The Secretary of Labor filed this action under § 902(b) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, seeking
invalidation by the District Court of an election of union officers
held by respondent in 1963 and an order directing that a new
election be conducted under the Secretary's supervision. That
provision authorizes the Secretary, upon the complaint of a union
member who has exhausted is union remedies, to file suit when an
investigation gives the Secretary probable cause to believe that a
union election violates the standards prescribed in § 401 of the
Act. If the court finds that a § 401 violation "may have affected
the outcome of an election," the Act provides that the court shall
declare the election void and direct a new election supervised by
the Secretary. The complaint alleged that the Union had violated §
401(e) of the Act by imposing an unreasonable restriction on
members' eligibility to be candidates and to hold office. Although
finding the restriction violative of § 401(e), the District Court
dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not established that
the violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election.
While petitioner's appeal was pending, the Union, in 1965, held
another regular election. The Court of Appeals held that the 1965
election mooted the Secretary's challenge to the 1963 election, and
vacated the District Court's judgment without reaching the
merits.
Held: When the Secretary of Labor proves the existence
of a § 401 violation that may have affected the outcome of a
challenged election, he is not deprived of the right to a court
order voiding the challenged election and directing that a new
election be conducted under his supervision because the union has
meanwhile conducted another unsupervised election. Pp.
389 U. S.
467-476.
372 F.2d 86, reversed and remanded.
Page 389 U. S. 464
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, filed this action in the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania seeking a
judgment declaring void the election of officers conducted by
respondent Local Union on October 18, 1963, and directing that a
new election be conducted under the Secretary's supervision.
Section 402(b) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 482(b), authorizes the Secretary of Labor,
upon complaint by a union member who has exhausted his internal
union remedies, to file the suit when an investigation of the
complaint gives the Secretary probable cause to believe that the
union election was not conducted in compliance with the standards
prescribed in § 401 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 481. If the court finds
that a violation of § 401 occurred which "may have affected the
outcome of an election," it "shall declare the election, if any, to
be void, and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision
of the Secretary." [
Footnote 1]
The alleged illegality in the
Page 389 U. S. 465
election was a violation of the provision of § 401(e), 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(e), that, in a union election subject to the Act, every union
member "in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to
hold office (subject to . . . reasonable qualifications uniformly
imposed). . . ."
Page 389 U. S. 466
A Local bylaw provided that union members had to have attended
75% of the Local's regular meetings in the two years preceding the
election to be eligible to stand for office. [
Footnote 2] The union member whose complaint
invoked the Secretary's investigation had not been allowed to stand
for President at the 1963 election because he had attended only 17
of the 24 regular monthly meetings, one short of the requisite 75%;
under the bylaws, working on the night shift was the only excusable
absence, and none of his absences was for this reason.
The District Court held that the meeting attendance requirement
was an unreasonable restriction upon the eligibility of union
members to be candidates for office, and therefore violated §
401(e), [
Footnote 3] but
dismissed the suit on the ground that it was not established that
the violation "may have affected the outcome" of the election.
244 F.
Supp. 745. The Secretary appealed to the Court
Page 389 U. S. 467
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The appeal was pending when
the Local conducted its next regular biennial election in October,
1965. The Court of Appeals held that the Secretary's challenge to
the 1963 election was mooted by the 1965 election, and therefore
vacated the District Court judgment with the direction to dismiss
the case as moot. In consequence, the court did not reach the
merits of the question whether the unlawful meeting attendance
qualification may have affected the outcome of the 1963 election.
372 F.2d 86. [
Footnote 4]
Because the question whether the intervening election mooted the
Secretary's action is important in the administration of the LMRDA,
we granted certiorari, 387 U.S. 904, and set the case for oral
argument with No. 58,
Wirtz v. Local 126, Laborers' Int'l
Union, post, p.
389 U. S. 477. We
reverse.
The holding of the Court of Appeals did not rest on any explicit
statutory provision that, on the happening of another unsupervised
election, the Secretary's cause of action should be deemed to have
"ceased to exist."
California v. San Pablo & T. R.
Co., 149 U. S. 308,
149 U. S. 313.
[
Footnote 5] Indeed, a literal
reading of § 402(b) would more reasonably
Page 389 U. S. 468
compel the contrary conclusion. For no exceptions are admitted
by the unambiguous wording that, when
"the violation of § 401 may have affected the outcome of an
election, the court
shall declare the election, if any, to
be void and direct the conduct of a new election under supervision
of the Secretary. . . ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, this does not end the inquiry. We have cautioned
against a literal reading of congressional labor legislation; such
legislation is often the product of conflict and compromise between
strongly held and opposed views, and its proper construction
frequently requires consideration of its wording against the
background of its legislative history and in the light of the
general objectives Congress sought to achieve.
