The Public Authorities Law of New York requires all contracts
awarded by a public authority for work or services to provide that,
upon refusal of "a person" to testify before a grand jury, to
answer relevant questions, or to waive immunity against subsequent
prosecution, such person and any corporation of which he is an
officer or director shall be disqualified for five years from
contracting with any public authority and any existing contracts
may be canceled by the authority without penalty or damages.
Appellant corporation's president, who was also a director and
stockholder, executed three painting contracts, on behalf of
appellant, with the New York City Housing Authority. When appellant
learned of an impending investigation of bid rigging, the president
resigned and divested himself of his stock. He remained in
appellant's employ as an "estimator." He was later subpoenaed to
appear before the grand jury, and refused to sign a waiver of
immunity. Appellant was notified that the contracts were canceled
and that it and the president were disqualified for five years. The
New York Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant, holding the
disqualification valid and the statute constitutional. The court
also rejected appellant's claim that it should not have been
disqualified because its president resigned as president and
director before being called to testify.
Held:
1. The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is "a
personal one, applying only to natural individuals," and, since
appellant corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege, it
cannot take advantage of the claimed invalidity of a penalty
imposed for refusal of an individual, its president, to waive the
privilege. Pp.
392 U. S.
288-289.
2. There is no reason to disturb the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the resignation of the president was solely for the
purpose of avoiding disqualification, and the conclusion of that
court that the purported resignation should be disregarded for
purposes of this case. P.
392 U. S.
289.
20 N.Y.2d 370, 229 N.E.2d 602, affirmed.
Page 392 U. S. 287
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Public Authorities Law of New York, § 2601, provides that a
clause must be inserted in all contracts awarded by a public
authority of the State for work or services to provide that, upon
refusal of "a person" to testify before a grand jury, to answer any
relevant question, or to waive immunity against subsequent criminal
prosecution, such person and any firm or corporation of which he is
a member, officer, or director shall be disqualified for five years
from contracting with any public authority, and any existing
contracts may be canceled by the public authority without incurring
any penalty or damages. [
Footnote
1]
During 1964, appellant, a closely held family corporation,
entered into three painting contracts with appellee New York City
Housing Authority. Each of these contained the standard
disqualification clause. The contracts were executed by appellant's
president, George Campbell, Jr., who was also a director and
stockholder of the corporation.
Early in 1965, appellant became aware that the District Attorney
of New York County was conducting an
Page 392 U. S. 288
investigation before a grand jury of alleged bid rigging on
public contracts, including those of appellant. Thereafter, George
Campbell, Jr., resigned as appellant's president and director and
divested himself of his stock. He remained in appellant's employ as
an "estimator."
A few weeks thereafter, Campbell was subpoenaed to appear before
the grand jury. He refused to sign the waiver of immunity. In due
course, the Public Housing Authority notified appellant that,
pursuant to the provision in its contracts, the contracts were
terminated and Campbell and the corporation were disqualified from
doing business with the Authority for five years.
After proceedings in the lower courts of New York, the New York
Court of Appeals denied relief to appellant. It held that the
disqualification was valid and that § 2601 of the Public
Authorities Law is constitutional, citing
Gardner v.
Broderick, 20 N.Y.2d 227, 229 N.E.2d 184 (1967) (reversed this
day,
ante, p.
392 U. S. 273).
The Court of Appeals also rejected appellant's claim that it should
not have been disqualified because Campbell resigned as president
and director before he was called to testify. [
Footnote 2] We noted probable jurisdiction. 390
U.S. 918 (1968).
We do not consider the constitutionality of § 2601 of New York's
Public Authorities Law or the validity or effect of the contract
provisions incorporating that section. Appellant's claim is that
these provisions operated unconstitutionally to require its
president, Mr. Campbell, to waive the benefits of his privilege
against self-incrimination. But appellant cannot avail itself of
this point, assuming its validity. It has long been settled in
federal jurisprudence that the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is "essentially a personal one, applying only to
natural individuals." It "cannot be utilized by
Page 392 U. S. 289
or on behalf of any organization, such as a corporation."
United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694,
322 U. S. 698,
322 U. S. 699
(1944);
see also Essgee Co. v. United States, 262 U. S.
51 (1923);
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. ICC,
221 U. S. 612,
221 U. S. 622
(1911);
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.
S. 361,
221 U. S.
382-385 (1911);
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.
43,
201 U. S. 74-75
(1906). If a corporation cannot avail itself of the privilege
against self-incrimination, it cannot take advantage of the claimed
invalidity of a penalty imposed for refusal of an individual, its
president, to waive the privilege. Since the privilege is not
available to it, appellant, a corporation, cannot invoke the
privilege to challenge the constitutionality of § 2601 of the
Public Authorities Law.
A fortiori, it cannot assail the
validity of the provision in the contracts into which it entered,
incorporating the substance of that section.
As to appellant's claim that its due process rights were denied
by the imposition of the penalty despite Mr. Campbell's purported
resignation from managerial positions, we do not reach the abstract
legal question that is urged upon us. We see no reason to disturb
the finding of the New York Court of Appeals that "the resignation
was tendered and accepted solely for the purpose of avoiding the
statutory disqualification," and the conclusion of that court that
the purported resignation should be disregarded for purposes of
this case.
Affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
Section 2602 provides for disqualification on the same basis
without reference to any contractual clause.
[
Footnote 2]
The Court of Appeals noted that § 2603 of the Public Authorities
Act vests the State Supreme Court with jurisdiction, for stated
reasons, to remove the disqualification.
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs,
dissenting.
Appellant corporation has been disqualified as a contractor with
the State of New York because its president, George Campbell, Jr.,
who was also a director and an owner of 10% of its stock, invoked
the protection of the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment when summoned before the grand jury. All other officers,
directors,
Page 392 U. S. 290
and the controlling stockholders of this closely held
corporation appeared and indicated a willingness to sign waivers of
immunity and to testify. The president, who invoked the
Self-Incrimination Clause, resigned as officer and director and
agreed to sell his 10% stock interest, though, so far as appears,
the contract of sale has not been consummated. [
Footnote 2/1]
In the old days when a culprit, unpopular person, or suspect was
punished by a bill of attainder, the penalty imposed often reached
not only his own property, but also interests of his family.
[
Footnote 2/2] When the present law
blacklists this family corporation, it has a like impact.
I fail to see how any penalty -- direct or collateral -- can be
imposed on anyone for invoking a constitutional guarantee. A
corporation, to be sure, is not a beneficiary of the
Self-Incrimination Clause, in the sense that it may invoke it.
United States v. White, 322 U. S. 694. Yet
placing this family corporation on the blacklist and
Page 392 U. S. 291
disqualifying it from doing business with the State of New York
is one way of reaching the economic interest of the recalcitrant
president. [
Footnote 2/3] If, as I
felt in
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.
S. 511, placing the penalty of disbarment on a lawyer
for invoking the Self-Incrimination Clause is unconstitutional, so
is placing a monetary penalty on a businessman for doing the same.
[
Footnote 2/4] Reducing the value
of appellant corporation by putting it on the State's blacklist is
a penalty which every stockholder suffers. If New York provided
that, where a businessman invokes the Self-Incrimination Clause of
the Fifth Amendment,
Page 392 U. S. 292
he shall forfeit, say, $10,000, the law would plainly be
unconstitutional as exacting a penalty for asserting a
constitutional privilege. What New York could not do directly, it
may not do indirectly. Yet penalizing this man's family corporation
for his assertion of immunity has precisely that effect.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2) gives
the Fifth Amendment, now applicable to the States by reason of the
Fourteenth, controlling authority over New York's law.
[
Footnote 2/1]
One of the directors of the corporation testified before
appellee New York City Housing Authority that no consideration was
paid for the stock at the time of transfer, and that there was as
yet no formal or informal agreement as to payment for the
stock.
Moreover, the pleadings reveal that George Campbell, Jr., was at
all times relevant here a 10% residuary legatee under the estate of
his late father. That estate contained 50% of the stock of
appellant corporation. Thus, George Campbell, Jr., possessed a
substantial additional interest in the corporation which would
likely be affected by any increase or decrease in the value of the
stock.
[
Footnote 2/2]
E.g., Delaware Laws 1778, c. 29b; New Jersey, Act of
Dec. 11, 1778, N.J.Rev.Laws 40 (Paterson ed. 1800).
Compare North Carolina Laws, Session of April 14, 1778, c.
5, calling for confiscation of the estates of certain persons
"inimical to the United States," but specifically providing that
members of their families should be allowed that portion of the
estate forfeited which they might have enjoyed had the owner died
intestate.
See also Bayard v. Singleton, 1 Martin's N.C.
Rep. 42 (1787).
And see Comment, The Supreme Court's Bill
of Attainder Doctrine: A Need for Clarification, 54 Calif.L.Rev.
212, 214, 216 (1966).
[
Footnote 2/3]
Damage to shareholders which results indirectly from damage done
to the corporation can, of course, be rectified through suit by the
corporation itself or by a stockholder's derivative action.
E.g., Paulson v. Margolis, 234 App.Div. 496, 255 N.Y.S.
568 (Sup.Ct.1932).
See generally Ballantine, Corporations
333-339 (1946); 13 Fletcher Cyclopedia, Corporations §§ 5908-5911
(1961). There is no indication in the opinion of the New York Court
of Appeals that that remedy is inappropriate on the facts of this
case.
[
Footnote 2/4]
The fact that appellant may petition the New York courts for
discretionary relief under § 2603 of the New York Public
Authorities Law does not cure the defect. For appellant's claim is
that its disqualification was improper, and that it was penalized
pursuant to an unconstitutional statute. Its remedy cannot be
limited by § 2603, which was construed by the New York Court of
Appeals below to grant the state courts discretion to afford relief
from a proper disqualification when the application of the statute
would cause an unnecessary hardship. Indeed, § 2603, by its terms,
does not even involve a review of the basis for the
disqualification, but provides that any disqualified corporation
may apply to the New York Supreme Court to discontinue the
disqualification:
"Such application shall be in the form of a petition setting
forth grounds, including that the cooperation by petitioner with
the grand jury at the time of the refusal was such, and the amount
and degree of control and financial interest, if any, in the
petitioning firm, partnership or corporation by the member,
partner, officer or director who refused to waive immunity is such
that it will not be in the public interest to cancel or terminate
petitioner's contracts or to continue the disqualification. . .
."