Petitioner, 14 years of age, was adjudged a delinquent by an
Ohio Juvenile Court on the basis of the trial judge's finding that
there was "probable cause" to believe that he had committed
second-degree murder, a felony if committed by an adult. He
appealed to a state Court of Appeals alleging that the delinquency
proceeding violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment below, and the Ohio
Supreme Court dismissed a further appeal. After the petition for
certiorari was filed here on April 11, 1967, petitioner was bound
over for trial as an adult and indicted for first-degree
murder.
Held: Since the Ohio courts have not had the
opportunity to assess the impact of
In re Gault,
387 U. S. 1, decided
May 15, 1967, on petitioner's constitutional claims, the judgment
is vacated and remanded to the state Court of Appeals for
reconsideration in light of
Gault. Upon remand, the court
may also consider the impact, if any, on petitioner's questions
concerning the intervening Juvenile Court order requiring him to
face trial in the adult courts.
13 Ohio App.2d 11, 233 N.E.2d 333, vacated and remanded.
Page 391 U. S. 342
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner, who was 14 years old at the time, was adjudged a
delinquent by the Juvenile Court of Fairfield County, Ohio, on
September 7, 1966, on the basis of the trial judge's finding that
there was "probable cause" to believe that he had committed a crime
that would be a felony if committed by an adult, namely,
second-degree murder. Petitioner appealed to the Ohio Court of
Appeals for Fairfield County, contending that the proceeding in the
Juvenile Court which resulted in the order adjudicating him a
delinquent violated his rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, he argued that he had been
determined to be a delinquent on the basis of an unconstitutionally
low standard of proof, and that he had been denied his
constitutional rights to trial by jury, to an impartial tribunal,
and to bail pending disposition of the case against him; he also
contended that his privilege against self-incrimination had been
violated by the admission into evidence against him of statements
made in response to questioning from police officers. The Ohio
Court of Appeals rejected these contentions and affirmed the
judgment of the Juvenile Court on January 3, 1967. 13 Ohio App.2d
11, 233 N.E.2d 333. On March 15, 1967, the Supreme Court of Ohio,
sua sponte, dismissed petitioner's further appeal on the
ground that it presented "no substantial constitutional question."
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court which
we granted, 389 U.S. 819 (1967), raising the same issues presented
in the Ohio courts.
Under Ohio law, an adjudication that a child is a delinquent can
have numerous substantial consequences. For example, once such a
determination is made, the Juvenile Court may place the child in a
variety of state institutions or in a foster home. Ohio Rev.Code §
2151.35. Another alternative disposition in a case where the
child
Page 391 U. S. 343
has been found to have committed a felony is for the Juvenile
Court to bind the child over to the Court of Common Pleas for trial
under the criminal statutes applicable to adults. Ohio Rev.Code §
2151.26.
* At the time the
petition for certiorari was filed in this case on April 11, 1967,
no disposition beyond the adjudication itself and ordering of a
physical and mental examination of petitioner had been made by the
Juvenile Court. We have since been informed by the parties that
petitioner has been bound over for trial as an adult, and that he
has been indicted for the crime of first-degree murder.
The State argues vigorously that, because of the disposition
subsequently made by the Juvenile Court, the proceeding at which
the determination of delinquency was made was merely the equivalent
of a probable cause hearing for an adult. Petitioner, on the other
hand, asserts that his adjudication as a delinquent is final for
purposes of appellate review, and that substantial consequences of
that decision continue despite the supervening transfer of
jurisdiction over petitioner to the adult criminal courts. The
resolution of this dispute is crucial to many of the issues
presented by petitioner, since, for example, in ordinary probable
cause hearings involving adults, there is no right to either trial
by jury or a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The
unresolved question under Ohio law is not whether the adjudication
of delinquency is a final, appealable order. The Ohio Court of
Appeals considered that issue and ruled that
Page 391 U. S. 344
the order is appealable, and the Ohio Supreme Court necessarily
accepted this conclusion because its dismissal of the appeal was
not based on the jurisdictional issue. The question which the Ohio
courts have not settled is what, if any, effect the "disposition"
order, entered after their decisions on the appeal and after the
petition for certiorari was filed here, has upon the prior
delinquency determination made by the Juvenile Court.
On the constitutional issues, petitioner relies heavily on
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, which
was decided on May 15, 1967, some two months after the dismissal by
the Ohio Supreme Court in this case. In
Gault, this Court
held squarely, for the first time, that various of the federal
constitutional guarantees accompanying ordinary criminal
proceedings were applicable to state juvenile court proceedings
where possible commitment to a state institution was involved.
Because the Ohio courts have not had the opportunity to assess the
impact of that decision on petitioner's claims, we deem it
appropriate to vacate the judgment of the Ohio Court of Appeals and
remand the case for reconsideration in light of
Gault.
Upon such remand, the Ohio court may, of course, also consider the
impact, if any, on the questions raised by petitioner of the
intervening order of the Juvenile Court requiring him to face trial
in the adult courts.
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Ohio
Court of Appeals for Fairfield County for consideration in light of
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1
(1967).
Vacated and remanded.
* In addition, Ohio specifically provides that a delinquency
judgment may be considered by any court with respect to sentencing
or probation in subsequent criminal proceedings. Ohio Rev.Code §
2151.35. For a general discussion of the practical consequences for
juveniles of a delinquency record,
see the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 66-67, 75 (1967), and its Task
Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime 92-93, 360-361,
385, 417-418 (1967).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins,
dissenting.
I would dismiss this case because the determination of
delinquency which we have before us is not a final judgment within
our appellate jurisdiction over proceedings in state courts. 28
U.S.C. § 1257.
Estman
Page 391 U. S. 345
v. Ohio, 299 U.S. 505 (1936);
Polakow's Realty
Experts, Inc. v. Alabama, 319 U.S. 750 (1943);
see Berman
v. United States, 302 U. S. 211,
302 U. S. 212
(1937);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.
S. 160,
314 U. S. 171
(1941); R. Stern & E. Gressman, Supreme Court Practice § 3-15
(3d ed.1962); Robertson & Kirkham's Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court of the United States, § 39 (R. Wolfson & P. Kurland,
eds.1951). The Juvenile Court's formal order found petitioner to be
delinquent but made no final disposition of his case; it did not
relinquish jurisdiction to the adult court, place petitioner on
probation, or commit him to a juvenile institution. Since that
time, however, the Juvenile Court has entered an order
relinquishing jurisdiction to the adult court. That order is now on
appeal in the courts of Ohio, and that order may be a final
judgment of the Juvenile Court falling within the reach of our
appellate jurisdiction. If that order were properly before us now,
it would raise the question of the constitutionality of the
procedures employed to determine delinquency where such a
determination is a prerequisite (as it may be under Ohio law) to
relinquishing jurisdiction to the adult court. I do not believe
that turnover proceedings require all of the formalities which
should attend a determination of delinquency for purposes of final
disposition in the Juvenile Court itself. I also have great doubt
that the finding of delinquency in this case, and any consequences
which normally attach to it, would in any way survive a trial and a
not guilty verdict in the adult courts.