Petitioner union and respondent company were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement which required payment of
accumulated vacation pay to qualified employees upon termination of
their employment. In June, 1957, the company discharged employees
covered by the agreement without such payment. An action brought in
the Indiana courts to recover the amounts allegedly due was
dismissed in 1960 on the ground that the complaint was insufficient
under state law. Almost four years later, and almost seven years
after the employees' discharge, the union brought this action in
the Federal District Court under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 1947. The Act contains no time limitation upon the
bringing of an action under § 301. The District Court viewed the
action as based partly on the collective bargaining agreement and
partly on the oral contract of each employee, and held that
Indiana, in such case, would apply its six-year statute of
limitations governing contracts not in writing. The complaint was
accordingly dismissed as untimely, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed.
Held:
1. A union may properly sue under § 301 to recover wages or
vacation pay claimed by its members pursuant to a collective
bargaining agreement.
Smith v. Evening News Assn.,
371 U. S. 195,
371 U. S. 198.
Pp.
383 U. S.
699-700.
2. The timeliness of a suit under § 301, there being no
governing federal provision, is to be determined, as a matter of
federal law, by reference to the appropriate state statute of
limitations. Pp.
383 U. S.
701-704.
(a) The fact that Congress did not provide a uniform limitations
provision for § 301 suits does not require that the courts invent
one. P.
383 U. S.
703.
(b) State statutes have repeatedly supplied the periods of
limitation for federal causes of action when federal legislation
has been silent. Pp.
383 U. S.
703-704.
Page 383 U. S. 697
3. The characterization of this suit as one not exclusively
based on a written contract, and the application of the Indiana
six-year statute of limitations, do not conflict with federal labor
policy. Pp.
383 U. S.
705-707.
4. The statute of limitations was not tolled in this case by the
prior litigation.
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424,
distinguished. Pp.
383 U. S.
707-708.
346 F.2d 242, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, confers
jurisdiction upon the federal district courts over suits upon
collective bargaining contracts. [
Footnote 1] Nowhere
Page 383 U. S. 698
in the Act, however, is there a provision for any time
limitation upon the bringing of an action under § 301. The
questions presented by this case arise because of the absence of
such a provision.
The petitioner union and the respondent company were parties to
a collective bargaining contract within the purview of § 301. The
contract contained a section governing vacations. One clause in
this section dealt with payment of accumulated vacation pay, by
providing:
"Employees who qualified for a vacation in the previous year and
whose employment is terminated for any reason before the vacation
is taken will be paid that vacation at time of termination."
On June 1, 1957, prior to the expiration of the contract, the
company terminated the employment of employees covered by the
agreement, but it did not pay them any accumulated vacation pay.
Since that date, two lawsuits have been brought to recover amounts
allegedly due. The first was a class action in early 1958, brought
against the company in an Indiana court, but the court ruled that
such
Page 383 U. S. 699
an action was impermissible under Indiana law. In an attempt to
remedy this pleading defect, the former employees assigned their
vacation pay claims to a union representative, who then filed an
amended complaint, but this form of action, too, was held improper
under Indiana law. Thereafter, by further amended complaints, the
employees sought to reform and reinstitute the class action, but,
once again, the trial court held the complaint insufficient as a
matter of state law. The court dismissed the suit in June, 1960,
and the judgment of dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
Johnson
v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 134 Ind. 477,
189 N.E.2d
592.
Almost four years after the dismissal of that lawsuit by the
Indiana trial court, and almost seven years after the employees had
left the company, the union filed the present action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. On the
company's motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint,
concluding that the suit was barred by a six-year Indiana statute
of limitations. The court regarded this action as based partly upon
the written collective bargaining agreement and partly upon the
oral employment contract each employee had made, and it held that
Indiana would apply to such a hybrid action its six-year statute
governing contracts not in writing. Ind.Stat.Ann. § 2-601 (1965
Supp.). 235 F. Supp. 183. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed, 346 F.2d 242, and we granted certiorari, 382 U.S.
808.
We note at the outset that this action was properly brought by
the union under § 301. There is no merit to the contention that a
union may not sue to recover wages or vacation pay claimed by its
members pursuant to the terms of a collective bargaining contract.
