Respondent was convicted in 1959 of murdering his common law
wife, and given a life sentence. It was conceded at trial that he
had shot and killed her, but counsel claimed that respondent was
insane at the time of the incident, and also not competent to stand
trial. It was uncontradicted that respondent had a long history of
disturbed behavior, had been confined as a psychopathic patient,
and had committed acts of violence, including the killing of his
infant son and an attempted suicide. Four defense witnesses
testified that respondent was insane. The trial court declined
rebuttal medical testimony as to respondent's sanity, deeming
sufficient a stipulation that a doctor would testify that, when
respondent was examined a few months before trial, he knew the
nature of the charges and could cooperate with his counsel. The
trial court's rejection of contentions as to respondent's sanity
was challenged on appeal as a deprivation of due process of law
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court affirmed
the conviction on the grounds that no hearing on mental capacity to
stand trial had been requested and that the evidence was
insufficient to require the trial court to conduct a sanity hearing
sua sponte or to raise a "reasonable doubt" as to
respondent's sanity at the time of the homicide. This Court denied
certiorari. The District Court denied respondent's subsequently
filed petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the unduly hurried trial did not provide a
fair opportunity for development of facts on the insanity issues,
and remanded the case to the District Court for a limited hearing
as to the sanity of respondent at the time of the homicide and as
to whether he was constitutionally entitled to a hearing upon his
competence to stand trial.
Held:
1. The evidence raised a sufficient doubt as to respondent's
competence to stand trial so that respondent was deprived of due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment by the trial court's
failure to afford him a hearing on that issue. Pp.
383 U. S.
378-386.
(a) The conviction of a legally incompetent defendant violates
due process.
Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961. P.
383 U. S.
378.
Page 383 U. S. 376
(b) the record shows that respondent did not waive the defence
of incompetence to stand trial. P.
383 U. S.
384.
(c) In view of evidence raising a doubt on the competence issue,
the court was required to impanel a jury and conduct a sanity
hearing, and could not rely in lieu thereof on respondent's
demeanor at trial or on the stipulated medical testimony. Pp.
383 U. S.
385-386.
2. In view of the difficulty of retrospectively determining the
issue of an accused's competence to stand trial (particularly
where, as here, the time lapse is over six years), a hearing
limited to that issue will not suffice; respondent must therefore
be discharged unless the State gives him a new trial within a
reasonable time. P.
383 U. S.
387.
345 F.2d 691, affirmed in part and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 1959, respondent Robinson was convicted of the murder of his
common law wife, Flossie May Ward, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for life. Being an indigent, he was defended by
court-appointed counsel. It was conceded at trial that Robinson
shot and killed Flossie May, but his counsel claimed that he was
insane at the time of the shooting, and raised the issue of his
incompetence to stand trial. On writ of error to the Supreme Court
of Illinois, it was asserted that the trial court's rejection of
these contentions deprived Robinson of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment. His conviction was affirmed, the court
finding that no hearing on mental capacity to stand trial had been
requested, that the evidence failed to raise sufficient doubt as to
his competence to require the trial court to
Page 383 U. S. 377
conduct a hearing on its own motion, and further that the
evidence did not raise a "reasonable doubt" as to his sanity at the
time of the offense.
People v. Robinson, 22 Ill. 2d
162,
174 N.E.2d
820 (1961). We denied certiorari.
Robinson v. Pate,
368 U.S. 995 (1962). Thereupon, Robinson filed this petition for
habeas corpus, which was denied without a hearing by the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The
Court of Appeals reversed,
United States ex rel. Robinson v.
Pate, 345 F.2d 691 (1965), on the ground that Robinson was
convicted in an unduly hurried trial, without a fair opportunity to
obtain expert psychiatric testimony and without sufficient
development of the facts on the issues of Robinson's insanity when
he committed the homicide and his present incompetence. It remanded
the case to the District Court with directions to appoint counsel
for Robinson; to hold a hearing as to his sanity when he committed
the alleged offense; and, if it found him to have been insane at
that time, to order his release, subject to an examination into his
present mental condition. The Court of Appeals directed that the
District Court should also determine upon the hearing whether
Robinson was denied due process by the state court's failure to
conduct a hearing upon his competence to stand trial, and, if it
were found his rights had been violated in this respect, that
Robinson
"should be ordered released, but such release may be delayed for
a reasonable time . . . to permit the State of Illinois to grant
Robinson a new trial."
