Application for vacation of Court of Appeals' stay of
preliminary injunction entered by District Court that had the
effect of requiring partial implementation of a school
desegregation plan is granted, the Court of Appeals' order is
vacated, and the District Court's order is directed to be
reinstated. A district court's order granting a preliminary
injunction should not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless the
grant was an abuse of discretion, which the Court of Appeals did
not find here. Nor does the desire to develop public support for
the desegregation plan that the Court of Appeals manifested
constitute justification for delay in the plan's
implementation.
See: 303 F.
Supp. 279 and 289.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN.
In this school desegregation case, I am asked to vacate a stay
by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit of a preliminary
injunction entered by the District Court for the District of
Colorado. The preliminary injunction has the effect of requiring
partial implementation of a school desegregation plan prepared by
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado, and then rescinded by that
Board after changes in membership followed a school board
election.
The Court of Appeals issued the stay pending decision of an
appeal taken by the School Board from the preliminary injunction. I
have concluded that the stay was
Page 396 U. S. 1216
improvidently granted and must be vacated. An order of a
district court granting or denying a preliminary injunction should
not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless it appears that the
action taken on the injunction was an abuse of discretion.
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.
S. 229 (1929). Where a preliminary injunction has issued
to vindicate constitutional rights, the presumption in favor of the
District Court's action applies with particular force. The Court of
Appeals did not suggest that the District Court abused its
discretion. On the contrary, the Court of Appeals expressly stated
that the District Court's findings of fact
"represent a painstaking analysis of the evidence presented.
They establish a racial imbalance in certain named schools. From
the facts found, the district court either made a conclusion or
drew an inference, that
de jure segregation exists in
named schools. Its grant of the temporary injunction is grounded on
the premise that there is
de jure segregation."
The Court of Appeals nevertheless stated that it "must decide
whether the public interest is best served by the maintenance of
the
status quo or by the acceptance of the injunctive
order," since the time before the Denver schools were to open on
September{2} was insufficient to permit an examination of the
record to determine whether the District Court correctly held that
this was a case of
de jure segregation. It may be that
this inquiry was appropriate notwithstanding the presumption in
favor of continuing the preliminary injunction in force. But the
reasons given by the Court of Appeals for striking the balance in
favor of the stay clearly supplied no support in law for its
action. It was not correct to justify the stay on the ground that
constitutional principles demanded only "that desegregation be
accomplished with all convenient speed." "The time for mere
deliberate speed' has run out. . . ." Griffin
v. County
Page 396 U. S. 1217
School Board, 377 U. S. 218,
377 U. S. 234
(1964).
"The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promise's
realistically to work
now."
Green v. County School Board, 391 U.
S. 430,
391 U. S. 439
(1968). The obligation of the District Court was to assess the
effectiveness of the School Board's plans in light of that
standard.
Ibid. Since the Court of Appeals not only was
unable to say that the District Court's assessment was an abuse of
discretion, but agreed that it "may be correct," the stay of the
preliminary injunction was improvident.
The Court of Appeals also seems to have based its action on the
premise that public support for the plan might be developed if any
order awaited final hearing; the Court of Appeals stated that a
plan of desegregation "must depend for its success on the
understanding cooperation of the people of the area." But the
desirability of developing public support for a plan designed to
redress
de jure segregation cannot be justification for
delay in the implementation of the plan.
Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U. S. 1
(1958).
I therefore grant the application, vacate the order of the Court
of Appeals, and direct the reinstatement of the order of the
District Court.