Petitioner was indicted for willfully attempting to evade
federal income taxes in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. At the end
of his trial, he requested that the jury be instructed that it
could acquit him of that offense, a felony, but could convict him
of the lesser included misdemeanors of willfully filing a
fraudulent or false return in violation of § 7207, or willfully
failing to pay his taxes when due in violation of § 7203. The
request was denied, and petitioner was found guilty. The Court of
Appeals upheld the conviction.
Held:
1. Since § 7207 applies to income tax violations, as §§ 7201 and
7203 clearly do, with obvious overlapping among them, the lesser
included offense doctrine would be applicable in an appropriate
case. Pp.
380 U. S.
347-349.
2. A lesser included offense instruction is proper only where
the charged greater offense requires that the jury find a disputed
factual element which is not a requisite for conviction of the
lesser included offense.
Berra v. United States,
351 U. S. 131,
followed. Pp.
380 U. S.
349-350.
3. There were here no disputed issues of fact which would
justify instructions to the jury that it could find that petitioner
had committed all the elements of §§ 7203 and 7207 without having
violated § 7201, and so petitioner was not entitled to lesser
included offense instructions. Pp.
380 U. S.
350-354.
334 F.2d 287 affirmed.
Page 380 U. S. 344
MR. JUSTICE GOLDBERG delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner Sansone was indicted for willfully attempting to
evade federal income taxes for the year 1957 in violation of § 7201
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 7201 provides:
"Any person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall,
in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a
felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both, together
with the costs of prosecution."
The following facts were established at trial. In March, 1956,
petitioner and his wife purchased a tract of land for $22,500 and
simultaneously sold a portion of the tract for $20,000. In August,
1957, petitioner sold another portion of the tract for $27,000. He
did not report the gain on either the 1956 or 1957 sale in his
income tax returns for those years. [
Footnote 1] Petitioner conceded that the 1957 transaction
was reportable and that, in not reporting it, he understated his
tax liability for that year by $2,456.48. He contended, however,
that this understatement was not willful, since he believed at the
time that extensive repairs on a creek adjoining a portion of the
tract he retained might be necessary, and that the cost of these
repairs might wipe out his profit on the 1957 sale.
To counter this defense, the Government introduced the following
signed statement made by petitioner during the Treasury
investigation of his tax return:
"I did not report the 1957 sale in our joint income tax return
for 1957 because I was burdened with a
Page 380 U. S. 345
number of financial obligations, and did not feel I could raise
the money to pay any tax due. It was my intention to report all
sales in a future year and pay the tax due. I knew that I should
have reported the 1957 sale, but my wife did not know that it
should have been reported. It was not my intention to evade the
payment of our proper taxes, and I intended to pay any additional
taxes due when I was financially able to do so."
At the conclusion of the trial, petitioner requested that the
jury be instructed that it could acquit him of the charged offense
of willfully attempting to evade or defeat taxes in violation of §
7201, but still convict him of either or both of the asserted
lesser included offenses of willfully filing a fraudulent or false
return, in violation of § 7207, [
Footnote 2] or willfully failing to pay his taxes at the
time required by law, in violation of § 7203. [
Footnote 3] Section 7201 is a felony, providing
for a maximum fine of $10,000 and imprisonment for five years. Both
§§ 7203 and 7207 are misdemeanors, with maximum prison sentences of
one year under each
Page 380 U. S. 346
section, and maximum fines of $10,000 under § 7203 and $1,000
under § 7207.
The requested instructions were denied. [
Footnote 4] Petitioner was found guilty by the jury of
violating § 7201, and was
Page 380 U. S. 347
sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $2,000 and to serve 15
months' imprisonment. The conviction was upheld by the Court of
Appeals. 334 F.2d 287. We granted certiorari to consider the
applicability of the lesser included offense doctrine to these
federal tax statutes. 379 U.S. 886.
I
We are faced with the threshold question as to whether or not §
7207, which proscribes the willful filing with a Treasury official
of any known false or fraudulent "return," applies to the filing of
an income tax return. [
Footnote
5] If § 7207 does not apply to income tax returns, it is
obvious that the defendant was not here entitled to a lesser
included offense charge based on that section.
