Petitioner was arrested at the age of 16 in connection with
charges of housebreaking, robbery and rape. As a juvenile, he was
subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia
Juvenile Court unless that court, after "full investigation,"
should waive jurisdiction over him and remit him for trial to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
Petitioner's counsel filed a motion in the Juvenile Court for a
hearing on the question of waiver, and for access to the Juvenile
Court's Social Service file which had been accumulated on
petitioner during his probation for a prior offense. The Juvenile
Court did not rule on these motions. It entered an order waiving
jurisdiction, with the recitation that this was done after the
required "full investigation." Petitioner was indicted in the
District Court. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground
that the .Juvenile Court's waiver was invalid. The District Court
overruled the motion, and petitioner was tried. He was convicted on
six counts of housebreaking and robbery, but acquitted on two rape
counts by reason of insanity. On appeal, petitioner raised, among
other things, the validity of the Juvenile Court's waiver of
jurisdiction; the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit affirmed, finding the procedure leading to
waiver and the waiver order itself valid.
Held: The Juvenile Court order waiving jurisdiction and
remitting petitioner for trial in the District Court was invalid.
Pp.
383 U. S.
552-564.
(a) The Juvenile Court's latitude in determining whether to
waive jurisdiction is not complete. It
"assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular
circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and
fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a
'full investigation.'"
Pp.
383 U. S.
552-554.
(b) The
parens patriae philosophy of the Juvenile Court
"is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness." Pp.
383 U. S.
554-556.
(c) As the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
has held, "the waiver of jurisdiction is a
critically
important'
Page 383 U. S.
542
action determining vitally important statutory rights of the
juvenile." Pp. 383 U. S.
556-557.
(d) The Juvenile Court Act requires "full investigation," and
makes the Juvenile Court records available to persons having a
"legitimate interest in the protection . . . of the child. . . ."
These provisions, "read in the context of constitutional principles
relating to due process and the assistance of counsel," entitle a
juvenile to a hearing, to access by his counsel to social records
and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by
the Juvenile Court, and to a statement of the reasons for the
Juvenile Court's decision sufficient to enable meaningful appellate
review thereof. Pp.
383 U. S.
557-563.
(e) Since petitioner is now 21, and beyond the jurisdiction of
the Juvenile Court, the order of the Court of Appeals and the
judgment of the District Court are vacated, and the case is
remanded to the District Court for a hearing
de novo,
consistent with this opinion, on whether waiver was appropriate
when ordered by the Juvenile Court.
"If that court finds that waiver was inappropriate, petitioner's
conviction must be vacated. If, however it finds that the waiver
order was proper when originally made, the District Court may
proceed, after consideration of such motions as counsel may make
and such further proceedings, if any, as may be warranted, to enter
an appropriate judgment."
Pp.
383 U. S.
564-565.
119 U.S.App.D.C. 378, 343 F.2d 247, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE FORTAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is here on certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The facts and the
contentions of counsel raise a number
Page 383 U. S. 543
of disturbing questions concerning the administration by the
police and the Juvenile Court authorities of the District of
Columbia laws relating to juveniles. Apart from raising questions
as to the adequacy of custodial and treatment facilities and
policies, some of which are not within judicial competence, the
case presents important challenges to the procedure of the police
and Juvenile Court officials upon apprehension of a juvenile
suspected of serious offenses. Because we conclude that the
Juvenile Court's order waiving jurisdiction of petitioner was
entered without compliance with required procedures, we remand the
case to the trial court.
Morris A. Kent, Jr., first came under the authority of the
Juvenile Court of the District of Columbia in 1959. He was then
aged 14. He was apprehended as a result of several housebreakings
and an attempted purse snatching. He was placed on probation, in
the custody of his mother, who had been separated from her husband
since Kent was two years old. Juvenile Court officials interviewed
Kent from time to time during the probation period, and accumulated
a "Social Service" file.
On September 2, 1961, an intruder entered the apartment of a
woman in the District of Columbia. He took her wallet. He raped
her. The police found in the apartment latent fingerprints. They
were developed and processed. They matched the fingerprints of
Morris Kent, taken when he was 14 years old and under the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court. At about 3 p.m. on September 5,
1961, Kent was taken into custody by the police. Kent was then 16,
and therefore subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the
Juvenile Court. D.C.Code § 11-907 (1961), now § 11-1551 (Supp. IV,
1965). He was still on probation to that court as a result of the
1959 proceedings.
Upon being apprehended, Kent was taken to police headquarters,
where he was interrogated by police officers.
Page 383 U. S. 544
It appears that he admitted his involvement in the offense which
led to his apprehension, and volunteered information as to similar
offenses involving housebreaking, robbery, and rape. His
interrogation proceeded from about 3 p.m. to 10 p.m. the same
evening. [
Footnote 1]
Sometime after 10 p.m., petitioner was taken to the Receiving
Home for Children. The next morning, he was released to the police
for further interrogation at police headquarters, which lasted
until 5 p.m. [
Footnote 2]
The record does not show when his mother became aware that the
boy was in custody, but, shortly after 2 p.m. on September 6, 1961,
the day following petitioner's apprehension, she retained
counsel.
Counsel, together with petitioner's mother, promptly conferred
with the Social Service Director of the Juvenile Court. In a brief
interview, they discussed the possibility that the Juvenile Court
might waive jurisdiction under D.C.Code § 11-914 (1961), now §
11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965), and remit Kent to trial by the District
Court. Counsel made known his intention to oppose waiver.
