One longshoreman was killed and two others were injured on piers
permanently affixed to shore in accidents that occurred while they
were attaching cargo from railroad cars to ships' cranes. The
District Court upheld denial of compensation claims under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927. The
Court of Appeals reversed.
Held:
1. The Longshoremen's Act, which covers injuries occurring "upon
navigable waters," and furnishes a remedy only "if recovery . . .
through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be
provided by state law," does not provide compensation to workmen
injured on a pier permanently affixed to the land, and hence
clearly within the jurisdiction of the States. Pp.
396 U. S.
214-221.
2. Though the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act extends
admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship-caused injuries on a pier, it
does not enlarge the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act. Pp.
396 U. S.
221-223.
398 F.2d 90, reversed.
Page 396 U. S. 213
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The single question of statutory construction presented by these
cases is whether injuries to longshoremen occurring on piers
permanently affixed to shore are compensable under the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act of 1927
(Longshoremen's Act), 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950.
Johnson and Klosek were employed by the Nacirema Operating
Company as longshoremen; Avery was similarly employed by the Old
Dominion Stevedoring Corporation. All three men were engaged at the
time of their accidents in performing similar operations as
"slingers," attaching cargo from railroad cars located on piers
[
Footnote 1] to ships' cranes
for removal to the ships. Klosek was killed, and each of the other
men was injured, when cargo hoisted by the ship's crane swung back
and knocked him to the pier or crushed him against the side of
the
Page 396 U. S. 214
railroad car. Deputy Commissioner of the United States
Department of Labor denied claim for compensation in each case on
the ground that the injuries had not occurred "upon the navigable
waters of the United States" a required by the Act. [
Footnote 2] The District Courts upheld the
Deputy Commissioners' decisions.
243 F.
Supp. 184 (D.C. Md.1965);
245 F. Supp.
51 (D.C.E.D. Va.1965). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed. [
Footnote 3] 398 F.2d 900 (1968). We granted certiorari,
393 U.S. 976 (1968), to resolve the resulting conflict with
decisions in other circuits holding that pier injuries are not
covered by the Act. [
Footnote
4] We have concluded from an examination of the language,
purpose, and legislative history of the Act, as well as prior
decisions of this Court, that the judgment of the Court of Appeals
must be reversed.
Since long before the Longshoremen's Act was passed, it has been
settled law that structures such as wharves
Page 396 U. S. 215
and piers, permanently affixed to land, are extension of the
land. [
Footnote 5] Thus,
literally read, a statute that cover injuries "upon the navigable
waters" would not cover injuries on a pier even though the pier,
like a bridge, extends over navigable waters. [
Footnote 6]
Respondents urge, however, that the 1927 Act, though it employs
language that determines coverage by the "situs" of the injury, was
nevertheless aimed at broader coverage: coverage of the "status" of
the longshoreman employed in performing a maritime contract. We do
not agree. Congress might have extended coverage to all
longshoremen by exercising its power over maritime contracts.
[
Footnote 7] But the language
of the Act is to the contrary
Page 396 U. S. 216
and the background of the statute leaves little doubt that
Congress' concern in providing compensation was a narrower one.
Ten years before the Act was passed, this Court, in
Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205
(1917), held that a State was without power to extend a
compensation remedy to a longshoreman injured on the gangplank
between the ship and the pier. The decision left longshoremen
injured on the seaward side of the pier without a compensation
remedy, while longshoremen injured on the pier enjoyed the
protection of state compensation acts.
State Industrial
Commission v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.
S. 263 (1922).
Twice Congress attempted to fill this gap by passing legislation
that would have extended state compensation remedies beyond the
line drawn in Jensen. [
Footnote
8] Each time, this Court struck down the statute as an unlawful
delegation of congressional power.
Washington v. Dawson
Co., 264 U. S. 219
(1924);
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.
S. 149 (1920). Finally, responding to this Court's
suggestion that what Congress could not empower the States to do,
it could do itself, [
Footnote
9] Congress passed the Longshoremen's Act. The clear
implication is that, in enacting its own compensation statute,
Congress
Page 396 U. S. 217
was trying to do what it had failed to do in earlier attempts:
to extend a compensation remedy to workmen injured beyond the pier
and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the States. This purpose was
clearly expressed in the language limiting coverage to injuries
occurring "upon the navigable waters," and permitting recovery only
"if recovery . . . through workmen's compensation proceedings may
not validly be provided by State law." [
Footnote 10]
This conclusion is fully supported by the legislative history.
