Petitioners sued under the Jones Act for damages for injuries to
one seaman and for death of another resulting from an automobile
accident in Trinidad. The seamen, who were crew members of
respondent's tanker docked at respondent's refinery, fell ill and
were unable to continue the voyage. To comply with the statutory
requirement that incapacitated seamen be brought before a U.S.
Consul before discharge in a foreign port, the ship's Master
procured a cab from one of the two local taxi companies usually
used for trips outside the refiner area. The jury found the taxi
driver negligent, and judgment on the jury's verdict was entered
for petitioners in the District Court. The Court of Appeals
reversed the determination that respondent is liable for the taxi
driver's negligence.
Held: Under the standards of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, incorporated into the Jones Act, which render an
employer liable for injuries to his employees inflicted through the
negligence of his "officers, agents, or employees," respondent, who
had a duty of getting the seamen to the Consulate and who selected,
as it had done before, the taxi service, bears the responsibility
for the negligence of the driver it chose.
Sinkler v. Missouri
Pac. R. Co., 356 U. S. 326.
Certiorari granted; 351 F.2d 415 reversed.
PER CURIAM.
These actions were brought under the Jones Act, as amended (41
Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964 ed.)), to recover damages for
injuries sustained by one seaman, and for the death of another, as
a result of an automobile accident on the island of Trinidad.
Judgment on the jury's verdict was entered in United States
District Court in favor of the plaintiffs, but the Court of
Appeals
Page 383 U. S. 263
reversed. 351 F.2d 415. We grant the petition for a writ of
certiorari, and reverse.
The facts are not in dispute. The two seamen were members of the
crew of respondent's tanker, which was docked at respondent's
refinery at Pointe-a-Pierre on the island of Trinidad. Both fell
ill, and it was determined that they would be unable to continue
the voyage. In order to discharge an incapacitated seaman in a
foreign port, federal law [
Footnote
1] requires that he be taken to a United States Consul, where
arrangements for his return to the United States can be made. The
United States Consul's Office was located in Port of Spain, some 38
miles distant. Although respondent had a fleet of motor vehicles
used for transportation in the immediate vicinity of the refinery
and docking area, its practice was to utilize either of two local
taxi companies for journeys to more distant points. The ship's
Master procured one of these cabs, which set out for Port of Spain
with the two ill seamen. En route, the taxi collided with a truck,
killing the Master and one of the seamen; the other seaman was
seriously injured. The jury found that the taxi driver had been
negligent
-- a finding challenged neither in the Court of
Appeals nor here. The Court of Appeals reversed the District
Court's determination that respondent is liable to petitioners for
this negligence of the taxi operator.
The Jones Act [
Footnote 2]
incorporates the standards of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,
as amended, [
Footnote 3] which
renders an employer liable for the injuries negligently inflicted
on its employees by its "officers, agents, or employees." [
Footnote 4] We noted in
Sinkler v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 356 U. S. 326,
that the latter Act was "an avowed
Page 383 U. S. 264
departure from the rules of the common law" (
id. at
356 U. S.
329), which, recognizing "[t]he cost of human injury, an
inescapable expense of railroading," undertook to "adjust that
expense equitably between the worker and the carrier."
Ibid. In order to give "an accommodating scope . . . to
the word
agents'" (id. at
356 U. S.
330-331), we concluded that,
"when [an] . . . employee's injury is caused in whole or in part
by the fault of others performing, under contract, operational
activities of his employer, such others are 'agents' of the
employer within the meaning of § 1 of FELA."
(
Id. at
356 U. S.
331-332).
We think those principles apply with equal force here. These
seamen were in the service of the ship, and the ill-fated journey
to Port of Spain was a vital part of the ship's total operations.
The ship could not sail with these two men, nor could it lawfully
discharge them without taking them to the United States Consul.
Indeed, to have abandoned them would have breached the statutory
duty to arrange for their return to the United States. Getting
these two ill seamen to the United States Consul's office was,
therefore, the duty of respondent. And it was respondent -- not the
seamen -- which selected, as it had done many times before, the
taxi service. Respondent -- the law says -- should bear the
responsibility for the negligence of the driver which it chose.
This is so because, as we said in
Sinkler,
"justice demands that one who gives his labor to the furtherance
of the enterprise should be assured that all combining their
exertions with him in the common pursuit will conduct themselves in
all respects with sufficient care that his safety while doing his
part will not be endangered."
356 U.S. at
356 U. S.
330.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, believing that
Sinkler v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 356 U. S. 326,
should not be extended, dissents.
[
Footnote 1]
Rev.Stat. §§ 4578, 4580, 4581, as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 679,
682, 683 (1964 ed.).
[
Footnote 2]
46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964 ed.).
[
Footnote 3]
53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 51
et seq. (1964 ed.).
[
Footnote 4]
45 U.S.C. § 51 (1964 ed.).