Petitioner was detained at the Receiving Home for almost a week.
There was no arraignment during this
Page 383 U. S. 545
time, no determination by a judicial officer of probable cause
for petitioner's apprehension. [
Footnote 3]
During this period of detention and interrogation, petitioner's
counsel arranged for examination of petitioner by two psychiatrists
and a psychologist. He thereafter filed with the Juvenile Court a
motion for a hearing on the question of waiver of Juvenile Court
jurisdiction, together with an affidavit of a psychiatrist
certifying that petitioner "is a victim of severe psychopathology,"
and recommending hospitalization for psychiatric observation.
Petitioner's counsel, in support of his motion to the effect that
the Juvenile Court should retain jurisdiction of petitioner,
offered to prove that if petitioner were given adequate treatment
in a hospital under the aegis of the Juvenile Court, he would be a
suitable subject for rehabilitation.
Page 383 U. S. 546
At the same time, petitioner's counsel moved that the Juvenile
Court should give him access to the Social Service file relating to
petitioner which had been accumulated by the staff of the Juvenile
Court during petitioner's probation period, and which would be
available to the Juvenile Court judge in considering the question
whether it should retain or waive jurisdiction. Petitioner's
counsel represented that access to this file was essential to his
providing petitioner with effective assistance of counsel.
The Juvenile Court judge did not rule on these motions. He held
no hearing. He did not confer with petitioner or petitioner's
parents or petitioner's counsel. He entered an order reciting that
after "full investigation, I do hereby waive" jurisdiction of
petitioner and directing that he be "held for trial for [the
alleged] offenses under the regular procedure of the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia." He made no findings. He did
not recite any reason for the waiver. [
Footnote 4] He made no reference to the motions filed by
petitioner's counsel. We must assume that he denied,
sub
silentio, the motions for a hearing, the recommendation for
hospitalization for psychiatric observation, the request for access
to the Social Service file, and the offer to prove that petitioner
was a fit subject for rehabilitation under the Juvenile Court's
jurisdiction. [
Footnote 5]
Page 383 U. S. 547
Presumably, prior to entry of his order, the Juvenile Court
judge received and considered recommendations of the Juvenile Court
staff, the Social Service file relating to petitioner, and a report
dated September 8, 1961 (three days following petitioner's
apprehension), submitted to him by the Juvenile Probation Section.
The Social Service file and the September 8 report were later sent
to the District Court, and it appears that both of them referred to
petitioner's mental condition. The September 8 report spoke of "a
rapid deterioration of [petitioner's] personality structure and the
possibility of mental illness." As stated, neither this report nor
the Social Service file was made available to petitioner's
counsel.
The provision of the Juvenile Court Act governing waiver
expressly provides only for "full investigation." It states the
circumstances in which jurisdiction may be waived and the child
held for trial under adult procedures, but it does not state
standards to govern the Juvenile Court's decision as to waiver. The
provision reads as follows:
"If a child sixteen years of age or older is charged with an
offense which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or
any child charged with an offense which if committed by an adult is
punishable by death or life imprisonment, the judge may, after full
investigation, waive jurisdiction and order
Page 383 U. S. 548
such child held for trial under the regular procedure of the
court which would have jurisdiction of such offense if committed by
an adult; or such other court may exercise the powers conferred
upon the juvenile court in this subchapter in conducting and
disposing of such cases. [
Footnote
6]"
Petitioner appealed from the Juvenile Court's waiver order to
the Municipal Court of Appeals, which affirmed, and also applied to
the United States District Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which
was denied. On appeal from these judgments, the United States Court
of Appeals held on January 22, 1963, that neither appeal to the
Municipal Court of Appeals nor habeas corpus was available. In the
Court of Appeals' view, the exclusive method of reviewing the
Juvenile Court's waiver order was a motion to dismiss the
indictment in the District Court.
Kent v. Reid, 114
U.S.App.D.C. 330, 316 F.2d 331 (1963).
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1961, shortly after the Juvenile
Court order waiving its jurisdiction, petitioner was indicted by a
grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. The indictment contained eight counts alleging two
instances of housebreaking, robbery, and rape, and one of
housebreaking and robbery. On November 16, 1961, petitioner moved
the District Court to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that
the waiver was invalid. He also moved the District Court to
constitute itself a Juvenile Court as authorized by D.C.Code §
11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965). After substantial
delay occasioned by petitioner's appeal and habeas corpus
proceedings, the District Court addressed itself to the motion to
dismiss on February 8, 1963. [
Footnote 7]
Page 383 U. S. 549
The District Court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment.
The District Court ruled that it would not "go behind" the Juvenile
Court judge's recital that his order was entered "after full
investigation." It held that
"The only matter before me is as to whether or not the statutory
provisions were complied with and the Courts have held . . . with
reference to full investigation, that that does not mean a
quasi-judicial or judicial hearing. No hearing is
required."
On March 7, 1963, the District Court held a hearing on
petitioner's motion to determine his competency to stand trial. The
court determined that petitioner was competent. [
Footnote 8]
Page 383 U. S. 550
At trial, petitioner's defense was wholly directed toward
proving that he was not criminally responsible because "his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect."
Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 241, 214
F.2d 862, 875, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1954). Extensive evidence,
including expert testimony, was presented to support this defense.
The jury found as to the counts alleging rape that petitioner was
"not guilty by reason of insanity." Under District of Columbia law,
this made it mandatory that petitioner be transferred to St.
