Respondents were convicted in state court of felonies, following
their pleas of guilty, entered on advice of counsel, which in
petitions for collateral relief they claimed,
inter alia,
were the illegal product of coerced confessions. Following denial
of relief in the state courts, the District Courts, without
evidentiary hearings, denied the petitions. The Court of Appeals
reversed in each case, holding that a guilty plea (1) effectively
waives pretrial irregularities only if voluntary; (2) is not
voluntary if it results from an involuntary confession, and (3) is
vulnerable (at least in New York cases like these) where entered
prior to
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.
S. 368 (1964).
Held:
1. A competently counseled defendant who alleges that he pleaded
guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without more,
entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus. Pp.
397 U. S.
768-771.
(a) A defendant who pleads guilty despite his feeling that the
evidence against him is weak, apart from a confession he deems
inadmissible, is merely refusing to present his federal claims
regarding the confession to the state court in the first instance.
Such a defendant cannot claim that his bypass of state remedies was
not an intelligent act absent incompetent advice by counsel. Pp.
397 U. S.
768-769.
(b) A defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably competent
advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack as being
involuntary on the ground that his counsel may have misjudged the
admissibility of the defendant's confession. Pp.
397 U. S.
769-771.
2. A defendant who pleads guilty, thereby waiving his state
court remedies, does so under the law then existing and assumes the
risk of ordinary error in either his or his attorney's assessment
of the law and facts, and, in this case, the fact that respondents'
counsel did not anticipate this Court's decision in
Jackson v.
Denno, supra, and did not consider invalid the New York
procedures existing at the time their clients pleaded guilty does
not mean that respondents were incompetently advised. Pp.
397 U. S.
771-774.
408 F.2d 48 and 658, and 409 F.2d 1016, vacated and
remanded.
Page 397 U. S. 760
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petition for certiorari, which we granted, 396 U.S. 813
(1969), seeks reversal of three separate judgments of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit ordering hearings on petitions for
habeas corpus filed by the respondents in this case. [
Footnote 1] The principal issue before us is
whether and to what extent an otherwise valid guilty plea may be
impeached in collateral proceedings by assertions or proof that the
plea was motivated by a prior coerced confession. We find ourselves
in substantial disagreement with the Court of Appeals.
Page 397 U. S. 761
I
The three respondents now before us are Dash, Richardson, and
Williams. We first State the essential facts involved as to
each.
Dash: In February, 1959, respondent Dash was charged with
first-degree robbery which, because Dash had previously been
convicted of a felony, was punishable by up to 60 years'
imprisonment. [
Footnote 2]
After pleading guilty to robbery in the second degree in April, he
was sentenced to a term of eight to 12 years as a second felony
offender. [
Footnote 3] His
petition for collateral relief in the state courts in 1963 was
denied without a hearing. [
Footnote
4]
Page 397 U. S. 762
Relief was then sought in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York, where his petition for habeas
corpus alleged that his guilty plea was the illegal product of a
coerced confession and of the trial judge's threat to impose a
60-year sentence if he was convicted after a plea of not guilty.
His petition asserted that he had been beaten, refused counsel, and
threatened with false charges prior to his confession, and that the
trial judge's threat was made during an off-the-record colloquy in
one of Dash's appearances in court prior to the date of his plea of
guilty. Dash also asserted that his court-appointed attorney had
advised pleading guilty, since Dash did not "stand a chance due to
the alleged confession signed" by him. The District Court denied
the petition without a hearing because
"a voluntary plea of guilty entered on advice of counsel
constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in any prior
stage of the proceedings against the defendant,"
citing
United States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d
1018 (C.A.2d Cir.1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 915 (1966),
and other cases. The allegation of coercion by the trial judge did
not call for a hearing, since the prosecutor had filed an affidavit
in the state court categorically denying that the trial judge ever
threatened the defendant. Dash then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Richardson: Respondent Richardson was indicted in April, 1963,
for murder in the first degree. Two attorneys were assigned to
represent Richardson. He initially pleaded not guilty, but, in
July, withdrew his plea and pleaded guilty to murder in the second
degree, specifically admitting at the time that he struck the
victim with a knife. He was convicted and sentenced to a term of 30
years to life. Following the denial without a hearing of his
application for collateral relief in the
Page 397 U. S. 763
state courts, [
Footnote 5]
Richardson filed his petition for habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New York,
alleging in conclusory fashion that his plea of guilty was induced
by a coerced confession and by ineffective court-appointed counsel.
His petition was denied without a hearing, and he appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, including with his
appellate brief a supplemental affidavit in which he alleged that
he was beaten into confessing the crime, that his assigned attorney
conferred with him only 10 minutes prior to the day the plea of
guilty was taken, that he advised his attorney that he did not want
to plead guilty to something he did not do, and that his attorney
advised him to plead guilty to avoid the electric chair, saying
that "this was not the proper time to bring up the confession" and
that Richardson "could later explain by a writ of habeas corpus how
my confession had been beaten out of me."
Williams: In February, 1956, respondent Williams was indicted
for five felonies, including rape and robbery. He pleaded guilty to
robbery in the second degree in March, and was sentenced in April
to a term of 7 1/2 to 15 years. After unsuccessful applications for
collateral relief in the state courts, [
Footnote 6] he petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, asserting that his plea was the consequence of a coerced
confession and was made without an understanding of the nature of
the
Page 397 U. S. 764
charge and the consequences of the plea. In his petition and in
documents supporting it, allegations were made that he had been
handcuffed to a desk while being interrogated, that he was
threatened with a pistol and physically abused, and that his
attorney, in advising him to plead guilty, ignored his alibi
defense and represented that his plea would be to a misdemeanor
charge, rather than to a felony charge. The petition was denied
without a hearing, and Williams appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed in each
case, sitting en banc and dividing six to three in Dash's case
[
Footnote 7] and disposing of
Richardson's and Williams' cases in decisions by three-judge
panels. [
Footnote 8] In each
case, it was directed that a hearing be held on the petition for
habeas corpus. [
Footnote 9] It
was the Court of Appeals' view that
Page 397 U. S. 765
a plea of guilty is an effective waiver of pretrial
irregularities only if the plea is voluntary, and that a plea is
not voluntary if it is the consequence of an involuntary
confession. [
Footnote 10]
That the petitioner was represented by counsel and denied the
existence of coercion or promises when tendering his plea does not
foreclose a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus alleging
matters outside the state court record. Although conclusory
allegations would in no case suffice, the allegations in each of
these cases concerning the manner in which the confession was
coerced and the connection between the confession and the plea were
deemed sufficient to require a hearing. The law required this much,
the Court of Appeals thought, at least in New York, where, prior to
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368
(1964), constitutionally acceptable procedures were unavailable to
a defendant to test the voluntariness of his confession. The Court
of Appeals also ordered a hearing in each case for reasons other
than that the plea was claimed to rest on a coerced confession
which the defendant had no adequate opportunity to test in the
state courts. In the
Dash case, the additional issue to be
considered was whether the trial judge coerced the guilty plea by
threats as to the probable sentence after trial and conviction on a
plea of not guilty; in
Richardson, the additional issue
was the inadequacy of counsel allegedly arising from the
Page 397 U. S. 766
short period of consultation and counsel's advice to the effect
that the confession issue could be raised after a plea of guilty,
and, in
Williams, the additional question was the alleged
failure of counsel to consider Williams' alibi defense and to make
it clear that he was pleading to a felony, rather than to a
misdemeanor.
