Kenneth S. Jacobs, for petitioner.
Solicitor General Griswold, Assistant Attorney General Vinson
and Beatrice Rosenberg, for the United States.
Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Denied.
Memorandum of Mr. Justice STEWART.
This case, like Hart v. United States, No. 1044, Misc.,
391 U.S. 956, involves
the power of Congress, when no war has been declared, to enact a
law providing for a limited period of compulsory military training
and service, with an alternative of compulsory domestic civilian
service under certain circumstances. It does not involve the power,
in the absence of a declaration of war, to compel military service
in armed international conflict overseas. If the latter question
were presented. I would join Mr. Justice Douglas in voting to grant
the writ of certiorari.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, dissenting.
Petitioner, who describes himself as a Jehovah's Witnesses
minister, was classified by his Selective Service Appeal Board in
August 1965 as a conscientious objector. See 6(j) of the Universal
Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604 (now the
Military Selective Service Act of 1967), as amended, 50 U.S.C.App.
456(j). Under 6(j), as it read during all dates relevant to this
case, a conscientious objector who, like petitioner, is also
opposed to noncombatant military service, may in lieu of induction
'be ordered by his local board ... to perform ... such civilian
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 937
work contributing to the maintenance of the national health,
safety, or interest as the local board may deem appropriate. ...'
Beginning in October 1965 petitioner and his Local Board exchanged
a series of letters in which the Board explained to petitioner the
types of civilian work available and petitioner asserted his
religious scruples against serving the United States Government in
any capacity, including civilian work programs. Petitioner
reiterated this position in a personal meeting with his Local
Board.
On February 7, 1966, the Board sent petitioner an order to
report an February 21 to an Illinois state hospital for civilian
work assignment. However, on the day he was due to report,
petitioner notified the Board that he refused to do so far
religious reasons.
By indictment, petitioner was charged with willful failure to
report as ordered, in violation of 12(a) of the Act. [
Footnote 1] At his nonjury trial petitioner
moved for judgment of acquittal. That motion was denied, petitioner
was convicted and sentenced to three years imprisonment, and the
Court of Appeals affirmed, one judge dissenting. United States v.
Holmes,
387 F.2d
781 (C.A. 7th Cir.).
Petitioner asks this Court to decide whether a draft2 of men
into the Armed Forces in times of peace is con-
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 938
stitutionally permissible. In the absence of a declaration of
war, he argues, a draft is not authorized and is equivalent to
involuntary servitude. The Court of Appeals held that Congress'
power to conscript men into the Armed Forces was not so limited,
and the Government, opposing certiorari, states that '[e]ven
assuming that the present time is one of 'peace,' it has long been
settled that the power to raise armies by conscription is not
limited to periods of war or national emergency,' citing United
States v. Henderson,
180 F.2d
711 (C.A. 7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963, and Etcheverry
v. United States,
320 F.2d
873 (C.A. 9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 930.
It is clear from our decisions that conscription is
constitutionally permissible when there has been a declaration of
war. But we have never decided whether there may be conscription in
absence of a declaration of war. Our cases suggest (but do not
decide) that there may not be.
In Hamilton v. Regents of University of California,
293 U.S.
245, 265, Mr. Justice Cardozo, concurring (joined by Justices
Brandeis and Stone), indicated that 'governmental power in the
exaction of military service when the nation is at peace' was an
open question.
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 939
At the time Mr. Justice Cardozo wrote (1934) the Selective Draft
Law Act of 1917, 40 Stat. 76, had been tested in this Court and its
validity and congressional power to conscript men for military
service upheld. This Act, however, was enacted May 18, 1917, after
Congress had declared war on the German Empire on April 6, 1917.
(Public Res. No. 1, 65th Cong., 40 Stat. 1.) Thus, the Court had no
occasion to reach the problem of drafting men in a technical time
of peace, that is, a period not covered by declaration of war.
Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366. There the
Court stated that the basis of congressional power to conscript had
to be found in its Art. I, 8, power to 'make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces,' to 'raise
and support armies,' and 'to declare war.' Id., at 377.
