Two men were killed while working on artificial island drilling
rigs located on the Continental Shelf more than a marine league
from the Louisiana coast. The men's families brought suits for
wrongful death in the District Courts (1) under the Death on the
High Seas Act ("Seas Act"), which provides an admiralty action for
recovery of pecuniary loss for deaths due to wrongful actions or
omissions "occurring on the high seas" more than a marine league
off the coast, and (2) under Louisiana law (which would have
allowed recovery for additional elements of damage) as assertedly
made applicable by the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act ("Lands
Act"). In each case, the District Court held that the Seas Act
provided the exclusive remedy, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held: Petitioners' remedy is under the Lands Act and
Louisiana law. Under the Lands Act, federal law, supplemented by
the law of the adjacent State not inconsistent with federal law, is
to be applied to artificial islands, which Congress clearly
intended were to be treated as islands or federal enclaves within a
landlocked State and not as vessels subject to admiralty
jurisdiction. Pp.
395 U. S.
355-366.
391 F.2d 671 and 395 F.2d 216, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves two men, Dore and Rodrigue, who met their
deaths on artificial island drilling rigs located on the outer
Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast.
Page 395 U. S. 353
Each man's family brought suit for wrongful death in the federal
courts both under the Death on the High Seas Act, 41 Stat. 537, 46
U.S.C. § 761
et seq. (hereinafter "Seas Act"), and under
Louisiana law assertedly made applicable by the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. § 1331
et seq.
(hereinafter "Lands Act"). Each family's suit was separately heard
and decided in the District Courts and in the Court of Appeals
below. In both cases, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
affirming the District Courts, held that the Seas Act was the
exclusive remedy for these deaths. Petitioners sought certiorari,
claiming that they are entitled to an additional remedy under the
state law adopted by the Lands Act.
In the
Dore case, the decedent was working on a crane
mounted on the artificial island and being used to unload a barge.
As the crane lifted a load from the barge to place it on the
artificial island, the crane collapsed and toppled over onto the
barge, killing the worker. His widow and her three children brought
a single action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Louisiana, alleging their own and the decedent's
residency in Louisiana and the negligence of the firms which
manufactured, installed, and serviced the crane. The suit was
brought under the
"General Maritime Laws, the Death on the High Seas Act, . . .
Article 2315 of the [Louisiana Code] and under the other laws of
the United States and the State of Louisiana."
It claimed $670,000 in damages to the family plaintiffs for loss
of their husband and father, including pecuniary and psychic
losses. On motion for summary judgment as to all claims but that
under the Seas Act, the District Judge determined that the latter
was plaintiffs' only remedy, removed the case to the admiralty side
of the court, and thus limited the plaintiffs' recovery to
pecuniary loss. The state statute would have allowed recovery
Page 395 U. S. 354
for additional elements of damage. The District Judge certified
the question pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), and
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 391 F.2d
671.
In the
Rodrigue case, the decedent was performing a
test on a drill pipe. He was high on the derrick rising above the
artificial island, and fell from it to his death on the floor of
the structure. His widow and two children brought three actions in
the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. One was
an admiralty action under the Seas Act; the other two were civil
actions respectively against the owner and insurer of the drill
rig, and the owner of the stationary platform. The civil actions
were brought under the Lands Act and Article 2315 of the Louisiana
Revised Civil Code. The trial court consolidated the two civil
actions and dismissed the insurer, who had been made a party to one
of the civil actions pursuant to the Louisiana direct action
statute, La.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 22:655. No reason was assigned for the
dismissal, but the ground urged in the motion was that the accident
did not occur within the State of Louisiana, so that Louisiana law
did not apply. Consistently with this, the District Judge dismissed
the consolidated civil action before trial on the ground that the
Seas Act provided a remedy and that, under such circumstances, the
Lands Act would not make the inconsistent state remedy applicable.
[
Footnote 1] The admiralty
Page 395 U. S. 355
action proceeded to trial and judgment of $75,000, 266 F. Supp.
1, which is not now before us. On appeal of the dismissal of the
civil actions, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the District Court per curiam., citing its decision in the
Dore case almost two months before. 395 F.2d 216.
Certiorari was granted in both cases, 393 U.S. 932 (1968), and
they were argued together here. In light of the principles of
traditional admiralty law, the Seas Act, and the Lands Act, we hold
that petitioners' remedy is under the Lands Act and Louisiana law.