345 F.2d at 698. We granted certiorari to resolve the difficult
questions of state-federal relations posed by these rulings. 382
U.S. 890 (1965). We have concluded that Robinson was
constitutionally entitled to a hearing on the issue of his
competence to stand trial. Since we do not think there could be a
meaningful hearing on that issue at this late date, we direct that
the District Court, after affording the State another opportunity
to put Robinson to trial on its charges within a reasonable time,
order him
Page 383 U. S. 378
discharged. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals in this respect except insofar as it contemplated a hearing
in the District Court on Robinson's competence. Our disposition
makes it unnecessary to reach the other reasons given by the Court
of Appeals for reversal. [
Footnote
1]
I
The State concedes that the conviction of an accused person
while he is legally incompetent violates due process,
Bishop v.
United States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956), and that state procedures
must be adequate to protect this right. It insists, however, that
Robinson intelligently waived this issue by his failure to request
a hearing on his competence at the trial, and further that, on the
basis of the evidence before the trial judge, no duty rested upon
him to order a hearing
sua sponte. A determination of
these claims necessitates a detailed discussion of the conduct of
the trial and the evidence touching upon the question of Robinson's
competence at that time.
The uncontradicted testimony of four witnesses [
Footnote 2] called by the defense revealed
that Robinson had a long history of disturbed behavior. His mother
testified that, when he was between seven and eight years of age, a
brick dropped from a third floor hit Robinson on the head. "He
blacked out, and the blood run from his head like a faucet."
Thereafter, "he acted a little peculiar." The blow knocked him
"cockeyed," and his mother took him to a specialist "to correct the
crossness of his eyes." He also suffered headaches during his
childhood, apparently stemming from the same event. His conduct
became
Page 383 U. S. 379
noticeably erratic about 1946 or 1947, when he was visiting his
mother on a furlough from the Army. While Robinson was sitting and
talking with a guest, "he jumped up and run to a bar and kicked a
hole in the bar and he run up in the front." His mother asked "what
on earth was wrong with him and he just stared at [her], and placed
the floor with both hands in his pockets." On other occasions, he
appeared in a daze, with a "glare in his eyes," and would not speak
or respond to questions. In 1951, a few years after his discharge
from the service, he "lost his mind and was pacing the floor saying
something was after him." This incident occurred at the home of his
aunt, Helen Calhoun. Disturbed by Robinson's conduct, Mrs. Calhoun
called his mother about six o'clock in the morning, and she "went
to see about him." Robinson tried to prevent Mrs. Calhoun from
opening the door, saying "that someone was going to shoot him or
someone was going to come in after him." His mother testified that,
after gaining admittance,
"I went to him and hugged him to ask him what was wrong, and he
went to pushing me back, telling me to get back, somebody was going
to shoot him, somebody was going to shoot him."
Upon being questioned as to Robinson's facial expression at the
time, the mother stated that he "had that starey look, and seemed
to be just a little foamy at the mouth." A policeman was finally
called. He put Robinson, his mother, and aunt in a cab, which drove
them to Hines Hospital. On the way, Robinson tried to jump from the
cab, and, upon arrival at the hospital, he was so violent that he
had to be strapped in a wheelchair. He then was taken in an
ambulance to the County Psychopathic Hospital, from which he was
transferred to the Kankakee State Hospital. The medical records
there recited:
"The reason for admission: the patient was admitted to this
hospital on the 5th day of June, 1952,
Page 383 U. S. 380
from the Hines Hospital. Patient began presenting symptoms of
mental illness about a year ago, at which time he came to his
mother's house. He requested money, and, when it was refused, he
suddenly kicked a hole in her bar."
"
* * * *"
"Was drinking and went to the Psychopathic Hospital. He imagined
he heard voices, voices of men and women, and he also saw things.
He saw a little bit of everything. He saw animals, snakes, and
elephants, and this lasted for about two days. He went to Hines.
