Appellants, residents and taxpayers of the Kansas City School
District, one of eight school districts constituting the Junior
College District of Metropolitan Kansas City, brought this suit
claiming that their right to vote for trustees of the district was
unconstitutionally diluted in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since their separate district
contains approximately 60% of the total apportionment basis of the
entire junior college district, but the state statutory formula
results in the election of only 50% of the trustees from their
district. The trial court's dismissal of the suit was upheld by the
Missouri Supreme Court, which held the "one man, one vote"
principle inapplicable.
Held: Whenever a state or local government by popular
election selects persons to perform public functions, the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that each
qualified voter have an equal opportunity to participate in the
election, and when members of an elected body are chosen from
separate districts, each district must be established on a basis
that, as far as practicable, will insure that equal numbers of
voters can vote for proportionally equal numbers of officials.
Avery v. Midland County, 390 U. S. 474. Pp.
397 U. S.
52-59.
432 S.W.2d
328, reversed and remanded.
Page 397 U. S. 51
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment
and the "one man, one vote" principle apply in the election of
local governmental officials. Appellants are residents and
taxpayers of the Kansas City School District, one of eight separate
school districts that have combined to form the Junior College
District of Metropolitan Kansas City. Under Missouri law, separate
school districts may vote by referendum to establish a consolidated
junior college district and elect six trustees to conduct and
manage the necessary affairs of that district. [
Footnote 1] The state law also provides that these
trustees shall be apportioned among the separate school districts
on the basis of "school enumeration," defined as the number of
persons between the ages of six and 20 years who reside in each
district. [
Footnote 2] In the
case of the Kansas City School District, this apportionment plan
results in the election of three trustees, or 50% of the total
number, from that district. Since that district contains
approximately 60% of the total school enumeration in the junior
college district, [
Footnote 3]
appellants
Page 397 U. S. 52
brought suit claiming that their right to vote for trustees was
being unconstitutionally diluted in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Missouri Supreme
Court upheld the trial court's dismissal of the suit, stating that
the "one man, one vote" principle was not applicable in this case.
432 S.W.2d
328 (1968). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal, 393
U.S. 1115 (1969), and, for the reasons set forth below, we reverse
and hold that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the trustees
of this junior college district be apportioned in a manner that
does not deprive any voter of his right to have his own vote given
as much weight, as far as is practicable, as that of any other
voter in the junior college district.
In
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S.
1 (1964), we held that the Constitution requires that,
"as nearly as is practicable, one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's."
Id. at
376 U.S. 7-8. Because of
this requirement, we struck down a Georgia statute which allowed
glaring discrepancies among the populations in that State's
congressional districts. In
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 (1964), and the companion cases, [
Footnote 4] we considered state laws that had
apportioned state legislatures in a way that again showed glaring
discrepancies in the number of people who lived in different
legislative districts. In an elaborate opinion in
Reynolds, we called attention to prior cases indicating
that a qualified voter has a constitutional right to vote in
elections without having his vote wrongfully denied, debased, or
diluted.
Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.
S. 371 (1880);
Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.
S. 651 (1884);
United States v. Mosley,
238 U. S. 383
(1915);
Guinn v. United
States,
Page 397 U. S. 53
238 U. S. 347
(1915);
Lane v. Wilson, 307 U. S. 268
(1939);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.
S. 299 (1941). Applying the basic principle of
Wesberry, we therefore held that the various state
apportionment schemes denied some voters the right guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to have their votes given the same weight
as that of other voters. Finally, in
Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U. S. 474
(1968), we applied this same principle to the election of Texas
county commissioners, holding that a qualified voter in a local
election also has a constitutional right to have his vote counted
with substantially the same weight as that of any other voter in a
case where the elected officials exercised "general governmental
powers over the entire geographic area served by the body."
Id. at
390 U. S.
485.
Appellants in this case argue that the junior college trustees
exercised general governmental powers over the entire district, and
that, under
Avery, the State was thus required to
apportion the trustees according to population on an equal basis,
as far as practicable. Appellants argue that, since the trustees
can levy and collect taxes, issue bonds with certain restrictions,
hire and fire teachers, make contracts, collect fees, supervise and
discipline students, pass on petitions to annex school districts,
acquire property by condemnation, and in general manage the
operations of the junior colleges, [
Footnote 5] their powers are equivalent, for apportionment
purposes, to those exercised by the county commissioners in
Avery. We feel that these powers, while not fully as broad
as those of the Midland County Commissioners, [
Footnote 6] certainly show that the trustees
Page 397 U. S. 54
perform important governmental functions within the districts,
and we think these powers are general enough and have sufficient
impact throughout the district to justify the conclusion that the
principle which we applied in
Avery should also be applied
here.