II
The core of the Court of Appeals' holding is the proposition
that if, in a collateral proceeding, a guilty plea is shown to have
been triggered by a coerced confession -- if there would have been
no plea had there been no confession -- the plea is vulnerable, at
least in cases coming from New York where the guilty plea was taken
prior to
Jackson v. Denno, supra. We are unable to agree
with the Court of Appeals on this proposition.
A conviction after a plea of guilty normally rests on the
defendant's own admission in open court that he committed the acts
with which he is charged.
Brady v. United States, ante at
397 U. S. 748;
McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.
S. 459,
394 U. S. 466
(1969). That admission may not be compelled, and since the plea is
also a waiver of trial -- and, unless the applicable law otherwise
provides, [
Footnote 11] a
waiver of the right to contest the admissibility of any evidence
the State might have offered against the defendant -- it must be an
intelligent act "done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."
Brady v. United States,
ante at
397 U. S.
748.
Page 397 U. S. 767
For present purposes, we put aside those cases where the
defendant has his own reasons for pleading guilty wholly aside from
the strength of the case against him, as well as those cases where
the defendant, although he would have gone to trial had he thought
the State could not prove its case, is motivated by evidence
against him independent of the confession. In these cases, as the
Court of Appeals recognized, the confession, even if coerced, is
not a sufficient factor in the plea to justify relief. Neither do
we have before us the uncounseled defendant,
see Pennsylvania
ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116
(1956), nor the situation where the circumstances that coerced the
confession have abiding impact, and also taint the plea.
Cf.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1940). It is not disputed that, in such cases, a guilty plea is
properly open to challenge. [
Footnote 12]
The issue on which we differ with the Court of Appeals arises in
those situations involving the counseled defendant who allegedly
would put the State to its proof if there was a substantial enough
chance of acquittal, who would do so except for a prior confession
that might be offered against him, and who, because of the
confession, decides to plead guilty to save himself the expense and
agony of a trial and perhaps also to minimize
Page 397 U. S. 768
the penalty that might be imposed. After conviction on such a
plea, is a defendant entitled to a hearing, and to relief if his
factual claims are accepted, when his petition for habeas corpus
alleges that his confession was, in fact, coerced, and that it
motivated his plea? We think not, if he alleges and proves no more
than this.
III
Since we are dealing with a defendant who deems his confession
crucial to the State's case against him and who would go to trial
if he thought his chances of acquittal were good, his decision to
plead guilty or not turns on whether he thinks the law will allow
his confession to be used against him. For the defendant who
considers his confession involuntary, and hence unusable against
him at a trial, tendering a plea of guilty would seem a most
improbable alternative. The sensible course would be to contest his
guilt, prevail on his confession claim at trial, on appeal, or, if
necessary, in a collateral proceeding, and win acquittal, however
guilty he might be. The books are full of case in New York and
elsewhere, where the defendant has made this choice and has
prevailed. If he nevertheless pleads guilty, the plea can hardly be
blamed on the confession which, in his view, was inadmissible
evidence, and no proper part of the State's case. Since, by
hypothesis, the evidence aside from the confession is weak and the
defendant has no reasons of his own to plead, a guilty plea in such
circumstances is nothing less than a refusal to present his federal
claims to the state court in the first instance -- a choice by the
defendant to take the benefits, if any, of a plea of guilty, and
then to pursue his coerced confession claim in collateral
proceedings. Surely later allegations that the confession rendered
his plea involuntary would appear incredible, and whether his plain
bypass
Page 397 U. S. 769
of state remedies was an intelligent act depends on whether he
was so incompetently advised by counsel concerning the forum in
which he should first present his federal claim that the
Constitution will afford him another chance to plead.
A more credible explanation for a plea of guilty by a defendant
who would go to trial except for his prior confession is his
prediction that the law will permit his admissions to be used
against him by the trier of fact. At least the probability of the
State's being permitted to use the confession as evidence is
sufficient to convince him that the State's case is too strong to
contest, and that a plea of guilty is the most advantageous course.
Nothing in this train of events suggests that the defendant's plea,
as distinguished from his confession, is an involuntary act. His
later petition for collateral relief asserting that a coerced
confession induced his plea is, at most, a claim that the
admissibility of his confession was mistakenly assessed and that,
since he was erroneously advised, either under the then-applicable
law or under the law later announced, his plea was an unintelligent
and voidable act. The Constitution, however, does not render pleas
of guilty so vulnerable.
As we said in
Brady v. United States, ante at
397 U. S.
756-757, the decision to plead guilty before the
evidence is in frequently involves the making of difficult
judgments. All the pertinent facts normally cannot be known unless
witnesses are examined and cross-examined in court. Even then, the
truth will often be in dispute. In the face of unavoidable
uncertainty, the defendant and his counsel must make their best
judgment as to the weight of the State's case. Counsel must predict
how the facts, as he understands them, would be viewed by a court.
If proved, would those facts convince a judge or jury of the
defendant's guilt? On those facts, would evidence seized without a
warrant be admissible? Would
Page 397 U. S. 770
the trier of fact, on those facts, find a confession voluntary
and admissible? Questions like these cannot be answered with
certitude; yet a decision to plead guilty must necessarily rest
upon counsel's answers, uncertain as they may be. Waiving trial
entails the inherent risk that the good faith evaluations of a
reasonably competent attorney will turn out to be mistaken either
as to the facts or as to what a court's judgment might be on given
facts.