They sent him to the Psychopathic Hospital. The voices threatened
him. He imagined someone was outside with a pistol aimed at him. He
was very, very scared, and he tried to call the police, and his
aunt then called the police. He thought he was going to be harmed.
And he says this all seems very foolish to him now. Patient is
friendly, and tries to cooperate."
"
* * * *"
"He went through an acute toxic episode from which he has some
insight. He had been drinking heavily . I am wondering possibly he
isn't schizophrenic. I think he has recovered from this condition.
I have seen the wife, and she is in a pathetic state. I have no
objection to giving him a try."
After his release from the state hospital, Robinson's irrational
episodes became more serious. His grandfather testified that, while
Robinson was working with him as a painter's assistant,
"all at once, he would come down [from the ladder] and walk on
out and never say where he is going and whatnot, and he would be
out two or three hours, and at times he would be in a daze, and
when he comes out, he comes back just as fresh. He just
Page 383 U. S. 381
says he didn't do anything. I noticed that he wasn't at all
himself."
The grandfather also related that, one night when Robinson was
staying at his house, Robinson and his wife had a "ruckus," which
caused his wife to flee to the grandfather's bedroom. Robinson
first tried to kick down the door. He then grabbed all of his
wife's clothes from their room and threw them out in the yard,
intending to set them on fire. Robinson got so unruly that the
grandfather called the police to lock him up.
In 1953, Robinson, then separated from his wife, brought their
18-month-old son to Mrs. Calhoun's home and asked permission to
stay there for a couple of days. She observed that he was highly
nervous, prancing about and staring wildly. While she was at work
the next day, Robinson shot and killed his son and attempted
suicide by shooting himself in the head. It appeared that, after
Robinson shot his son, he went to a nearby park and tried to take
his life again by jumping into a lagoon. By his mother's
description, he "was wandering around" the park, and walked up to a
policeman and "asked him for a cigarette." It was stipulated that
he went to the South Park Station on March 10, 1953, and said that
he wanted to confess to a crime. When he removed his hat, the
police saw that he had shot himself in the head. They took him to
the hospital for treatment of his wound.
Robinson served almost four years in prison for killing his son,
being released in September, 1956. A few months thereafter, he
began to live with Flossie May Ward at her home. In the summer of
1957 or 1958, Robinson "jumped on" his mother's brother-in-law and
"beat him up terrible." She went to the police station and swore
out a warrant for his arrest. She described his abnormalities, and
told the officers that Robinson "seemed to have a disturbed mind."
She asked the police "to pick him up so I can have him put away."
Later, she went
Page 383 U. S. 382
back to see why they had not taken him into custody because of
"the way he was fighting around in the streets, people were beating
him up." She made another complaint a month or so before Robinson
killed Flossie May Ward. However, no warrant was ever served on
him.
The killing occurred about 10:30 p.m. at a small barbecue house
where Flossie May Ward worked. At that time, there were 10
customers in the restaurant, six of them sitting at the counter. It
appears from the record that Robinson entered the restaurant with a
gun in his hand. As he approached the counter, Flossie May said,
"Don't start nothing tonight." After staring at her for about a
minute, he walked to the rear of the room and, with the use of his
hand, leaped over the counter. He then rushed back toward the front
of the restaurant, past two other employees working behind the
counter, and fired once or twice at Flossie May. She jumped over
the counter and ran out the front door with Robinson in pursuit.
She was found dead on the sidewalk. [
Footnote 3] Robinson never spoke a word during the
three-to-four minute episode.
Subsequently, Robinson went to the apartment of a friend, Mr.
Moore, who summoned the police. When three officers, two in
uniform, arrived, Robinson was standing in the hall approximately
half way between the elevator and the apartment. Unaware of his
identity, the officers walked past him and went to the door of the
apartment. Mrs. Moore answered the door and told them that Robinson
had left a short time earlier. As the officers turned around, they
saw Robinson still standing where they had first observed him.