Such a suit is among those "[s]uits for violation of contracts
between an employer and a labor organization" that § 301 was
designed to permit. This conclusion is unimpaired
Page 383 U. S. 700
by the fact that each worker's claim may also depend upon the
existence of his individual contract of employment.
See J. I.
Case Co. v. Labor Bard, 321 U. S. 332,
321 U. S.
335-336. In
Smith v. Evening News Assn.,
371 U. S. 195, we
rejected the view, once held for varying reasons by a majority of
this Court,
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U. S. 437,
"that § 301 did not give the . . . courts jurisdiction over a
suit brought by a union to enforce employee rights . . .
characterized as . . . arising 'from separate hiring contracts
between the employer and each employee.'"
371 U.S. at
371 U. S. 198.
Although the
Smith case was brought by an individual
worker, there is every reason to recognize the union's standing to
vindicate employee rights under a contract the union obtained. Such
recognition is fully consistent with the language of § 301(b): "Any
. . . labor organization may sue . . . in behalf of the employees
whom it represents in the courts of the United States." 61 Stat.
156, 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1964 ed.). [
Footnote 2] And indeed, the union's standing to vindicate
employee rights under § 301 implements no more than the established
doctrine that the union's role in the collective bargaining process
does not end with the making of the contract. [
Footnote 3]
Page 383 U. S. 701
Since this suit was properly brought under § 301, the question
of its timeliness is squarely presented. It is clearly a federal
question, for, in § 301 suits, the applicable law is "federal law,
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor
laws."
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448,
353 U. S. 456.
Relying upon that statement and upon the coordinate principle that
"incompatible doctrines of local law must give way to principles of
federal labor law,"
Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S. 102,
the union contends that this suit cannot be barred by a statute of
limitations enacted by a State. We are urged, instead, to devise a
uniform time limitation to close the statutory gap left by
Congress. But the teaching of our cases does not require so bald a
form of judicial innovation.
Lincoln Mills instructs that,
in fashioning federal law, the "range of judicial inventiveness
will be determined by the nature of the problem." 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 457.
We do not question that there are problems so vital to the
implementation of federal labor policy that they will command a
high degree of inventiveness from the courts. The problem presented
here, however, is not of that nature.
It is true that, if state limitations provisions govern § 301
suits, these suits will lack a uniform standard of timeliness. It
is also true that the subject matter of § 301 is "peculiarly one
that calls for uniform law."
Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour
Co., supra, at
369 U. S. 103.
Our cases have defined the need for uniformity, however, in terms
that are largely inapplicable here:
"The possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings under [two systems of law] would inevitably
exert a disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and
administration of collective
Page 383 U. S. 702
agreements. Because neither party could be certain of the rights
which it had obtained or conceded, the process of negotiating an
agreement would be made immeasurably more difficult by the
necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in such a way
as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of law
which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the
collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting
substantive interpretation under competing legal systems would tend
to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation. Indeed,
the existence of possibly conflicting legal concepts might
substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract
terms providing for final arbitral or judicial resolution of
disputes."
". . . The ordering and adjusting of competing interests through
a process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the
keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial peace. State
law which frustrates the effort of Congress to stimulate the smooth
functioning of that process thus strikes at the very core of
federal labor policy."
Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S.
95,
369 U. S.
103-104.
The need for uniformity, then, is greatest where its absence
would threaten the smooth functioning of those consensual processes
that federal labor law is chiefly designed to promote -- the
formation of the collective agreement and the private settlement of
disputes under it. For the most part, statutes of limitations come
into play only when these processes have already broken down. Lack
of uniformity in this area is therefore unlikely to frustrate in
any important way the achievement of any significant goal of labor
policy. Thus, although a uniform limitations provision for § 301
suits might well
Page 383 U. S. 703
constitute a desirable statutory addition, there is no
justification for the drastic sort of judicial legislation that is
urged upon us. [
Footnote 4]
See Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra, at
371 U. S. 203
(BLACK, J., dissenting).
That Congress did not provide a uniform limitations provision
for § 301 suits is not an argument for judicially creating one,
unless we ignore the context of this legislative omission. It is
clear that Congress gave attention to limitations problems in the
Labor Management Relations Act, 1947; it enacted a six months'
provision to govern unfair labor practice proceedings, 61 Stat.