None of the decisions prior to the Selective Draft Law Cases
touches directly on the power to conscript in peacetime, and the
reason would appear to be that prior to 1917 the Congress had not
enacted a true conscription or draft provision. In 1794 and 1797
Congress enacted measures authorizing the President to require
state governors to organize a militia. I Selective Service System,
Backgrounds of Selective Service 59- 60 (1947).) In 1814 President
Madison by his Secretary of War James Monroe proposed a form of
draft into the federal army which would raise some 80, 000 recruits
for two years' service. (6 Brant, James Madison 337 (1961); 2
Selective Service System, The Selective Service Act, Appendix A, at
143 ( 1954)). A bill along this line passed the Senate, 19 to 12,
but was defeated in the House (6 Brant, at 349, 359-360),3 and the
War of 1812 was completed with use of volunteers and the state
militia.
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 940
The Civil War provision, the Enrollment Act of 1863, 12 Stat.
731, was the first enactment resembling what can be called a
'draft' provision. 4 However, it created a 'draft' on paper only.
Under 13 of the Enrollment Act enrollees could procure a substitute
to avoid service
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 941
or buy their way out for $300 or less. The result was that
'[t]he poor hired themselves to serve for the well-to-do, as the
law contemplated; then a flourishing traffic in substitution
blossomed out; ....' ( Backgrounds of Selective Service, supra, at
66.) The Act procured only 6% of the total manpower for the North
in the war: 46,000 conscripts and 118, 000 substitutes. See Randall
& Gordon, The Civil War and Reconstruction 315 (2d ed. 1961);
and see Brandon, Where the Action Was in 1863, The Progressive,
April 1968, at 19, and McCague, The Second Rebellion (1968),
discussing extensive riots ignited by the 1863 Conscription.
Act.
The Act of 1863 was never directly attacked in this Court, and
thus no opportunity to weigh the significance of the absence of a
declaration of war (see the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635) arose. Many
years later this Court twice suggested in dicta that the Act of
1863 was valid, but the absence of a declaration of war was not
considered. [
Footnote 5] This
dicta would have particularly little weight
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 942
in view of the fact that what the 1863 Act created was not a
true 'draft' as we understand that term today.
Dicta in three post-Civil War cases indicated in a broad sense
that the Court believed the Congress had power to enact a draft.
Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397; Street v. United States,
133 U.S. 299; and In re
Grimley,
137 U.S.
147. But none of these cases factually concerned conscription,
and there is no reason to believe that the Court, in indicating
that conscription could be valid, had in mind a peacetime
draft.
During the Spanish American War no draft provision was enacted-
Congress merely called for a volunteer army. Apart from certain
laws reorganizing the national militia, it was not until the
Selective Draft Act of 1917 that Congress provided for conscription
into the Regular Army.
Accordingly, Mr. Justice Cardozo's statement in Hamilton that
Congress' power to institute a peacetime draft was an open question
is vindicated by the pre-1934 decisions of this Court. Turning to
post-1934 decisions of this Court, the same conclusion follows. The
Act of 1917 was superseded by the Selective Service Act of 1940, 54
Stat. 885. No decision directly attacking the constitutional basis
of congressional power to conscript, as exercised in the 1940 Act,
came before this Court. In those decisions involving application of
the Act, the attempt to induct the potential soldier had occurred
after the declaration of war with Japan on December 8, 1941 (55
Stat. 795), so that the issue of a peacetime draft was not before
the Court. Thus, in Billings v. Truesdell,
321 U.S. 542, where a
1942 induction was in issue, the Court stated: 'We have no doubt of
the power of Congress to
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 943
enlist the manpower of the nation for the prosecution of the war
and to subject to military jurisdiction those who are unwilling, as
well as those who are eager, to come to the defense of their nation
in its hour of peril.' Id., at 556. (Emphasis added.)