See, e.g.,
National Woodwork Mfrs. Assn. v. NLRB, 386 U.
S. 612,
386 U. S. 619.
The LMRDA is no exception. [
Footnote 6]
A reading of the legislative history of the LMRDA, and of Title
IV in particular, reveals nothing to indicate any consideration of
the possibility that another election might intervene before a
final judicial decision of the Secretary's challenge to a
particular election. The only reasonable inference is that the
possibility did not occur to the Congress. [
Footnote 7] We turn, therefore, to the question
Page 389 U. S. 469
whether, in light of the objectives Congress sought to achieve,
the statute may properly be construed to terminate the Secretary's
cause of action upon the fortuitous event of another unsupervised
election before final judicial decision of the suit.
The LMRDA has seven subdivisions dealing with various facets
both of internal union affairs and of labor-management relations.
The enactment of the statute was preceded by extensive
congressional inquiries upon which Congress based the findings,
purposes, and policy expressed in § 2 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 401.
[
Footnote 8] Of special
significance in this case are the findings that, "in the public
interest," remedial legislation was necessary to
Page 389 U. S. 470
further the objective
"that labor organizations . . . and their officials adhere to
the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in
administering the affairs of their organizations . . . ,"
29 U.S.C. § 401(a), this because Congress found,
"from recent investigations in the labor and management fields
that there have been a number of instances of breach of trust,
corruption, disregard of the rights of individual employees, and
other failures to observe high standards of responsibility and
ethical conduct . . ."
requiring
"supplementary legislation that will afford necessary protection
of the rights and interests of employees and the public generally
as they relate to the activities of labor organizations . . . and
their officers and representatives."
29 U.S.C. § 401(b).
Title IV's special function in furthering the overall goals of
the LMRDA is to insure "free and democratic" elections. [
Footnote 9] The legislative history
shows that Congress
Page 389 U. S. 471
weighed how best to legislate against revealed abuses in union
elections without departing needlessly from its longstanding policy
against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union
affairs. [
Footnote 10] The
extensive and vigorous debate over Title IV manifested a conflict
over the extent to which governmental intervention in this most
crucial aspect of internal union affairs was necessary or
desirable. In the end, there emerged a
"general congressional policy to allow unions great latitude in
resolving their own internal controversies, and, where that fails,
to utilize the agencies of Government most familiar with union
problems to aid in bringing about a settlement through discussion
before resort to the courts."
Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U. S. 134,
379 U. S.
140.
But the freedom allowed unions to run their own elections was
reserved for those elections which conform to the democratic
principles written into § 401. International union elections must
be held not less often than once every five years, and local union
elections not less often than once every three years. Elections
must be
Page 389 U. S. 472
by secret ballot among the members in good standing, except that
international unions may elect their officers at a convention of
delegates chosen by secret ballot. 29 U.S.C. §§ 481(a), (b).
Specific provisions insure equality of treatment in the mailing of
campaign literature; require adequate safeguards to insure a fair
election, including the right of any candidate to have observers at
the polls and at the counting of ballots; guarantee a "reasonable
opportunity" for the nomination of candidates, the right to vote
without fear of reprisal, and, pertinent to the case before us, the
right of every member in good standing to be a candidate, subject
to "reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed." 29 U.S.C. §§
481(c), (e).
Even when an election violates these standards, the stated
commitment is to postpone governmental intervention until the union
is afforded the opportunity to redress the violation. This is the
effect of the requirement that a complaining union member must
first exhaust his internal union remedies before invoking the aid
of the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a). And if the union denies the
member relief and he makes a timely complaint to the Secretary, the
Secretary may not initiate an action until his own investigation
confirms that a violation of § 401 probably infected the challenged
election. Moreover, the Secretary may attempt to settle the matter
without any lawsuit; the objective is not a lawsuit, but to "aid in
bringing about a settlement through discussion before resort to the
courts."
Calhoon v. Harvey, supra. And if the Secretary
must finally initiate an action, the election is presumed valid
until the court has adjudged it invalid. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a).
Congress has explicitly told us that these provision were designed
to preserve a
"maximum amount of independence and self-government by giving
every international
Page 389 U. S. 473
union the opportunity to correct improper local elections."