That a guilty plea must be intelligently made is not a
requirement that all advice offered by the defendant's lawyer
withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction hearing.
Courts continue to have serious differences among themselves on the
admissibility of evidence, both with respect to the proper standard
by which the facts are to be judged and with respect to the
application of that standard to particular facts. That this Court
might hold a defendant's confession inadmissible in evidence,
possibly by a divided vote, hardly justifies a conclusion that the
defendant's attorney was incompetent or ineffective when he thought
the admissibility of the confession sufficiently probable to advise
a plea of guilty.
In our view, a defendant's plea of guilty based on reasonably
competent advice is an intelligent plea not open to attack on the
ground that counsel may have misjudged the admissibility of the
defendant's confession. [
Footnote 13] Whether a plea of guilty is unintelligent,
and therefore vulnerable when motivated by a confession
Page 397 U. S. 771
erroneously thought admissible in evidence depends, as an
initial matter, not on whether a court would retrospectively
consider counsel's advice to be right or wrong, but on whether that
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
criminal cases. On the one hand, uncertainty is inherent in
predicting court decisions; but, on the other hand, defendants
facing felony charges are entitled to the effective assistance of
competent counsel. [
Footnote
14] Beyond this we think the matter, for the most part, should
be left to the good sense and discretion of the trial courts, with
the admonition that, if the right to counsel guaranteed by the
Constitution is to serve its purpose, defendants cannot be left to
the mercies of incompetent counsel, and that judges should strive
to maintain proper standards of performance by attorneys who are
representing defendants in criminal cases in their courts.
IV
We hold, therefore, that a defendant who alleges that he pleaded
guilty because of a prior coerced confession is not, without more,
entitled to a hearing on his petition for habeas corpus. Nor do we
deem the situation substantially different where the defendant's
plea was entered prior to
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.
S. 368 (1964). At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of the New York procedure for determining the
voluntariness of a confession offered in evidence at a jury trial.
This
Page 397 U. S. 772
procedure, which would have been applicable to the respondents
if they had gone to trial, required the trial judge, when the
confession was offered and a
prima facie case of
voluntariness established, to submit the issue to the jury without
himself finally resolving disputed issues of fact and determining
whether or not the confession was voluntary. The Court held this
procedure unconstitutional because it did not
"afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the
confession offered in evidence at the trial, did not adequately
protect Jackson's right to be free of a conviction based upon a
coerced confession, and therefore cannot withstand constitutional
attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."
378 U.S. at
378 U. S. 377.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court overruled
Stein v. New
York, 346 U. S. 15
(1953), which had approved the New York practice.
Whether a guilty plea was entered before or after
Jackson v.
Denno, the question of the validity of the plea remains the
same: was the plea a voluntary and intelligent act of the
defendant? As we have previously set out, a plea of guilty in a
state court is not subject to collateral attack in a federal court
on the ground that it was motivated by a coerced confession unless
the defendant was incompetently advised by his attorney. For the
respondents successfully to claim relief based on
Jackson v.
Denno, each must demonstrate gross error on the part of
counsel when he recommended that the defendant plead guilty instead
of going to trial and challenging the New York procedures for
determining the admissibility of confessions. Such showing cannot
be made, for precisely this challenge was presented to the New York
courts and to this Court in
Stein v. New York, supra, and,
in 1953, this Court found no constitutional
Page 397 U. S. 773
infirmity in the New York procedures for dealing with coerced
confession claims. Counsel for these respondents cannot be faulted
for not anticipating
Jackson v. Denno or for considering
the New York procedures to be as valid as the four dissenters in
that case thought them to be.
We are unimpressed with the argument that, because the decision
in
Jackson has been applied retroactively to defendants
who had previously gone to trial, the defendant whose confession
allegedly caused him to plead guilty prior to
Jackson is
also entitled to a hearing on the voluntariness of his confession
and to a trial if his admissions are held to have been coerced. A
conviction after trial in which a coerced confession is introduced
rests in part on the coerced confession, a constitutionally
unacceptable basis for conviction. It is that conviction and the
confession on which it rests that the defendant later attacks in
collateral proceedings. The defendant who pleads guilty is in a
different posture. He is convicted on his counseled admission in
open court that he committed the crime charged against him. The
prior confession is not the basis for the judgment, has never been
offered in evidence at a trial, and may never be offered in
evidence. Whether or not the advice the defendant received in the
pre-
Jackson era would have been different had
Jackson then been the law has no bearing on the accuracy
of the defendant's admission that he committed the crime.
What is at stake in this phase of the case is not the integrity
of the state convictions obtained on guilty pleas, but whether,
years later, defendants must be permitted to withdraw their pleas,
which were perfectly valid when made, and be given another choice
between admitting their guilt and putting the State to its proof.
It might be suggested that, if
Jackson had been the law
when the pleas in the cases below were made -- if the judge
Page 397 U. S. 774
had been required to rule on the voluntariness of challenged
confessions at a trial -- there would have been a better chance of
keeping the confessions from the jury, and there would have been no
guilty pleas. But, because of inherent uncertainty in guilty plea
advice, this is a highly speculative matter in any particular case,
and not an issue promising a meaningful and productive evidentiary
hearing long after entry of the guilty plea. The alternative would
be a
per se constitutional rule invalidating all New York
guilty pleas that were motivated by confessions and that were
entered prior to
Jackson. This would be an improvident
invasion of the State's interests in maintaining the finality of
guilty plea convictions that were valid under constitutional
standards applicable at the time. It is no denigration of the right
to trial to hold that, when the defendant waives his state court
remedies and admits his guilt, he does so under the law then
existing; further, he assumes the risk of ordinary error in either
his or his attorney's assessment of the law and facts. Although he
might have pleaded differently had later decided cases then been
the law, he is bound by his plea and his conviction unless he can
allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel
sufficient to show that his plea was not, after all, a knowing and
intelligent act.