146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1964 ed.), and it did so only after
appreciable controversy. [
Footnote
5] In this context, and against the background of the
relationship between Congress and the courts on the question of
limitations provisions, it cannot be fairly inferred that, when
Congress left § 301 without a uniform time limitation, it did so in
the expectation that the courts would invent one. As early as 1830,
this Court held that state statutes of limitations govern the
timeliness of federal causes of action unless
Page 383 U. S. 704
Congress has specifically provided otherwise.
McCluny v.
Silliman, 3 Pet. 270,
28 U. S. 277.
In 1895, the question was reexamined in another context, but the
conclusion remained firm.
Campbell v. Haverhill,
155 U. S. 610.
Since that time, state statutes have repeatedly supplied the
periods of limitations for federal causes of action when federal
legislation has been silent on the question. [
Footnote 6]
E.g., McClaine v. Rankin,
197 U. S. 154,
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461
(National Bank Act);
Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta,
203 U. S. 390
(Sherman Act);
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.
S. 318 (Civil Rights Act of 1870);
Englander Motors,
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802 (C.A. 6th Cir.) (Clayton
Act);
but see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392 (Federal Farm Loan Act). Yet, when Congress has
disagreed with such an interpretation of its silence, it has spoken
to overturn it by enacting a uniform period of limitations.
E.g., 69 Stat. 283, 15 U.S.C. 15b (1964 ed.) (Clayton
Act); 35 U.S.C. § 286 (Patent Act).
See also Herget v. Central
Bank Co., 324 U. S. 4. Against
this background, we cannot take the omission in the present statute
as a license to judicially devise a uniform time limitation for §
301 suits. Accordingly, since no federal provision governs, we hold
that the timeliness of a § 301 suit, such as the
Page 383 U. S. 705
present one, is to be determined, as a matter of federal law, by
reference to the appropriate state statute of limitations.
[
Footnote 7] This leaves two
subsidiary question to be decided. Which of Indiana's limitations
provisions governs? [
Footnote
8] Does any tolling principle preserve the timeliness of this
action?
The union argues that, if the timeliness of this action is to be
determined by reference to Indiana statutes, federal law precludes
reference to the Indiana six-year provision governing contracts not
in writing. Reference must be made instead, it is urged, to the
Indiana 20-year provision governing written contracts.
Ind.Stat.Ann. § 602 (1965 Supp.). This contention rests on the view
that, under federal law, this § 301 suit must be regarded
Page 383 U. S. 706
as exclusively bottomed upon the written collective bargaining
agreement. We agree that the characterization of this action for
the purpose of selecting the appropriate state limitations
provision is ultimately a question of federal law.
Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, supra; McClaine v. Rankin, supra.
But there is no reason to reject the characterization that state
law would impose unless that characterization is unreasonable or
otherwise inconsistent with national labor policy.
Cf.
Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.
S. 204,
328 U. S. 210;
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U. S. 570,
351 U. S.
580-582.
Applying this principle, we cannot agree that federal law
requires that this action be regarded as exclusively based upon a
written contract. For purposes of § 301 jurisdiction, we have
rejected the view that a suit such as this is based solely upon the
separate hiring contracts, frequently oral, between the employer
and each employee.
Smith v. Evening News Assn., supra. It
does not follow, however, that the separate contracts of employment
may not be taken into account in characterizing the nature of a
specific § 301 suit for the purpose of selecting the appropriate
state limitations provision. Indeed, as the present case indicates,
consideration of the separate contracts for that purpose is
entirely acceptable. The petitioner seeks damages based upon an
alleged breach of the vacation pay clause in a written collective
bargaining agreement. Proof of the breach and of the measure of
damages, however, both depend upon proof of the existence and
duration of separate employment contracts between the employer and
each of the aggrieved employees. Hence, this § 301 suit may fairly
be characterized as one not exclusively based upon a written
contract.
Moreover, the characterization that Indiana law imposes upon
this action does not lead to any conflict with
Page 383 U. S. 707
federal labor policy. Indeed, to the extent that a policy is
manifest in the Labor Management Relations Act, it supports
acceptance of the characterization adopted here. The six months'
provision governing unfair labor practice proceedings, 61 Stat.
146, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b), suggests that relatively rapid disposition
of labor disputes is a goal of federal labor law. Since state
statutes of limitations governing contracts not exclusively in
writing are generally shorter than those applicable to wholly
written agreements, their applicability to § 301 actions comports
with that goal. There may, of course, be § 301 actions that can
only be characterized fairly as based exclusively upon a written
agreement. But since many § 301 actions for wages or other
individual benefits will concern employment contracts of the sort
involved here, there is no reason to inhibit the achievement of an
identifiable goal of labor policy by precluding application of the
generally shorter limitations provisions. [
Footnote 9]
Accordingly, we accept the District Court's application of the
six-year Indiana statute of limitations to this action.
Cf.
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.
S. 198,
350 U. S.
204-205;
Steele v. General Mills, 329 U.
S. 433,
329 U. S. 438.
Thus, since this federal lawsuit was not filed until almost seven
years after the cause of action accrued, the cause
Page 383 U. S. 708
is barred by the six-year statute unless that statute was
somehow tolled by reason of the particularized circumstances of
this case. [
Footnote 10]
The contention that some tolling principle saves the life of
this action was raised for the first time in this Court. In any
event, we find the contention without merit. In
Burnett v. New
York Central R. Co., 380 U. S. 424, we
held that the bringing of a timely action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act in a state court, even though venue was
improper, served to toll the statute of limitations contained in
that Act. The primary underpinning of
Burnett, however, is
wholly lacking here. As the Court noted in that case, a tolling
principle was necessary to implement the national policy of a
uniform time bar clearly expressed by Congress when it enacted the
FELA limitations provision. 380 U.S. at
380 U. S. 434.
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act establishes no
such policy of uniformity expressed in a national limitations
provision. Moreover, unlike the plaintiff in
Burnett, who
could no longer bring a timely federal action after the state court
dismissed his complaint, the union here had a full three years to
bring this lawsuit in federal court after the dismissal of the
state court action. [
Footnote
11] Under these circumstances, we have no difficulty in
concluding that this cause of action expired in June 1963, six
years after it arose.
Affirmed.
Page 383 U. S. 709
[
Footnote 1]
We use the term "collective bargaining contracts" for
convenience only, and do not intend to suggest that § 301 is
limited to such contracts.
See Retail Clerks v. Lion Dry
Goods, 369 U. S. 17.
Section 301 provides:
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer
whose activities affect commerce as defined in this chapter shall
be bound by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may
sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as an
entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable against
any individual member or his assets."
"(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or against
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States,
district courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor
organization (1) in the district in which such organization
maintains its principal office, or (2) in any district in which its
duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in representing or
acting for employee members."
"(d) The service of summons, subpoena, or other legal process of
any court of the United States upon an officer or agent of a labor
organization, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service
upon the labor organization."
"(e) For the purposes of this section, in determining whether
any person is acting as an 'agent' of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or
subsequently ratified shall not be controlling."
61 Stat. 156-157, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964 ed .).
[
Footnote 2]
See also Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;
Dowd Box v. Courtney, 368 U.
S. 502,
368 U. S. 504;
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel Car Corp.,
363 U. S. 593.
[
Footnote 3]
See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U. S.
41,
355 U. S. 46;
Comment, 28 U.Chi.L.Rev. 707, 716.
That the employees in this case did not assign their claims to
the union presents no barrier to the union's standing to sue in
their behalf. Such a technical requirement would conflict with one
of the widely recognized purposes of Congress in enacting § 301 --
the elimination of common law procedural obstacles to suits for
breach of collective bargaining agreements.
See, e.g., Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U. S. 448,
353 U. S. 451.
Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over
Labor Relations: II, 59 Col.L.Rev. 269.
[
Footnote 4]
Our cases have spoken of the federal law applicable to § 301
suits as "substantive,"
see, e.g., Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at
353 U. S. 456,
and the need for uniformity in the "substantive principles" that
govern these suits.
See Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U.S. at
369 U. S. 103.
In the view we take of the problem presented here, we need not
decide whether statutes of limitations are "substantive" or
"procedural."
See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U. S.