Elizabeth's Hospital, a mental institution, until his sanity is
restored. [
Footnote 9] On the
six counts of housebreaking and robbery, the jury found that
petitioner was guilty. [
Footnote
10]
Kent was sentenced to serve five to 15 years on each count as to
which he was found guilty, or a total of 30 to 90 years in prison.
The District Court ordered that the time to be spent at St.
Elizabeth's on the mandatory commitment after the insanity
acquittal be counted as part of the 30- to 90-year sentence.
Petitioner appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit. That court affirmed. 119 U.S.App.D.C.
378, 343 F.2d 247 (1964). [
Footnote 11]
Page 383 U. S. 551
Before the Court of Appeals and in this Court, petitioner's
counsel has urged a number of grounds for reversal. He argues that
petitioner's detention and interrogation, described above, were
unlawful. He contends that the police failed to follow the
procedure prescribed by the Juvenile Court Act in that they failed
to notify the parents of the child and the Juvenile Court itself,
note 1 supra; that
petitioner was deprived of his liberty for about a week without a
determination of probable cause which would have been required in
the case of an adult,
see note 3 supra; that he was interrogated by the
police in the absence of counsel or a parent,
cf. Harling v.
United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 176, 295 F.2d 161, 163,
n. 12 (1961), without warning of his right to remain silent or
advice as to his right to counsel, in asserted violation of the
Juvenile Court Act and in violation of rights that he would have if
he were an adult; and that petitioner was fingerprinted in
violation of the asserted intent of the Juvenile Court Act and
while unlawfully detained, and that the fingerprints were
unlawfully used in the District Court proceeding. [
Footnote 12]
These contentions raise problems of substantial concern as to
the construction of and compliance with the Juvenile Court Act.
They also suggest basic issues as to the justifiability of
affording a juvenile less protection than is accorded to adults
suspected of criminal offenses, particularly where, as here, there
is an absence of any indication that the denial of rights available
to adults was offset, mitigated or explained by action of the
Government, as
parens patriae, evidencing the special
Page 383 U. S. 552
solicitude for juveniles commanded by the Juvenile Court Act.
However, because we remand the case on account of the procedural
error with respect to waiver of jurisdiction, we do not pass upon
these questions. [
Footnote
13]
It is to petitioner's arguments as to the infirmity of the
proceedings by which the Juvenile Court waived its otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction that we address our attention. Petitioner
attacks the waiver of jurisdiction on a number of statutory and
constitutional grounds. He contends that the waiver is defective
because no hearing was held; because no findings were made by the
Juvenile Court; because the Juvenile Court stated no reasons for
waiver; and because counsel was denied access to the Social Service
file which presumably was considered by the Juvenile Court in
determining to waive jurisdiction.
We agree that the order of the Juvenile Court waiving its
jurisdiction and transferring petitioner for trial in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia was invalid.
There is no question that the order is reviewable on motion to
dismiss the indictment in the District Court, as specified by the
Court of Appeals in this case.
Kent v. Reid, supra. The
issue is the standards to be applied upon such review.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates
that the Juvenile Court should have considerable
Page 383 U. S. 553
latitude within which to determine whether it should retain
jurisdiction over a child or -- subject to the statutory
delimitation [
Footnote 14]
-- should waive jurisdiction. But this latitude is not complete. At
the outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the
particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due
process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory
requirement of a "full investigation."
Green v. United
States, 113 U.S.App.D.C. 348, 308 F.2d 303 (1962). [
Footnote 15] The statute gives the
Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual
considerations to be evaluated, the weight to be given them, and
the conclusion to be reached. It does not confer upon the Juvenile
Court a license for arbitrary procedure. The statute does not
permit the Juvenile Court to determine, in isolation and without
the participation or any representation of the child, the
"critically important" question whether a child will be deprived of
the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act.
[
Footnote 16] It does not
authorize the Juvenile Court, in total disregard of a motion for
hearing filed by counsel, and without any hearing or statement or
reasons, to decide -- as in this case -- that the child will be
taken from the Receiving Home for Children
Page 383 U. S. 554
and transferred to jail along with adults, and that he will be
exposed to the possibility of a death sentence, [
Footnote 17] instead of treatment for a
maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21. [
Footnote 18]
We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been
transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for
reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony
-- without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel,
without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of
justice dealing with adults with respect to a similar issue would
proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's
special concern for children, as reflected in the District of
Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold
that it does not.
1. The theory of the District's Juvenile Court Act, like that of
other jurisdictions, [
Footnote
19] is rooted in social welfare philosophy, rather than in the
corpus juris. Its proceedings are designated as civil,
rather than criminal. The Juvenile Court is theoretically engaged
in determining the needs of the child and of society, rather than
adjudicating criminal conduct. The objectives are to provide
measures of guidance and rehabilitation for the child and
protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt
and punishment. The State is
parens
Page 383 U. S. 555
patriae, rather than prosecuting attorney and judge.
[
Footnote 20] But the
admonition to function in a "parental" relationship is not an
invitation to procedural arbitrariness.
2. Because the State is supposed to proceed in respect of the
child as
parens patriae, and not as adversary, courts have
relied on the premise that the proceedings are "civil" in nature,
and not criminal, and have asserted that the child cannot complain
of the deprivation of important rights available in criminal cases.