The Lands Act makes it clear that federal law, supplemented by
state law of the adjacent State, is to be applied to these
artificial islands as though they were federal enclaves in an
upland State. This approach was deliberately taken in lieu of
treating the structures as vessels, to which admiralty law,
supplemented by the law of the jurisdiction of the vessel's owner,
would apply.
The Hamilton, 207 U.
S. 398 (1907). This was done in part because men working
on these islands are closely tied to the adjacent State, to which
they often commute and on which their families live, unlike
transitory seamen to whom a more generalized admiralty law is
appropriate. Since the Seas Act does not apply of its own force
under admiralty principles, and since the Lands Act deliberately
eschewed the application of admiralty principles to these novel
structures, Louisiana law is not ousted by the Seas Act, and, under
the Lands Act, it is made applicable.
I
The purpose of the Lands Act was to define a body of law
applicable to the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures
such as those in question here on the outer Continental Shelf. That
this law was to be federal law of the United States, applying state
law only as federal law and then only when not inconsistent
Page 395 U. S. 356
with applicable federal law, is made clear by the language of
the Act. Section 3 makes it the "policy of the United States" that
the affected areas "appertain to the United States and are subject
to its jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition." [
Footnote 2] Section 4 [
Footnote 3] makes the "Constitution
Page 395 U. S. 357
and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United
States" apply "to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State." Since federal law, because of its limited function in a
federal system, might be inadequate to cope with the full range of
potential legal problems, the Act supplemented gaps in the federal
law with state law through the "adoption of State law as the law of
the United States." Under § 4, the adjacent State's laws were made
"the law of the United States for [the relevant subsoil and seabed]
and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon," but
only to "the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with . . . other Federal laws."
It is evident from this that federal law is "exclusive" in its
regulation of this area, and that state law is adopted only as
surrogate federal law. The Senate Report on the bill referred to
the "precise unequivocal language" of "the provision for the
adoption of State laws as Federal law," and referred to the
applicable body of law as consisting of the Constitution and laws
of the United States, the regulations of the Secretary of the
Interior, and finally the laws of the adjacent States "adopted as
Federal law and made applicable to supplement existing Federal law
and regulations." S.Rep. No. 411 of the Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 (1953).
It was the Senate Committee which first introduced the present
provision adopting state law, and in its report explaining the
introduction it asserted:
"Paragraph (2) adopts State law as Federal law, to be used when
Federal
Page 395 U. S. 358
statutes or regulations of the Secretary of the Interior are
inapplicable."
Id. at 23. This language makes it clear that state law
could be used to fill federal voids. And in the conference report,
the House managers of the bill noted that laws of adjacent States
which are not inconsistent with federal law "are adopted as the
laws of the United States for those particular areas."
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1031, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 12 (1953).
The principles that federal law should prevail, and that state
law should be applied only as federal law and then only when no
inconsistent federal law applied, were adopted by a Congress in
which full debate had underscored the issue. Senator Cordon, in
presenting the Lands Act to the Senate, noted that the problem
addressed by the committee had been raised by
"the fact that the full development of the estimated values in
the shelf area will require the efforts and the physical presence
of thousands of workers on fixed structures in the shelf area.
Industrial accidents, accidental death, peace, and order"
present problems requiring a body of law for their solution.
Since, "as every Member of the Senate knows, the Federal Code was
never designed to be a complete body of law in and of itself," the
committee decided that state law would have to be referred to in
some instances. 99 Cong.Rec. 6962-6963. As Senator Anderson, a
member of the conference committee, put it:
"The real point is . . . that the language in section 4 provides
that Federal laws and regulations shall be applicable in the area,
but that, where there is a void, the State law may be applicable. .
. ."
99 Cong.Rec. 7164. Senator Cordon noted that this view was
"entirely correct," and added that: "These laws, by the terms of
the act, are enacted as Federal law."
The opponents of the Act realized full well that state law was
being used only to supplement federal law, and
Page 395 U. S. 359
Senator Long introduced an amendment to the Act which would have
made
"the laws of such State applicable to the newly acquired area,
and . . . the officials of such State [the agents empowered] to
enforce the laws of the State in the newly acquired area."
In arguing for his amendment, Senator Long asserted that "[i]t
is even more important that State law should apply on the
artificial islands than on natural islands. . . ." But the
amendment was rejected.
See 99 Cong.Rec. 7232-7236. This
legislative history buttresses the Court of Appeals' finding that,
in view of the inconsistencies between the state law and the Seas
Act, the Seas Act remedy would be exclusive if it applied.
II
.
However, for federal law to oust adopted state law, federal law
must first apply. The court below assumed that the Seas Act
[
Footnote 4] did apply, since
the island was located more than a marine league off the Louisiana
coast. But that is not enough to make the Seas Act applicable.