This Court has consistently held in a long series of cases
[
Footnote 7] that, in
situations involving elections, the States are required to insure
that each person's vote counts as much, insofar as it is
practicable, as any other person's. We have applied this principle
in congressional elections, state legislative elections, and local
elections. The consistent theme of those decisions is that the
right to vote in an election is protected by the United States
Constitution against dilution or debasement. While the particular
offices involved in these cases have varied, in each case, a
constant factor is the decision of the government to have citizens
participate individually by ballot in the selection of certain
people who carry out governmental functions. Thus, in the case now
before us, while the office of junior college trustee differs in
certain respects from those offices considered in prior cases, it
is exactly the same in the one crucial factor -- these officials
are elected by popular vote.
When a court is asked to decide whether a State is required by
the Constitution to give each qualified voter the same power in an
election open to all, there is no discernible valid reason why
constitutional distinctions should be drawn on the basis of the
purpose of the election.
Page 397 U. S. 55
If one person's vote is given less weight through unequal
apportionment, his right to equal voting participation is impaired
just as much when he votes for a school board member as when he
votes for a state legislator. While there are differences in the
powers of different officials, the crucial consideration is the
right of each qualified voter to participate on an equal footing in
the election process. It should be remembered that, in cases like
this one, we are asked by voters to insure that they are given
equal treatment, and, from their perspective, the harm from unequal
treatment is the same in any election, regardless of the officials
selected.
If the purpose of a particular election were to be the
determining factor in deciding whether voters are entitled to equal
voting power, courts would be faced with the difficult job of
distinguishing between various elections. We cannot readily
perceive judicially manageable standards to aid in such a task. It
might be suggested that equal apportionment is required only in
"important" elections, but good judgment and common sense tell us
that what might be a vital election to one voter might well be a
routine one to another. In some instances, the election of a local
sheriff may be far more important than the election of a United
States Senator. If there is any way of determining the importance
of choosing a particular governmental official, we think the
decision of the State to select that official by popular vote is a
strong enough indication that the choice is an important one. This
is so because, in our country, popular election has traditionally
been the method followed when government by the people is most
desired.
It has also been urged that we distinguish, for apportionment
purposes, between elections for "legislative" officials and those
for "administrative" officers. Such a suggestion would leave courts
with an equally unmanageable
Page 397 U. S. 56
principle, since governmental activities "cannot easily be
classified in the neat categories favored by civics texts,"
Avery, supra, at
390 U. S. 482,
and it must also be rejected. We therefore hold today that, as a
general rule, whenever a state or local government decides to
select persons by popular election to perform governmental
functions, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that each qualified voter must be given an equal
opportunity to participate in that election, and when members of an
elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must
be established on a basis that will insure, as far as is
practicable, that equal numbers of voters can vote for
proportionally equal numbers of officials. It is, of course,
possible that there might be some case in which a State elects
certain functionaries whose duties are so far removed from normal
governmental activities and so disproportionately affect different
groups that a popular election in compliance with
Reynolds,
supra, might not be required, but certainly we see nothing in
the present case that indicates that the activities of these
trustees fit in that category. Education has traditionally been a
vital governmental function, and these trustees, whose election the
State has opened to all qualified voters, are governmental
officials in every relevant sense of that term.
In this particular case the "one man, one vote" principle is to
some extent already reflected in the Missouri statute. That act
provides that, if no one or more of the component school districts
has 33 1/3% or more of the total enumeration of the junior college
district, then all six trustees are elected at large. If, however,
one or more districts has between 33 1/3% and 50% of the total
enumeration, each such district elects two trustees, and the rest
are elected at large from the remaining districts.
Page 397 U. S. 57
Similarly, if one district has between 50% and 66 2/3% of the
enumeration, it elects three trustees, and if one district has more
than 66 2/3%, it elects four trustees. [
Footnote 8] This scheme thus allocates increasingly more
trustees to large districts as they represent an increasing
proportion of the total enumeration.