This Court held in
Achilli v. United States,
353 U. S. 373,
that § 7207's statutory predecessor, § 3616(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1939, which made it a misdemeanor for any person to
deliver to the Collector of Revenue
"any false or fraudulent list, return, account, or statement,
with intent to defeat or evade the
Page 380 U. S. 348
valuation, enumeration, or assessment intended to be
made. . . ."
(emphasis added), despite its broad language, was not intended
by Congress to apply to income tax returns.
There were two major bases of this Court's conclusion in
Achilli that § 3616(a) did not apply to such returns.
First, unlike other criminal provisions clearly applicable to
income taxes which appeared in the income tax chapter of the 1939
Code and were specifically designed to punish evasion of that tax,
§ 3616(a) was placed among the Code's "General Administrative
Provisions," and did not specifically refer to income taxes.
Second, § 3616(a) required that the false or fraudulent return be
filed "with intent to defeat or evade the valuation, enumeration,
or assessment intended to be made." This provision, as the Court
had already held in
Berra v. United States, 351 U.
S. 131, if applied to income tax returns, would have
made § 3616(a) completely coextensive with the predecessor of §
7201 where the attempt to evade income taxes was accomplished by
filing a fraudulent income tax return. It was clear that the
predecessor of § 7201 applied to this method of attempting to evade
income taxes, and the Court was unwilling to presume that Congress
intended to enact both felony and misdemeanor provisions which
completely overlap in this important area.
Both of these bases of decision were removed by the 1954 Code.
Unlike their predecessors in the 1939 Code, §§ 7201, 7203, and
7207, together with other sections clearly applicable to income tax
violations, were all placed in the same section (Part I of Chapter
75) of the 1954 Code. Congress specifically stated that it placed
all these provisions in the same part of the Code because it wished
them to apply to taxes generally, including income taxes.
See S.Rep.No.1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 147; H.R.Rep.
Page 380 U. S. 349
.No.1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 108. In contrast, Part II of
Chapter 75 contains provisions applicable only to specified taxes,
none of which includes income taxes.
Further, Congress, in enacting § 7207, did not reenact §
3616(a)'s requirement that the false or fraudulent return be made
with "intent to defeat or evade" the tax due. Thus, the second
basis for the Court's conclusion in
Achilli that § 3616(a)
did not apply to income taxes was removed.
See Berra v. United
States, supra, at
351 U. S. 134,
n. 5. Finally, in providing that the false or fraudulent return be
made "willfully," § 7207 was conformed to the language contained in
the other misdemeanor provisions clearly applicable to income
taxes.
See, e.g., § 7203.
We conclude, therefore, that § 7207 applies to income tax
violations. Since there is no doubt that §§ 7201 and 7203 also
apply to income tax violations, with obvious overlapping among
them, there can be no doubt that the lesser included offense
doctrine applies to these statutes in an appropriate case.
See
Spies v. United States, 317 U. S. 492,
317 U. S. 495;
Berra v. United States, supra.
II
The basic principles controlling whether or not a lesser
included offense charge should be given in a particular case have
been settled by this Court. Rule 31(c) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part, that the "defendant
may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the
offense charged." Thus,
"[i]n a case where some of the elements of the crime charged
themselves constitute a lesser crime, the defendant, if the
evidence justifie[s] it . . . , [is] entitled to an instruction
which would permit a finding of guilt of the lesser offense."
Berra v. United States, supra, at
351 U. S. 134.
See Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.
S. 313. But a lesser offense charge is not proper where,
on the
Page 380 U. S. 350
evidence presented, the factual issues to be resolved by the
jury are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses.
Berra v. United States, supra; Sparf v. United States,
156 U. S. 51,
156 U. S. 63-64.
In other words, the lesser offense must be included within, but
not, on the facts of the case, be completely encompassed by, the
greater. A lesser included offense instruction is only proper where
the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed
factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser
included offense.
Berra v. United States, supra; Sparf v.
United States, supra, at
156 U. S. 63-64.
[
Footnote 6] We now apply the
principles declared in these cases to the instant case.
