Appellants, who were independent candidates for presidential
electors from Illinois in the 1968 election, sought declaratory and
injunctive relief from a denial of certification by appellees,
members of the State's Electoral Board. An Illinois statute
provides that nominating petitions for independent candidates must
have 25,000 signatures, including 200 signatures from each of at
least 50 of the State's 102 counties. Appellants' petitions
contained over 25,000 signatures, but not 200 voters from each of
50 counties. Of the State's registered voters, 93.4% reside in the
49 most populous counties, and only 6.6% in the remaining 53
counties. The District Court dismissed the complaint, relying on
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U. S. 281.
Held:
1. The case is not moot, as the burden which
MacDougall v.
Green, supra, placed on nominations for statewide offices
controls future elections, and reflects a continuing federal-state
controversy which needs resolution. P. 816.
2. The Illinois statute, which is an integral part of the
election process, applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely
settled counties and populous counties alike, and thus
discriminates against the residents of the populous counties in the
exercise of their political rights in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
MacDougall v.
Green, supra, overruled. Pp.
394 U. S.
816-819.
293 F. Supp. 411, reversed.
Page 394 U. S. 815
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, announced by MR.
JUSTICE BRENNAN.
This is a suit for declaratory relief and for an injunction, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, brought by appellants who are independent
candidates for the offices of electors of President and Vice
President of the United States from Illinois. The defendants or
appellees are members of the Illinois Electoral Board.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 46, §§ 7-14. In 1968, appellants filed with
appellees petitions containing the names of 26,500 qualified voters
who desired that appellants be nominated. The appellees ruled that
appellants could not be certified to the county clerks for the
November, 1968, election because of a proviso added in 1935 to an
Illinois statute requiring that at least 25,000 electors sign a
petition to nominate such candidates. The proviso reads:
"that included in the aggregate total of 25,000 signatures are
the signatures of 200 qualified voters from each of at least 60
counties."
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 46, § 10-3 (1967).
A three-judge District Court was convened, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281,
2284, which, feeling bound by
MacDougall v. Green,
336 U. S. 281,
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. 293
F. Supp. 411. The case is here on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1263.
On October 8, 1968, the same day the case was docketed,
appellants filed a motion to advance and expedite the hearing and
disposition of this cause. Appellees opposed the motion. On October
14, 1968, we entered the following order:
"Because of the representation of the State of Illinois that 'it
would be a physical impossibility' for the State 'to effectuate the
relief which the appellants seek,' the 'Motion to Advance and
Expedite the
Page 394 U. S. 816
Hearing and Disposition of this Cause' is denied. MR. JUSTICE
FORTAS would grant the motion. 393 U.S. 814."
Appellees urged in a motion to dismiss that, since the November
5, 1968, election has been held, there is no possibility of
granting any relief to appellants, and that the appeal should be
dismissed. But while the 1968 election is over, the burden which
MacDougall v. Green, supra, allowed to be placed on the
nomination of candidates for statewide offices remains and controls
future elections, as long as Illinois maintains her present system
as she has done since 1935. The problem is therefore "capable of
repetition, yet evading review,"
Southern Pacific Terminal Co.
v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U.
S. 498,
219 U. S. 515.
The need for its resolution thus reflects a continuing controversy
in the federal-state area, where our "one man, one vote" decisions
have thrust. We turn then to the merits.
MacDougall v. Green is indistinguishable from the
present controversy. The allegations in that case were that 52% of
the State's registered voters were residents of Cook County alone,
87% were residents of the 49 most populous counties, and only 13%
resided in the 53 least populous counties. The argument was that a
nominating procedure so weighted violates the Equal Protection
Clause.
Today, in contrast, 93.4% of the State's registered voters
reside in the 49 most populous counties, and only 6.6% are resident
in the remaining 53 counties. The constitutional argument, however,
remains the same.
Five members of the Court held in
MacDougall that a
State has
"the power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative
as between its thinly populated counties and those having
concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have
practical opportunities for exerting
Page 394 U. S. 817
their political weight at the polls not available to the
former."
335 U.S. at
335 U. S. 284.
Three members of the Court dissented on the ground that the
nominating procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause. One
member of the Court voted not to exercise this Court's jurisdiction
in equity to resolve the dispute.
While the majority cited
Colegrove v. Green,
328 U. S. 549, as
their authority for denying relief, and while a few who took part
in
Colegrove put this type of question in the "political,"
as distinguished from the "justiciable," category, 328 U.S. at
328 U. S. 552,
that matter was authoritatively resolved in
Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186,
369 U. S. 202.
When a State makes classifications of voters which favor residents
of some counties over residents of other counties, a justiciable
controversy is presented. 369 U.S. at
369 U. S.
198-204.
When we struck down the Georgia county-unit system in statewide
primary elections, we said:
"How then can one person be given twice or ten times the voting
power of another person in a statewide election merely because he
lives in a rural area or because he lives in the smallest rural
county? Once the geographical unit for which a representative is to
be chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to
have an equal vote -- whatever their race, whatever their sex,
whatever their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever
their home may be in that geographical unit. This is required by
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U. S. 368,
372 U. S.
379.
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
held that a State in an apportionment of state representatives and
senators among districts and counties could not deprive voters
in
Page 394 U. S. 818
the more populous counties of their proportionate share of
representatives and senators.
"The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is
of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on
that right strike at the heart of representative government. And
the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise."
377 U.S. at
377 U. S.
555.
We have said enough to indicate why
MacDougall v. Green
is out of line with our recent apportionment cases. The use of
nominating petitions by independents to obtain a place on the
Illinois ballot is an integral part of her elective system.
See
People v. Election Commissioners, 221 Ill. 9, 18, 77 N.E. 321,
323. All procedures used by a State as an integral part of the
election process must pass muster against the charges of
discrimination or of abridgment of the right to vote.