In 1948 the Act of 1940 was superseded by the Universal Military
Training and Service Act, which in turn forms the basis of the
current draft law, the Military Selective Service Act of 1967, 81
Stat. 100. No direct attack was made in this Court on the power of
Congress to conscript, as exercised in the 1948 Act, but
application of the Act was before the Court in two Korean War
period cases. Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, concerned a
petitioner called up under the doctor's draft provisions of the Act
who demanded that he either be commissioned an officer and assigned
medical duties in the area of his specialty or released. The doctor
was inducted on July 26, 1951, before the effective date of
termination of our state of war with either Germany ( October 19,
1951) or Japan (April 28, 1952). No question of unlawful peacetime
draft was raised or alluded to in the case.
United States v. Nugent,
346 U.S. 1, concerned the
procedures for administrative appeal of those claiming to be
conscientious objectors, one of the petitioners having been called
for induction in November 1951 and the other in February 1952. The
Court said:
'The Selective Service Act is a
comprehensive statute designed to provide an orderly, efficient and
fair procedure to marshal the available manpower of the country, to
impose a common obligation of military service on all physically
fit young men. It is a valid exercise of the war power. It is
calculated to function-it functions today-in times of peril.' Id.,
at 9, decided June 8, 1953. (Emphasis added.)
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 944
In that case the declaration of war against Japan in 1941 still
had effect at the time of petitioners' induction, although there
had been no declaration of war accompanying the Korean
conflict.6
The Court has held that 'War does not cease with a cease-fire
order . ...' Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S.
160, 167. It 'continues for the duration of [the] emergency'
(Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S.
138, 141), and empowers the Government 'to guard against the
immediate renewal of the conflict.' Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U.S.
146, 161, 40 S. Ct. 106 (quoting from Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall.
493, 507). In the Kentucky Distilleries case the Court indicated
that war powers endure for some purposes until the treaty of peace
is effective. [
Footnote 7] If,
for the
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 945
purposes of the draft, war continues until the treaty is
effective, the attempted inductions of the petitioners in the
Nugent case were manifestly not peacetime inductions.
In World War II Germany surrendered May 8, 1945, and Japan
surrendered September 2, 1945. See Lee v. Madigan,
358 U.S.
228, 230, 79 S. Ct. 276. On December 31, 1946, the President
proclaimed the cessation of hostilities, declaring that a state of
war still existed. (12 Fed.Reg. 1.) Congress declared the state of
war with Germany terminated on October 19, 1951 (House Joint Res.
No. 289, 65 Stat. 451) and the President proclaimed the same on
October 24, 1951 (66 Stat., c. 3). The effective date of
termination of state of war with Japan was April 28, 1952, when the
Japanese Peace Treaty took effect (66 Stat., c. 31). See Lee v.
Madigan,
358 U.S.
228, 230.
Mr. Justice Cardozo's question about peacetime draft seems,
therefore, to be an open one still. While some decisions suggest
that war powers may be exercised in an 'emergency' prior to
declaration of war, e. g., Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark,
332 U.S.
469, 476, there are other decisions directly linking the power
of conscription to Congress' power under Art. I, 8, cl. 11, to
'declare war.'8 For example, in United States v. Mac-
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 946
intosh
283 U.S.
605, the Court said: 'In express terms Congress is empowered
'to declare war,' which necessarily connotes the plenary power to
wage war with all the force necessary to make it effective; and 'to
raise ... armies,' which necessarily connotes the like power to say
who shall serve in them and in what way.' Id., at 622.
This Court has not reached the merits of the question which I
have been discussing since the Prize Cases, 2 Black 635, decided in
1863. Even though Lincoln was putting down an insurrection within
the country, the Court was divided five-to-four, Mr. Chief Justice
Taney
______--- stated in 1777 in a letter to John Adams: 'Our people,
even under the monarchial government, had learned to consider it
[the draft] as the last of all oppressions.' Jeffersonian
Cyclopedia 263 (1900).
Chief Justice Taney said of the congressional power 'to raise
and support armies': '[T]he words themselves, even if they stood
alone, will not, according to their known and established use and
meaning in the English language, justify this construction
[permitting conscription].