Although the statutory scheme reflects to some extent a
principle of equal voting power, it does so in a way that does not
comport with constitutional requirements. This is so because the
Act necessarily results in a systematic discrimination against
voters in the more populous school districts. This discrimination
occurs because whenever a large district's percentage of the total
enumeration falls within a certain percentage range, it is always
allocated the number of trustees corresponding to the bottom of
that range. Unless a particular large district has exactly 331 /3%,
50%, or 66 2/3% of the total enumeration, it will always have
proportionally fewer trustees than the small districts. As has been
pointed out, in the case of the Kansas City School District,
approximately 60% of the total enumeration entitles that district
to only 50% of the trustees. Thus, while voters in large school
districts may frequently have less effective voting power than
residents of small districts, they can never have more. Such
built-in discrimination against voters in large districts cannot be
sustained as a sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate that each person's vote count as much as another's, as far
as practicable. Consequently Missouri cannot allocate the junior
college trustees according to the statutory formula employed in
this case. [
Footnote 9] We
would be faced with a different
Page 397 U. S. 58
question if the deviation from equal apportionment presented in
this case resulted from a plan that did not contain a built-in bias
in favor of small districts, but rather from the inherent
mathematical complications in equally apportioning a small number
of trustees among a limited number of component districts. We have
said before that mathematical exactitude is not required,
Wesberry, supra, at
376 U. S. 18,
Reynolds, supra, at
377
U.S. 577, but a plan that does not automatically
discriminate in favor of certain districts is.
In holding that the guarantee of equal voting strength for each
voter applies in all elections of governmental officials, we do not
feel that the States will be inhibited in finding ways to insure
that legitimate political goals of representation are achieved. We
have previously upheld against constitutional challenge an election
scheme that required that candidates be residents of certain
districts that did not contain equal numbers of people.
Dusch
v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112
(1967). Since all the officials in that case were elected at large,
the right of each voter was given equal treatment. [
Footnote 10] We have also held that, where
a State chooses to select members of an official body by
appointment, rather than election, and that choice does not itself
offend the Constitution, the fact that each official does not
"represent" the same number of people does not deny those people
equal protection of the laws.
Sailors v. Board of
Education, 387 U. S. 105
(1967);
cf. Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.
S. 231 (1966). And a State may, in certain cases, limit
the
Page 397 U. S. 59
right to vote to a particular group or class of people. As we
said before,
"[v]iable local governments may need many innovations, numerous
combinations of old and new devices, great flexibility in municipal
arrangements to meet changing urban conditions. We see nothing in
the Constitution to prevent experimentation."
Sailors, supra, at
387 U. S.
110-111. But once a State has decided to use the process
of popular election, and
"once the class of voters is chosen and their qualifications
specified, we see no constitutional way by which equality of voting
power may be evaded."
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368,
372 U. S. 381
(1963).
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment below is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the Missouri Supreme Court for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 178.800, 178.820 (Cum.Supp. 1967).
[
Footnote 2]
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 167.011 (Cum.Supp. 1967).
[
Footnote 3]
For the years 1963 through 1967, the actual enumeration in the
Kansas City School District varied between 63.65% and 59.49%. App.
38.
[
Footnote 4]
WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.
S. 633 (1964);
Maryland Committee v. Tawes,
377 U. S. 656
(1964);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U. S. 678
(1964);
Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.
S. 695 (1964);
Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly,
377 U. S. 713
(1964).
[
Footnote 5]
Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 167.161, 171.011, 177.031, 177.041, 178.770,
178.850-178.890 (Cum.Supp. 1967).
[
Footnote 6]
The Midland County Commissioners established and maintained the
county jail, appointed numerous county officials, made contracts,
built roads and bridges, administered the county welfare system,
performed duties in connection with elections, set the county tax
rate, issued bonds, adopted the county budget, built and ran
hospitals, airports, and libraries, fixed school district
boundaries, established a housing authority, and determined the
election districts for county commissioners.
Avery, supra,
at
390 U. S.
476-477.
[
Footnote 7]
Wesberry, supra; Reynolds, supra; cases cited
n 4,
supra; Avery, supra; Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U. S. 368
(1963);
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S.
73 (1966);
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.
S. 440 (1967).
[
Footnote 8]
Mo.Rev.Stat. § 178.820 (Cum.Supp. 1967).
[
Footnote 9]
There is some question in this case whether school enumeration
figures, rather than actual population figures, can be used as a
basis of apportionment.
