The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) Regional Director,
after investigating petitioner's charge that respondent union was
violating § 8(b)(4)(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, issued
an unfair labor practice complaint with the NLRB and petitioned the
District Court for injunctive relief under § 10(
l) of the
Act, which directs him to apply for such temporary relief "pending
the final adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter."
The Regional Director did not appeal the denial of an injunction,
but petitioner (which had not formally intervened at the District
Court hearing) sought to do so. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal on the ground that only the Regional Director could appeal.
The NLRB thereafter found that the union had violated § 8(b)(4)(b)
and ordered it to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct.
Held: Since any injunctive relief to which petitioner
might have been entitled under § 10(
l) terminated upon
final action by the NLRB, albeit respondent union is seeking
judicial review of the order, the question whether petitioner could
appeal the denial of an injunction is moot.
410 F.2d 1148, vacated and remanded.
Page 397 U. S. 656
PER CURIAM.
The petitioner, Sears, Roebuck and Company (Sears), filed a
charge with the NLRB Regional Director, alleging that the
respondent union was engaged in unlawful secondary picketing of the
petitioner's premises in violation of § 8(b)(4)(B) of the National
Labor Relations Act, as amended. [
Footnote 1] The Regional Director investigated the charge
and, finding there was reasonable cause to believe it was true,
issued an unfair labor practice complaint
Page 397 U. S. 657
with the Board. He also petitioned a Federal District Court for
injunctive relief pursuant to § 10(
l) of the Act, which
directs him to apply for such temporary relief "pending the final
adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter." [
Footnote 2]
Counsel for Sears appeared at the hearing before the District
Court, but Sears did not seek to intervene formally. After hearing
testimony, the court declined to issue an injunction, believing
that Sears was not likely to prevail before the Board on its unfair
labor practice charge. [
Footnote
3] The Regional Director did not appeal the court's decision,
but Sears sought to do so. 410 F.2d 1148. The Court of Appeals
dismissed Sears' appeal on the ground that, under the Act, only the
Regional Director could appeal from the denial of a §
10(
l) injunction. Thereafter the Board issued its decision
and order in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding,
finding that the respondent union had violated § 8(b)(4)(b) of the
Act, and ordering it to cease and desist from its unlawful conduct.
176 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 71 L.R.R.M. 1372 (1969).
Under these circumstances, the question whether Sears could
appeal the District Court's denial of an injunction has now become
moot. For even if the Court of Appeals was wrong in dismissing
Sears' appeal, any relief that that court might have given would
now have terminated. "
To adjudicate a cause which no longer
exists is a proceeding which this Court uniformly has declined to
entertain.'" Oil Workers Union v. Missouri, 361 U.
S. 363, 361 U. S. 371,
quoting from Brownlow v. Schwartz, 261 U.
S. 216, 261 U. S.
217-218. See also Hall v. Beals, 396 U. S.
45; Brockington v. Rhodes, 396 U. S.
41; Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.
S. 103.
Page 397 U. S. 658
Sears concedes that an injunction, had one issued, would
terminate upon "final" Board resolution of the underlying unfair
labor practice charge. But it argues that the Board's action cannot
be considered final where, as here, one of the parties, in this
case the respondent union, has sought review of the Board's order.
In this situation, Sears maintains, the injunctive relief, if
granted, would remain in effect until the Board's order with
respect to the underlying unfair labor practice were either
enforced or denied enforcement by the Court of Appeals. It is
argued that, because the Court of Appeals has not yet acted on the
Board's order here, Sears may still be entitled to injunctive
relief, and thus the question of whether it was entitled to appeal
the denial of a § 10(
l) injunction remains a viable
one.
But neither the language, the legislative history, nor the
policies of the Act support this construction. For, by its terms, §
10(
l) merely authorizes the issuance of an injunction
"pending the final adjudication
of the Board with respect
to [the] matter." (Emphasis added.) Once the Board has acted, it
can itself seek injunctive relief from the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to § 10(e) of the Act, which empowers that court to grant
"such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and
proper." [
Footnote 4]
See
McLeod v. Business Machine Mechanics Conference Board, 300
F.2d 237, 241. The legislative history makes clear that the purpose
of enacting § 10(
l) in 1947 was simply to supplement the
preexisting § 10(e) power of the Board by authorizing injunctive
relief prior to Board action. [
Footnote 5] It was thus relief prior to Board
Page 397 U. S. 659
action that Congress was concerned with providing when it
enacted § 10(
l), and any injunction issued pursuant to
that section terminates when the Board resolves the underlying
dispute.
Where the Board ultimately finds no unfair labor practice, it
would clearly be contrary to the policies of the Act to permit a
district court injunction to remain in effect pending Court of
Appeals review of the District Court's action. And where the Board
does find an unfair labor practice, § 10(e) provides an adequate
remedy should its order be disobeyed. Yet, on the petitioner's
reading of the Act, the District Court injunction would remain in
effect until Court of Appeals review, whatever the Board did. This
is not what was intended by § 10(
l), and the courts that
have confronted the issue have consistently so held.
Carpenters' District Council v. Boire, 288 F.2d 454, 455;
Monique, Inc. v. Boire, 344 F.2d 1017, 1018;
NLRB v.
Nashville Bldg. Trades Council, 383 F.2d 562, 564.
See
also this Court's disposition in
Los Angeles Bldg. &
Construction Trades Council v. LeBaron, 342 U.S. 802.
But
see Houston Insulation Contractors Assn. v. NLRB, 339 F.2d
868.
Because any injunctive relief to which Sears might have been
entitled under § 10(
l) would now have terminated in any
event, the question of whether Sears was entitled to challenge the
denial of such relief has become moot.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated,
and the case is remanded to the District Court with directions to
dismiss the complaint as moot.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Sec. 8(b).
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization
or its agents --"
"
* * * *"
"(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual
employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or
commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten,
coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof
is -- . . .(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using,
selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the
products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to
cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring
any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor
organization as the representative of his employees unless such
labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 9. . . ."
(61 Stat. 141, 73 Stat. 542, 21 U.S.C. § 158(b).)
[
Footnote 2]
20 U.S.C. § 160(
l).
[
Footnote 3]
The District Court decision is unreported.
[
Footnote 4]
29 U.S.C. § 160(e).
[
Footnote 5]
"Under the present act, the Board is empowered to seek interim
relief only after it has filed in the appropriate circuit court of
appeals its order and the record on which it is based. . . ."
"In subsections (j) and (l). . . , the Board is given additional
authority to seek injunctive relief. . . . Thus, the Board need not
wait, if the circumstances call for such relief, until it has held
a hearing, issued its order, and petitioned for enforcement of its
order."
S.Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 27 (1947).