Certiorari was granted to consider petitioner's contention that
his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination had been
infringed by the California prison authorities. Petitioner, who was
serving consecutive sentences of not less than five years each,
attacked the constitutionality of his confinement pursuant to the
California Indeterminate Sentence Law. He asserted that respondent
Adult Authority extended his term beyond the date tentatively set
for his discharge solely because he refused to admit his guilt.
Respondents filed no response to the petition for habeas corpus in
the District Court, and, in response to the petition for
certiorari, merely argued that petitioner's claim was legally
insubstantial. In their brief on the merits here, they have
presented documentary evidence that the actual facts do not present
the issue for which certiorari was granted.
Held: The writ of certiorari is dismissed as
improvidently granted.
Certiorari dismissed.
PER CURIAM.
The petition for habeas corpus in this case, which was filed in
the District Court for the Northern District of California and
which was prepared by petitioner, attacked the constitutionality of
petitioner's confinement in the state prison system pursuant to the
California
Page 396 U. S. 108
Indeterminate Sentence Law. [
Footnote 1] Petitioner recited that he was convicted in
1952 on two counts of first-degree robbery and was given
consecutive sentences of not less than five years each, with no
maximum prescribed by law. California law provides that, where no
maximum term is set, the punishment shall be life imprisonment
subject to the power of the California Adult Authority to
"determine and redetermine" the length of time that a prisoner
shall be required to serve. Cal.Penal Code § 671 (1955), 1168, 3020
(1956).
Petitioner asserted that, in June, 1961, he appeared before the
Adult Authority for parole consideration, as he had done on a
yearly basis during his confinement. According to petitioner,
during that appearance, the members of the Authority evinced an
intention to extend his term beyond March, 1962, the date that had
been tentatively set for his discharge, solely because petitioner
refused to admit his guilt. [
Footnote 2] Shortly after the appearance, the Adult
Authority rescinded its earlier action scheduling petitioner for
release in 1962; no new date for release was fixed, and petitioner
has remained in custody continuously since that time.
The petition for habeas corpus stated flatly that the appearance
before the Authority in June, 1961, was for routine parole
consideration; petitioner claimed that he had been free from
infractions of prison rules for at least
Page 396 U. S. 109
a year prior to the appearance. He further declared that he was
given no reason for the redetermination of his sentence, and
received no notice or hearing concerning any possible basis for
such action. In conclusion, petitioner stated that,
"obviously, the only reason for this action was to coerce
petitioner to plead guilty and not challenge his conviction after
being released on discharge."
Respondents filed no response to the petition in the District
Court. That court denied the writ without a hearing, in a brief
order stating that no federal questions had been presented. The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied a certificate of
probable cause to appeal for the reasons expressed by the District
Court, and petitioner applied to this Court for a writ of
certiorari. On the facts recited by petitioner, we granted
certiorari to consider his contention that his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination had been infringed by the prison
authorities. 393 U.S. 1062 (1969).
In its brief on the merits, respondents have brought to our
attention a series of prison documents, whose accuracy has in no
way been drawn into question by petitioner, that cast petitioner's
detention in a light wholly different from that shed by his
petition for certiorari. These documents show that, in December,
1960, Conway was served with a notice charging him with violation
of prison rules and informing him that the violation might result
in a refixing of his prison term; he attended a hearing at which he
was found guilty of fighting with another prisoner and was
sentenced to three days in isolation, with a recommendation that
his Adult Authority appearance be postponed until June, 1961.
Following that appearance, as petitioner notes, the Authority
rescinded its earlier action fixing a determinate sentence, thereby
reinstating by operation of law his initial indeterminate sentence.
Thus, it now appears respondents have documentary evidence that the
actual facts simply do not
Page 396 U. S. 110
present the issue for which certiorari was granted by us. That
this imposition on this Court has been revealed only at this late
stage seems to have been the result of the policy of the Attorney
General of California, as explained in the respondents' brief, to
make no response to habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners
unless the court in which a petition is filed requests a response,
as, for example, so respondents say, by issuing an order to show
cause why the writ should not be granted. Since no response
eventuated in this instance and respondents also failed to flush
the problem at the certiorari stage, [
Footnote 3] both this Court and the attorney appointed by
the Court to represent petitioner here have unwittingly been placed
in the unfortunate posture of addressing a situation that does not
exist.
In this state of affairs, we decline to adjudicate this case.
Were we to pass upon the purely artificial and hypothetical issue
tendered by the petition for certiorari, we would not only, in
effect, be rendering an advisory opinion, but also lending
ourselves to an unjustifiable intrusion upon the time of this
Court. Accordingly, the writ of certiorari is dismissed as
improvidently granted.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
See Cal.Penal Code § 1168 (1956) and provisions there
listed.
[
Footnote 2]
Petitioner claimed that his discussion with the members of the
Authority had turned to what he planned to do if released. When
petitioner stated that he expected to go "to Bakersfield," one
member responded: "But that is where you got into this trouble.
What are you planning to do there?" Petitioner declared, "I'm going
to fight my case," prompting the member to ask whether petitioner
had not admitted to the Authority, two years earlier, that he was
guilty. After petitioner denied the previous admission, the members
raised -- assertedly for the first time -- the possibility of
extending petitioner's term.
[
Footnote 3]
In response to the petition for certiorari, respondents merely
locked horns with the allegations of the petition as filed, without
drawing the Court's attention to the actual facts as subsequently
revealed in its brief on the merits.