Cf. Burns v. Richardson,
384 U. S. 73,
384 U. S. 90-95
(1966). There is no need to decide this question at this time,
since, even if school numeration is a permissible basis, the
present statute fails to apportion trustees constitutionally.
[
Footnote 10]
The statute involved in this case provides that trustees who are
elected from component districts, rather than at large, must be
residents of the district from which they are elected. Mo.Rev.Stat.
§ 178.820(2) (Cum.Supp. 1967).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and MR. JUSTICE
STEWART join, dissenting.
Today's decision demonstrates, to a degree that no other case
has, the pervasiveness of the federal judicial intrusion into state
electoral processes that was unleashed by the "one man, one vote"
rule of
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.
S. 533 (1964).
Reynolds established that rule for the apportionment of
state legislatures, thereby denying States the right to take into
account in the structuring of their legislatures any historical,
geographical, economic, or social considerations, or any of the
many other practical and subtle factors that have always been
recognized as playing a legitimate part in the practice of
politics.
Four years later, in
Avery v. Midland County,
390 U. S. 474
(1968), the "one man, one vote" rule was extended to many kinds of
local governmental units, thereby affecting to an unknown extent
the organizational
Page 397 U. S. 60
integrity of some 80,000 such units throughout the country, and
constricting the States in the use of the electoral process in the
establishment of new ones.
And today, the Court holds the "one man, one vote" rule
applicable to the various boards of trustees of Missouri's junior
college system, and the case forebodes, if indeed it does not
decide, that the rule is to be applied to every elective public
body, no matter what its nature.
While I deem myself bound by
Reynolds and
Avery -- despite my continued disagreement with them as
constitutional holdings (
see my dissenting opinions in
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
377
U.S. 589, and in
Avery, 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 486)
-- I do not think that either of these cases, or any other in this
Court, justifies the present decision. I therefore dissent, taking
off from
Avery in what is about to be said.
I
In
Avery, the Court acknowledged that "the states'
varied, pragmatic approach in establishing governments" has
produced "a staggering number" of local governmental units. The
Court noted that,
"while special purpose organizations abound . . . , virtually
every American lives within what he and his neighbors regard as a
unit of local government with general responsibility and power for
local affairs."
The Midland County Commissioners Court, the body whose
composition was challenged in
Avery, was found to possess
a broad range of powers that made it "representative of most of the
general governing bodies of American cities, counties, towns, and
villages," and the Court was at pains to limit its holding to such
general bodies. 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 482
485. Today the Court discards that limitation, stating that "there
is no discernible, valid reason why constitutional distinctions
should be drawn on the basis of the purpose of the election."
Ante at
397 U. S. 54-55.
I believe, to the contrary, that the need to preserve flexibility
in the design of local
Page 397 U. S. 61
governmental units that serve specialized functions and that
must meet particular local conditions, furnishes a powerful reason
to refuse to extend the very ruling beyond its original limits. If
local units having general governmental powers are to be
considered, like state legislatures, as having a substantial
identity of function that justifies imposing on them a uniformity
of elective structure, it is clear that specialized local entities
are characterized by precisely the opposite of such identity. From
irrigation districts to air pollution control agencies to school
districts, such units vary in the magnitude of their impact upon
various constituencies and in the manner in which the benefits and
burdens of their operations interact with other elements of the
local political and economic picture. Today's ruling will forbid
these agencies from adopting electoral mechanisms that take these
variations into account.
In my opinion, this ruling imposes an arbitrary limitation on
the ways in which local agencies may be constituted. The Court
concedes that the States may use means other than apportionment "to
insure that legitimate political goals of representation are
achieved." For example, officials elected at large may be required
to be residents of particular areas that do not contain equal
numbers of people,
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.
S. 112 (1967); the right to vote may be denied outright
to persons whose interest in the function performed by the agency
is nonexistent or slight,
cf. Kramer v. Union Free School
District, 395 U. S. 621
(1969);
Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.
S. 701 (1969); or the State may in many instances
abandon the elective process altogether, and allow members of an
official body to be appointed, without any regard for the
equal-population principle,
Sailors v. Board of Education,
387 U. S. 105
(1967). Since the Court recognizes the States' need for flexibility
in structuring local units, I am unable to see any basis for its
selectively
Page 397 U. S. 62
denying to them one of the means to achieve such flexibility.