99;
Burnett v. New York Central R. Co.,
380 U. S. 424,
380 U. S. 427,
note 2. Nor need we rigidly classify them as "primary" or
"remedial." To the extent that these terms are useful, we need only
notice that lack of uniformity in limitations provisions is
unlikely to have substantial effect upon the private definition or
effectuation of "substantive" or "primary" rights in the collective
bargaining process.
See Wellington, Labor and the Federal
System, 26 U.Chi.L.Rev. 542, 556-559.
[
Footnote 5]
Compare, e.g., the remarks of Senator Wagner, 93
Cong.Rec. 3323,
and those of Senator Murray, 93 Cong.Rec.
4030,
with the remarks of Senator Smith, 93 Cong.Rec.
4283.
[
Footnote 6]
In
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.
S. 221, this Court held that,
"where an action for unseaworthiness is combined with an action
under the Jones Act a court cannot apply to the former a shorter
period of limitations than Congress has prescribed for the
latter."
357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 224.
The
McAllister case represents no departure from the
tradition discussed in the text. The Court's decision rested on the
peculiar configuration of the federal maritime remedies. A seaman
suing for both unseaworthiness and Jones Act negligence must do so
in a single proceeding.
Baltimore S. . Co. v. Phillips,
274 U. S. 316. The
Court had no occasion in
McAllister to consider whether a
state period longer than that provided in the Jones Act could be
applied. 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 227
(BRENNAN, J., concurring).
[
Footnote 7]
The present suit is essentially an action for damages caused by
an alleged breach of an employer's obligation embodied in a
collective bargaining agreement. Such an action closely resembles
an action for breach of contract cognizable at common law. Whether
other § 301 suits different from the present one might call for the
application of other rules on timeliness, we are not required to
decide, and we indicate no view whatsoever on that question.
See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392;
Moviecolor Limited v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80 (C.A.2d Cir.); 2 Moore Federal Practice �
3.07[1]-[3], at 740-764 (2d ed.1965); Hill, State Procedural Law in
Federal Nondiversity Litigation, 69 Harv.L.Rev. 66, 111-114.
[
Footnote 8]
The record indicates that Indiana is both the forum State and
the State in which all operative events occurred. Neither party has
suggested that the limitations provision of another State is
relevant. There is therefore no occasion to consider whether such a
choice of law should be made in accord with the principle of
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.
S. 487, or by operation of a different federal conflict
of laws rule.
See Richards v. United States, 369 U. S.
1;
De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.
S. 570;
Vanston Bondholders Protective Committee v.
Green, 329 U. S. 156;
McKenzie v. Irvin Trust Co., 323 U.
S. 365;
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp., 315 U. S. 447.
See also discussion in Hart Wechsler, The Federal Courts
and the Federal System 696
et seq.
[
Footnote 9]
Other questions would be raised if this case presented a state
law characterization of a § 301 suit that reasonably described the
nature of the cause of action, but required application of an
unusually short or long limitations period.
See, e.g.,
N.M.Stat. § 59-3 (1953) (an action for wages "must be commenced
within sixty [60] days from the date of discharge. . . .").
See
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610,
155 U. S. 615;
Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 161
F.2d 83 (C.A. 5th Cir.); Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law":
Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules
for Decision, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 797, 805-806.
[
Footnote 10]
Neither part has suggested that the cause of action "accrued" on
any date other than June 1, 1957, when the company terminated the
employees' jobs.
Cf. Rawlings v. Ray, 312 U. S.
96;
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.
S. 461;
Moviecolor Limited v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80, 83 (C.A.2d Cir.).
[
Footnote 11]
It should be noted also that Indiana has a saving statute,
Ind.Ann.Stat. § 2-608 (1946 Repl. Vol.), but the union has never
contended that it preserves the timeliness of this suit.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN join, dissenting.
Certain principles are undisputed in this case. The period of
limitations for § 301 suits is to be determined by federal law;
and, since Congress has made no express provision for any time
limitation, this Court must fashion the governing rule. By adopting
the statutes of the several States, the Court creates 50 or more
different statutes of limitations, [
Footnote 2/1] rather than fashioning a uniform rule
after consideration of relevant federal and state statutes.