It has been asserted that he can claim only the fundamental due
process right to fair treatment. [
Footnote 21] For example, it has been held that he is not
entitled to bail; to indictment by grand jury; to a speedy and
public trial; to trial by jury; to immunity against
self-incrimination; to confrontation of his accusers; and, in some
jurisdictions (but not in the District of Columbia,
see
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 371, 236
F.2d 666 (1956), and
Black v. United States, supra), that
he is not entitled to counsel. [
Footnote 22]
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose of
juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures well
enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immunity
of the process from the reach of constitutional guaranties
applicable to adults. [
Footnote
23] There is much evidence that some juvenile courts, including
that of the District of Columbia, lack
Page 383 U. S. 556
the personnel, facilities and techniques to perform adequately
as representatives of the State in a
parens patriae
capacity, at least with respect to children charged with law
violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds
for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that
he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.
[
Footnote 24]
This concern, however, does not induce us in this case to accept
the invitation [
Footnote 25]
to rule that constitutional guaranties which would be applicable to
adults charged with the serious offenses for which Kent was tried
must be applied in juvenile court proceedings concerned with
allegations of law violation. The Juvenile Court Act and the
decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis for decision of this
case, and we go no further.
3. It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is
a "critically important" action determining vitally important
statutory rights of the juvenile. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit has so held.
See Black v. United
States, supra; Watkins v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 409,
343 F.2d 278 (1964). The statutory scheme makes this plain. The
Juvenile Court is vested with "original and exclusive jurisdiction"
of the child. This jurisdiction confers special rights and
immunities. He is, as specified by the statute, shielded from
publicity. He may be confined, but, with rare exceptions, he may
not be jailed along with adults. He may be detained, but only until
he is 21 years of age. The court is admonished by the statute to
give preference to retaining the child in the custody of his
parents "unless his welfare and the safety and protection
Page 383 U. S. 557
of the public cannot be adequately safeguarded without . . .
removal." The child is protected against consequences of adult
conviction such as the loss of civil rights, the use of
adjudication against him in subsequent proceedings, and
disqualification for public employment. D.C.Code §§ 11-907, 11-915,
11-927, 11-929 (1961). [
Footnote
26]
The net, therefore, is that petitioner -- then a boy of 16 --
was, by statute, entitled to certain procedures and benefits as a
consequence of his statutory right to the "exclusive" jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court. In these circumstances, considering
particularly that decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and
transfer of the matter to the District Court was potentially as
important to petitioner as the difference between five years'
confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a condition
to a valid waiver order, petitioner as entitled to a hearing,
including access by his counsel to the social records and probation
or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court,
and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We
believe that this result is required by the statute, read in the
context of constitutional principles relating to due process and
the assistance of counsel. [
Footnote 27]
The Court of Appeals in this case relied upon
Wilhite v.
United States, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 279, 281 F.2d 642 (1960). In
that case, the Court of Appeals held, for purposes of a
determination as to waiver of jurisdiction,
Page 383 U. S. 558
that no formal hearing is required and that the "full
investigation" required of the Juvenile Court need only be such "as
is needed to satisfy
that court . . . on the question of
waiver." [
Footnote 28]
(Emphasis supplied.) The authority of
Wilhite, however, is
substantially undermined by other, more recent, decisions of the
Court of Appeals.
In
Black v. United States, decided by the Court of
Appeals on December 8, 1965, the court held that [
Footnote 29] assistance of counsel in the
"critically important" determination of waiver is essential to the
proper administration of juvenile proceedings. Because the juvenile
was not advised of his right to retained or appointed counsel, the
judgment of the District Court, following waiver of jurisdiction by
the Juvenile Court, was reversed. The court relied upon its
decision in
Shioutakon v. District of Columbia, 98
U.S.App.D.C. 371, 236 F.2d 666 (1956), in which it had held that
effective assistance of counsel in juvenile court proceedings is
essential.
See also McDaniel v. Shea, 108 U.S.App.D.C. 15,
278 F.2d 460 (1960). In
Black, the court referred to the
Criminal Justice Act, enacted four years after
Shioutakon,
in which Congress provided for the assistance of counsel "in
proceedings before the juvenile court of the District of Columbia."
D.C.Code § 2-2202 (1961). The court held that
"The need is even greater in the adjudication of waiver [than in
a case like
Shioutakon], since it contemplates the
imposition of criminal sanctions."
122 U.S.App.D.C. at 395, 355 F.2d at 106.
In
Watkins v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 409, 343
F.2d 278 (1964), decided in November, 1964, the
Page 383 U. S. 559
Juvenile Court had waived jurisdiction of appellant who was
charged with housebreaking and larceny. In the District Court,
appellant sought disclosure of the social record in order to attack
the validity of the waiver. The Court of Appeals held that in a
waiver proceeding a juvenile's attorney is entitled to access to
such records. The court observed that
"All of the social records concerning the child are usually
relevant to waiver, since the Juvenile Court must be deemed to
consider the entire history of the child in determining waiver. The
relevance of particular items must be construed generously. Since
an attorney has no certain knowledge of what the social records
contain, he cannot be expected to demonstrate the relevance of
particular items in his request."
"The child's attorney must be advised of the information upon
which the Juvenile Court relied in order to assist effectively in
the determination of the waiver question, by insisting upon the
statutory command that waiver can be ordered only after 'full
investigation,' and by guarding against action of the Juvenile
Court beyond its discretionary authority."
119 U.S.App.D.C. at 413, 343 F.2d at 282. The court remanded the
record to the District Court for a determination of the extent to
which the records should be disclosed.
