In a class action brought by recipients of old age benefits who
are subject to California welfare termination provisions, a
three-judge District Court upheld the California pre-termination
review procedure in welfare cases though it does not afford the
recipient an evidentiary hearing at which he may personally appear
to offer oral evidence and confront adverse witnesses.
Held: Procedural due process requires a pre-termination
evidentiary hearing before welfare payments may be discontinued or
suspended.
Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p.
397 U. S. 254. Pp.
397 U. S.
281-282.
296 F.
Supp. 138, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a companion case to No. 62,
Goldberg v. Kelly,
ante, p.
397 U. S. 254. It
is a class action brought by all recipients
Page 397 U. S. 281
of old age benefits who are subject to California welfare
termination provisions. A three-judge District Court for the
Northern District of California held that the California procedure
for pre-termination review in welfare cases satisfies the
requirements of the Due Process Clause,
296 F.
Supp. 138 (1968), and we noted probable jurisdiction, 394 U.S.
970 (1969). This procedure requires notice to the recipient of the
proposed discontinuance or suspension at least three days prior to
its effective date, together with reasons for the intended action
and a statement of what information or action is required to
reestablish eligibility, advice that the recipient may meet his
caseworker before his benefits are terminated "[t]o discuss the
entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where
possible, resolution," and assurance that there will be "prompt
investigation" of the case and restoration of payments "as soon as
there is eligibility" to receive them.
* The procedure
does not, however,
Page 397 U. S. 282
afford the recipient an evidentiary hearing at which he may
personally appear to offer oral evidence and confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. In
Goldberg v. Kelly,
supra, decided today, we held that procedural due process
requires such an evidentiary pre-termination hearing before welfare
payments may be discontinued or suspended. Accordingly, the
judgment of the District Court must be and is reversed on the
authority of
Goldberg v. Kelly.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, for the reasons set forth in his dissenting
opinion in No. 62,
Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p.
397 U. S. 271,
dissents and would affirm the judgment below.
* California State Department of Social Welfare, Public Social
Services Manual, Reg. 44-325 (effective April 1, 1968). The
pertinent provisions of the regulation state:
".43 . . . The recipient . . . shall be notified, in writing,
immediately upon the initial decision being made to withhold a
warrant beyond its usual delivery date . . . and in no case less
than three . . . mail delivery days prior to the usual delivery
date of the warrant. . . . The county shall give such notice as it
has reason to believe will be effective, including, if necessary, a
home call by appropriate personnel. . . . Every notification shall
include: "
".431 A statement setting forth the proposed action and the
grounds therefor, together with what information, if any, is needed
or action required to reestablish eligibility. . . ."
".432 Assurance that prompt investigation is being made; that
the withheld warrant will be delivered as soon as there is
eligibility to receive it, and that the evidence or other
information which brought about the withholding action will be
freely discussed with the recipient . . . if he so desires. . .
."
"
* * * *"
".434 A statement that the recipient . . . may have the
opportunity to meet with his caseworker . . . in the county
department, at a specified time, or during a given time period
which shall not exceed three . . . working days, and the last day
of which shall be at least one . . . day prior to the usual
delivery date of the warrant, and at a place specifically
designated in order to enable the recipient. . . ."
"(a) To learn the nature and extent of the information on which
the withholding action is based;"
"(b) To provide any explanation or information, including, but
not limited to that described in the notification . . . ;"
"(c) To discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of
clarification and, where possible, resolution."
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins,
dissenting.*
Although I agree in large part with MR. JUSTICE BLACK's views in
No. 62,
Goldberg v. Kelly, ante, p.
397 U. S. 271,
there are additional factors I wish to mention in dissent from
today's unwise and precipitous constitutional holdings.