V
As we have previously indicated, in each case below, the Court
of Appeals ruled that a hearing was required to consider claims
other than the claim that the plea of guilty rested on a coerced
confession and was entered prior to
Jackson v. Denno,
supra. With respect to these other claims, we now express no
disagreement with the judgments of the Court of Appeals; but, since
our holding will require reassessment of the petitions for
habeas
Page 397 U. S. 775
corpus in the light of the standards expressed herein, the
judgments of the Court of Appeals are vacated, and the case is
remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, while still adhering to his separate opinion
in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368,
378 U. S.
401-423, concurs in the Court's opinion and judgment in
this case.
[
Footnote 1]
Our grant of certiorari also included a fourth respondent,
another petitioner for habeas corpus, Wilbert Ross.
See
n 7,
infra. However,
upon consideration of a subsequent suggestion of mootness by reason
of Ross' death, we vacated the Court of Appeal' judgment and
remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York
with directions to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus as moot.
396 U. S. 118
(1969).
[
Footnote 2]
N.Y.Penal Law § 2125, then in effect, provided that first-degree
robbery was punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term,
the minimum of which was to be not less than 10 years and the
maximum of which was to be not more than 30 years. Under N.Y.Penal
Law § 1941, subd. 1, then in effect, conviction for a second felony
was punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term, with the
minimum one-half the maximum set for a first conviction and the
maximum twice the maximum set for a first conviction.
In addition to the first-degree robbery charge, Dash was also
charged with grand larceny and assault.
[
Footnote 3]
Waterman and Devine, two men accused of taking part in the
robbery along with Dash, did not plead guilty; after a jury trial,
they were convicted of first-degree robbery, second-degree grand
larceny, and second-degree assault, and were sentenced to 15 to 20
years' imprisonment. On appeal, these convictions were reversed
because of the State's use of post-indictment confessions given by
one of the defendants in the absence of counsel.
People v.
Waterman, 12 App.Div.2d 84, 208 N.Y.S.2d 596; (1960),
aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 561, 175 N.E.2d 445 (1961). Waterman and
Devine then pleaded guilty to assault in the second degree, and
were sentenced to imprisonment for 2 1/2 to 3 years.
[
Footnote 4]
The denial of relief was affirmed by the Appellate Division of
the New York Supreme Court,
People v. Dash, 21 App.Div.2d
978, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (1964),
aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 493,
208 N.E.2d 171 (1965).
[
Footnote 5]
The denial of relief was affirmed without opinion by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
People v.
Richardson, 23 App.Div.2d 969, 260 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1965).
[
Footnote 6]
The denial of relief on the claims later presented in the
Federal District Court was affirmed without opinion by the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court,
People v.
Williams, 25 App.Div.2d 620, 268 N.Y.S.2d 958 (1966).
[
Footnote 7]
United States ex rel. Ross v. McMann, 409 F.2d 1016
(C.A.2d Cir.1969). The Court of Appeals' opinion dealt also with
the appeal of Wilbert Ross from a denial of habeas corpus without a
hearing by the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. Ross, in his habeas petition, alleged that
his 1955 plea of guilty to second-degree murder was induced by the
State's possession of an unconstitutionally obtained confession.
The Court of Appeals held that, like Dash, Ross was entitled to a
hearing on his claims. Along with the three respondents dealt with
in this opinion, we granted certiorari as to Ross, but the matter
was subsequently remanded for dismissal as moot after the death of
Ross.
See n 1,
supra.
[
Footnote 8]
United States ex rel. Richardson v. McMann, 408 F.2d 48
(C.A.2d Cir.1969);
United States ex rel. Williams v.
Follette, 408 F.2d 658 (C.A.2d Cir.1969).
[
Footnote 9]
The same day that the Court of Appeals ordered hearings in the
Dash and
Richardson cases, the court, en banc and
without dissent, held that a hearing was not required in the case
of a petitioner for habeas corpus who had pleaded guilty after a
trial judge ruled that his confession was admissible in evidence --
the Court of Appeals found that the petition for habeas corpus did
not allege with sufficient specificity that the plea of guilty was
infected by the allegedly coerced confession.
United States ex
rel. Rosen v. Follette, 409 F.2d 1042 (C.A.2d Cir.1969).
[
Footnote 10]
The majority and concurring opinions in the
Dash case
relied on decisions in several other circuits:
United States ex
rel. Collins v. Maroney, 382 F.2d 547 (C.A.3d Cir.1967);
Jones v. Cunningham, 297 F.2d 851 (C.A.4th Cir.1962);
Smith v. Wainwright, 373 F.2d 506 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967);
Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967);
Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243 (C.A. 5th Cir.1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 916 (1967);
Reed v.
Henderson, 385 F.2d 995 (C.A. 6th Cir.1967);
Smiley v.
Wilson, 378 F.2d 144 (C.A. 9th Cir.1967);
Doran v.
Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 (C.A. 9th Cir.1966).
[
Footnote 11]
New York law now permits a. defendant to challenge the
admissibility of a confession in a pretrial hearing and to appeal
from an adverse ruling on the admissibility of the confession even
if the conviction is based on a plea of guilty. N.Y.Code Crim.Proc.
§ 813-g (Supp. 1969) (effective July 16, 1965). A similar provision
permits a defendant to appeal an adverse ruling on a Fourth
Amendment claim after a plea of guilty. N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 813-c
(Supp. 1969) (effective April 29, 1962).
[
Footnote 12]
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.
S. 116 (1956), involved a plea of guilty made by a
defendant without assistance of counsel.
Herman did not
hold that a plea of guilty, offered by a defendant assisted by
competent counsel, is invalid whenever induced by the prosecution's
possession of a coerced confession. Likewise,
Chambers v.
Florida, 309 U. S. 227
(1940), does not support the position taken by the Court of Appeals
in these cases. In
Chambers, the voluntariness of the
confessions was properly considered by this Court both because the
alleged coercion producing the confessions appeared to carry over
to taint the guilty pleas and because the convictions were based on
the confessions, as well as the guilty pleas.
See Chambers v.
State, 136 Fla. 568, 187 So. 156 (1939),
rev'd,
309 U. S. 227
(1940).
[
Footnote 13]
We do not here consider whether a conviction, based on a plea of
guilty entered in a State permitting the defendant pleading guilty
to challenge on appeal the admissibility of his confession (as in
New York after July 16, 1965,
see n 11,
supra), would be open to attack
in federal habeas corpus proceedings on the grounds that the
confession was coerced.
Cf. United States ex rel. Rogers v.
