said settlers, and by granting a just compensation to the
Pennsylvania claimants.' Commissioners were again appointed, for
carrying the confirming law into effect; but 'when they met, in
pursuance of the law, they were interrupted in their proceedings by
the combinations, threatenings, and outrageous violence, of certain
lawless people in the county of Luzerne, and obliged to fly for the
preservation of their lives;' aided by persons who were severely
wounded on the occasion. The confirming law was thereupon suspended
(29th March 1788) 3 vol. 450. 530. Hall & Seller's edit. and,
afterwards, on the 1st of April 1790, it was condemned and
repealed, as unjust and unconstitutional. 2 vol. 786. Dall. edit.
During this period of legislative patience and conciliation, it is
matter of public notoriety, that every pacific overture was
condemned; every coercive measure was resisted, or evaded; the
powers of government were taken into the hands of voluntary
associations of individuals; the sheriffs, and other public
officers, were menaced and defied; the commissioners of the
government were insulted, assaulted, and imprisoned; the
Pennsylvania claimants were waylaid and murdered; the number of
intruders was daily augmented; and the extent of their
encroachments was indefinitely enlarged.
For the magnitude of this evil, did the laws in force, furnish
an adequate remedy? The Connecticut claim was now spread over the
whole county, extending beyond the original seventeen townships,
throughout the north-western boundary of the state. Where the land
was actually occupied by a Connecticut claimant, no Pennsylvania
patentee could safely enter; and the danger increased, if the
possession was vacant. The process of ejectment, or forcible entry
and detainer, or any other civil process, was not effectual to give
to the right of property, protection and enjoyment; and even the
force of the militia had failed. The evil was an intrusion upon
lands (not to try a title, not to submit to the dispensations of
the judicial power, but) to seize, possess, and hold, by force,
violence, and terror. There was no law, in existence, that could
afford a remedy; and, yet, there is no man, who will contend, that
a remedy ought not to be provided.
Page 4 U.S.
255, 264
Could the federal government afford an adequate remedy? The case
was not within their legislative, or executive, owers, either
expressly, or as an incident to an express power. It is a case of
domestic violence; as to which the federal government can only
interfere, 'on application of the state legislature, or of the
executive, when the legislature cannot be convened.' Const. U. S.
art. 4. s. 4. Nor could the judicial power of the United States
afford relief. It provides, indeed, for a suit between citizens,
claiming grants under different states; but it no where provides,
for prosecutions by a state, against its own citizens, committing
offences against her municipal laws. Ibid. art. 3. s. 2.
Amendments. Acts Congress, 3 vol. 131. 1 vol. 53. s. 9. Ibid. 55.
s. 11. Ibid. 57. s. 12. Ibid. 58. s. 13. In the Commonwealth v.
Cobbett. 3 Dall. Rep. 467. The principle was discussed and settled;
and in Rush v. Cobbett, the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, was
adjudged to apply only to cases of contract; and not to a case of
damages, for a libel.
The competency of the state government to redress the evil, is a
necessary inference from the incompetency of any other power, known
to our constitutions and laws, unless it is expressly prohibited.
Now, it is not expressly prohibited; and it cannot, by any act of
perversion, be assimilated to an attainder law; to an ex post facto
law; or to a law impairing the obligation of contracts. Nor is it a
legislative encroachment upon the judicial department. It decides
no question of personal guilt; it inflicts no punishment; it merely
declares in this, as in every instance of the penal code, what
shall constitute an offence, and how the offender shall be
punished.
2d. Having thus vindicated the subject of the law, from the
imputation of being unconstitutional; it is next to be examined,
whether there is any departure, from constitutional principles, in
the regulations for carrying it into effect?
In the construction of a remedial statute, the previous mischief
is to be considered. Here, the act of assembly describes the
offence, in the very terms of the mischief: 1st. 'Taking possession
of, entering, intruding, or settling on lands, &c. by virtue,
or under colour of any conveyance of half share right, or other
pretended title, not derived from the authority of this
commonwealth, &c.' And, 2d. 'Conspiring for the purpose of
conveying, possessing, or settling on any lands within the limits
aforesaid, under any half share right or pretended title as
aforesaid; or for the purpose of laying out townships by persons
not entitled or acknowledged, by the laws of this commonwealth.' If
the description of the offense contains nothing unconstitutional,
does the nature of the punishment? No: it is fine and imprisonment;
and the offender is to be removed from the premises, of which he
was tortiously, and unlawfully possessed, after full notice of the
law, by proclamation, and publishing
Page 4 U.S.
255, 265
in Court. 3 vol. State Laws, 703. s. 1, 2, 3. 6. This proceeding
by indictment, and the expulsion upon conviction, are said,
however, to destroy the right of entry, upon which alone the civil
remedy of ejectment can be pursued. But the law contemplates no
such entry, in the description of the offence; for, let it be
repeated, it is a tortious entry, to hold by force; and not a
lawful entry to try a right, that the legislature condemns and
punishes.
After advisement and deliberation, the Judges delivered their
opinions, seriatim.
SHIPPEN, Chief Justice, YEATES and SMITH, Justices, concurred in
declaring, that the act of assembly, on which the indictment is
founded, was constitutional, in all its relations.
BRACKENRIDGE, Justice.
The second count in the indictment, is founded upon the second
section of the act of assembly; and the special verdict finds
expressly, that the defendants did conspire for the purpose
mentioned in that section. The purpose was, 'to lay out townships
in the county of Luzerne, by persons not appointed, or
acknowledged, by the laws of this commonwealth.' Now, the term
township, indicates a local jurisdiction, for objects of local
police, with powers and officers to effectuate the jurisdiction;
and a conspiracy by individuals to erect such townships, is an
encroachment upon the rights and authority of the state. It is an
offence indictable at common law, and the legislature, with a view
more effectually to prevent its commission, had an unquestionable
power to increase the punishment.
As to the first section of the act of assembly, I am not
prepared to pronounce, that it is unconstitutional; and,
consequently, I could not, even on that ground, decide, at present,
to arrest the judgment. But it is enough to observe, that on the
finding of the jury, I shall be ready to give judgment, for the
commonwealth, on the second count of the indictment, when the
subject is brought before us in the Circuit Court.(a)
(a) The cause was argued, upon the other objections, in
arrest of judgment, before the Supreme Court, in December Term
1804. See post.