If, as the Court speculates, other means will prove as effective as
apportionment in the adaptation of local agencies to meet specific
needs, presumably those other means will also enable the States
just as effectively to accomplish whatever evils the Court thinks
it is preventing by today's decision. The Court has not shown that,
under the supervision of state legislatures that are apportioned
according to
Reynolds, flexible methods of apportionment
of local official bodies carry any greater danger of abuse than
these other means of achieving the desirable goal of
specialization. The Court's imposition of this arbitrary limitation
on the States can be justified only in the name of mathematical
nicety.
I do not believe that, even after
Avery, such a result
is compelled by the absence of "judicially manageable standards"
for the "difficult job of distinguishing between various
elections."
Ante at
397 U. S. 56.
Before today, the Court's rule was that "one man, one vote" applied
only to local bodies having "general governmental powers over the
entire geographic area served by the body." 390 U.S. at
390 U. S. 485.
The Court in
Avery professed no temerity about concluding
that the Midland County Commissioners Court was such a body. The
Court's mere recitation of the powers of that entity,
ante
at
397 U.S. 53-54, n. 6,
suffices to establish that conclusion. At the same time, it cannot
be argued seriously that the Junior College District of
Metropolitan Kansas City is the general governing body for the
people of its area. The mere fact that the trustees can, with
restrictions, levy taxes, issue bonds, and condemn property for
school purposes does not detract from the crucial consideration
that the sole purpose for which the district exists is the
operation of a junior college. If the Court adhered to the
Avery line, marginal cases would of course arise in which
the courts would face difficulty in determining whether a
particular
Page 397 U. S. 63
entity exercised general governmental powers, but such a
determination would be no different in kind from many other matters
of degree upon which courts must continually pass. The importance
of ensuring flexibility in the organization of specialized units of
government, and the uncertainty whether the rule announced today
will further any important countervailing interest, convince me
that the Court should not proceed further into the political
thicket than it has already gone in
Avery.
II
The facts of this case afford a clear indication of the extent
to which reasonable state objectives are to be sacrificed on the
altar of numerical equality. We are not faced with an apportionment
scheme that is a historical relic, with no present-day
justification, or one that reflects the stranglehold of a
particular group that, having once attained power, blindly resists
a redistribution. The structure of the Junior College District of
Metropolitan Kansas City is based upon a state statute enacted in
1961. Prior to that date, the individual school boards had the
power to create their own junior colleges, as they still do, but
there was apparently no authorization for cooperation among
districts. The 1961 statute was enacted out of concern on the part
of the legislature that Missouri's public educational facilities
were not expanding at a satisfactory rate,
see Three Rivers
Junior College District v. Statler, 421 S.W.2d
235, 237 (Mo.1967). [
Footnote
2/1]
Page 397 U. S. 64
The provisions of the statute evidence a legislative
determination of the most effective means to encourage expansion
through cooperation between districts.
The statutory provision for election of the six-man board of
trustees, summarized by the Court, reflects a careful balancing of
the desirability of population-based representation against the
practical problems involved in the creation of new educational
units. The statute does not, by its own force, create any junior
college districts; this is left to the initiative of the residents
of particular areas who are interested in providing public junior
college education for their children. In recognition of the fact
that individual school districts may lack the funds or the
population to support a junior college of their own, the state
legislature has authorized them to make voluntary arrangements with
their neighbors for joint formation of a junior college district.
If one of the cooperating school districts greatly preponderates in
size, it enters into the arrangement knowing that its
representation on the board of trustees, while large, will be
somewhat smaller than it would be if based strictly on relative
school enumeration.
The features of this system are surely sensibly designed to
facilitate creation of new educational bodies while guaranteeing to
small school districts that they will not be entirely swallowed up
by a large partner. The small districts are free to avoid alliance
with a highly populated neighbor if they prefer to link with enough
others of their own size to provide a viable base for a junior
college. At the same time, a very large school district is probably
capable of forming a junior college on its own if it prefers not to
consolidate, on the terms set by statute, with smaller neighbors.
On the other hand, large and small districts may work together if
they find this the
Page 397 U. S. 65
most beneficial arrangement. [
Footnote 2/2] The participation, as here, of seven
smaller and one larger school district in the joint formation of a
junior college district, represents a pragmatic choice by all
concerned from among a number of possible courses of action.