As originally drafted, § 3 extended coverage to injuries
"on a place within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States, except employment of local concern and of no direct
relation to navigation and commerce. [
Footnote 11] During the hearings, it was repeatedly
emphasized and apparently assumed by representatives from both the
shipping industry and the unions that a 'place within the admiralty
jurisdiction' did not include a dock or pier. [
Footnote 12] In fact, a representative of the
Labor Department
Page 396 U. S. 218
objected to the bill precisely for that reason, urging the
Committee to extend coverage to embrace the contract, 'and not the
man simply when he is on the ship.' [
Footnote 13] If Congress had intended to adopt that
suggestion, it could not have chosen a more inappropriate way of
expressing its intent than by substituting the words 'upon the
navigable waters' for the words 'within the admiralty
jurisdiction.' [
Footnote 14]
Indeed, the Senate Report that accompanied the revised bill,
containing the language of the present Act, makes clear that the
suggestion was rejected, rather than adopted:"
"[I]njuries occurring in
Page 396 U. S. 219
loading or unloading are not covered unless they occur on the
ship or between the wharf and the ship so as to bring them within
the maritime jurisdiction of the United States."
S.Rep. No. 973, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 16. We decline to ignore
these explicit indications of a design to provide compensation only
beyond the pier where the States could not reach. "That is the gap
that we are trying to fill." [
Footnote 15] In filling that gap Congress did not extend
coverage to longshoremen like those respondents whose injuries
occurred on the landward side of the
Jensen line,
Page 396 U. S. 220
clearly entitling them to protection under state compensation
Acts. [
Footnote 16]
Decisions of this Court have more than once embraced this
interpretation.
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S.
1 (1946), held that neither the Jones Act nor the
Longshoremen's Act covered a longshoreman injured on the dock in
the course of his employment even if the injury was caused by a
vessel on navigable waters.
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales,
314 U. S. 244,
314 U. S. 249
(1941), concluded that the purpose of the Act "was to provide for
federal compensation in the area which the specific decisions
referred to placed beyond the reach of the states."
Davis v.
Dept. of Labor Industries, 317 U. S. 249,
317 U. S. 256
(1942), noted that, in passing the Longshoremen's Act, Congress had
specifically adopted the
Jensen line. The interpretation
endorsed by these cases is also reflected in a consistent course of
administrative construction commencing immediately after the
enactment of the Act. Employees' Compensation Commission Opinions
Nos. 5 and 16, 1927 A.M.C. 1558 and 1855; No. 30, 1928 A.M.C.
417.
It is true that, since
Jensen, this Court has permitted
recovery under state remedies in particular situations seaward of
the pier,
Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, supra, and in
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.
S. 114 (1962), approved recovery under the
Longshoremen's Act for injuries occurring on navigable waters which
might also have been compensable under state law.
Calbeck
made it clear that Congress intended to exercise its full
jurisdiction seaward of the
Jensen line
Page 396 U. S. 221
and to cover all injuries on navigable waters, whether or not
state compensation was also available in particular situations. The
proviso to § 3(a) conditioning coverage on the unavailability of
state remedies was not meant to deny federal relief where the
injury occurred on navigable waters. But removing uncertainties as
to the Act's coverage of injuries occurring on navigable waters is
a far cry from construing the Act to reach injuries on land
traditionally within the ambit of state compensation acts.
Indeed,
Calbeck freely cited the
Parker and
Davis declarations that the Longshoremen's Act adopted the
Jensen line, and
Calbeck's holding rejected the
notion that the line should advance or recede simply because
decisions of this Court had permitted state remedies in narrow
areas seaward of that line. Otherwise, the reach of the federal Act
would be subject to uncertainty, and its coverage would
"expand and recede in harness with developments in
constitutional interpretation as to the scope of state power to
compensate injuries on navigable waters,"
with the result "that every litigation raising an issue of
federal coverage would raise an issue of constitutional dimension,
with all that that implies. . . ." 370 U.S. at
370 U. S. 126.
As in
Calbeck, we refuse to impute to Congress the intent
of burdening the administration of compensation by perpetuating
such confusion.
Nor can we agree that what Congress did not do in 1927, it did
in 1948 when it passed the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act
(Extension Act), 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740. In pertinent part,
that Act provides:
"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused
Page 396 U. S. 222
by a vessel on navigable water, notwithstanding that such damage
or injury be done or consummated on land."
By its very choice of language, the Act reenforces the
conclusion that Congress was well aware of the distinction between
land injuries and water injuries and that, when it limited recovery
to injuries on navigable waters, it did not mean injuries on land.