The Court justifies its decision in part by reliance on cases
decided under the Rules of Decisions Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964
ed.), which interpreted "the silence of Congress . . . to mean that
it is federal policy to adopt the local law of limitation."
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392,
327 U. S. 395;
see, e.g., Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.
S. 390,
203 U. S. 397;
Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U. S. 610;
McCluny v.
Silliman, 3 Pet. 270,
28 U. S. 277.
But the cases also establish that the silence of Congress is not to
be read as automatically putting an imprimatur on state law.
Rather, state law is applied only because it supplements and
fulfills federal policy, and the ultimate question is what federal
policy requires.
See Board of County Comm'rs v. United
States, 308 U. S. 343,
308 U. S.
350-352;
Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392,
327 U. S.
394-395;
Association of Westinghouse Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 348 U.
S. 437,
348 U. S. 463
(Reed, J., concurring).
Page 383 U. S. 710
More specifically, it is quite clear that, with respect to § 301
suits, congressional silence extends not just to the question of
limitations, but encompasses the entirety of the governing legal
principles. Rather than inferring from congressional silence that
state law was to govern,
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U. S. 448,
held that the federal courts were to "fashion from the policy of
our national labor laws" general federal law applicable to suits on
collective bargaining agreements.
Id. at
353 U. S. 456.
Although
Lincoln Mills recognized that "state law, if
compatible with the purpose of § 301, may be resorted to in order
to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy,"
id. at
353 U. S. 457,
it did not intimate in any way that federal policy would be
furthered by the adoption of 50 different state rules. To the
contrary, subsequent decisions have recognized that
"[c]omprehensiveness is inherent in the process by which the law is
to be formulated under the mandate of
Lincoln Mills," and
that, "[m]ore important, the subject matter of § 301(a)
is
peculiarly one that calls for uniform law.'" Teamsters Local v.
Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S. 103.
There is, therefore, no sound basis for saying that Congress, by
its silence on the limitations matter, intended the state laws to
apply or for adopting diverse state laws simply because of a
reluctance to supply what Congress omitted. The courts are expected
to develop the law of labor contracts, and this case represents
only another task in this process.
The Court reasons, however, that to devise a uniform time
limitation would be too "bald a form of judicial innovation."
Ante at p.
383 U. S. 701.
Cases defining a need for uniformity in § 301 suits are said to be
limited to matters concerning which the possible application of
varying systems of law "
would inevitably exert a disruptive
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of
Page 383 U. S.
711
collective agreements.'" Ante at pp. 383 U. S.
701-702. Since, according to the majority, the lack of a
uniform statute of limitations would generally not have that
effect, [Footnote 2/2] the Court
concludes that, although such a uniform provision
"might well constitute a desirable statutory addition, there is
no justification for the drastic sort of judicial legislation that
is urged upon us."
Ante at pp.
383 U. S.
702-703.
The Court is undoubtedly correct in stating that a uniform
limitations period would be desirable. Suppose, for example, that
the collective bargaining contract in dispute was one made in
Detroit for a multi-state unit of truck drivers, and that, as is
true in this case, 100 of the covered employees were discharged
without payment of accumulated vacation pay. Suppose further that
some of the employees were hired in Chicago and discharged in
Indiana, while others were hired in St. Louis, Cleveland, and Terre
Haute, and were discharged in Illinois, Michigan, and Iowa (in
whatever combinations are preferred). Suppose, finally, that some
sue in Indiana, some in other States, some in federal court, and
some in state court. Simple justice dictates in such a
situation
Page 383 U. S. 712
that the right of employees in different States to assert their
federal claim should be equally available. Clearly there is no
sense or justice in referring to 50 or more different statutes of
limitations so that one employee may be barred after one year while
another employee may sue any time within six years. Nor is there
any reason why an employer operating under the contract in one
State should be bothered with stale claims already barred as
against other employers in other States.