Robinson made no attempt to avoid being arrested. When asked his
address
Page 383 U. S. 383
he gave several evasive answers. He also denied knowing anything
about the killing. [
Footnote
4]
Four defense witnesses expressed the opinion that Robinson was
insane. [
Footnote 5] In
rebuttal the State introduced only a stipulation that Dr. William
H. Haines, Director of the Behavior Clinic of the Criminal Court of
Cook County would, if present, testify that, in his opinion,
Robinson knew the nature of the charges against him and was able to
cooperate with counsel when he examined him two or three months
before trial. However, since the stipulation did not include a
finding of sanity, the prosecutor advised the court that
"we should have
Page 383 U. S. 384
Dr. Haines' testimony as to his opinion whether this man is sane
or insane. It is possible that the man might be insane and know the
nature of the charge or be able to cooperate with his counsel. I
think it should be in evidence, your Honor, that Dr. Haines'
opinion is that this defendant was sane when he was examined."
However, the court told the prosecutor, "You have enough in the
record now. I don't think you need Dr. Haines." In his summation,
defense counsel emphasized "our defense is clear. . . . It is as to
the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime and also as to
the present time." The court, after closing argument by the
defense, found Robinson guilty and sentenced him to prison for his
natural life.
II
The State insists that Robinson deliberately waived the defense
of his competence to stand trial by failing to demand a sanity
hearing as provided by Illinois law. But it is contradictory to
argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or
intelligently "waive" his right to have the court determine his
capacity to stand trial.
See Taylor v. United States, 282
F.2d 16, 23 (C.A.8th Cir. 1960). In any event, the record shows
that counsel, throughout the proceedings, insisted that Robinson's
present sanity was very much in issue. He made a point to elicit
Mrs. Robinson's opinion of Robinson's "present sanity." And, in his
argument to the judge, he asserted that Robinson "should be found
not guilty and presently insane on the basis of the testimony that
we have heard." Moreover, the prosecutor himself suggested at trial
that "we should have Dr. Haines' testimony as to his opinion
whether this man is sane or insane." With this record, we cannot
say that Robinson waived the defense of incompetence to stand
trial. [
Footnote 6]
Page 383 U. S. 385
We believe that the evidence introduced on Robinson's behalf
entitled him to a hearing on this issue. The court's failure to
make such inquiry thus deprived Robinson of his constitutional
right to a fair trial. [
Footnote
7]
See Thomas v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 934 (C.A.4th
Cir. 1963). Illinois jealously guards this right. Where the
evidence raises a "
bona fide doubt" as to a defendant's
competence to stand trial, the judge, on his own motion, must
impanel a jury and conduct a sanity hearing pursuant to
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 104-2 (1963).
People v.
Shrake, 25 Ill. 2d
141,
182 N.E.2d
754 (1962). The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the
evidence here was not sufficient to require a hearing in light of
the mental alertness and understanding displayed in Robinson's
"colloquies" with the trial judge. 22 Ill. 2d at 168, 174 N.E.2d at
823. But this reasoning offers no justification for ignoring the
uncontradicted testimony
Page 383 U. S. 386
of Robinson's history of pronounced irrational behavior. While
Robinson's demeanor at trial might be relevant to the ultimate
decision as to his sanity, it cannot be relied upon to dispense
with a hearing on that very issue.
Cf. Bishop v. United
States, 350 U.S. 961 (1956),
reversing 96
U.S.App.D.C. 117, 120, 223 F.2d 582, 585 (1955). Likewise, the
stipulation of Dr. Haines' testimony was some evidence of
Robinson's ability to assist in his defense. But, as the state
prosecutor seemingly admitted, on the facts presented to the trial
court, it could not properly have been deemed dispositive on the
issue of Robinson's competence. [
Footnote 8]
III
Having determined that Robinson's constitutional rights were
abridged by his failure to receive an adequate hearing on his
competence to stand trial, we direct that the writ of habeas corpus
must issue, and Robinson be discharged, unless the State gives him
a new trial within a reasonable time. This disposition accords with
the procedure adopted in
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.
S. 534 (1961). We there determined that, since the state
court had applied an erroneous standard to judge the admissibility
of a confession, the
"defendant should have the opportunity to have all issues which
may be determinative of his guilt tried by a state judge or a state
jury under appropriate state procedures, which conform to the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment."
At
365 U. S.
547-548.