[
Footnote 5] The Act redresses
only those deaths stemming from wrongful actions or omissions
"occurring on the high seas," and these cases involve a series of
events on artificial islands. Moreover, the islands were not
erected primarily as navigational aids, and the
Page 395 U. S. 360
accidents here bore no relation to any such function. Admiralty
jurisdiction has not been construed to extend to accidents on
piers, jetties, bridges, or even ramps or railways running into the
sea. [
Footnote 6] To the extent
that it has been applied to fixed structures completely surrounded
by water, this has usually involved collision with a ship and has
been explained by the use of the structure solely or principally as
a navigational aid. [
Footnote
7] But when the damage is caused by a vessel admittedly in
admiralty jurisdiction, the Admiralty Extension Act [
Footnote 8] would now make available the
admiralty remedy in any event.
The accidents in question here involved no collision with a
vessel, and the structures were not navigational aids. They were
islands, albeit artificial ones, and the accidents had no more
connection with the ordinary stuff of admiralty than do accidents
on piers. Indeed, the Court has specifically held that drilling
platforms are not within admiralty jurisdiction.
Phoenix
Construction Co. v. The Steamer Poughkeepsie, 212 U.S. 558,
affirming 162 F. 494 (1908). There, a ship damaged a
structure "composed of various lengths of wrought iron pipe
surrounded by a platform on the surface." Citing the same cases on
which the lower court had relied, this Court affirmed its
conclusion that jurisdiction was lacking, since the
"project which the libellant was engaged
Page 395 U. S. 361
in is not even suggestive of maritime affairs. It was supplying
water to a city and the mere fact of the means being carried under
the bed of a river, with extensions through the river to the
surface, did not create any maritime right, nor was it in any sense
an aid to navigation, which was the distinguishing feature of The
Blackheath."
162 F. at 496. In these circumstances, the Seas Act -- which
provides an action in admiralty -- clearly would not apply under
conventional admiralty principles and, since the Lands Act provides
an alternative federal remedy through adopted state law, there is
no reason to assume that Congress intended to extend those
principles to create an admiralty remedy here. And if the Congress
had made the 1920 Seas Act applicable, ousting inconsistent state
law, the artificial island worker would be entitled to far less
comprehensive remedies in many cases than he is now.
Even if the admiralty law would have applied to the deaths
occurring in these cases under traditional principles, the
legislative history shows that Congress did not intend that result.
First, Congress assumed that the admiralty law would not apply
unless Congress made it apply, and then Congress decided not to
make it apply. The legislative history of the Lands Act makes it
clear that these structures were to be treated as islands or as
federal enclaves within a landlocked State, not as vessels.
In introducing the bill to the Senate, Senator Cordon explained
its inception as follows:
"The committee first attempted to provide housekeeping law for
the outer shelf by applying to the structures necessary for the
removal of the minerals in the area under the maritime law of the
United States. This was first attempted by incorporating by
reference the admiralty statutes. This solution at first seemed to
be a reasonably complete answer . . . inasmuch as the drilling
platforms would
Page 395 U. S. 362
have been treated as vessels. Maritime law, which applies to
American vessels, would have applied under that theory to the
structures themselves."
"However, further consideration clearly showed that this
approach was not an adequate and complete answer to the problem.
The so-called social laws necessary for protection of the workers
and their families would not apply. I refer to such things as
unemployment laws, industrial accident laws, fair labor standards
laws, and so forth. . . ."
"
* * * *"
"[Ultimately, instead,] the whole body of Federal law [was made
applicable] to the area [as well as state law, where necessary].
Thus, the legal situation is comparable to that in the areas owned
by the Federal Government under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Federal Government and lying within the boundaries of a State in
the uplands."
99 Cong.Rec. 6963.
Similarly, Senator Ellender asserted that, in the first draft,
it "was sought to treat the platforms or artificial islands created
in the water as ships," but now the "islands are made subject to
our domestic law" instead, so as to be "treated just as though they
were islands created by nature insofar as the application of our
domestic laws is concerned." 99 Cong.Rec. 7235.
The House bill, H.R. 5134, had made federal law applicable, but
also provided that the not "inconsistent . . . laws of each coastal
State which so provides shall be applicable," at least if adopted
by the Secretary of the Interior. H.R.Rep. No. 413, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., 4, 8-9 (1953). The Senate bill, as it read before committee
amendments, provided instead that acts "on any structure (other
than a vessel)" located on the Continental Shelf for exploring or
exploiting its resources
"shall be
Page 395 U. S. 363
deemed to have occurred or been committed aboard a vessel of the
United States on the high seas and shall be adjudicated . . .
according to the laws relating to such acts . . . on vessels of the
United States on the high seas."