'During the period when the United
States were English Colonies, the Army of England,-the standing
army,-was always raised by voluntary enlistments,-and the right to
coerce all the able bodied subjects of the Crown into the ranks of
the Army and subject them to military law, was not claimed or
exercised by the English Government-and when the power to raise and
support armies was delegated to Congress [by the States], the words
of the grant necessarily implied that they were to be raised in the
usual manner.-And the general government has always heretofore so
understood them and has uniformly by its own officers recruited the
ranks of its 'land forces' by voluntary enlistments for a specified
period.' Taney, Thoughts on the Conscription Law of the U.
States-Rough Draft Requiring Revision, in Auchampaugh, ed., A Great
Justice On State and Federal Power, 18 Tyler's Quarterly Historical
& Genealogical Magazine, 72, 81 (1936). See also Kneedler v.
Lane, 45 Pa.St. 238, 254-255 (opinion of Woodward, J .); Black, the
Selective Draft Cases-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism, 11 B.U.L.Rev. 37 (1931).
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 947
and Justices Catron, Clifford, and Nelson9 voting that the
President alone had no power to place an embargo under which a
British ship was seized while in Hampton Roads.
Putting down an internal insurrection, like defending our shores
against an aggressor, is certainly quite different from launching
hostilities against a nation or a people overseas. [
Footnote 10] I express no opinion on the
merits.
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 948
But there is a weighty view that what has transpired respecting
Vietnam is unconstitutional, absent a declaration of war; that the
Tonkin Gulf Resolution is no constitutional substitute for a
declaration of war; that the making of appropriations was not an
adequate substitute; and that 'executive war-making is illegal.'
Those are the views of Francis D. Wormuth in The Vietnam War: The
President versus the Constitution (1968). 11 Many share his views.
[
Footnote 12] Another
professor has recently pointed out the serious deleterious effects
in the country stemming from the Court's failure to decide whether
the President may constitutionally wage a foreign war in Vietnam
without a declaration of war by Congress. Hughes, Civil
Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1
( 1968). In these type of cases, he says, 'to deny certiorari, to
dismiss suits without
Page 391 U.S.
936 , 949
a reasoned opinion has a tendency to arouse suspicion that the
Court is shrinking from making pronouncements about the basic norms
of the [ constitutional] system.' Id., at 18. If an executive war
is unconstitutional, he says, but the Court refuses to invalidate
it, then the President's 'conduct strengthens the moral case for
disobeying executive orders which stem from his departure from
constitutional demands.' Id., at 19.
As I said, the question whether there can be conscription when
there has not been a declaration of war, has never been decided by
this Court. It is an important question. It is a recurring
question. It is coming to us in various forms in many cases as a
result of the conflict in Vietnam. I think we owe to those who are
being marched off to jail for maintaining that a declaration of war
is essential for conscription an answer to this important undecided
constitutional question.
I would therefore grant certiorari in this case.
Footnotes
Footnote 1 Section 12(a)
provides in part: 'Any member of the Selective Service System ...
charged as herein provided with the duty of carrying out any of the
provisions of this title, or the rules or regulations made or
directions given thereunder, who shall knowingly fail or neglect to
perform such duty ... shall, upon conviction in any district court
of the United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by
imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more
than $10,000, or by both. ...'
Footnote 2 There is no
permissible distinction between men conscripted for armed,
combatant service overseas and those drafted for civilian work.
Initially, the Government purports to uphold the conscription both
of combatants for armed service and conscientious objectors for
'civilian work' under the same source of power-Congress' war power
and power to raise armies. Moreover, the loss of liberty for a
conscientious objector drafted into civilian work is not
appreciably less than that suffered by the combatant soldier.
Except in unusual cases, the Local Board will not permit the
conscientious objector to fulfill his work obligation in his home
town (32 CFR 1660.21(a)). The conscientious objector may indeed be
ordered to do civilian work overseas (32 CFR 1660.31(b)). There is
nothing in the Act or regulations which precludes assigning the
conscientious objector to civilian work in a theater of war, where
his personal safety is imperiled. If he does not perform the
assigned work 'satisfactorily,' he faces prosecution (32 CFR
1660.31(c)).