S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, I Leg.Hist. 417.
But it is incorrect to read these provisions circumscribing the
time and basis for the Secretary's intervention as somehow
conditioning his right to relief once that intervention has been
properly invoked. Such a construction would ignore the fact that
Congress, although committed to minimal intervention, was obviously
equally committed to making that intervention, once warranted,
effective in carrying out the basic aim of Title IV. [
Footnote 11] Congress deliberately
gave exclusive enforcement authority to the Secretary, having
"decided to utilize the special knowledge and discretion of the
Secretary of Labor in order best to serve the public interest."
Calhoon v. Harvey, supra. In so doing, Congress rejected
other proposals, among them plans that would have authorized suits
by complaining members in their own right. [
Footnote 12] And Congress unequivocally declared
that,
Page 389 U. S. 474
once the Secretary establishes in court that a violation of §
401 may have affected the outcome of the challenged election, "the
court
shall declare the election . . . to be void and
direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of the
Secretary. . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 482(c). (Emphasis supplied.)
We cannot agree that this statutory scheme is satisfied by the
happenstance intervention of an unsupervised election. The notion
that the unlawfulness infecting the challenged election should be
considered as washed away by the following election disregards
Congress' evident conclusion that only a supervised election could
offer assurance that the officers who achieved office as
beneficiaries of violations of the Act would not by some means
perpetuate their unlawful control in the succeeding election. That
conclusion was reached in light of the abuses surfaced by the
extensive congressional inquiry showing how incumbents' use of
their inherent advantage over potential rank and file challengers
established and perpetuated dynastic control of some unions.
See S.Rep. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. These abuses
were among the "number of instances of breach of trust . . . [and]
disregard of the rights of individual employees. . ." upon which
Congress rested its decision that the legislation was required in
the public interest. [
Footnote
13] Congress chose the alternative of a supervised election as
the remedy for a § 401 violation in the belief that the protective
presence of a neutral Secretary of Labor would best prevent the
unfairness in the first election from infecting, directly or
indirectly, the remedial election. The choice also reflects a
conclusion that union members made aware of unlawful practices
could not adequately protect their own interests through an
unsupervised election. It is clear, therefore, that the
intervention of an election
Page 389 U. S. 475
in which the outcome might be as much a product of unlawful
circumstances as the challenged election cannot bring the
Secretary's action to a halt. Aborting the exclusive statutory
remedy would immunize a proved violation from further attack and
leave unvindicated the interests protected by § 401. Title IV was
not intended to be so readily frustrated.
Respondent argues that granting the Secretary relief after a
supervening election would terminate the new officers' tenure
prematurely on mere suspicion. But Congress, when it settled on the
remedy of a supervised election, considered the risk of incumbents'
influence to be substantial, not a mere suspicion. The only
assurance that the new officers do, in fact, hold office by reason
of a truly fair and a democratic vote is to do what the Act
requires, rerun the election under the Secretary's supervision.
The Court of Appeals concluded that it would serve "no practical
purpose" to void an old election once the terms of office conferred
have been terminated by a new election. We have said enough to
demonstrate the fallacy of this reasoning: first, it fails to
consider the incumbents' possible influence on the new election.
Second, it seems to view the Act as designed merely to protect the
right of a union member to run for a particular office in a
particular election. But the Act is not so limited, for Congress
emphatically asserted a vital public interest in assuring free and
democratic union elections that transcends the narrower interest of
the complaining union member.
We therefore hold that, when the Secretary of Labor proves the
existence of a § 401 violation that may have affected the outcome
of a challenged election, the fact that the union has already
conducted another unsupervised election does not deprive the
Secretary of his right to a court order declaring the challenged
election void
Page 389 U. S. 476
and directing that a new election be conducted under his
supervision. [
Footnote
14]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case
remanded to that court with direction to decide the merits of the
Secretary's appeal.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
LMRDA § 402, 29 U.S.C. § 482:
"(a) A member of a labor organization --"
"(1) who has exhausted the remedies available under the
constitution and bylaws of such organization and of any parent
body, or"
"(2) who has invoked such available remedies without obtaining a
final decision within three calendar months after their invocation,
may file a complaint with the Secretary within one calendar month
thereafter alleging the violation of any provision of section 401
(including violation of the constitution and bylaws of the labor
organization pertaining to the election and removal of officers).