The Court of Appeals' decision in the present case was handed
down on October 26, 1964, prior to its decisions in
Black
and
Watkins. The Court of Appeals assumed that, since
petitioner had been a probationer of the Juvenile Court for two
years, that Court had before it sufficient evidence to make an
informed judgment. It therefore concluded that the statutory
requirement of a "full investigation" had been met. It noted the
absence of
Page 383 U. S. 560
"a specification by the Juvenile Court Judge of precisely why he
concluded to waive jurisdiction." 119 U.S.App.D.C. at 384, 343 F.2d
at 253. While it indicated that, "in some cases, at least," a
useful purpose might be served "by a discussion of the reasons
motivating the determination,"
id. at 384, 343 F.2d at
253, n. 6, it did not conclude that the absence thereof invalidated
the waiver.
As to the denial of access to the social records, the Court of
Appeals stated that "the statute is ambiguous." It said that
petitioner's claim, in essence, is "that counsel should have the
opportunity to challenge them, presumably in a manner akin to
cross-examination."
Id. at 389, 343 F.2d at 258. It held,
however, that this is "the kind of adversarial tactics which the
system is designed to avoid." It characterized counsel's proper
function as being merely that of bringing forward affirmative
information which might help the court. His function, the Court of
Appeals said, "is not to denigrate the staff's submissions and
recommendations."
Ibid . Accordingly, it held that the
Juvenile Court had not abused its discretion in denying access to
the social records.
We are of the opinion that the Court of Appeals misconceived the
basic issue and the underlying values in this case. It did note, as
another panel of the same court did a few months later in
Black and
Watkins, that the determination of
whether to transfer a child from the statutory structure of the
Juvenile Court to the criminal processes of the District Court is
"critically important." We hold that it is, indeed, a "critically
important" proceeding. The Juvenile Court Act confers upon the
child a right to avail himself of that court's "exclusive"
jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals has said,
"[I]t is implicit in [the Juvenile Court] scheme that
noncriminal treatment is to be the rule -- and the adult criminal
treatment the exception which must be governed
Page 383 U. S. 561
by the particular factors of individual cases."
Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174,
177-178, 295 F.2d 161, 164-165 (1961).
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should
review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have
before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver,
including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not
"assume" that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume
that "full investigation" has been made. Accordingly, we hold that
it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver
order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor.
We do not read the statute as requiring that this statement must be
formal, or that it should necessarily include conventional findings
of fact. But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that
the statutory requirement of "full investigation" has been met, and
that the question has received the careful consideration of the
Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with
sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.
Correspondingly, we conclude that an opportunity for a hearing,
which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a
waiver order. Under
Black, the child is entitled to
counsel in connection with a waiver proceeding, and, under
Watkins, counsel is entitled to see the child's social
records. These rights are meaningless -- an illusion, a mockery --
unless counsel is given an opportunity to function.
The right to representation by counsel is not a formality. It is
not a grudging gesture to a ritualistic requirement. It is of the
essence of justice. Appointment of counsel without affording an
opportunity for hearing on a "critically important" decision is
tantamount to denial of counsel. There is no justification
Page 383 U. S. 562
for the failure of the Juvenile Court to rule on the motion for
hearing filed by petitioner's counsel, and it was error to fail to
grant a hearing.
We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held
must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial, or
even of the usual administrative hearing, but we do hold that the
hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment.
Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 50,
274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959).
With respect to access by the child's counsel to the social
records of the child, we deem it obvious that, since these are to
be considered by the Juvenile Court in making its decision to
waive, they must be made available to the child's counsel. This is
what the Court of Appeals itself held in
Watkins. There is
no doubt as to the statutory basis for this conclusion, as the
Court of Appeals pointed out in
Watkins. We cannot agree
with the Court of Appeals in the present case that the statute is
"ambiguous." The statute expressly provides that the record shall
be withheld from "indiscriminate" public inspection,
"except that such records or parts thereof
shall be
made available by rule of court or special order of court to such
persons . . . as have a
legitimate interest in the
protection. . . of the child. . . ."
D.C.Code § 11- 929(b) (1961), now § 11-1586(b) (Supp. IV, 1965).
(Emphasis supplied.) [
Footnote
30] The Court of Appeals has held in
Black, and we
agree, that counsel must be afforded to the child in waiver
proceedings. Counsel, therefore,
Page 383 U. S. 563
have a "legitimate interest" in the protection of the child, and
must be afforded access to these records. [
Footnote 31]
We do not agree with the Court of Appeals' statement, attempting
to justify denial of access to these records, that counsel's role
is limited to presenting
"to the court anything on behalf of the child which might help
the court in arriving at a decision; it is not to denigrate the
staff's submissions and recommendations."
On the contrary, if the staff's submissions include materials
which are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely
the role of counsel to "denigrate" such matter. There is no
irrebuttable presumption of accuracy attached to staff reports. If
a decision on waiver is "critically important," it is equally of
"critical importance" that the material submitted to the judge --
which is protected by the statute only against "indiscriminate"
inspection -- be subjected, within reasonable limits having regard
to the theory of the Juvenile Court Act, to examination, criticism
and refutation. While the Juvenile Court judge may, of course,
receive
ex parte analyses and recommendations from his
staff, he may not, for purposes of a decision on waiver, receive
and rely upon secret information, whether emanating from his staff
or otherwise. The Juvenile Court is governed in this respect by the
established principles which control courts and
quasi-judicial agencies of the Government.