I find it bizarre to conclude that such a voluntary arrangement
effects an unconstitutional "dilution" of the votes of residents of
the largest school district. When the Court, in
Reynolds,
rejected a proposed analogy between state legislatures and the
Federal Congress, it relied heavily on the fact that state
legislative districts "are merely involuntary political units of
the State created by statute to aid in the administration of state
government." 377 U.S. at
377 U. S. 548.
In contrast, the National Government was created by the union of "a
group of formerly independent States." The system of representation
in Congress was "conceived out of compromise and concession"
between the larger and smaller States.
Id. at
377 U.S. 574. The system struck down
today shares much of this same character of voluntary compromise.
It is true that the analogy would be even closer if the legislature
had left the school districts free to negotiate their own
apportionment terms, rather than imposing a uniform scale; but, as
I read the Court's opinion today, it would strike down the
apportionment in this case even if the terms had resulted from an
entirely free agreement among the eight school districts.
Insistence upon a simplistic mathematical formula as the measure of
compliance with the Equal Protection
Page 397 U. S. 66
Clause in cases involving the electoral process has resulted in
this instance in a total disregard of the salutary purposes
underlying the statutory scheme.
III
Finally, I find particularly perplexing the portion of the
Court's opinion explaining why the apportionment involved in this
case does not measure up even under the "one man, one vote" dogma.
The Court holds that the voters of the Kansas City School District,
who elect 50% of the trustees, are denied equal protection of the
laws because that district contains about 60% of the school
enumeration. This is so because the statutory formula embodies a
"built-in discrimination against voters in large districts."
Ante at
397 U. S. 57.
The Court seems to suggest that the same discrepancy among
districts might pass muster if it could be shown to be
mathematically unavoidable in the apportionment of the small number
of trustees among the component districts; but the discrepancy is
not permissible where it simply reflects the legislature's choice
of a means to foster a legitimate state goal. This reasoning seems
hard to follow, and also disturbing on two scores.
First, to apply the rule with such rigor to local governmental
units, especially single-function units, is to disregard the
characteristics that distinguish such units from state
legislatures. As I noted in my dissent in
Avery, 390 U.S.
at
390 U. S.
488-490, there is a much smaller danger of abuse through
malapportionment in the case of local units, because there exist
avenues of political redress that are not similarly available to
correct malapportionment of state legislatures. Further, as noted
above, the greater diversity of functions performed by local
governmental units creates a greater need for flexibility
Page 397 U. S. 67
in their structure. If these considerations are inadequate to
stave off the extension of the
Reynolds rule to units of
local government, they at least provide a persuasive rationale for
applying that rule so as to allow local governments much more play
in the joints.
Such an approach is not foreclosed by the previous cases. In
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
377
U.S. 577-581, the Court catalogued a number of
considerations indicating that "[s]omewhat more flexibility" might
be permissible in state legislative apportionment than in
congressional districting.
Compare Swann v. Adams,
385 U. S. 440
(1967),
with Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.
S. 526 (1969),
and Wells v. Rockefeller,
394 U. S. 542
(1969). The need for more flexibility becomes greater as we proceed
down the spectrum from the state legislature to the single-purpose
local entity.
The disparities of representation in
Avery were of an
entirely different order from those here. In that case, each of the
four districts elected one commissioner to the Commissioners Court,
despite the fact that the population of one district was 67,906,
while those of the remaining three were 852, 414, and 828. I think
that the
Avery rule, born in an extreme case, is being
applied here with a rigidity that finds no justification in the
considerations that gave it birth.
Cf. Wells v.
Rockefeller, 394 U.S. at
394 U. S. 553
(WHITE, J., dissenting). In this case, the disparity of
representation is relatively minor. Even more important, it is not
an unexplained and unjustified deviation from equality,
see
Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. at
385 U. S.
445-446, but reflects an enlightened state policy of
encouraging individual school districts to join together
voluntarily to expand the State's public junior college
facilities.
Page 397 U. S. 68
Second, the Court leaves unexplored the premises underlying its
conclusion that the apportionment here does not achieve equality,
"as far as practicable."
Ante at
397 U. S. 57.
Missouri is forbidden to use the statutory formula employed in this
case because the percentage categories it creates will, in
particular instances, only approximate equality, and because
whatever discrepancy exists will always favor residents of the
smaller districts. The Court does not suggest how a formula could
be devised that would provide a general rule for application to all
the various junior college districts but would not share these
alleged faults. If a large district falling within a given
percentage range were allocated the number of trustees
corresponding to the top, rather than the bottom, of the range,
that would also produce, on the Court's theory, a "built-in
discrimination" against voters in small districts.