Footnote 3 The House bill
required classification of all free, white males 18 to 45 into
groups of 25 men. Each group would have to provide one recruit.
Under Monroe's version, if this was not done, the recruit would be
chosen by draft, but the drafted man could provide a substitute. (2
Selective Service System, The Selective Service Act, Appendix A, at
145). Under the House version failure to provide the recruit
resulted in a monetary forfeiture levied on each member of the
group. (Id., at 153-154.) Daniel Webster strenuously argued in the
House of Representatives that the draft bill was unconstitutional.
He noted that the draft power claimed for Congress by Madison and
Monroe was not limited to time of war or invasion and would permit
a draft of men for any type of military service, at home or abroad,
at the discretion of the Government. (Daniel Webster, Speech
Against the Conscription Bill, House of Representatives, December
9, 1814, in L. Schlissel, ed., Conscience in America 67 (1968). And
see 86 Cong. Rec. 5210). 'Who will show me,' he argued, 'any
constitutional injunction, which makes it the duty of the American
people to surrender every thing valuable in life, & even life
itself, not when the safety of their country and its liberties may
demand the sacrifices, but whenever the purposes of an ambitious
& mischievous Government may require it? Sir, I almost disdain
to go to quotations & references to prove that such an
abominable doctrine has no foundation in the Constitution of the
country.' (Id., at 68.)
Footnote 4 The Act of 1863
provided in 1, 'That all able-bodied male Citizens of the United
States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared on
oath their intention to become citizens under and in pursuance of
the laws thereof, between the ages of twenty and forty-five years,
except as hereinafter excepted, are hearby declared to constitute
the national forces, and shall be liable to perform military duty
in the service of the United States when called out by the
President for that purpose.'
The country was divided up into enrollment districts, and
enrollment officers made up two types of lists: class No. 1
consisting of all unmarried eligible enrollees plus others 20 to
35; class No. 2 consisting of the others. Men could be called up
during a two-year period following the July after their enrollment
and would have to serve up to three years. A pecking-order for
draft purposes was compiled on a Draw or lottery-type system. The
President would inform each enrollment district of its conscription
quota. Exemptions were given the physically and mentally
handicapped and sole surviving sons of widows, widowers with young
dependent children, etc.
Footnote 5 In the Selective
Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S.
366, 388, 165, the Court said: 'Cogency, however, if possible,
is added to the demonstration by pointing out that in the only case
to which we have been referred where the constitutionality of the
Act of 1863 was contemporaneously challenged on grounds akin to, if
not absolutely identical with, those here urged, the validity of
the act was maintained for reasons not different from those which
control our judgment. (Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa.St. 238.)' In
Lichter v. United States,
334 U.S. 742, 757, n. 4,
the Court said: 'The draft was put in force both by the Union and
by the Confederacy during the Civil War and its validity was
sustained by the courts in both North and South. 'The power of
coercing the citizen to render military service, is indeed a
transcendent power, in the hands of any government; but so far from
being inconsistent with liberty, it is essential to its
preservation." The Lichter case itself did not concern a
conscription act, but rather statutes enacted in 1942-1945
providing for recovery of excessive wartime profits, applied in
that case to 1942-1943 earnings. Peacetime exercise of the war
power was, therefore, not involved in Lichter.
Footnote 6 Cf. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S.
579, 642, 72 S. Ct. 863, where Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring,
said:
'... no doctrine that the Court could
promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a
President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely
uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can vastly enlarge his
mastery over the internal affairs of the country by his own
commitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign
venture.'
Footnote 7 The Court has
used different tests to determine when war has ended depending on
the nature of the war power sought to be exercised. In Lee v.
Madigan,
358 U.S.
228, involving a prohibition of the Articles of War against
court-martial trials for rape or murder committed in the United
States 'in time of peace,' and in Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 33-35 (opinion
of Black, J.), concerning court-martial jurisdiction of civilians
abroad, the Court said war ended with the cessation of hostilities.