For the reasons stated, we conclude that the Court of Appeals
and the District Court erred in sustaining the validity of the
waiver by the Juvenile Court. The Government urges that any error
committed by the Juvenile
Page 383 U. S. 564
Court was cured by the proceedings before the District Court. It
is true that the District Court considered and denied a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of the invalidity of the waiver order of the
Juvenile Court, and that it considered and denied a motion that it
should itself, as authorized by statute, proceed in this case to
"exercise the powers conferred upon the juvenile court." D.C.Code §
11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965). But we agree with
the Court of Appeals in
Black that
"the waiver question was primarily and initially one for the
Juvenile Court to decide, and its failure to do so in a valid
manner cannot be said to be harmless error. It is the Juvenile
Court, not the District Court, which has the facilities, personnel
and expertise for a proper determination of the waiver issue."
122 U.S.App.D.C. at 396, 355 F.2d at 107. [
Footnote 32]
Ordinarily, we would reverse the Court of Appeals and direct the
District Court to remand the case to the Juvenile Court for a new
determination of waiver. If, on remand, the decision were against
waiver, the indictment in the District Court would be dismissed.
See Black v. United States, supra. However, petitioner has
now passed the age of 21, and the Juvenile Court can no longer
exercise jurisdiction over him. In view of the unavailability of a
redetermination of the waiver question by the Juvenile Court, it is
urged by petitioner that the conviction should be vacated and the
indictment dismissed. In the circumstances of this case, and in
light of the remedy which the Court of Appeals fashioned in
Page 383 U. S. 565
Black, supra, we do not consider it appropriate to
grant this drastic relief. [
Footnote 33] Accordingly, we vacate the order of the
Court of Appeals and the judgment of the District Court and remand
the case to the District Court for a hearing
de novo on
waiver, consistent with this opinion. [
Footnote 34] If that court finds that waiver was
inappropriate, petitioner's conviction must be vacated. If,
however, it finds that the waiver order was proper when originally
made, the District Court may proceed, after consideration of such
motions as counsel may make and such further proceedings, if any,
as may be warranted, to enter an appropriate judgment.
Cf.
Black v. United States, supra.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
There is no indication in the file that the police complied with
the requirement of the District Code that a child taken into
custody, unless released to his parent, guardian or custodian,
"shall be placed in the custody of a probation officer or other
person designated by the court, or taken immediately to the court
or to a place of detention provided by the Board of Public Welfare,
and the officer taking him shall immediately notify the court and
shall file a petition when directed to do so by the court."
D.C.Code § 11-912 (1961), now § 16-2306 (Supp. IV, 1965).
[
Footnote 2]
The elicited statements were not used in the subsequent trial
before the United States District Court. Since the statements were
made while petitioner was subject to the jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court, they were inadmissible in a subsequent criminal
prosecution under the rule of
Harling v. United States,
111 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 295 F.2d 161 (1961).
[
Footnote 3]
In the case of adults, arraignment before a magistrate for
determination of probable cause and advice to the arrested person
as to his rights, etc., are provided by law, and are regarded as
fundamental.
Cf. Fed.Rules Crim.Proc. 5(a), (b);
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.
S. 449. In
Harling v. United States, supra, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated the basis
for this distinction between juveniles and adults as follows:
"It is, of course, because children are, generally speaking,
exempt from criminal penalties that safeguards of the criminal law,
such as Rule 5 and the exclusionary
Mallory rule, have no
general application in juvenile proceedings."
111 U.S.App.D.C. at 176, 295 F.2d at 163.
In
Edwards v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 383, 384,
330 F.2d 849, 850 (1964) it was said that:
". . . special practices . . . follow the apprehension of a
juvenile. He may be held in custody by the juvenile authorities --
and is available to investigating officers -- for five days before
any formal action need be taken. There is no duty to take him
before a magistrate, and no responsibility to inform him of his
rights. He is not booked. The statutory intent is to establish a
nonpunitive, noncriminal atmosphere."
We indicate no view as to the legality of these practices.
Cf. Harling v. United States, supra, 111 U.S.App.D.C. at
176, 295 F.2d at 163, n. 12.
[
Footnote 4]
At the time of these events, there was in effect Policy
Memorandum No. 7 of November 30, 1959, promulgated by the judge of
the Juvenile Court to set forth the criteria to govern disposition
of waiver requests. It is set forth in the
383
U.S. 541app|>Appendix. This Memorandum has since been
rescinded.
See United States v. Caviness, 239 F.
Supp. 545, 550 (D.C.D.C.1965).
[
Footnote 5]
It should be noted that, at this time, the statute provided for
only one Juvenile Court judge. Congressional hearings and reports
attest the impossibility of the burden which he was supposed to
carry.
See Amending the Juvenile Court Act of the District
of Columbia. Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House
Committee on the District of Columbia, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); Juvenile Delinquency, Hearings before the Subcommittee to
Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959-1960); Additional Judges for
Juvenile Court, Hearing before the House Committee on the District
of Columbia, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); H.R.Rep.No.1041, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); S.Rep.No.841, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961); S.Rep.No.116, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The statute was
amended in 1962 to provide for three judges for the court. 76 Stat.
21; D.C.Code § 11-1502 (Supp. IV, 1965).
[
Footnote 6]
D.C.Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553 (Supp. IV, 1965).
[
Footnote 7]
On February 5, 1963, the motion to the District Court to
constitute itself a Juvenile Court was denied. The motion was
renewed orally and denied on February 8, 1963, after the District
Court's decision that the indictment should not be dismissed.