Warden, 31 F.2d 209 (C.A.2d Cir.1967).
[
Footnote 14]
Since
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.
S. 335 (1963), it has been clear that a defendant
pleading guilty to a felony charge has a federal right to the
assistance of counsel.
See White v. Maryland, 373 U. S.
59 1963);
Arsenault v. Massachusetts,
393 U. S. 5 1968).
It has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right
to the effective assistance of counsel.
See Reece v.
Georgia, 350 U. S. 85,
350 U. S. 90
(1955);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S.
60,
315 U. S. 69-70
(1942);
Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.
S. 444,
308 U. S. 446
(1940);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S.
45,
287 U. S. 57
(1932).
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE Douglas and MR.
JUSTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting.
In this case, the Court moves yet another step toward the goal
of insulating all guilty pleas from subsequent attack, no matter
what unconstitutional action of government may have induced a
particular plea. Respondents alleged in some detail that they were
subjected to physical and mental coercion in order to force them to
confess; that they succumbed to these pressures, and that, because
New York provided no constitutionally acceptable procedures for
challenging the validity of their confessions in the trial court,
they had no reasonable alternative to pleading guilty. [
Footnote 2/1] Respondents' contention, in
short, is that their pleas were the product of the State's illegal
action. Notwithstanding the possible truth of the claims, the Court
holds that respondents are not even entitled to a hearing which
would afford them an opportunity to substantiate their allegations.
I
Page 397 U. S. 776
cannot agree, for it is clear that the result reached by the
Court is inconsistent not only with the prior decisions of this
Court, but also with the position adopted by virtually every court
of appeals that has spoken on this issue. [
Footnote 2/2]
I
The basic principle applicable to this case was enunciated for
the Court by MR. JUSTICE BLACK in
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman
v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116,
350 U. S. 118
(1956):
"[A] conviction following trial or on a plea of guilty based on
a confession extorted by violence or by mental coercion is invalid
under the Federal Due Process Clause."
The critical factor in this formulation is that convictions
entered on guilty pleas are not valid if they are "based on"
coerced confessions. A defendant who seeks to overturn his guilty
plea must therefore demonstrate the existence of a sufficient
interrelationship or nexus between the plea and the antecedent
confession so at the plea may be said to be infected by the State's
prior illegal action. Thus, to invalidate a guilty plea more must
be shown than the mere existence of a coerced
Page 397 U. S. 777
confession. The Court of Appeals so held; respondents do not
disagree. The critical question, then, is what elements in addition
to the coerced confession must be alleged and proved to demonstrate
the invalidity of a guilty plea.
The Court abruptly forecloses any inquiry concerning the impact
of an allegedly coerced confession by decreeing that the assistance
of "reasonably competent" counsel insulates a defendant from the
effects of a prior illegal confession. However, as the Court
tacitly concedes, the absolute rigor of it new rule must be
adjusted to accommodate cases such a
Chambers v. Florida,
309 U. S. 227
(1940). In that case, the four defendants confessed. Subsequently,
three of them pleaded guilty, while the fourth pleaded not guilty
and was tried before a jury. Each of the defendants, represented by
counsel, stated during the trial that he had confessed and was
testifying voluntarily. [
Footnote
2/3] Notwithstanding this testimony in open court, the
proffering of guilty pleas, and representation by counsel, the
state courts and this Court as well properly permitted a collateral
attack upon the judgments of conviction entered on the guilty
pleas.
In explication of
Chambers, the Court notes that the
coercive circumstances that compelled the confessions may "have
abiding impact and also taint the plea."
Ante at
397 U. S. 767.
Apparently the Court would permit a defendant who was represented
by counsel to attack his conviction collaterally if he could
demonstrate that coercive pressures were brought to bear upon him
at the
Page 397 U. S. 778
very moment he was called to plead. This position is certainly
unexceptionable. I cannot agree, however, that the pleading process
is constitutionally adequate despite a coerced confession merely
because the coercive pressures that compelled the confession ceased
prior to the entry of the plea. In short, the "abiding impact" of
the coerced confession may continue to prejudice a defendant's case
or unfairly influence his decisions regarding his legal
alternatives.
Moreover, our approach in
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v.
Claudy, 350 U. S. 116
(1956), is inconsistent with the absolute rule that the Court
adopts today. We there considered whether, under all the
circumstances of the case, the pressures brought to bear on the
defendant by the State, including the extraction of a coerced
confession, were sufficient to render his guilty plea involuntary.
While the fact that the defendant was not assisted by counsel was
given considerable weight in determining involuntariness, it was
hardly the sole critical consideration. Thus, the Court's attempt
to distinguish
Claudy on the basis of counsel's assistance
alone is unpersuasive. I would continue to adhere to the approach
adopted in
Chambers and
Claudy, and take into
account all of the circumstance surrounding the entry of a plea,
rather than attach talismanic significance to the presence of
counsel.
I concluded in
Parker v. North Carolina and
Brady
v. United States, post at
397 U. S. 802,
that
"the legal concept of 'involuntariness' has not been narrowly
confined but refers to a surrender of constitutional rights
influenced by considerations that the government cannot properly
introduce"
into the pleading process. In
Parker and
Brady, the "impermissible factor" introduced by the
government was an unconstitutional death penalty scheme; here, the
improper influence is a coerced confession. In either event, the
defendant must establish that the unconstitutional influence
actually infected the
Page 397 U. S. 779
pleading process, that it was a significant factor in his
decision to plead guilty. But if he does so, then he is entitled to
reversal of the judgment of conviction entered on the plea.
Harrison v. United States, 392 U.
S. 219 (1968), lends additional support to this
conclusion. There, confessions had been illegally procured from a
defendant and then introduced at his trial. At a new trial, after
reversal of the defendant's conviction, he objected to the
introduction of his testimony from the previous trial on the ground
that he had been improperly induced to testify at the former trial
by the introduction of the inadmissible confessions. We sustained
this contention, noting in part that
"the petitioner testified only after the Government had
illegally introduced into evidence three confessions, all
wrongfully obtained, and the same principle that prohibits the use
of confessions so procured also prohibits the use of any testimony
impelled thereby -- the fruit of the poisonous tree, to invoke a
time-worn metaphor. For the"
"essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence
in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used at
all."
"
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S.