In respect to seizure and removal of aliens from this country,
Ludecke v. Watkins,
335 U.S. 160, summary
exclusion of aliens without hearing; United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy,
338
U.S. 537, imposition of housing and rent controls; Woods v.
Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, and
conserving manpower by forbidding liquor, Hamilton v. Kentucky
Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U.S. 146, the Court
has held that 'war' extends beyond the cessation of hostilities. In
Knauff the Court said as recently as 1950 that we were then in a
state of war. 338 U.S. at 546, 70 S. Ct. at 314. Because no
decision of this Court
has faced the question directly of the need for a declaration of
war to uphold conscription, no decision indicates when 'war' ends
for draft purposes.
Footnote 8 The case against
the constitutionality of a peacetime draft is forcefully argued in
a lawyers' brief on the subject which Senator Wheeler had printed
in the Congressional Record when Congress was debating the bill
that became the Selective Service Act of 1940. The argument,
praised by Senator Wheeler as a 'real contribution' to the debate,
reviews the history of conscription in England prior to the
American Revolution, concludes that peacetime draft was not
tolerated there, and urges that the Framers of the Constitution
intended Congress to 'raise' armies' in the manner by which they
were raised in England. 86 Cong. Rec. 5206-5210. Jefferson
Footnote 9 The dissent by
Mr. Justice Nelson, which the other three joined, stated:
'I am compelled to the conclusion
that no civil war existed between this Government and the States in
insurrection till recognized by the Act of Congress 13th of July,
1861; that the President does not possess the power under the
Constitution to declare war or recognize its existence within the
meaning of the law of nations, which carries with it belligerent
rights, and thus change the country and all its citizens from a
state of peace to a state of war; that this power belongs
exclusively to the Congress of the United States and, consequently,
that the President had no power to set on foot a blockade under the
law of nations, and the capture of the vessel and cargo in this
case, and in all cases before us in which the capture occurred
before the 13th of July, 1861, for breach of blockade, or as
enemies' property, are illegal and void, and that the decrees of
condemnation should be reversed and the vessel and cargo restored.'
2 Black 698-699.
Footnote 10 See United
States v. Smith, 27 Fed. Cas. p. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y.1806). The
defendant was charged with helping outfit a military expedition
against a foreign nation with which the United States was at peace.
(See 1 Stat. 384.) As one defense, he proposed to call witnesses
who would prove that the President had consented to the military
venture against Spanish holdings in South America. The report of
the case contains an extensive, scholarly debate between counsel on
the President's power to himself order a foreign invasion.
A two-judge court, speaking through Paterson, J., held that the
Constitution, 'which measures out the powers and defines the duties
of the president, does not vest in him any authority to set on foot
a military expedition against a nation with which the United States
are at peace.' ( Pp. 1229-1230.) 'Does he possess the power of
making war? That power is exclusively vested in Congress. ... [T]he
executive magistrate ... and commander-in-chief of the forces by
sea and land [may] ... repel an invading foe. But to repel
aggressions and invasions is one thing, and to commit them against
a friendly power is another. ... There is a manifest distinction
between our going to war with a nation at peace, and a war being
made against us by an actual invasion, or a formal declaration. In
the former case, it is the exclusive province of congress to change
a state of peace into a state of war. A nation, however, may be in
such a situation as to render it more prudent to submit to certain
acts of a hostile nature, and to trust to negotiations for redress,
rather than to make an immediate appeal for arms. Various
considerations may induce to a measure of this kind: such as
motives of policy, calculations of interest the nature of the
injury and provocation, the relative resources, means and strength
of the two nations, etc. and, therefore, the organ entrusted with
the power to declare war, should first decide whether it is
expedient to go to war, or to continue in peace. ...' (Pp.
1230-1231).
Footnote 11 An Occasional
Paper published by the Center for the Study of Democratic
Institutions, Santa Barbara, California.
Footnote 12 There are of
course opposed views; and many pros and cons of the issue are
canvassed in The Vietnam War and International Law (Amer.Soc.Int.
Law, ed. by Richard A. Falk) also published in 1968.