An action was instituted by the Bank of Alexandria, in the
County of Alexandria, against the defendants, residents in the
County of Washington, in the same district, for money loaned. The
suit was brought in the County of Washington. The defendants
pleaded the statute of limitations of Maryland, which prevails in
that part of the District of Columbia, and which limits such
actions to three years, from the date of the contract. The
plaintiff replied that he was "beyond seas," claiming the benefit
of the exception in the statute in favor of persons "beyond
seas."
The words "beyond seas" in the statute of limitations of
Maryland, are manifestly borrowed from the English statute of
limitations of James I, ch. 21, and it has always been held, that
they ought not to be interpreted according to their literal
meaning, but ought to be construed as equivalent to the words,
"without the jurisdiction of the state." According to this
interpretation, a person residing in another state of the Union was
"beyond seas," within the meaning of the act of assembly, and
therefore excepted from its operation, until he should come within
the limits of Maryland. This statute is in force in Washington
County, in the District of Columbia, and this Court will give it
the same construction it has received in the courts of
Maryland.
The County of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia, cannot be
regarded as standing in the same relation to the County of
Washington that the states of this Union stand in relation to one
another.
The Counties of Washington and Alexandria together constitute
the Territory of Columbia, and are united under one territorial
government. They have been formed by the acts of Congress into one
separate political community, and the counties which constitute it
resemble different counties in the same state, and do not stand
towards one another in the relations of distinct and separate
governments. Residents of the County of Alexandria were not "beyond
seas" in respect to the County of Washington.
On 26 October, 1835, the plaintiff in error instituted a suit in
the Circuit Court of the United States for the County of
Washington, in the District of Columbia, against the defendants,
for the sum of two thousand five hundred dollars, by them, the
plaintiffs, before that time, in Alexandria, in the District of
Columbia, lent and advanced to the defendants, at their special
instance and request.
The defendants pleaded the statute of limitations of the State
of Maryland, which limits actions of this nature to three years. To
this plea the plaintiff replied that at the time of making of the
promise alleged against the defendants, they, the said plaintiffs,
were in the County of Alexandria, in the District of Columbia,
beyond the seas, and so continued until the day of the impetration
of the original writ in this action.
The defendants demurred to this replication, and the circuit
court gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiffs prosecuted
this writ of error.
Page 39 U. S. 145
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case arises upon an action of assumpsit, brought by the
plaintiffs in error, against the defendants, in the Circuit Court
of the United States for Washington County, in the District of
Columbia. The declaration contains the usual money counts, to which
the defendants pleaded the statute of limitations. The plaintiffs
replied, that they ought not to be precluded from having their
action, because at the time of making the promise, they (the
plaintiffs) "were in the County of Alexandria, in the District of
Columbia, beyond the seas," and so in the County of Alexandria,
beyond the seas, remained until the bringing of this action. To
this replication, the defendants demurred. The plaintiffs joined in
demurrer, and the circuit court gave judgment for the
defendants.
The question presented by these pleadings is the construction of
that clause in the Maryland act of limitations, which exempts from
the operation of the act all persons who are "beyond the seas" at
the time cause of action accrues, and continues the exemption until
they shall return. The words "beyond the seas" in this law are
manifestly borrowed from the English statute of limitation of James
I, ch. 21, and it has always been held, that they ought not to be
interpreted according to their literal meaning, but ought to be
construed as equivalent to the words "without the jurisdiction of
the state." According to this interpretation, a person residing in
any other state of the Union was "beyond the seas," within the
meaning of this act of assembly, and therefore excepted from its
operation until he should come within the limits of Maryland.
This statute is in force in Washington County in this District,
where the present action was brought, having been adopted for that
county by the Act of Congress of February 27, 1801, together with
the other laws of Maryland, as they then existed. And having been
thus adopted, the Court will, of course, give to it the
construction which it has uniformly received in the courts of
Maryland.
But the County of Alexandria, in this District, cannot be
regarded as standing in the same relation to the County of
Washington that the states of this Union stand in relation to one
another. When this act of limitation was passed (1715, ch. 23), no
doubt a person in Alexandria was "beyond the seas" in relation to
Maryland in the sense in which these words are used in the law in
question. But it is equally certain that if the County of
Alexandria had afterwards been ceded to Maryland and been
incorporated with it as a part of the same political body, the
inhabitants of that county
Page 39 U. S. 146
would no longer have been within the saving of this proviso, and
the act of limitations would have operated directly upon them. The
same principles must apply when the County of Alexandria has become
united with a portion of Maryland, in which this act of limitation
is in force, and forms with such portion one political community,
united under one government. Such is now the condition of the
Counties of Washington and Alexandria, which together constitute
the Territory of Columbia and are united under one territorial
government. They have been formed by the acts of Congress into one
separate political community, and the two counties which compose
it, resemble different counties in the same state, and do not stand
towards one another in the relation of distinct and separate
governments. The plaintiffs, therefore, were not "beyond the seas"
in respect to the County of Washington, and the judgment of the
circuit court must be
Affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Washington and was argued
by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of the said circuit court
in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.