Page 383 U. S. 387
It has been pressed upon us that it would be sufficient for the
state court to hold a limited hearing as to Robinson's mental
competence at the time he was tried in 1959. If he were found
competent, the judgment against him would stand. But we have
previously emphasized the difficulty of retrospectively determining
an accused's competence to stand trial.
Dusky v. United
States, 362 U. S. 402
(1960). The jury would not be able to observe the subject of their
inquiry, and expert witnesses would have to testify solely from
information contained in the printed record. That Robinson's
hearing would be held six years after the fact aggravates these
difficulties. This need for concurrent determination distinguishes
the present case from
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.
S. 368 (1964), where we held that, on remand, the State
could discharge its constitutional obligation by giving the accused
a separate hearing on the voluntariness of his confession.
If the State elects to retry Robinson, it will, of course, be
open to him to raise the question of his competence to stand trial
at that time and to request a special hearing thereon. In the event
a sufficient doubt exists as to his present competence, such a
hearing must be held. If found competent to stand trial, Robinson
would have the usual defenses available to an accused.
The case is remanded to the District Court for action consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Nor do we pass on the contention that Robinson was denied his
Sixth Amendment rights by the trial judge's refusal to issue
summonses for material witnesses.
[
Footnote 2]
These witnesses were Miss Willie Ceola Peterson, Robinson's
mother; Mr. William H. Langham, his grandfather; Mrs. Helen
Calhoun, his aunt; and Mrs. Alice Moore, a family friend.
[
Footnote 3]
The Reverend Elmer Clemons was also shot and killed in the
fracas. The indictment covering that offense was dismissed at the
close of the trial in question.
[
Footnote 4]
According to the testimony of an arresting officer, the
following exchange took place:
"I asked him what his name was, and he said, 'My name is Ted.' I
said, 'What is your real name?' And he said, 'Theodore Robinson.'
Then I asked him -- I told him he was under arrest, and he said,
'For what?' I said, 'Well, you are supposed to be wanted for
killing two people on the south side.' I asked him did he know
anything about it. He said, 'No, I don't know what you are talking
about.' So then I asked him where he lived, and he said, 'I don't
live no place.'"
"I said, 'What do you mean you don't live no place?' He said,
'That's what I said.'"
"So then pretty soon asked him again, and he said, 'Sometimes I
stay with my mother.' And I said, 'Where does she live?' He said,
'Some address on East 44th Street.'"
"So then we took him on to the 27th District, and, while we were
making the arrest slip, asked him again his address, and he said he
lived at 7320 South Parkway. That's about all he said. He didn't
know anything about any killing or anything."
[
Footnote 5]
His mother stated: "I think he is insane." Mrs. Calhoun
testified as follows:
"Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not presently he is
sane or insane?"
"A. He is sick. He is insane."
"Q. First of all, do you have an opinion?"
"A. Yes."
"Q. What is your opinion as to his present sanity? . . ."
"A. He is mentally sick."
[
Footnote 6]
Although defense counsel phrased his questions and argument in
terms of Robinson's present insanity, we interpret his language as
necessarily placing in issue the question of Robinson's mental
competence to stand trial. Counsel was simply borrowing the
terminology of the relevant Illinois statutes and decisions. The
state law in effect at the time of Robinson's trial differentiated
between lack of criminal responsibility and competence to stand
trial, but used "insanity" to describe both concepts.
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, §§ 592, 593 (1963). The judges likewise
phrased their decisions only in terms of sanity and insanity.
See, e.g., People v. Baker, 26 Ill. 2d
484,
187 N.W.2d
227 (1962). The statutory provisions and terminology in this
field have now been clarified by the enactment of an article
dealing with the "competency of accused." Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, §§
104-1 to 104-3 (1963), as amended by the Code of Criminal Procedure
of 1963. Even if counsel may also have meant to refer to the
statutory provisions dealing with commitment for present insanity,
Ill.Rev.Stat., c. 38, § 592 (1963), this fact would not affect the
determination that counsel's words raised a question as to
competence that the trial judge should have considered.
[
Footnote 7]
Moreover, as the Court of Appeals stressed, the trial judge did
not give Robinson an opportunity to introduce expert testimony on
the question of his sanity. The judge denied counsel's request for
a continuance of several hours in order to secure the appearance of
a psychiatrist from the Illinois Psychiatric Institute.
