Decision on motion that this Court initiate a contempt
proceeding against Greene County, Ala., Probate Judge for allegedly
disobeying this Court's order in
Hadnott v. Amos, ante, p.
394 U. S. 358,
restoring the District Court's temporary restraining order,
deferred pending timely initiation and completion of proceedings in
the District Court to determine whether the Judge's failure to
place certain candidates on the ballot constituted contempt of the
District Court.
PER CURIAM.
The appeal in
Hadnott v. Amos, ante, p.
394 U. S. 358,
decided today, was argued with the motion filed by appellants on
November 19, 1968, "for an order to show cause why Judge Herndon
should not be held in contempt and for other relief." 393 U.S.
996.
On September 18, 1968, the three-judge court entered a temporary
restraining order enjoining appropriate Alabama officials from
using any ballots at the general election of November 5, 1968 which
did not include the
Page 394 U. S. 400
names of the candidates of the National Democratic Party of
Alabama (NDPA). This order was dissolved on October 11, 1968, one
judge dissenting.
295 F.
Supp. 1003. The appellants sought interim relief from this
Court pending appeal, and on October 14, 1968, we entered an order
that: "The application for restoration of temporary relief is
granted pending oral argument on the application. . . ." 393 U.S.
815 (1968). Oral argument was heard on October 18, and on October
19 we entered an order that:
"The order entered on October 14, 1968, restoring temporary
relief is continued pending action upon the jurisdictional
statement which has been filed."
393 U.S.
904. Nevertheless, Judge Herndon, who was responsible for the
preparation of the Greene County ballot for local offices, did not
place the NDPA candidates for such offices on the ballot.
We conclude that decision on the motion should await timely
initiation and completion of appropriate proceedings in the
District Court to determine whether Judge Herndon's failure to
place NDPA candidates on the ballot constituted contempt of the
order of September 18 of the District Court. Decision on the motion
is therefore postponed.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins,
dissenting.
This is a motion requesting that we initiate a proceeding
against Herndon, Probate Judge in Greene County, Alabama, for
disobedience of our order as described in No. 647,
Hadnott v.
Amos, ante, p.
394 U. S. 358,
decided this day. Our order, if obeyed, would have resulted in the
black candidates, sponsored by the National Democratic Party of
Alabama (NDPA), having been on the
Page 394 U. S. 401
ballot for county offices in Greene County in the general
election of November, 1968. They were, it is alleged, left off the
ballot due to the actions of Judge Herndon, as related in
Hadnott v. Amos.
This motion, filed by appellants in No. 647, states they are
informed and believe that Judge Herndon's failure to place these
nominees on the ballot was done "willfully and with actual
knowledge of the order of this court." Judge Herndon filed his
response to that motion, in which he denied that the omission of
the NDPA candidates for county office was "willfully or
contumaciously done with actual knowledge of the said orders of
this court."
This motion was briefed and argued when No. 647 was presented on
the merits.
I have studied the record and read the briefs, and, as presently
advised, I think there is probable cause to conclude that Judge
Herndon knowingly and purposefully evaded our order. What the
ultimate conclusion will be depends, of course, on a full hearing
at which Judge Herndon receives that notice and that opportunity to
be heard which is required by due process. But if what appears to
be probable cause matures into full-fledged findings, we have a
flagrant violation of our order, which involves a vital problem of
civil rights, involving the command of the Fifteenth Amendment,
that extends the ballot to the blacks.
In a case of far less consequence, the Court, proceeding by
contempt on an information filed by the Attorney General,
United States v. Shipp, 214 U. S. 386,
held a sheriff and his deputies in contempt for silent cooperation
with a mob in hanging a prisoner whose case was before this Court.
That sheriff acted by merely turning his back and letting the mob
run wild. In the present case, if the facts alleged are proved,
Judge Herndon's
Page 394 U. S. 402
affirmative acts unlawfully kept the NDPA candidates off the
ballot.
Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs
contempt in the presence of the court. Rule 42(b) covers the
contempt alleged here,
viz., disrespect or violation of
this Court's order. Rule 42(b) provides:
"A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) of
this rule shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice shall state the
time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the
preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts
constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.
The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States
attorney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose,
by an order to show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is
entitled to a trial by jury in any case in which an act of Congress
so provides. He is entitled to admission to bail as provided in
these rules. If the contempt charged involves disrespect to or
criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from presiding at
the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon a
verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing
the punishment."
I would issue the notice prescribed by Rule 42(b), designate an
attorney to represent the Court, appoint a Master, and get on with
the hearings.
Reservation of action on the motion implicates the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Successive federal prosecutions of the same person
based on the same acts are prohibited by the Fifth Amendment.{1}
See United States v.
Lanza,
Page 394 U. S. 403
260 U. S. 377,
260 U. S. 382;
Abbate v. United States, 359 U. S. 187,
359 U. S. 197
(opinion of BRENNAN, J.). It was held in
Pereira v. United
States, 347 U. S. 1,
347 U. S. 9,
that:
"[A] defendant may be convicted of [two offenses] even though
the charges arise from a single act or series of acts, so long as
each requires the proof of a fact not essential to the other."
In the instant case, however, it is likely that the facts
underlying both contempt charges will be identical. In fact, it may
have been impossible for Judge Herndon to have violated one court
order without violating the other.{2}
"Our minds rebel against permitting the same sovereignty to
punish an accused twice for the same offense."
Francis v.
Resweber, 329 U. S. 459,
329 U. S. 462
(opinion of Reed, J.).
"The Constitutional safeguard [against double jeopardy] applies
. . . [where] a person has been tried and convicted of a crime and
it is sought to prosecute him again for the same or an included
offense; [where] a person has been convicted and sentenced and an
attempt is made to increase the sentence; [and where] a person has
been acquitted after a trial on the merits and an endeavor is made
to prosecute him again for the same or an included offense."
United States v. Whitlow, 110 F.
Supp. 871, 872 (D.C. D.C.1953).