[
Footnote 8]
The District Court had before it extensive information as to
petitioner's mental condition, hearing upon both competence to
stand trial and the defense of insanity. The court had obtained the
"Social Service" file from the Juvenile Court and had made it
available to petitioner's counsel. On October 13, 1961, the
District Court had granted petitioner's motion of October 6 for
commitment to the Psychiatric Division of the General Hospital for
60 days. On December 20, 1961, the hospital reported that
"It is the concensus [
sic] of the staff that Morris is
emotionally ill and severely so . . . ; we feel that he is
incompetent to stand trial and to participate in a mature way in
his own defense. His illness has interfered with his judgment and
reasoning ability. . . ."
The prosecutor opposed a finding of incompetence to stand trial,
and at the prosecutor's request, the District Court referred
petitioner to St. Elizabeth's Hospital for psychiatric observation.
According to a letter from the Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's of
April 5, 1962, the hospital's staff found that petitioner was
"suffering from mental disease at the present time, Schizophrenic
Reaction, Chronic Undifferentiated Type," that he had been
suffering from this disease at the time of the charged offenses,
and that, "if committed by him [those criminal acts] were the
product of this disease." They stated, however, that petitioner was
"mentally competent to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to consult properly with counsel in his own
defense."
[
Footnote 9]
D.C.Code § 24-301 (1961).
[
Footnote 10]
The basis for this distinction -- that petitioner was "sane" for
purposes of the housebreaking and robbery but "insane" for the
purposes of the rape -- apparently was the hypothesis, for which
there is some support in the record, that the jury might find that
the robberies had anteceded the rapes, and, in that event, it might
conclude that the housebreakings and robberies were not the
products of his mental disease or defect, while the rapes were
produced thereby.
[
Footnote 11]
Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing
en banc, but
subsequently moved to withdraw the petition in order to prosecute
his petition for certiorari to this Court. The Court of Appeals
permitted withdrawal. Chief Judge Bazelon filed a dissenting
opinion in which Circuit Judge Wright joined. 119 U.S.App.D.C. at
395, 343 F.2d at 264 (1964).
[
Footnote 12]
Cf. Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174, 295
F.2d 161 (1961);
Bynum v. United States, 104 U.S.App.D.C.
368, 262 F.2d 465 (1958). It is not clear from the record whether
the fingerprints used were taken during the detention period or
were those taken while petitioner was in custody in 1959, nor is it
clear that petitioner's counsel objected to the use of the
fingerprints.
[
Footnote 13]
Petitioner also urges that the District Court erred in the
following respects:
(1) It gave the jury a version of the "
Allen" charge.
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.
S. 492.
(2) It failed to give an adequate and fair competency
hearing.
(3) It denied the motion to constitute itself a juvenile court
pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-914 (1961), now § 11-1553. (Supp. IV,
1965.)
(4) It should have granted petitioner's motion for acquittal on
all counts,
n.o.v., on the grounds of insanity.
We decide none of these claims.
[
Footnote 14]
The statute is set out at pp.
383 U. S.
547-548, supra.
[
Footnote 15]
"What is required before a waiver is, as we have said, 'full
investigation.' . . . It prevents the waiver of jurisdiction as a
matter of routine for the purpose of easing the docket. It prevents
routine waiver in certain classes of alleged crimes. It requires a
judgment in each case based on"
"an inquiry not only into the facts of the alleged offense but
also into the question whether the parens patriae plan of procedure
is desirable and proper in the particular case."
"
Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 50, 274
F.2d 556, 559 (1959)."
Green v. United States, supra, at 350, 308 F.2d at
305.
[
Footnote 16]
See Watkins v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 409,
413, 343 F.2d 278, 282 (1964);
Black v. United States, 122
U.S.App.D.C. 393, 355 F.2d 104 (1965).
[
Footnote 17]
D.C.Code § 22-2801 (1961) fixes the punishment for rape at 30
years, or death if the jury so provides in its verdict. The maximum
punishment for housebreaking is 15 years, D.C.Code § 22-1801
(1961); for robbery it is also 15 years, D.C.Code § 22-2901
(1961).
[
Footnote 18]
The jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court over a child ceases when
he becomes 21. D.C.Code § 11-907 (1961), now § 11-1551 (Supp. IV,
1965).
[
Footnote 19]
All States have juvenile court systems. A study of the actual
operation of these systems is contained in Note, Juvenile
Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice,
79 Harv.L.Rev. 775 (1966).
[
Footnote 20]
See Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary
System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis.L.Rev. 7.
[
Footnote 21]
Pee v. United States, 107 U.S.App.D.C. 47, 274 F.2d 556
(1959).
[
Footnote 22]
See Pee v. United States, supra, at 54, 274 F.2d at
563; Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 Minn.L.Rev. 547
(1957).
[
Footnote 23]
Cf. Harling v. United States, 111 U.S.App.D.C. 174,
177, 295 F.2d 161, 164 (1961).
[
Footnote 24]
See Handler,
op. cit. supra, note 20; Note supra, note 19; materials cited in |
note 19; materials cited in
S. 541fn5|>note 5,
supra.
[
Footnote 25]
See brief of
amicus curiae.
[
Footnote 26]
These are now, without substantial changes, §§ 11-1551, 16-2307,
16-2308, 16-2313, 11-1586 (Supp. IV, 1965).