385,
251 U. S. 392."
". . . The question is not
whether the petitioner made
a knowing decision to testify, but
why. If he did so in
order to overcome the impact of confessions illegally obtained, and
hence improperly introduced, then his testimony was tainted by the
same illegality that rendered the confessions themselves
inadmissible."
392 U.S. at
392 U. S.
222-223. (Emphasis in original.)
The same reasoning is applicable here. That is, if the coerced
confession induces a guilty plea, that plea, no
Page 397 U. S. 780
less than the surrender of the self-incrimination privilege in
Harrison, is the fruit of the State's prior illegal
conduct, and thus is vulnerable to attack. [
Footnote 2/4]
Page 397 U. S. 781
As in
Parker and
Brady, the Court lays great
stress upon the ability of counsel to offset the improper influence
injected into the pleading process by the State's unconstitutional
action. However, here again, the conclusions that the Court draws
from the role it assigns to counsel are, in my view, entirely
incorrect, for it cannot be blandly assumed, without further
discussion, that counsel will be able to render effective
assistance to the defendant in freeing him from the burdens of his
unconstitutionally extorted confession.
In
Parker and
Brady, there was no action that
counsel could take to remove the threat posed by the
unconstitutional death penalty scheme. There was no way, in short,
to counteract the intrusion of an impermissible factor into the
pleading process.
However, where the unconstitutional factor is a coerced
confession, it is not necessarily true that counsel's role is so
limited. It is a common practice, for example, to hold pretrial
hearings or devise other procedures for the purpose of permitting
defendants an opportunity to challenge the admissibility of
allegedly coerced confessions. If it is assumed that these
procedures provide a constitutionally adequate means to attack the
validity of the confession, then it must be expected that a
defendant who subsequently seeks to overturn his guilty plea will
come forward with a persuasive explanation for his failure to
invoke those procedures which were readily available to test the
validity of his confession.
It does not follow from this that a defendant assisted by
counsel can never demonstrate that this failure to
Page 397 U. S. 782
invoke the appropriate procedures was justified. The entry of a
guilty plea is, essentially, a waiver, or the "intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,"
Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U. S. 458,
304 U. S. 464
(1938). By pleading guilty, the defendant gives up not only his
right to a jury trial,
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.
S. 238 (1969), but also, in most jurisdictions, the
opportunity to challenge the validity of his confession by whatever
procedures are provided for that purpose. It is always open to a
defendant to establish that his guilty plea was not a
constitutionally valid waiver, that he did not deliberately bypass
the orderly processes provided to determine the validity of
confessions.
Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.
S. 391,
372 U. S.
438-440 (1963). Whether or not there has been a
deliberate bypass can be determined, of course, only by a
consideration of the total circumstances surrounding the entry of
each plea. [
Footnote 2/5]
II
In the foregoing discussion, I have assumed that the State has
provided a constitutionally adequate method to challenge an
allegedly invalid confession in the trial court. That assumption is
not applicable to respondents in this case, however, because, as we
held in
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.
S. 368 (1964), the procedure that New York employed at
the time their pleas were tendered failed to provide a
constitutionally acceptable means to challenge the validity of
confessions. Thus, even the
Page 397 U. S. 783
most expert appraisal and advice by counsel necessarily had to
take into account a procedure for challenging the validity of
confessions that was fundamentally defective, but that had
nevertheless been approved by this Court in
Stein v. New
York, 346 U. S. 156
(1953). Hence, the advice of counsel could not remedy or offset the
constitutional defect infused into the pleading process. Therefore,
respondents are entitled to relief if they can establish that
confessions were coerced from them and that their guilty pleas were
motivated in significant part by their inability to challenge the
validity of the confessions in a constitutionally adequate
procedure. [
Footnote 2/6] By such a
showing they would establish a nexus between the coerced
confessions and the subsequent pleas, and thereby demonstrate that
their respective pleas were the product of the State's illegal
action.
The Court seeks to avoid the impact of
Jackson v. Denno
upon pre-
Jackson guilty pleas by adding a new and totally
unjustified element to the Court's confused pattern of
retroactivity rules.
Jackson v. Denno has been held to be
retroactive, at least in the sense that it requires hearings to
determine the voluntariness of pre-
Jackson confessions
that were introduced at trial. [
Footnote 2/7] The
Page 397 U. S. 784
Court today decides, however, that
Jackson's effect is
to be limited to situations in which the confession was introduced
at trial, and is to have no application whatever to guilty pleas.
In short,
Jackson v. Denno is now held to be only
partially retroactive, a wholly novel and unacceptable result.
As I understand the Court's opinion, there are basically three
reasons why the Court rejects the contention that the
Jackson-Denno defect may unconstitutionally infect the
pleading process. The first is the highly formalistic notion that
the guilty plea, and not the antecedent confession, is the basis of
the judgments against respondents. Of course this is true in the
technical sense that the guilty plea is
always the legal
basis of a judgment of conviction entered thereon. However, this
argument hardly disposes adequately of the contention that the
plea, in turn, was at least partially induced, and therefore is
tainted, by the fact that no constitutionally adequate procedures
existed to test the validity of a highly prejudicial and allegedly
coerced confession.
The Court's formalism is symptomatic of the desire to ignore
entirely the motivational aspect of a decision to plead guilty. As
long as counsel is present when the defendant pleads, the Court is
apparently willing to assume that the government may inject
virtually any influence into the process of deciding on a plea.
However, as I demonstrated in
Parker and
Brady,
this insistence upon ignoring the factors with which the
prosecution confronts the defendant before he pleads departs
broadly from the manner in which the voluntariness of guilty pleas
has traditionally been approached. In short, the critical question
is not, as the Court insists, whether respondents knowingly decided
to plead guilty, but
why they made that decision.
Cf.
Harrison v. United States, 392 U. S. 219,
392 U. S. 223
(1968).
Page 397 U. S. 785
Secondly, the Court views the entry of the guilty pleas as
waivers of objections to the allegedly coerced confessions. For the
reasons previously stated, I do not believe that the pleas were
legally voluntary if respondents' allegations are proved. Nor were
the pleas the relinquishment of a known right, for it was only when
Stein v. New York, 346 U. S. 156
(1953), was overruled by
Jackson v. Denno that it became
clear that the New York procedure was constitutionally inadequate.
Thus, there is no sense in which respondents deliberately bypassed
or "waived" state procedures constitutionally adequate to
adjudicate their coerced confession claims.
