This Court previously sustained the formula of the Federal Power
Commission (FPC) for determining the tax component of respondent's
cost of service, but remanded the cases (386 U.S. 237) with respect
to whether it was significant in applying the formula that
respondent had both jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional income.
The Court of Appeals held that the issue had been sufficiently
raised by respondent's petition for rehearing before the FPC, and
that the formula required that consolidated tax savings be first
allocated to respondent's nonjurisdictional income.
Held: Since the FPC did not disclose the basis for its
order and did not "give clear indication that it has exercised the
discretion with which Congress has empowered it,"
Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177,
313 U. S. 197,
the cases were not in the proper posture for judicial review, and
should have been remanded to the FPC for further consideration.
Certiorari granted; 388 F.2d 385, reversed and remanded.
PER CURIAM.
When these cases were here the first time, we sustained the
authority of the Federal Power Commission to determine the tax
component of United's cost of service in
Page 393 U. S. 72
accordance with the formula developed by it in
Cities
Service Gas Co., 30 F.P.C. 18 (1963), but remanded the cases
with respect to whether, in applying the
Cities Service
formula, it was significant that United apparently had both
jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional activities and income.
FPC
v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 386 U. S. 237
(1967). Over the objections of the Commission, the Court of Appeals
held that the issue had been sufficiently raised by United in its
petition for rehearing before the Commission in accordance with §
19 of the Natural Gas Act, 52 Stat. 831, as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
717r, and that the
Cities Service formula required that
consolidated return tax savings coming to United be first allocated
to United's nonjurisdictional income.
The petitions for certiorari are granted, and the judgment of
the Court of Appeals is reversed.** Although we acquiesce in the
Court of Appeals' construction of United's petition for rehearing
filed with the Commission, the issue on remand was not in the
proper posture for final determination by the Court of Appeals, and
should have been remanded to the Commission for further
consideration. It is true that the Commission, in its opinion, had
remarked that "United is largely a regulated company, and we shall
designate it as such for the purpose of these computations."
United Gas Pipe Line Co., 31 F.P.C. 1180, 1190 (1964). But
the Commission made no effort to justify this characterization of
United in terms of the findings, the fundamentals of the
Cities
Service formula, or the applicable law. This may have been
because the adversary proceedings were primarily concerned with the
validity of the formula itself, and never focused precisely on the
question of intra-company revenue and cost allocation. Whatever the
reason, there was "no indication of the basis on which the
Commission exercised its expert
Page 393 U. S. 73
discretion," no articulation of "any rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made."
Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U. S. 156,
371 U. S. 167,
371 U. S. 168
(1962). On this issue, the Commission's order was vulnerable on
rehearing and in the Court of Appeals.
But it does not follow that the Court of Appeals, in the face of
the Commission's insistence that its decision was wholly consistent
with its
Cities Service formula, should have itself
determined that consolidated return savings be first allocated to
nonjurisdictional income, and that
"income from the unregulated component of United is sufficiently
large to absorb all such net tax losses, and no excess remains to
reduce the regulated taxable income of United."
United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 388 F.2d 385, 391-392
(C.A. 5th Cir.1968) (footnote omitted). These questions should have
had adequate attention from the Commission in the first instance
before being subjected to judicial review. Before the courts can
properly review agency action, the agency must disclose the basis
of its order and "give clear indication that it has exercised the
discretion with which Congress has empowered it,"
Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177,
313 U. S. 197
(1941); otherwise the courts are propelled "into the domain which
Congress has set aside exclusively for the administrative agency."
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U. S. 194,
332 U. S. 196
(1947). The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the
cases are remanded with instructions to return the cases to the
Commission for further proceedings.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS and MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the
consideration or decision of these cases.
* Together with No. 248,
Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., also on petition for
writ of certiorari to the same court.
** The motion for leave to use the record in the prior
proceedings before this Court, Nos. 127 and 128, October Term,
1966, is granted.