[
Footnote 8]
As defense counsel insisted in his closing argument:
"In this case, which is a very serious case, the defendant has
been able to cooperate with counsel with some reservations. . . .
However, I do not feel that this present . . . lucidity bears on
the issue of his sanity at the time of the crime and his sanity at
the present time. I think the words sanity and insanity, the words
are legal terms. I think that, presently, Mr. Theodore Robinson is
in a lucid interval. I believe that, from the witness stand, you
have heard testimony to indicate and prove that Mr. Theodore
Robinson is presently insane. . . ."
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK joins,
dissenting.
The facts now canvassed by this Court to support its
constitutional holding were fully sifted by the Illinois Supreme
Court. I cannot agree that the state court's unanimous appraisal
was erroneous, and still less that it was error of constitutional
proportions.
Page 383 U. S. 388
The Court appears to hold that a defendant's present
incompetence may become sufficiently manifest during a trial that
it denies him due process for the trial court to fail to conduct a
hearing on that question on its own initiative. I do not dissent
from this very general proposition, and I agree also that such an
error is not "waived" by failure to raise it, and that it may
entitle the defendant to a new trial without further proof. Waiver
is not an apposite concept where we premise a defendant so deranged
that he cannot oversee his lawyers. Since our further premise is
that the trial judge should and could have avoided the error, a new
trial seems not too drastic an exaction in view of the proof
problems arising after a significant lapse of time. [
Footnote 2/1] However, I do not believe the
facts known to the trial judge in this case suggested Robinson's
incompetence at time of trial with anything like the force
necessary to make out a violation of due process in the failure to
pursue the question.
Before turning to the facts, it is pertinent to consider the
quality of the incompetence they are supposed to indicate. In
federal courts -- and I assume no more is asked of state courts --
the test of incompetence that warrants postponing the trial is
reasonably well settled. In language this Court adopted on the one
occasion it faced the issue,
"the 'test must be whether . . . [the defendant] has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding -- and whether he has a rational, as well
as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him.'"
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.
S. 402. In short, emphasis is on capacity to consult
with counsel and to comprehend the proceedings,
Page 383 U. S. 389
and lower courts have recognized that this is by no means the
same test as those which determine criminal responsibility at the
the of the crime. [
Footnote 2/2]
The question, then, is not whether the facts before the trial judge
suggested that Robinson's crime was an insane act, but whether they
suggested he was incompetent to stand trial.
The Court's affirmative answer seemingly rests on two kinds of
evidence, principally adduced by Robinson to prove an insanity
defense after the State rested its main case. First, there was
evidence of a number of episodes of severe irrationality in
Robinson's past. Among them were the slaying of his infant son, his
attempted suicide, his efforts to burn his wife's clothing, his
fits of temper and of abstraction, and his seven-week incarceration
in a state hospital eight years before the trial. This evidence may
be tempered by the State's counterarguments, for example, that
Robinson was found guilty of his son's killing and that alcoholism
may explain his hospitalization, but it cannot be written off
entirely. The difficulty remains that, while this testimony may
suggest that Flossie May Ward's killing was just one more
irrational act, I cannot say as a matter of common knowledge that
it evidences incapacity during the trial. Indeed, the pattern
revealed may best indicate that Robinson did function adequately
during most of his life, interrupted by periods of severe
derangement that would have been quite apparent had they occurred
at trial. The second class of data pertinent to the Court's theory,
remarks by witnesses and counsel that Robinson was "presently
insane," deserves little comment. I think it apparent that these
statements were addressed to Robinson's responsibility
Page 383 U. S. 390
for the killing, that is, his ability to do insane acts, and not
to his general competency to stand trial. [
Footnote 2/3]
Whatever mild doubts this evidence may stir are surely allayed
by positive indications of Robinson's competence at the trial.
Foremost is his own behavior in the courtroom. The record reveals
colloquies between Robinson and the trial judge which undoubtedly
permitted a reasonable inference that Robinson was quite cognizant
of the proceedings, and able to assist counsel in his defense.