The Act no doubt extended the admiralty tort jurisdiction to ship
caused injuries on a pier. But far from modifying the clear
understanding in the law that a pier was an extension of land and
that a pier injury was not on navigable waters, but on land, the
Act accepts that rule and nevertheless declares such injuries to be
maritime torts if caused by a vessel on navigable waters.
The Extension Act was passed to remedy the completely different
problem that arose from the fact that parties aggrieved by injuries
done by ships to bridges, docks, and the like could not get into
admiralty at all. [
Footnote
17] There is no evidence that Congress thereby intended to
amend or affect the coverage of the Longshoremen's Act or to
overrule
Swanson v. Marra Bros., supra, decided just two
years earlier. [
Footnote 18]
While the Extension
Page 396 U. S. 223
Act may have the effect of permitting respondents to maintain an
otherwise unavailable libel in admiralty, [
Footnote 19]
see Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 373 U. S. 206
(1963), the Act has no bearing whatsoever on their right to a
compensation remedy under the Longshoremen's Act.
There is much to be said for uniform treatment of longshoremen
injured while loading or unloading a ship. But even construing the
Extension Act to amend the Longshoremen's Act would not effect this
result, since longshoremen injured on a pier by pier-based
equipment would still remain outside the Act. And construing the
Longshoremen's Act to coincide with the limits of admiralty
jurisdiction -- whatever they may be and however they may change --
simply replaces one line with another whose uncertain contours can
only perpetuate on the landward side of the
Jensen line,
the same confusion that previously existed on the seaward side.
While we have no doubt that Congress had the power to choose either
of these paths in defining the coverage of its
Page 396 U. S. 224
compensation remedy, the plain fact is that it chose instead the
line in
Jensen separating water from land at the edge of
the pier. The invitation to move that line landward must be
addressed to Congress, not to this Court.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The piers involved extended from shore into the Patapsco River
at Sparrows Point, Maryland, and into the Elizabeth River at
Norfolk, Virginia.
[
Footnote 2]
§ 3(a) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 903(a), provides in relevant
part:
"(a) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect
of disability or death of an employee, but only if the disability
or death results from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters
of the United States (including any dry dock) and if recovery for
the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings
may not validly be provided by State law. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
The three cases were consolidated on appeal. In a fourth case,
an award to a longshoreman who had drowned after being knocked off
a pier into the water was affirmed by the District Court and the
Court of Appeals.
Marine Stevedoring Corp. v.
Oosting, 238 F. Supp.
78 (D.C.E.D. Va.1965).
[
Footnote 4]
Nicholson v. Calbeck, 385 F.2d 221 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1051 (1968);
Houser v.
O'Leary, 383 F.2d 730 (C.A. 9th Cir.1967),
cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 954 (1968);
Travelers Insurance Co. v.
Shea, 382 F.2d 344 (C.A. 5th Cir.1967),
cert. denied sub
nom. McCollough v. Travelers Insurance Co., 389 U.S. 1050
(1968);
Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v. Arrien, 344 F.2d
640 (C.A.2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 835 (1965).
[
Footnote 5]
Swanson v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U. S.
1 (1946);
Minnie v. Port Huron Terminal Co.,
295 U. S. 647
(1935);
T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Taylor, 276 U.
S. 179 (1928);
State Industrial Commission v.
Nordenholt Corp., 259 U. S. 263
(1922);
Cleveland Terminal Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S.S.
Co., 208 U. S. 316
(1908);
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20 (1866); 1 E. Benedict, The Law of American Admiralty §§
28, 29 (6th ed.1940); G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of
Admiralty §§ 6-46, 7-17 (1957); G. Robinson, Handbook of Admiralty
Law in the United States § 11 (1939).
[
Footnote 6]
We reject the alternative holding of the Court of Appeals that
all injuries on these piers, despite settled doctrine to the
contrary, may now be considered injuries on navigable waters -- a
proposition rejected implicitly by a unanimous Court just last
Term.
See Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty Co., 395 U.
S. 352,
395 U. S. 360,
395 U. S. 366
(1969). Piers, like bridges, are not transformed from land
structures into floating structures by the mere fact that vessels
may pass beneath them.
[
Footnote 7]
The admiralty jurisdiction in tort was traditionally "bounded by
locality,"
De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776)
(C.C.D.Mass. 1815) (Story, J.) (followed in
Insurance
Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall. 1 (1871)), encompassing all
torts that took place on navigable waters. By contrast, admiralty
contract jurisdiction
"extends over all contracts (wheresoever they may be made or
executed, or whatsoever may be the form of the stipulations) which
relate to the navigation, business or commerce of the sea."