Thus, the result of the Court's holding may be that Missouri is
forbidden to establish any formula of general application for
apportionment of trustees, but must instead provide for the
improvisation of an individual apportionment scheme for each junior
college district after the contours of the district have been
settled. But surely a State could reasonably determine that the
mechanics of operating such a system would be so unduly burdensome
that it would be better to apportion according to a state-wide
formula. Would not such considerations justify a conclusion that
the state-wide formula achieves equality "as far as practicable"?
While the Court does not discuss the problem, its invalidation of
this statutory formula seems to be based on the premise that such
practical considerations, like a State's desire to encourage
cooperation among districts, are constitutionally inadequate to
justify any divergence from voting "equality."
Page 397 U. S. 69
The Court does not, however, spell out any rationale for
concluding that such matters of administrative convenience deserve
no weight in determining what is "practicable." This is especially
incongruous in light of the Court's unexplained conclusion that
deference can be be given to legislative determinations that the
boards should have a small number of trustees and that the trustees
in some instances should represent component school districts. Why
does the Court not require that the number of trustees be increased
from six, in order to reduce the roughness with which equality is
approximated? Would a three-man board be unconstitutionally small?
Why is the Court willing to accept inequality that derives from a
desire to give representation to component school districts, when
similar inequality in state legislative districting could probably
not be justified by a desire to give representation to counties?
Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. at
377 U.S. 579-581;
Swann v.
Adams, 385 U.S. at
385 U. S. 444.
If equality cannot be achieved when representation is by component
districts, why does the "as far as practicable" standard not
require at-large election of trustees? Is there something about
these considerations that gives them a status under the Equal
Protection Clause that is not possessed by a legislative desire to
apportion by a formula of state-wide application? It seems to me
that beneath the surface of the Court's opinion lie unspoken
answers to these and other similar questions, questions that I can
characterize only as matters of political judgment. The Court's
adoption of a rigid mathematical rule turns out not to have saved
it from having to balance and judge political considerations,
concluding that one does merit some weight in an apportionment
scheme, while another does not. The fact that the courts, rather
than the legislatures, now are the final arbiters of such matters
will continue, I fear,
Page 397 U. S. 70
after the present decision to be the inevitable consequence of
the shallow approach to the Equal Protection Clause represented by
the "one man, one vote" theory. The Court could at least lessen the
disruptive impact of that approach at the local level by approving
this relatively minor divergence from strict equality on the ground
that the legislature could reasonably have concluded that it was
necessary to accomplish legitimate state interests.
I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri.
What our Court has done today seems to me to run far afield of the
values embodied in the scheme of government ordained by the
Constitution.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Counsel for appellees informed the Court at oral argument that,
prior to the passage of this statute, when the law merely
authorized each school district in the State to establish its own
junior college, there were only seven such junior colleges, with a
total enrollment of approximately 5,000 students. Today there are
12 junior college districts, in which nearly 120 individual school
districts participate, with a total enrollment of over 30,000
students.
[
Footnote 2/2]
At the time this suit was filed, nine junior college districts
had been formed pursuant to the statutory procedures. Of these,
three did not contain a component district large enough to bring
into play the fractional formula; the remaining six did contain
such a district.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting.
I concur fully in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE HARLAN. I add this
comment to emphasize the subjective quality of a doctrine of
constitutional law that has as its primary standard "a general
rule, [that] whenever a state or local government decides to select
persons by popular election . . . ," the Constitution commands that
each qualified voter must be given a vote which is equally weighted
with the votes cast by all other electors.
The failure to provide guidelines for determining when the
Court's "general rule" is to be applied is exacerbated when the
Court implies that the stringent standards of "mathematical
exactitude" that are controlling in apportionment of federal
congressional districts need not be applied to smaller specialized
districts such as the junior college district in this case. This
gives added relevance to MR. JUSTICE HARLAN's observation that
"[t]he need for more flexibility becomes greater as we proceed
down the spectrum from the state legislature to the single-purpose
local entity."
Ante at
397 U. S. 67.
Yet the Court has given almost no indication of which
non-population
Page 397 U. S. 71
interests may or may not legitimately be considered by a
legislature in devising a constitutional apportionment scheme for a
local, specialized unit of government.
Ultimately, only this Court can finally apply these "general
rules," but, in the interim, all other judges must speculate as
best they can when and how to apply them. With all deference, I
suggest the Court's opinion today fails to give any meaningful
guidelines.