[
Footnote 2/4] Turning from lay
impressions to those of an expert, it was stipulated at trial that
a Dr. Haines, Director of the Behavior Clinic of the Criminal Court
of Cook County, had examined Robinson several months earlier and,
if called, would testify that Robinson "knows
Page 383 U. S. 391
the nature of the charge and is able to cooperate with his
counsel." The conclusive factor is that Robinson's own lawyers, the
two men who apparently had the closest contact with the defendant
during the proceedings, never suggested he was incompetent to stand
trial and never moved to have him examined on incompetency grounds
during trial; [
Footnote 2/5]
indeed, counsel's remarks to the jury seem best read as an
affirmation of Robinson's present "lucidity" which would be highly
peculiar if Robinson had been unable to assist properly in his
defense.
See p.
383 U. S. 386,
n 8,
ante, of the
Court's opinion.
Thus, I cannot agree with the Court that the requirements of due
process were violated by the failure of the trial judge, who had
opportunities for personal observation of the defendant that we do
not possess, to halt the trial and hold a competency hearing on his
own motion.
Several other grounds have been urged as a basis for habeas
corpus relief for Robinson. These other grounds are understandably
not discussed in the Court's opinion, and I think it is sufficient
for me to say I do not believe that they warrant further
proceedings. In my view, the Court of Appeals should be reversed,
and the District Court's dismissal of the petition reinstated.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The constitutional violation alleged is the failure to make an
inquiry. In the more usual case, the simple claim that a defendant
was convicted while incompetent during the trial, there is, of
course, no proof of a constitutional violation until that
incompetence is established in appropriate proceedings.
[
Footnote 2/2]
See James v. Boles, 339 F.2d 431;
United States v.
Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110;
Lyles v. United States, 103
U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725.
[
Footnote 2/3]
At the time Robinson's mother and Mrs. Calhoun made the
statements noted in the Court's opinion, p.
383 U. S. 383,
n 5,
ante, they also
stated Robinson did not know the difference between right and
wrong. Counsel's statement, too, quoted by the Court at p.
383 U. S. 386,
n 8,
ante, was
directed to acquittal, not postponement.
See n 5,
infra. Mrs. Moore, a family
friend, responded to the question on Robinson's sanity by saying:
"When he is in those moods, I think he is insane; when he is in
those moods, because he is terrible."
[
Footnote 2/4]
The Illinois Supreme Court stated in its opinion:
"[T]he record reflects several instances where defendant
displayed his ability to assist in the conduct of his defense in a
reasonable and rational manner. Typical instances of when defendant
displayed mental alertness, as well as understanding and knowledge
of the proceeding, appear in his remarks to the court as
follows:"
"Your honor, they were on the State's witness list and the State
said they have several witnesses. They produced two. For what
reason, I don't know, but I am on trial here, and I would like to
be given every consideration, and I would like that the court be
adjourned until tomorrow morning to give me time to confer with
counsel for the calling of witnesses."
"Again, when discussing witnesses with the court, defendant
said:"
"Well, the police are contending that the clothes they have
found in Moore's apartment was mine. That is the reason at the
beginning of trial, I asked the attorney to have a pretrial
preliminary to determine the admissibility and validity of the
evidence that the State was intending to use against me."
22 Ill. 2d at 168, 174 N.E.2d at 823.
[
Footnote 2/5]
The record, in my view, does not bear out any suggestion that
Robinson's counsel apprised the trial judge that he believed
Robinson incompetent to stand trial, even granting that "insane"
was a synonym for "incompetent" under then-existing state law (pp.
383 U. S.
384-385,
n 6, ante).
Under Illinois law, as one would naturally expect, incompetence at
the time of trial has been a ground not for acquitting the
defendant, but for postponing his trial; and nowhere in the record
does Robinson's counsel even hint to the judge that he believes the
trial should be deferred or abated because his client is not fit to
continue. The ready explanation for counsel's references to
"present insanity," apart from emphasizing Robinson's general lack
of criminal responsibility, is that Illinois law provided that one
acquitted on grounds of insanity at the time of the crime shall by
the same verdict be found cured of or still afflicted with "such
insanity" and committed in the latter instance. Ill.Rev.Stat., c.
38, § 592 (1959).