When the Senate bill was reported from committee, this section
had been replaced by the present language, omitting entirely any
reference to treating the islands as though they were vessels.
Careful scrutiny of the hearings which were the basis for
eliminating from the Lands Act the treatment of artificial islands
as vessels convinces us that the motivation for this change,
together with the adoption of state law as surrogate federal law,
was the view that maritime law was inapposite to these fixed
structures.
See generally Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., on
S.1901 (1953) (hereafter Hearings). One theme running throughout
the hearings was the close relationship between the workers on the
islands and the adjoining States. Objections were repeatedly voiced
to application of maritime law, and, with it, the admiralty
principle that the law of the State of the owner of the artificial
island "vessel" is used for supplementation. [
Footnote 9] On the other
Page 395 U. S. 364
hand, federal enforcement of the law in this area was insisted
upon by the Department of Justice, and there was substantial doubt
whether state law and jurisdiction could or should be extended to
the structures. [
Footnote
10] A federal solution was thought necessary.
The committee was aware that it had the power to treat activity
on these artificial islands as though it occurred aboard ship.
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202
(1890); Hearings 511-512; Extension of Admiralty Act of 1948, 62
Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740;
see United States v. Matson Nav.
Co., 201 F.2d 10 (C.A. 9th Cir.1953);
cf. Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U. S. 206,
373 U. S. 209
(1963). And the very decision to do so in the initial bill
recognized that, if it were not adopted explicitly, maritime law
simply would not apply to these stationary structures not erected
as navigational aids. [
Footnote
11] Moreover, the committee was acutely aware of the inaptness
of admiralty law. The bill applied the same law to the
Page 395 U. S. 365
seabed and subsoil as well as to the artificial islands, and
admiralty law was obviously unsuited to that task. [
Footnote 12]
Although the Assistant Attorney General, office of Legal
Counsel, persisted to the end in his claim that admiralty law
should apply, and that with it should be incorporated the law of
the State of the island's owner, this view obviously did not
prevail. Instead, a compromise emerged. The administration's
opposition to committing these areas solely to the jurisdiction of
state courts, state substantive law, and state law enforcement was
recognized in that the applicable law was made federal law
enforceable by federal officials in federal courts. But the special
relationship between the men working on these artificial islands
and the adjacent shore to which they commute to visit their
families was also recognized by dropping the treatment of these
structures as "vessels" and, instead, over the objections of the
administration that these islands were not really located within a
State, the bill was amended to treat them "as if [they] were [in]
an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State."
State law became federal law federally enforced.
In view of all this, and the disclosure by Senator Cordon to the
Senate upon introduction of the bill that the admiralty or maritime
approach of the original bill had been abandoned, it is apparent
that the Congress decided that these artificial islands, though
surrounded by the
Page 395 U. S. 366
high seas, were not themselves to be considered within maritime
jurisdiction. Thus, the admiralty action under the Seas Act no more
applies to these accidents actually occurring on the islands than
it would to accidents occurring in an upland federal enclave or on
a natural island to which admiralty jurisdiction had not been
specifically extended. At a minimum, the legislative history shows
that accidents on these structures, which, under maritime
principles, would be no more under maritime jurisdiction than
accidents on a wharf located above navigable waters, were not
changed in character by the Lands Act.
Since the inapplicability of the Seas Act removes any obstacle
to the application of state law by incorporation as federal law
through the Lands Act, the decisions below are reversed, and the
causes remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The District Court dismissed one of the civil causes of action
on the ground that, unlike the other, it did not specifically name
the Lands Act, but rested instead directly on Louisiana law. This
formal omission was inconsequential because of the District Judge's
view that there would be no cause of action even under the Lands
Act and Louisiana law together. On remand, it may be that both
claims can be construed to assert actions under the Lands Act and
Louisiana Law, or that any deficiency in this regard can be cured
by amendment of the pleadings. Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 15.
[
Footnote 2]
67 Stat. 462, as set forth in 43 U.S.C. § 1332:
"(a) It is declared to be the policy of the United States that
the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction, control, and
power of disposition as provided in this subchapter."
[
Footnote 3]
67 Stat. 462, as set forth in 43 U.S.C. § 1333:
"§ 1333. Laws and regulations governing lands."