The procedures for review of administrative action in the
"welfare" area are in a relatively early stage of development; HEW
has already taken the initiative by promulgating regulations
requiring that AFDC payments
Page 397 U. S. 283
be continued until a final decision after a "fair hearing" is
held. [
Footnote 1] The net
effect would be to provide a hearing prior to a termination of
benefits. Indeed, the HEW administrative regulations go far beyond
the result reached today, since they require that recipients be
given the right to appointed counsel, [
Footnote 2] a position expressly rejected by the majority.
As the majority notes,
see ante at
397 U. S. 257
n. 3, these regulations are scheduled to take effect in July, 1970.
Against this background, I am baffled as to why we should engage in
"legislating" via constitutional fiat when an apparently reasonable
result has been accomplished administratively.
That HEW has already adopted such regulations suggests to me
that we ought to hold the heavy hand of constitutional adjudication
and allow evolutionary processes at various administrative levels
to develop, given their flexibility to make adjustments in
procedure without long delays. This would permit orderly
development of procedural solutions, aided as they would be by
expert guidance available within federal agencies which have an
overview of the entire problem in the 50 States. I cannot accept --
indeed, I reject -- any notion that a government which pays out
billions of dollars to nearly nine million welfare recipients is
heartless, insensitive, or indifferent to the legitimate needs of
the poor.
The Court's action today seems another manifestation of the now
familiar constitutionalizing syndrome: once some presumed flaw is
observed, the Court then eagerly accepts the invitation to find a
constitutionally "rooted" remedy. If no provision is explicit on
the point, it is then seen as "implicit" or commanded by the vague
and nebulous concept of "fairness."
Page 397 U. S. 284
I can share the impatience of all who seek instant solutions;
there is a great temptation in this area to frame remedies that
seem fair and can be mandated forthwith, as against administrative
or congressional action that calls for careful and extended study.
That is thought too slow. But, however cumbersome or glacial, this
is the procedure the Constitution contemplated.
I would not suggest that the procedures of administering the
Nation's complex welfare programs are beyond the reach of courts,
but I would wait until more is known about the problems before
fashioning solutions in the rigidity of a constitutional
holding.
By allowing the administrators to deal with these problems, we
leave room for adjustments if, for example, it is found that a
particular hearing process is too costly. The history of the
complexity of the administrative process followed by judicial
review as we have seen it for the past 30 years should suggest the
possibility that new layers of procedural protection may become an
intolerable drain on the very funds earmarked for food, clothing,
and other living essentials. [
Footnote 3]
Aside from the administrative morass that today's decision could
well create, the Court should also be cognizant of the legal
precedent it may be setting. The majority holding raises intriguing
possibilities concerning the right to a hearing at other stages in
the welfare process which affect the total sum of assistance, even
though the action taken might fall short of complete termination.
For example, does the Court's holding
Page 397 U. S. 285
embrace welfare reductions or denial of increases, as opposed to
terminations, or decisions concerning initial applications or
requests for special assistance? The Court supplies no
distinguishable considerations, and leaves these crucial questions
unanswered.
* [This opinion applies also to No. 62,
Goldberg v. Kelly,
ante, p.
397 U. S.
254.]
[
Footnote 1]
45 CFR § 205.10, 34 Fed.Reg. 1144 (1969).
[
Footnote 2]
45 CFR § 220.25, 34 Fed.Reg. 1356 (1969).
See also HEW
Handbook, pt. IV, §§ 2300(d)(5), 6200-6400.
[
Footnote 3]
We are told, for example, that Los Angeles County alone employs
12,500 welfare workers to process grants to 500,000 people under
various welfare programs. The record does not reveal how many more
employees will be required to give this newly discovered "due
process" to every welfare recipient whose payments are terminated
for fraud or other factors of ineligibility or those whose initial
applications are denied.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, dissenting.*
Although the question is, for me, a close one, I do not believe
that the procedures that New York and California now follow in
terminating welfare payments are violative of the United States
Constitution.
See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U. S. 886,
367 U. S.
894-897.
* [This opinion applies also to No. 62,
Goldberg v. Kelly,
ante, p.
397 U. S.
254.]