United
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299,
313 U. S.
314-318;
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.
S. 649,
321 U. S.
664.
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112, is
not relevant to the problem of this case. There, each councilman
was required to be a resident of the borough from which he was
elected. Like the residence requirement for state senators from a
multi-district county (
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.
S. 433), the place of residence did not mark the voting
unit; for, in
Dusch, all the electors in the city voted
for each councilman.
It is no answer to the argument under the Equal Protection
Clause that this law was designed to require statewide support for
launching a new political party, rather than support from a few
localities. This law applies a rigid, arbitrary formula to sparsely
settled counties and populous counties alike, contrary to the
constitutional
Page 394 U. S. 819
theme of equality among citizens in the exercise of their
political rights. The idea that one group can be granted greater
voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote
basis of our representative government.
Under this Illinois law, the electorate in 49 of the counties
which contain 93.4% of the registered voters may not form a new
political party and place its candidates on the ballot. Yet 25,000
of the remaining 6.6% of registered voters properly distributed
among the 53 remaining counties may form a new party to elect
candidates to office. This law thus discriminates against the
residents of the populous counties of the State in favor of rural
sections. It, therefore, lacks the equality to which the exercise
of political rights is entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment.
MacDougall v. Green is overruled.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins,
dissenting.
I cannot join in the Court's casual extension of the "one voter,
one vote" slogan to a case that involves neither voters, votes, nor
even an ongoing dispute.
First of all, the case is moot. The appellants brought this
action merely as prospective
"candidates for the offices of Electors of President and
Vice-President of the United States from the State of Illinois to
be voted on at the general election to be held on November 5,
1968."
But the 1968 election is now history, and no relief relating to
its outcome is sought. In the absence of any assertion that the
appellants intend to participate as candidates in any future
Illinois election, the Court's reference to cases involving
"continuing controversies" between the parties is wide of the mark.
Cf. Golden v. Zwickler, ante, p.
394 U. S. 103.
There simply remains no judicially cognizable dispute in this case.
Since, however, the Court reaches a
Page 394 U. S. 820
contrary conclusion, I shall indicate briefly the reasons for my
disagreement with its holding on the merits.
The legislative apportionment cases, upon which the Court places
its entire reliance, were decided on the theory that voters
residing in "underrepresented" electoral districts were denied
equal protection.
"Overweighting and overvaluation of the votes of those living
here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the
votes of those living there."
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533,
377 U. S. 563. In
this case, by contrast, the appellants have sued merely as
prospective candidates for office. They claim no impairment
whatever of any interests they might have as voters; indeed, their
complaint contains no allegation that any of them is, in fact, a
qualified Illinois voter. Undeterred by the appellants' failure to
explain how or as against whom they themselves are denied equal
protection, however, the Court reaches out to hold that this
statute "discriminates against the residents of the populous
counties of the State in favor of rural sections." But since no
"residents of the populous counties of the State" have asserted any
rights, the Court's decision represents, at best, an advisory
vindication of interests not involved in this case.
Even if the interests of voters in Illinois' "populous counties"
were actually represented here, the Court's conclusion would still
be completely unjustified.
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, and
its offspring at least involved situations in which the
"debasement" or "dilution" of voting power found by the Court was
the "certain" result of population variations among electoral
districts. Under the Illinois statute now before us, however, no
injury whatever is suffered by voters in heavily populated areas so
long as their favored candidates are able to secure places on the
ballot. And there is absolutely no indication in the record that
the appellants could not, if they had made
Page 394 U. S. 821
the effort, have easily satisfied Illinois' 50-county,
200-signature requirement. Indeed, there is no suggestion that the
counties from which the appellants drew their support were
"populous", rather than "rural." The rationale of
Reynolds v.
Sims simply does not control this case.
Any reliance by the Court on
Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U. S. 23, would
also be misplaced. That case involved an Ohio requirement that new
political parties secure the support of over 433,000 persons -- 15%
of the electorate -- before their candidates could appear on the
ballot. Here, the 25,000 signatures required by Illinois represent
only about one-half of one percent of the total number of Illinois
voters -- a percentage requirement permissible, one would hope,
under any view of the
Rhodes case. Nor do the appellants
make any showing that securing 200 signatures in less than half of
the State's counties would be a burden at all comparable to that
involved in
Williams v. Rhodes.
The Court held in
MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.
S. 281, in sustaining the very statutory requirement
here at issue, [
Footnote 1]
that Illinois had pursued an "allowable State policy [of]
requir[ing] that candidates for statewide office should have
support not limited to a concentrated locality."
Id. at
335 U. S. 283.
That conclusion seems to me to be no less sound today than it was
at the time of the
McDougall decision. [
Footnote 2] Illinois' policy is, in fact, not
at
Page 394 U. S. 822
all unlike that upheld by the Court only two Terms ago in
Dusch v. Davis, 387 U. S. 112, in
which a district residence requirement imposed upon municipal
officers despite population variations among districts was
nevertheless held proper as reasonably "reflect[ing] a detente
between urban and rural communities. . . ."
Id. at
387 U. S. 117.
Cf. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly, 377 U.
S. 713,
377 U. S. 744
(STEWART, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, supra, at
377 U.S. 589 (HARLAN, J.,
dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
[
Footnote 1]
MacDougall involved Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 46, § 10-2,
relating to ballot position for candidates of new political
parties; Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 46, § 13, involved here, imposes
identical signature requirements for independent candidates.
[
Footnote 2]
While
MacDougall involved candidates for various
offices, the appellants here all sought election as presidential
electors.
See U.S.Const., Art. II, § 1:
"Each State shall appoint,
in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be
entitled in the Congress. . . ."
(Emphasis added.)