"(a) Constitution and United States laws; laws of adjacent
States; publication of projected State lines; restriction on State
taxation and jurisdiction."
"(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political
jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and
seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands
and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose
of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources
therefrom, to the same extent as if the outer Continental Shelf
were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a
State:
Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer
Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the
provisions of this subchapter."
"(2) To the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent
with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of
the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and
criminal laws of each adjacent State as of the effective date of
this subchapter are declared to be the law of the United States for
that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental
Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon,
which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were
extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental
Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the Federal
Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining each
such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and
enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United
States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer
Continental Shelf."
"(3) The provisions of this section for adoption of State law as
the law of the United States shall never be interpreted as a basis
for claiming any interest in or jurisdiction on behalf of any State
for any purpose over the seabed and subsoil of the outer
Continental Shelf, or the property and natural resources thereof or
the revenues therefrom."
[
Footnote 4]
41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-768. 46 U.S.C. § 761 reads:
"Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act,
neglect, or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine
league from the shore of any State, or the District of Columbia, or
the Territories or dependencies of the United States, the personal
representative of the decedent may maintain a suit for damages in
the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the
exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child,
or dependent relative against the vessel, person, or corporation
which would have been liable if death had not ensued."
[
Footnote 5]
Since this topic received scant attention in argument in this
Court, additional briefs were requested.
[
Footnote 6]
The Plymouth, 3
Wall. 20 (1866);
The Troy, 208 U.
S. 321 (1908);
T. Smith Son, Inc. v. Taylor,
276 U. S. 179
(1928);
Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910 (C.A.4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 380 U. 6. 963 (1965).
[
Footnote 7]
The Blackheath, 195 U. S. 361
(1904);
The Raithmoor, 241 U. S. 166
(196);
Doullut & Williams Co. v. United States,
268 U. S. 33
(1925).
[
Footnote 8]
"The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
shall extend to and include all cases of damage or injury, to
person or property, caused by a vessel on navigable water,
notwithstanding that such damage or injury be done or consummated
on land."
62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740.
[
Footnote 9]
For example, Senator Daniel asserted that
"the fixed platforms out there do not even touch the waters
except for the supporting pipes or 'legs,' which go through the
water down into the ground. I think you can treat those platforms
as connected with the soil and development of the soil, rather than
treating them as vessels."
Hearings 22. Similarly, Acting Secretary of the Treasury Rose
opined in a letter to the Committee that these islands might not
even be considered to be "upon navigable waters" for the purpose of
applying laws requiring safety lights. Hearings 53. A specific
provision was added to the statute to permit safety regulation. §
4(e), 43 U.S.C. § 1333(e). Obviously these islands were not
constructed principally as aids to navigation, as respondents
contend,
cf. Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60 (C.A. 5th
Cir.1961), but were, instead, hazards to navigation requiring
warning facilities. Governor Kennon of Louisiana voiced strong
opposition, Hearings 44485, as did Senator Long of that State,
e.g., Hearings 275-278.
See also Hearings
513-518, 545, 612. And, at Hearings 644-645, the inappropriateness
of applying the law of the owner of the artificial island or
subsoil lease, rather than the law of the adjacent State, was given
special emphasis.
[
Footnote 10]
See letter to Senator Cordon from Assistant Attorney
General Rankin, Hearings 700; testimony of Mr. Rankin, Hearings
644-645, 664-665, 652-653.
[
Footnote 11]
In the opening discussion of the original draft of the bill,
treating these islands as vessels, Senator Cordon remarked:
"It is the view of the chairman that, when these individuals
leave their vessels and board this structure, they are subject to
the law that operates on the structure, which, in this instance, is
the same law that operates on board a ship, but becomes that
only because of this act."
Hearings 9. (Emphasis added.) And at the end of the hearings,
when the Senators were questioning an admiralty lawyer on the
treatment these structures would receive absent any statutory
provision, he informed them that even a lighthouse would be treated
as land, except insofar as it was subject to admiralty jurisdiction
as an aid to navigation. Hearings 669-670.
[
Footnote 12]
An admiralty expert questioned by the committee took the
position that application of maritime law would be unwise.
"Maritime law in the strict sense has never had to deal with the
resources in the ground beneath the sea, and its whole tenor is
ill-adapted for that purpose."
Hearings 668. Since the Act treats seabed, subsoil, and
artificial islands the same, dropping any reference to special
treatment for presumptive vessels, the most sensible interpretation
of Congress' reaction to this testimony is that admiralty treatment
was eschewed altogether, except to the extent that the Extension of
Admiralty Act might make it applicable.