The challenged election shall be presumed valid pending a final
decision thereon (as hereinafter provided) and in the interim the
affairs of the organization shall be conducted by the officers
elected or in such other manner as its constitution and bylaws may
provide."
"(b) The Secretary shall investigate such complaint and, if he
finds probable cause to believe that a violation of this title he
occurred and has not been remedied, he shall, within sixty days
after the filing of such complaint, bring a civil action against
the labor organization as an entity in the district court of the
United States in which such labor organization maintains its
principal office to set aside the invalid election, if any, and to
direct the conduct of an election or hearing and vote upon the
removal of officers under the supervision of the Secretary and in
accordance with the provisions of this title and such rules and
regulations as the Secretary may prescribe. . . ."
"(c) If, upon a preponderance of the evidence after a trial upon
the merits, the court finds --"
"
* * * *"
"(2) that the violation of section 401 may have affected the
outcome of an election,"
"the court shall declare the election, if any, to be void and
direct the conduct of a new election under supervision of the
Secretary and, so far as lawful and practicable, in conformity with
the constitution and bylaws of the labor organization. . . ."
"(d) An order directing an election, dismissing a complaint, or
designating elected officers of a labor organization shall be
appealable in the same manner as the final judgment in a civil
action, but an order directing an election shall not be stayed
pending appeal."
The complaining union member invoked his internal union remedies
on October 24, 1963, and, not having received a final decision
within three calendar months, filed a timely complaint with the
Secretary.
[
Footnote 2]
Article IX, § 1, of the International Constitution provided
that:
"All candidates for office, before nomination, must have
attended 75 percent of the meetings for at least two years prior to
the election."
Article 4, § 12, of the Local's bylaws provided:
"No member may be a candidate unless said member is in good
standing and has attended seventy-five percent (75%) of the regular
local meetings since the last local election."
And § 13 further provided:
"In cases where members have to work at the time of meetings,
and so notify the Recording Secretary, they shall be marked present
at such meetings, provided they notify the Secretary in writing
within seventy-two (72) hours following the meeting. . . ."
[
Footnote 3]
As a consequence of the meeting attendance requirement, only 11
of the 500-member Local were eligible to run for office in 1963.
The Vice President and Financial Secretary ran for reelection
unopposed, and there were no candidates for Recording Secretary and
for three Trust positions. These positions were filled by
appointment of members who could not have qualified as candidates
under the meeting attendance requirement.
[
Footnote 4]
Pending decision on the appeal, the Court of Appeals, on the
Secretary's application, remanded the case to the District Court to
permit the Secretary to make a post-judgment motion to have the
1965 election declared invalid. The District Court denied the
motion. That denial was also appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed on the ground that,
"absent a complaint by a union member challenging the 1965
election, the Secretary had no authority to use to establish the
invalidity of that election."
372 F.2d at 88. Our decision makes unnecessary any consideration
of the correctness of that holding.
[
Footnote 5]
The Court of Appeals adopted the holding of the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in
Wirtz v. Local 410, IUOE, 366
F.2d 438. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in No. 58,
Wirtz v. Local 126, Laborers' Int'l Union, supra, also
followed the Second Circuit.
[
Footnote 6]
Archibald Cox, who actively participated in shaping much of the
LMRDA, has remarked:
"The legislation contains more than its share of problems for
judicial interpretation because much of the bill was written on the
floor of the Senate or House of Representatives and because many
sections contain calculated ambiguities or political compromises
essential to secure a majority. Consequently, in resolving them,
the courts would be well advised to seek out the underlying
rationale without placing great emphasis upon close construction of
the words."
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act
of 1959, 58 Mich.L.Rev. 819, 852 (1960).
[
Footnote 7]
There are references to the desirability of expeditious
determinations of the Secretary's suits, but it is clear from the
contexts in which they appear that the concern was to settle as
quickly as practicable the cloud on the incumbents' titles to
office, and not to avoid possible intervention of another election.
See S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 21, I Leg.Hist.
417; 104 Cong.Rec. 7954, Leg.Hist. 699 (Dept. Labor 1964)
(hereafter cited D.L.Leg.Hist.) (Senator Kennedy); 104 Cong.Rec.
11003, D.L.Leg.Hist. 710 (Senator Smith);
cf. Cox, The
Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy, 72 Harv.L.Rev. 609,
631-634 (1959). The provision of § 402(d), 29 U.S.C. § 482(d), that
"an order directing an election shall not be stayed pending appeal"
is consistent with the concern that challenges to incumbents'
titles to office be resolved as quickly as possible.