See Moreno v.
Beto, 415 F.2d 154 (C.A. 5th Cir.1969);
cf. Smith v.
Yeager, 393 U. S. 122
(1968).
Finally, the Court takes the position, in effect, that the
defect in the
Stein-approved New York procedure was not
very great -- that the procedure was only a little bit
unconstitutional -- and hence that it is too speculative to inquire
whether the difference between the pre-
Jackson and
post-
Jackson procedures would, in a particular case, alter
the advice given by counsel concerning the desirability of a plea.
If, indeed, the deficiency in the pre-
Jackson procedure
was not very great, then it is difficult to understand why we found
it necessary to invalidate the procedure, and, particularly, why it
was imperative to apply the
Jackson decision
retroactively. I, for one, have never thought
Jackson v.
Denno is so trivial, that it deals with procedural
distinctions of such insignificance, that they would necessarily
make no difference in the plea advice given to a defendant by his
attorney. To the contrary, the extent to which the constitutional
defect in the pre-
Jackson-Denno procedure actually
infected the pleading process cannot be determined by
a
priori pronouncements by this Court; rather, its effect can be
evaluated only after a factual inquiry into the circumstances
motivating particular pleas.
Page 397 U. S. 786
Despite the disclaimers to the contrary, what is essentially
involved both in the instant case and in
Brady and
Parker is nothing less than the determination of the Court
to preserve the sanctity of virtually an judgments obtained by
means of guilty pleas. There is no other adequate explanation for
the surprising notion of partial retroactivity that the Court today
propounds. An approach that shrinks from giving effect to the clear
implications of our prior decisions by drawing untenable
distinctions may have its appeal, but it hardly furthers the goal
of principled decisionmaking. Thus, I am constrained to agree with
the concurring judge in the Court of Appeals that it is
"the rankest unfairness, and indeed a denigration of the rule of
law, to recognize the infirmity of the pre-
Jackson v.
Denno procedure for challenging the legality of a confession
in the case of prisoners who went to trial, but to deny access to
the judicial process to those who improperly pleaded guilty merely
because the state would have more difficulty in affording a new
trial to them."
409 F.2d at 1027.
Lest it be thought that my views would render the criminal
process "less effective in protecting society against those who
have made it impossible to live today in safety,"
Harrison v.
United States, 392 U. S. 219,
392 U. S. 235
(WHITE, J., dissenting), I emphasize again that the only issue
involved in this case is whether respondents are entitled to a
hearing on their claims that coerced confessions and a
procedural device that we condemned as unconstitutional deterred
them from exercising their constitutional rights. Whether or not
these allegations have bases in fact is not before us, for these
individuals have never been afforded a judicial forum for the
presentation of their claims. In these circumstances, I would not
simply slam shut the door of the courthouse in their faces.
Page 397 U. S. 787
III
I agree with the Court of Appeals that a hearing is required for
the coerced confession claims presented in these cases. We have, of
course, held that a post-conviction hearing must be afforded to
defendants whose allegations of constitutional deprivation raise
factual issues, and are neither "vague, conclusory, or palpably
incredible,"
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.
S. 487,
368 U. S. 495
(1962), nor "patently frivolous or false,"
Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U. S. 116,
350 U. S. 119
(1956). [
Footnote 2/8] Respondents
have raised at least three factual issues that the record in its
present form does not resolve: (1) whether confessions were
obtained from them; (2) whether these confessions, if given, were
coerced, and (3) whether respondents had a justifiable reason for
their failure to challenge the validity of the confessions -- more
specifically, whether the confessions, together with the
Jackson-Denno defect in New York's procedures, influenced
in significant part the decisions to plead guilty. As to each of
these issues, respondents, of course, bear the burden of proof.
Respondents alleged in some detail that they had been coerced by
the police into confessing. They also alleged that the
Jackson-Denno defect in the state procedures rendered
futile any attempt to challenge the confessions in the state trial
court. [
Footnote 2/9] The Court of
Appeals noted
Page 397 U. S. 788
that, in the ordinary case, additional supporting material, such
as an affidavit from the attorney who represented the petitioner,
should be appended to his habeas corpus petition. Without
elaboration, however, the Court of Appeals concluded that no
material in corroboration was necessary in this case.
To be sure, it is difficult, though not impossible, to believe
that, without any corroborative evidence, a petitioner would
ultimately succeed with a sophisticated argument such as the
contention that a coerced confession, coupled with the
Jackson-Denno defect, induced his guilty plea. In this
connection, the views of the defense attorney when the plea was
entered are particularly important, because, in the ordinary case,
counsel is in a good position to appraise the factors that actually
entered into the decision to plead guilty. As a technical matter of
pleading, however, I would not absolutely require that a
petitioner, particularly one who is proceeding
pro se,
accompany his petition with extensive supporting materials.
[
Footnote 2/10] It is, of course,
prudent for petitioners who raise a claim such as the one presented
in the instant case to append a statement from counsel, or at least
an explanation of why such a statement was not procured, for the
petitioner who does not do so
Page 397 U. S. 789
takes a considerable risk that his petition will be denied as
vague, conclusory, or frivolous. [
Footnote 2/11]
The respondents in this case clearly raised the
Jackson-Denno issue in their petitions to the District
Court. Furthermore, this Court has not affected the judgment below
insofar as it requires hearings for these respondents on issues
other than their coerced confession claims. In these circumstances,
I would not disturb that portion of the Court of Appeals' order
that requires the District Court to consider the merits of
respondents' coerced confession allegations.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
[
Footnote 2/1]
There are additional allegations involved in this case,
including Richardson's claim that he was ineffectively represented
by counsel when he entered his plea and Dash's contention that he
was threatened by the trial judge with imposition of the statutory
maximum sentence (60 years) if he elected to stand trial and did
not prevail. I understand that the Court does not disturb the Court
of Appeals' holding that a hearing is required to consider these
additional allegations.
[
Footnote 2/2]
The Court does not deny that the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the instant case is in complete harmony with the
decisions of numerous other courts that have considered the same or
similar issues.
See, e.g., Moreno v. Beto, 415 F.2d 154
(C.A. 5th Cir.1969);
United States ex rel. McCloud v.
Rundle, 402 F.2d 853 (C.A.3d Cir.1968);
Kott v.
Green, 387 F.2d 136 (C.A. 6th Cir.1967);
Reed v.