Moreover, the Court's decision creates unnecessary complexities
and opportunities for vexatious litigation, some of which are
reflected in the Court's opinion. Thus, the Court notes that, in a
situation involving multi-state contacts, such as the example given
above, a federal court hearing the case would be required to decide
whether to apply a federal, or the forum State's, conflict of laws
rules to select the State of governing law. If this Court
ultimately holds that a federal conflict of laws rule is to govern
in federal court suits, the additional question will be presented
of whether the federal conflict of laws rule must also be applied
by state courts, or whether they may continue to apply their own
conflict of laws rule. Whatever conflict of laws rule, state or
federal, is selected, there will remain the difficult task of
applying that rule to find the State whose limitations statute is
to control. In cases not involving multi-state contacts, the court
may have to choose between two or more state statutes; here, the
choice is between the limitations period for suits on written
contracts and the period for suits on oral contracts. Under today's
decision, this choice is to be governed by the State's
characterization of the federal action (or a federal court's
Delphic opinion of what that characterization would be), "unless
that characterization is unreasonable or otherwise inconsistent
with national labor policy."
Ante at p.
383 U. S. 706.
The governing
Page 383 U. S. 713
state limitations statute, having finally been determined, is to
be applied unless the period is "unusually short or long."
[
Footnote 2/3]
Ante at p.
383 U. S. 707,
n. 9. The problems we have indicated are merely illustrative of the
complex questions that must be decided under the Court's approach
before it can be determined which of several competing state
statutes is to be applied and whether such application is
reasonable when tested by the federal labor policy; undoubtedly the
fertile imagination of counsel will conceive additional
intricacies. The desirability of a single, uniform, federal statute
to further justice and to avoid such litigation-creating
complexities was, of course, recognized by Congress in passing the
statutes, to which the majority refers, that overruled in
particular areas past refusals of this Court to fashion such a
uniform rule.
The case for the Court's decision thus ultimately comes down to
the proposition that fashioning a uniform federal statute would
involve too bald an exercise of judicial innovation. This is an
argument I have difficulty in fathoming. Courts have not always
been reluctant to "create" statutes of limitations, the common law
doctrine of prescription by which judgments are presumed to have
been paid after the lapse of 20 years,
see Gaines v.
Miller, 111 U. S. 395,
111 U. S. 399;
McElmoyle v.
Cohn, 13 Pet. 312,
38 U. S. 327,
being just one example. In equity they have applied the doctrine of
laches,
see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392. But here, there is no dispute concerning whether
a statute of limitations is to be fashioned -- the choice is
between one statute or 50. If the Court is to develop the
substantive law of labor contracts,
Page 383 U. S. 714
which it has undertaken to do with the blessing of Congress, it
seems odd that the Court should balk at establishing a single
limitations period, drawn from any of the sources available to it,
including the relevant federal and state statutes. I undertake no
such canvass here, [
Footnote 2/4]
but think the Court should do so. I therefore dissent.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court's approach adopts (and thereby creates as federal law)
at least one limitations statute for each State and Territory. In
many States, it adopts a multitude of limitations provisions, each
applicable to a particular type of § 301 suit. The Court's opinion
suggests, for example, that, had the present suit been "exclusively
based upon a written contract,"
ante at p.
383 U. S. 706,
the Indiana 20-year, rather than the six-year, statute would have
governed.
[
Footnote 2/2]
However, limitations questions will have an impact on the
negotiation and administration of the collective agreement in many
instances -- for example, if the parties decide to limit by
contract the period for bringing suit. The laws of the several
States vary with respect to the enforceability of such contractual
limitations periods, particularly when it is asserted that the
agreed period is unreasonable,
see Williston on Contracts
§ 183, at 711, n. 10 (Jaeger 3d ed.1957); Note, 63 Harv.L.Rev.
1177, 1181-1182 (1950). It may be assumed that, under the test
advanced by the majority, uniform federal law will be fashioned to
determine their validity, just as, at least in some circumstances,
federal law will determine when the cause of action arose,
see
Cope v. Anderson, 331 U. S. 461;
Rawlins v. Ray, 312 U. S. 96, and
whether the running of limitations was tolled by fraudulent
concealment,
see Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.
S. 392;
Moviecolor Limited v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 288 F.2d 80 (C.A.2d Cir.1961).
[
Footnote 2/3]
Unfortunately, the Court provides no enlightenment concerning
where we are to look for a limitations period should the state
statute be held unreasonable. Perhaps,
in extremis, even
the Court's approach will require the kind of innovation it now
rejects.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Nor do I intimate any opinion concerning the tolling question
mooted in the Court's opinion.