[
Footnote 8]
The background and legislative history of the 1959 Act are
discussed in Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of
Labor Unions,
supra, n
6; Levitan & Loewenberg, The Politics and Provisions of the
Landrum-Griffin Act, in Regulating Union Government 28 (Estey, Taft
& Wagner eds.1964); Rezler, Union Elections: The Background of
Title IV of LMRDA, in Symposium on LMRDA 475 (Slovenko ed.1961).
And see Cox, Preserving Union Democracy,
supra,
n 7, at 628-634.
Although Senator Kennedy, a principal sponsor of the
legislation, counseled against mixing up the interests of providing
for internal union democracy and of enacting measures concerned
with relations between labor and management,
see 105
Cong.Rec. 883 885, II Leg.Hist. 968-969;
cf. S.Rep. No.
187,
supra, n 7, at
5-7, I Leg.Hist. 401 403, neither the debates nor the Act itself
reveals unwavering adherence to this principle.
See, e.g.,
Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions,
supra, n 6, at 831-833.
[
Footnote 9]
"It needs no argument to demonstrate the importance of free and
democratic union elections. Under the National Labor Relations and
Railway Labor Acts, the union which is the bargaining
representative has power, in conjunction with the employer, to fix
a man's wages, hours, and conditions of employment. The individual
employee may not lawfully negotiate with his employer. He is bound
by the union contract. In practice, the union also has a
significant role in enforcing the grievance procedure where a mans
contract rights are enforced. The Government which gives unions
this power has an obligation to insure that the officials who wield
it are responsive to the desires of the men and women whom they
represent. The best assurance which can be given is a legal
guaranty of free and periodic elections. The responsiveness of
union officers to the will of the members depends upon the
frequency of elections and an honest count of the ballots.
Guaranties of fairness will preserve the confidence of the public
and the members in the integrity of union elections."
S.Rep. No. 187,
supra, n 7, at 20, and H.R.Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.,
15-16, I Leg.Hist. 416, 773-774.
See S.Rep. No. 187,
supra, at 2-5, H.R.Rep. No. 741,
supra, at 1-7, I
Leg.Hist. 398-401, 759-765.
[
Footnote 10]
See S.Rep. No. 187,
supra, n 7, at 7, I Leg.Hist. 403:
"In acting on this bill [S. 1555], the committee followed three
principles: 1. The committee recognized the desirability of minimum
interference by Government in the internal affairs of any private
organization. . . . [I]n establishing and enforcing statutory
standards, great care should be taken not to undermine union
self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective
bargaining agents. 2. Given the maintenance of minimum democratic
safeguards and detailed essential information about the union, the
individual members are fully competent to regulate union affairs. .
. . 3. Remedies for the abuses should be direct. . . . [T]he
legislation should provide an administrative or judicial remedy
appropriate for each specific problem."
See also ibid.:
"The bill reported by the committee, while it carries out all
the major recommendations of the [McClellan] committee, does so
within a general philosophy of legislative restraint."
The election title of the Senate bill referred to in the
Committee Report was enacted virtually as drafted by the
Senate.
[
Footnote 11]
See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 187,
supra, n 7, at 34, I Leg.Hist. 430:
"The committee bill places heavy reliance upon reporting and
disclosure to union members, the Government and the public to
effect correction of abuses where they have occurred. However, the
bill also endows the Secretary of Labor with broad power to insure
effectuation of its objectives. . . ."
"
* * * *"
". . . He has power to -- . . . (e) investigate violations of
the election provisions and bring court actions to overturn
improperly held elections and supervise conduct of new elections. .
. ."
"The committee believes that the
broad powers granted to the
Secretary by this bill combined with full reporting and
disclosure to union members and the public
provides a most
effective combination of devices by which abuses can be
remedied."
(Emphasis supplied.)
[
Footnote 12]
S. 748, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., I Leg.Hist. 84, 118-134; H.R.
8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., I Leg.Hist. 687, 727-729.
See
H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 35, I Leg.Hist.
939.
[
Footnote 13]
See supra at
389 U. S.
469-470
[
Footnote 14]
There is much discussion in the briefs of possible alternatives
to our conclusion, such as expediting proceedings under § 402 to
bring about their final decision before the next regular election,
or injunctive relief against the conduct of that election pending
final decision in the Secretary's suit. That discussion, however,
assumes a construction of the statute contrary to that which we
have reached, and therefore requires no comment.