Henderson, 385 F.2d 995 (C.A. 6th Cir.1967);
United States
ex rel. Collins v. Maroney, 382 F.2d 547 (C.A.3d Cir.1967);
Smiley v. Wilson, 378 F.2d 144 (C.A. 9th Cir.1967);
Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967);
Doran v. Wilson, 369 F.2d 505 (C.A. 9th Cir.1966);
White v. Pepersack, 352 F.2d 470 (C.A.4th Cir.1965);
Zachery v. Hale, 286 F. Supp. 237 (D.C.M.D.Ala.1968);
United States ex rel. Cuevas v. Rundle, 258 F.
Supp. 647 (D.C.E.D.Pa.1966);
People v.
Spencer, 66 Cal. 2d
158, 424 P.2d 715 (1967);
Commonwealth v. Baity, 428
Pa. 306, 237 A.2d 172 (1968).
[
Footnote 2/3]
"[E]ach of the defendants testified on the trial that the
confessions were freely and voluntarily made and that the
respective statement of each made upon the trial was the free and
voluntary statement of such defendant as a witness in his
behalf."
Chambers v. State, 113 Fla. 786, 792, 152 So. 437, 438
(1934),
on subsequent appeal, 136 Fla. 568, 187 So. 156
(1939),
rev'd, 309 U. S. 309 U.S.
227 (1940).
[
Footnote 2/4]
Indeed, one of the dissenting opinions in
Harrison
concludes that "[s]imilarly, an inadmissible confession preceding a
plea of guilty would taint the plea." 392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 234
(WHITE, J., dissenting). In response to this suggestion, the Court
noted that
"we decide here only a case in which the prosecution illegally
introduced the defendant's confession in evidence against him at
trial in its case-in-chief."
392 U.S. at
392 U. S. 223
n. 9. Of course, in
Harrison, we did consider a case in
which evidence had been introduced at trial. It hardly follows,
however, that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" rationale has no
application apart from the narrow confines of the
Harrison
factual context.
See generally Fahy v. Connecticut,
375 U. S. 85
(1963);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.
S. 471 (1963);
Vardone v. United States,
308 U. S. 338
(1939).
There are factual differences between
Harrison and the
instant case, but they are insufficient to undermine the analogy.
For example, in
Harrison, the inadmissible confessions had
actually been used in proceedings against the defendant, whereas
here, no more is involved than the potential use of the coerced
confessions. However, confessions have traditionally been
considered extremely valuable evidentiary material, and, in the
ordinary course of events, it is not to be expected that the
prosecution would, on its own initiative, refrain from attempting
to introduce a relevant confession. Of course, when a guilty plea
is attacked on the ground that it was induced by an involuntary
confession, it is always open to the prosecution to establish that
there was no confession, that any confession was not coerced, or
that the prosecution had decided not to use the confession against
the defendant and had communicated this fact to him.
Moreover, it is perhaps not as clear in the instant case as it
was in
Harrison that the prosecution's illegality infected
the subsequent proceedings involving the respective defendants. In
Harrison, the defense attorney had initially announced
that the defendant would not testify, and the defendant did, in
fact, take the stand only after the prosecution had introduced his
confessions. In that circumstance, the burden was appropriately
placed upon the prosecution to rebut the clear inference that the
inadmissible confessions induced the subsequent testimony. By
contrast, in the instant case, we are dealing with guilty pleas
that are usually the culmination of a decisionmaking process in
which the defendant has taken into account numerous factors. It can
therefore hardly be established on the basis of mere allegations
that, in a given case, a coerced confession induced the guilty
plea. This factual difference indicates no more, however, than that
the respondents here may have a more difficult time than the
petitioner in
Harrison in substantiating their respective
claims.
[
Footnote 2/5]
If the procedures for challenging the validity of confessions
are constitutionally adequate, then a persuasive justification for
the failure to invoke them does not arise from the fear that a
confession, erroneously or otherwise, will be determined to be
voluntary. If this were not true, then no guilty plea could
constitute an effective waiver, for the risk of error or adverse
result is inherent in every criminal proceeding, and it would be
open to every defendant to contend that this risk induced his
guilty plea.
[
Footnote 2/6]
The Court of Appeals held that a plea of guilty was not
voluntary
"if the plea was substantially motivated by a coerced confession
the validity of which [the defendant] was unable, for all practical
purposes, to contest."
409 F.2d at 1023. I would accept this formulation with the
understanding that a "substantial" motivating factor is any one
which is not merely
de minimis. Ordinarily, a decision to
plead guilty is the result of numerous considerations. As long as a
defendant was, in fact, motivated in significant part by the
influence of an unconstitutionally obtained confession that he had
no adequate means to challenge, I would relieve him of the
consequences of his guilty plea.
[
Footnote 2/7]
See, e.g., Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.
S. 719,
384 U. S.
727-728 (1966);
Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.
S. 406,
382 U. S. 416
(1966);
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.
S. 618,
381 U. S. 639
and n. 20 (1965).
[
Footnote 2/8]
Respondents have never had a hearing in the state courts on
their coerced confession claims because the state courts rejected
their contentions on the pleadings. In these circumstances, the
Court of Appeals properly instructed the District Court to afford
the State a reasonable time to proceed with its own hearings, if it
be so advised.
[
Footnote 2/9]
For example, respondent Dash stated the following in his
petition to the District Court:
"The futility of relator's position is more clearly seen when
this Court considers the fact that the only choice remaining to him
-- beside the entry of the plea of guilty to a crime that he had
not committed -- was to proceed to trial in the hope of challenging
the admissibility of the alleged coerced confession. For it was
only in the case of
Jackson v. Denno . . . that the Court
recognized the insoluble plight of a defendant in New York, faced
with the decision whether to challenge the admissibility of a
confession, had in violation of the United States Constitution.
Relator had no such remedy when he was faced with this
situation."
Respondent Williams' petition contains similar references to
Jackson v. Denno. Respondent Richardson's principal claim
relates to the adequacy of the legal assistance afforded him. He
concedes that the pre-
Jackson-Denno procedure played no
role in his decision to plead guilty.
[
Footnote 2/10]
See, e.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.
S. 266,
334 U. S. 292
(1948).
[
Footnote 2/11]
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nixon v. Follette, 299
F. Supp. 253 (D.C.S.D.N.Y.1969).