De Lovio v. Boit, supra, at 444. Since a workmen's
compensation act combines elements of both tort and contract,
Congress need not have tested coverage by locality alone. As the
text indicates, however, the history of the Act shows that Congress
did indeed do just that.
[
Footnote 8]
Act of October 6, 1917, 40 Stat. 395; Act of June 10, 1922, 42
Stat. 634.
[
Footnote 9]
Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.
S. 219,
264 U. S. 227
(1924). The passage from
Dawson & Co. was referred to
in the hearings in both the Senate and the House.
See
Hearings on S. 3170 before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., 18, 31, 103 and n. 3
(1926) (hereinafter "Senate Hearings"); Hearing on H.R. 9498 before
the House Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
16, pp. 18, 119 and n. 3 (1926) (hereinafter "House Hearing").
[
Footnote 10]
Drydocks were conceded to be within the admiralty jurisdiction
in both the hearings and the debates, even though such structures
are not always floating structures.
See House Hearing 34;
8 Cong.Rec. 5403 (1927). If Congress had thought the words "upon
the navigable waters" were broad enough to embrace the limits of
admiralty jurisdiction, there would have been no need to add the
parenthetical "(including any dry dock)."
[
Footnote 11]
See Senate Hearings 2.
[
Footnote 12]
Mr. Dempsey, representing the International Longshoremen's
Association, testified that the bill would cover injuries on the
dock as well as on the ship. When pressed as to how injuries on the
dock could come within the admiralty jurisdiction, he confessed he
did not understand the legal theory, and would defer to the
longshoremen's attorney, Mr. Austin. Mr. Austin proceeded to
testify: that the dock was not within the admiralty jurisdiction;
that injuries on the dock were compensable under state law; that
the problem arose because the longshoreman was left "high and dry"
once he left the State's jurisdiction and stepped on the gangplank,
and that "[t]hat is the gap that we are trying to fill. . . ."
Senate Hearings 28, 30-31. Testimony that longshoremen injured on
the docks would not be covered by the Act also came from
representatives of the shipbuilders.
See Senate Hearings
58, 95, 103.
See also n 15,
infra; Hearing on S. 3170 before the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 16, pt. 2,
pp. 141, 157 (1926) (testimony on the revised bill, containing the
language of the present § 3).
[
Footnote 13]
Senate Hearings 40.
[
Footnote 14]
While the reason for the change in the language concerning the
bill's coverage is not expressly indicated, it appears to have been
a response to objections that the original language, carving out an
exception for employment of "local concern," was too vague to
define clearly the line being drawn, and might even encounter
problems once again at the hands of this Court.
See Senate
Hearings 56-57, 95; House Hearing 77, 100. In fact, the same
spokesman for the shipbuilders who objected to the vagueness of the
"local concern" exception, also objected that the bill as written
might "upset all the present arrangements with respect to
compensating men on the dock." Senate Hearings 57. The implication
is that no one expected the federal law to extend into the area of
the State's jurisdiction on the dock, but that confusion existed as
to whether, conversely, state remedies would be exclusive as to
injuries "on navigable waters" but within the "maritime but local"
exception created by
Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde,
257 U. S. 469
(1922). This reading of the legislative history was adopted in
Calbeck v. Traveler Insurance Co., 370 U.
S. 114,
370 U. S.
121-127 (1962), where the Court concluded that the Act
did not prevent recovery for injuries on navigable waters, even
though a state remedy would also have been available under
Rohde.
[
Footnote 15]
See n 12,
supra. Other indications that Congress had no intention of
replacing or overlapping state compensation remedies for dockside
injuries can be found throughout the hearings. At one point, in
attempting to calculate the increased costs involved in the federal
Act, Senator Cummins, Chairman of the Committee, pointed out
that
"we are proceeding on the theory that these people cannot be
compensated under the New York compensation law or any other
compensation law."
"[T]he purpose of this law," he agreed with a witness, was
simply to cover the men who
"are going to be exposed a part of the time on board vessels . .
. and therefore will have to be compensated in some other way where
the New York law is not the remedy available."
Senate Hearings 84-85. Similarly, Representative Graham,
Chairman of the House Committee, agreed that "the real necessity
for this legislation" was to provide workers with compensation when
they stepped from dock to ship. House Hearing 25. In fact, the
labor representative who was testifying at that point in the
hearing insisted that the legislation sought was only for "[t]hose
who are injured on board vessels at the dock." Those injured on the
dock "are taken care of under the State law."
