Florida's Unemployment Compensation Law, as applied by the State
Industrial Commission's holding that petitioner was disqualified
for unemployment compensation solely because she filed an unfair
labor practice charge with the National Labor Relations Board,
held: invalid as violating the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution because it frustrates enforcement of the National
Labor Relations Act. Pp.
389 U. S.
238-240.
191 So. 2d 99, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160, authorizes the National Labor Relations
Board to initiate unfair labor practice proceedings whenever some
person charges that another person has committed such practices.
The Board cannot start a proceeding without such a charge being
filed with it.
See, e.g., National Labor Relations Board v.
National Licorice Co., 104 F.2d 655 (C.A.2d Cir.),
Page 389 U. S. 236
modified on other grounds, 309 U.
S. 350;
Local 1, Operating Engineers (Skur),
148 N.L.R.B. 679, 681. The crucial question presented here is
whether a State can refuse to pay its unemployment insurance to
persons solely because they have preferred unfair labor practice
charges against their former employer.
The facts are stipulated and need not be stated at length. The
petitioner, Mrs. Nash, who previously had been out on strike
against her employer, the Stanley Works and Stanley Building
Specialties, was, pursuant to union-management agreement,
reinstated to her former job on April 14, 1965. Approximately five
weeks later, on May 16, 1965, she was laid off by the company
because of alleged "slow production," meaning that the company had
insufficient work to warrant her retention. Mrs. Nash was
unemployed from this time until October 5, 1965, when the company
voluntarily called her back to work. She has been allowed
unemployment compensation, under Florida Statutes, chapter 443,
from the time of her discharge on May 16, up to June 17, but denied
any compensation from June 17 to October 5. The reason given for
this denial was that, on June 17 she filed an unfair labor practice
charge against her employer seeking reinstatement and back pay on
the ground that the employer had actually laid her off because of
her union activities in violation of the National Labor Relations
Act, and that this charge was still pending on October 5, when she
resumed work. In making this ruling the Florida Industrial
Commission relied on § 443.06 of the Florida Unemployment
Compensation Law which provides:
"An individual shall be disqualified for [unemployment]
benefits. . . .(4) For any week with respect to which the
commission finds that his total or partial unemployment is due to a
labor dispute in
Page 389 U. S. 237
active progress which exists at the factory, establishment or
other premises at which he is or was last employed. . . ."
The Commission held that the filing of the unfair labor practice
charge brought petitioner within the wording of the Act in that her
"unemployment" then became "due to a labor dispute." Thus, the sole
reason that petitioner was disqualified from compensation was that
she filed an unfair labor practice charge. According to the
Commission, the act of filing was the determinative factor under
Florida law which rendered petitioner ineligible for unemployment
compensation. The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third
District, denied per curiam petitioner's application for writ of
certiorari to review the determinations of the Florida Industrial
Commission Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Since such
denial by the Florida District Court of Appeal apparently precludes
further state review,{1} we granted certiorari because of the
important constitutional question involved, specifically whether
the Commission's ruling violates the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution (Art. VI, cl. 2) because it allegedly "frustrates"
enforcement
Page 389 U. S. 238
of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. §
151
et seq.{2}
The National Labor Relations Act is a comprehensive code passed
by Congress to regulate labor relations in activities affecting
interstate and foreign commerce. As such it is, of course, the law
of the land which no state law can modify or repeal. Implementation
of the Act is dependent upon the initiative of individual persons
who must, as petitioner has done here, invoke its sanctions through
filing an unfair labor practice charge.{3} Congress has made it
clear that it wishes all persons with information about such
practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting
them to the Board. This is shown by its adoption of § 8(a)(4),
which makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges.
See John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263-264, 191 F.2d 483,
485-486;
National Labor Relations Board v. Lamar Creamery
Co., 246 F.2d 8, 910 (C.A. 5th Cir.);
National Labor
Relations Board v. Syarcuse Stamping Co., 208 F.2d 77, 80
(C.A.2d Cir.). And it has been held that it is unlawful for an
employer to seek to restrain an employee in the exercise of his
right to file charges.