[
Footnote 27]
While we
"will not ordinarily review decisions of the United States Court
of Appeals [for the District of Columbia Circuit], which are based
upon statutes . . . limited [to the District] . . . ,"
Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 296 U.
S. 280,
296 U. S. 285,
the position of that court, as we discuss
infra, is
self-contradictory. Nor have we deferred to decisions on local law
where to do so would require adjudication of difficult
constitutional questions.
See District of Columbia v.
Little, 339 U. S. 1.
[
Footnote 28]
The panel was composed of Circuit Judges Miller, Fahy and
Burger. Judge Fahy concurred in the result. It appears that the
attack on the regularity of the waiver of jurisdiction was made 17
years after the event, and that no objection to waiver had been
made in the District Court.
[
Footnote 29]
Bazelon, C.J., and Fahy and Leventhal, JJ.
[
Footnote 30]
Under the statute, the Juvenile Court has power by rule or
order, to subject the examination of the social records to
conditions which will prevent misuse of the information. Violation
of any such rule or order, or disclosure of the information "except
for purposes for which . . . released," is a misdemeanor. D.C.Code
§ 11-929 (1961), now, without substantial change, § 11-1586 (Supp.
IV, 1965).
[
Footnote 31]
In
Watkins, the Court of Appeals seems to have
permitted withholding of some portions of the social record from
examination by petitioner's counsel. To the extent that
Watkins is inconsistent with the standard which we state,
it cannot be considered as controlling.
[
Footnote 32]
It also appears that the District Court requested and obtained
the Social Service file and the probation staff's report of
September 8, 1961, and that these were made available to
petitioner's counsel. This did not cure the error of the Juvenile
Court. Perhaps the point of it is that it again illustrates the
maxim that, while nondisclosure may contribute to the comfort of
the staff, disclosure does not cause heaven to fall.
[
Footnote 33]
Petitioner is in St. Elizabeth's Hospital for psychiatric
treatment as a result of the jury verdict on the rape charges.
[
Footnote 34]
We do not deem it appropriate merely to vacate the judgment and
remand to the Court of Appeals for reconsideration of its present
decision in light of its subsequent decisions in
Watkins
and
Black, supra. Those cases were decided by different
panels of the Court of Appeals from that which decided the present
case, and, in view of our grant of certiorari and of the importance
of the issue, we consider it necessary to resolve the question
presented instead of leaving it open for further consideration by
the Court of Appeals.
|
383
U.S. 541app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Policy Memorandum No. 7, November 30, 1959
The authority of the Judge of the Juvenile Court of the District
of Columbia to waive or transfer jurisdiction to the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia is contained in the Juvenile
Court Act (§ 11-914 D.C.Code, 1951 Ed.). This section permits the
Judge to waive jurisdiction "after full investigation" in the case
of any child
"sixteen years of age or older [who is] charged with an offense
which would amount to a felony in the case of an adult, or any
child charged with an
Page 383 U. S. 566
offense which if committed by an adult is punishable by death or
life imprisonment."
The statute sets forth no specific standards for the exercise of
this important discretionary act, but leaves the formulation of
such criteria to the Judge. A knowledge of the Judge's criteria is
important to the child, his parents, his attorney, to the judges of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, to the United
States Attorney and his assistants, and to the Metropolitan Police
Department, as well as to the staff of this court, especially the
Juvenile Intake Section.
Therefore, the Judge has consulted with the Chief Judge and
other judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, with the United States Attorney, with representatives of
the Bar, and with other groups concerned and has formulated the
following criteria and principles concerning waiver of jurisdiction
which are consistent with the basic aims and purpose of the
Juvenile Court Act.
An offense falling within the statutory limitations (set forth
above) will be waived if it has prosecutive merit and if it is
heinous or of an aggravated character, or -- even though less
serious -- if it represents a pattern of repeated offenses which
indicate that the juvenile may be beyond rehabilitation under
Juvenile Court procedures, or if the public needs the protection
afforded by such action.
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge
in deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such
offenses will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
Page 383 U. S. 567
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons
especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint,
i.e.,
whether there is evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected
to return an indictment (to be determined by consultation with the
United States Attorney).
5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire
offense in one court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged
offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined
by consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including
previous contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law
enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions,
prior periods of probation to this Court, or prior commitments to
juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is
found to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of
procedures, services and facilities currently available to the
Juvenile Court.
It will be the responsibility of any officer of the Court's
staff assigned to make the investigation of any complaint in which
waiver of jurisdiction is being considered to develop fully all
available information which may bear upon the criteria and factors
set forth above. Although not all such factors will be involved in
an individual case, the Judge will consider the relevant factors in
a
Page 383 U. S. 568
specific case before reaching a conclusion to waive juvenile
jurisdiction and transfer the case to the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia for trial under the adult procedures of
that Court.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK, MR. JUSTICE
HARLAN and MR. JUSTICE WHITE join, dissenting.
This case involves the construction of a statute applicable only
to the District of Columbia. Our general practice is to leave
undisturbed decisions of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit concerning the import of legislation governing the
affairs of the District.
General Motors Corp. v. District of
Columbia, 380 U. S. 553,
380 U. S. 556.
It appears, however, that two cases decided by the Court of Appeals
subsequent to its decision in the present case may have
considerably modified the court's construction of the statute.
Therefore, I would vacate this judgment and remand the case to the
Court of Appeals for reconsideration in the light of its subsequent
decisions,
Watkins v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 409,
343 F.2d 278, and
Black v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C.
393, 355 F.2d 104.