Id. at 28.
There was also testimony by a longshoremen's representative
that
"65 percent of the accidents in the courts of New York happen on
board ships or on gangplanks; . . . therefore . . . 65 percent of
the accidents of the men who are injured by performing this work
will be compensable under this bill."
Id. at 35.
See also id. at 44. Another noted
that
"our men that are working on the dock are protected, and well
protected, under the New York compensation act, but our men on
board ship are not protected. We feel that Congress wants to
protect them. . . ."
Senate Hearings 42.
[
Footnote 16]
Both Johnson and Klosek's widow and minor children have filed
claims, and are concededly entitled to benefits, under the Maryland
Workmen's Compensation Act. Avery has already been awarded benefits
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Law.
[
Footnote 17]
See Gilmore Black,
supra, n 5, § 7-17.
[
Footnote 18]
The legislative history of the Extension Act is devoid of any
reference to the Longshoremen's Act, as might well be expected in
an Act dealing with a wholly unrelated problem.
See S.Rep.
No. 1593, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R.Rep. No. 1523, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1948).
The House Report accompanying the Extension Act not that "the
bill will not create new causes of action"
id. at 3, and
the statute speaks of extending jurisdiction to suits "
in
rem or
in personam" for "damage" to "person or
property" -- concept wholly at odd with the theory of workmen's
compensation -- awards made in an administrative proceeding. The
conclusion of the District Court is inescapable.
"The two statutes do not deal with the same subject matter, are
inherently inconsistent with each other, and cannot be read as
being
in pari materia."
243 F.
Supp. 184, 194 (1965).
It is worth noting that a contemporaneous amendment of the
Longshoremen's Act contains no cross reference to the Extension
Act.
See Act of June 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 602 (a bill to
increase benefits under the Longshoremen's Act, passed five days
after the Extension Act). And a House Report dated July 28, 1958 --
10 years after enactment of the Extension Act -- points out that
employees "on the navigable waters of the United States" are
covered under the Longshoremen's Act, but are under state
protection "when performing work on docks and in other shore
areas." H.R.Rep. No. 2287, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (accompanying a
bill to provide safety programs for longshoremen).
[
Footnote 19]
We were informed in argument that two of the parties have in
fact, already commenced actions against the shipowner.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN concur, dissenting.
We dissent for the reasons stated by Judge Sobeloff speaking for
the Court of Appeals sitting en banc. 398 F.2d 900. As he says, the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act is not
restricted to conventional "admiralty tort jurisdiction," but is
"status-oriented, reaching all injuries sustained by longshoremen
in the course of their employment."
Id. at 904. The matter
should be at rest after
Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance
Co., 370 U. S. 114. In
that suit under this Act, we said that "
Congress intended the
compensation act to have a coverage coextensive with the limits of
its authority.'" Id. at 370 U. S. 130,
quoting from De Bardeleben Coal Corp. v. Henderson, 142
F.2d 481, 483. Judge Sobeloff in the instant cases, while answering
the argument that Calbeck was not concerned with the
meaning of "upon the navigable waters," referred to Judge
Palmieri's opinion in Michigan Mutual Liability Co. v.
Arrien, 233 F.
Supp. 496, 500, aff'd, 344 F.2d 640:
"What is just as important as the actual holding in
Calbeck is the general approach to the [Longshoremen's
Compensation] Act taken by the Court. No longer is the Act viewed
as merely filling in the interstices around the shore line of the
state acts, but rather as an affirmative exercise of admiralty
jurisdiction. "
Page 396 U. S. 225
Judge Sobeloff went on to say:
"This affirmative exercise of the admiralty power of Congress
"to the fullest extent" of its jurisdiction, creating "a coverage
coextensive with the limits of its authority," can only mean that
Congress effectively enacted a law to protect all who could
constitutionally be brought within the ambit of its maritime
authority. Again, in the words of Judge Palmieri, "it thus appears
that
upon navigable waters' is to be equated with `admiralty
jurisdiction.'""
398 F.2d at 905.
In addition to the cases being reviewed here, the Court of
Appeals affirmed a judgment in favor of the widow of a longshoreman
(238 F.Supp. 78) who, while working on the pier, was struck by a
cable and knocked into the water, where he died. It is incongruous
to us that, in an accident on a pier over navigable waters,
coverage of the Act depends on where the body falls after the
accident has happened. For this and the other reasons stated by
Judge Sobeloff, we dissent from a reversal of these judgments.