National Labor Relations Board v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., 213 F.2d 70 (C.A.3d Cir.);
National
Labor Relations Board v. Gibbs Corp., 308 F.2d 247 (C.A. 5th
Cir.);
Roberts v. National Labor Relations Board, 121
U.S.App.D.C. 297, 350 F.2d 427.
Page 389 U. S. 239
We have no doubt that coercive actions which the Act forbids
employers and unions to take against persons making charges are
likewise prohibited from being taken by the States. The action of
Florida here, like the coercive actions which employers and unions
are forbidden to engage in, has a direct tendency to frustrate the
purpose of Congress to leave people free to make charges of unfair
labor practices to the Board. Florida has applied its Unemployment
Compensation Law so that an employee who believes he has been
wrongly discharged has two choices: (1) he may keep quiet and
receive unemployment compensation until he finds a new job or (2)
he may file an unfair labor practice charge, thus under Florida
procedure surrendering his right to unemployment compensation, and
risk financial ruin if the litigation is protracted. Even the hope
of a future award of back pay may mean little to a man of modest
means and heavy responsibilities faced with the immediate severance
of sustaining funds. It appears obvious to us that this financial
burden which Florida imposes will impede resort to the Act and
thwart congressional reliance on individual action. A national
system for the implementation of this country's labor policies is
not so dependent on state law. Florida should not be permitted to
defeat or handicap a valid national objective by threatening to
withdraw state benefits from persons simply because they cooperate
with the Government's constitutional plan.{4}
In holding that this Florida law as applied in this case
conflicts with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
Page 389 U. S. 240
we but follow the unbroken rule that has come down through the
years.
In
McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316,
17 U. S. 436,
decided in 1819, this Court declared the States devoid of power
"to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry
into execution the powers vested in the general government."
In Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.
S. 275, decided in 1896, this Court declared that a
state law cannot stand that
"either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or
impairs the efficiency of those agencies of the Federal government
to discharge the duties, for the performance of which they were
created."
Id. at
161 U. S. 283.
And again, in
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.
S. 538,
325 U. S.
542-543, decided in 1945, this Court struck down a labor
regulation saying it stood "
as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress. . . .'" Id. at 325 U. S.
542.
All of the cases just cited and many more support our
invalidation under the Supremacy Clause of the Florida Unemployment
Compensation Law as here applied.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
The Florida Supreme Court seems to have decided that it lacks
jurisdiction by appeal to consider per curiam denials of certiorari
by the Florida District Court of Appeal.
Callendar v.
State, 181 So. 2d
529. While it is true that a district court of appeal may
certify a question "of great public interest" to the Florida
Supreme Court, this is done upon the district court of appeal's own
motion, and although litigants may file a suggestion that a
particular question be certified, such suggestion has been declared
to have "no legal effect."
See Whitaker v. Jacksonville
Expressway Authority, 131 So. 2d 22 (1st D.C. App. Fla.1961).
Thus, it is impossible for us to say that, under Florida law,
petitioner here had any right to call upon the State Supreme Court
for review. In these circumstances, we therefore are unable to say
that the District Court of Appeal was not the highest court in
Florida wherein a decision could be had, as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1257(3).
Because of our disposition of the case on Supremacy Clause
grounds, we need not consider petitioner's alternative argument
that such ruling violates her privileges and immunities of United
States citizenship in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Although § 10(a) of the Act empowers the Board to prevent unfair
labor practices, and thus to protect the employees' § 7 rights, §
10(b) conditions the exercise of that power on the filing of
charges; the Board cannot initiate its own processes.
Respondents suggest that petitioner might enjoy a windfall if
she was paid compensation and was subsequently awarded back pay by
the Labor Board. This argument is unresponsive to the issue in
dispute, however, since a State is free to recoup compensation
payments made during any period covered by a back-pay award.
See National Labor Relations Board v. Gullett Gin Co.,
340 U. S. 361,
340 U. S. 365,
n. 1.