III
The offense here charged was a violation of § 7201, which
proscribes willfully attempting in any manner to evade or defeat
any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code. As this Court has
recognized, this felony provision is
"the capstone of a system of sanctions which, singly or in
combination, were calculated to induce prompt and forthright
fulfillment of every duty under the income tax law and to provide a
penalty suitable to every degree of
Page 380 U. S. 351
delinquency."
Spies v. United States, supra, at
317 U. S. 497.
As such a capstone, § 7201 necessarily includes among its elements
actions which, if isolated from the others, constitute lesser
offenses in this hierarchical system of sanctions. Therefore, if,
on the facts of a given case, there are disputed issues of fact
which would enable the jury rationally to find that, although all
the elements of § 7201 have not been proved, all the elements of
one or more lesser offenses have been, it is clear that the
defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge as to
such lesser offenses.
As has been held by this Court, the elements of § 7201 are
willfulness; the existence of a tax deficiency,
Lawn v. United
States, 355 U. S. 339,
355 U. S. 361;
Spies v. United States, supra, at
317 U. S. 496;
and an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted evasion
of the tax,
Spies v. United States, supra. In comparison,
§ 7203 makes it a misdemeanor willfully to fail to perform a number
of specified acts at the time required by law -- the one here
relevant being the failure to pay a tax when due. This misdemeanor
requires only willfulness and the omission of the required act --
here, the payment of the tax when due. As recognized by this Court
in
Spies v. United States, supra, at
317 U. S. 499,
the difference between a mere willful failure to pay a tax (or
perform other enumerated actions) when due under § 7203 and a
willful attempt to evade or defeat taxes under § 7201 is that the
latter felony involves "some willful commission in addition to the
willful omissions that make up the list of misdemeanors." Where
there is, in a § 7201 prosecution, a disputed issue of fact as to
the existence of the requisite affirmative commission in addition
to the § 7203 omission, a defendant would, of course, be entitled
to a lesser included offense charge based on § 7203.
Cf. Spies
v. United States, supra. In this case, however, it is
undisputed that petitioner filed
Page 380 U. S. 352
a tax return, and that the petitioner's filing of a false tax
return constituted a sufficient affirmative commission to satisfy
that requirement of § 7201. The only issue at trial was whether
petitioner's act was willful. Given this affirmative commission and
the conceded tax deficiency, if petitioner's act was willful, that
is, if the jury believed, as it obviously did, that he knew that
the capital gain on the sale of the property was reportable in
1957, he was guilty of violating both §§ 7201 and 7203. If his act
was not willful, he was not guilty of violating either § 7201 or §
7203. Thus, on the facts of this case, §§ 7201 and 7203 "covered
precisely the same ground."
Berra v. United States, supra,
at
351 U. S. 134.
This being so, on the authorities cited, it is clear that
petitioner was not entitled to a lesser included offense charge
based on § 7203.
Section 7207 requires the willful filing of a document known to
be false or fraudulent in any material manner. The elements here
involved are willfulness and the commission of the prohibited act.
Section 7207 does not, however, require that the act be done as an
attempt to evade or defeat taxes. Conduct could therefore violate §
7207 without violating § 7201 where the false statement, though
material, does not constitute an attempt to evade or defeat
taxation because it does not have the requisite effect of reducing
the stated tax liability. This may be the case, for example, where
a taxpayer understates his gross receipts and he offsets this by
also understating his deductible expenses. In this example, if the
Government, in a § 7201 case, charged tax evasion on the grounds
that the defendant had understated his tax by understating his
gross receipts, and the defendant contended that this was not so,
as the misstatement of gross receipts had been offset by an
understatement of deductible expenses, the defendant would be
entitled to a lesser
Page 380 U. S. 353
included offense charge based on § 7207, there being this
relevant disputed issue of fact. This would be so, for, in such a
case, if the jury believed that an understatement of deductible
expenses had offset the understatement of gross receipts, while the
defendant would have violated § 7207 by willfully making a material
false and fraudulent statement on his return, he would not have
violated § 7201, as there would not have been the requisite § 7201
element of a tax deficiency. Here, however, there is no dispute
that petitioner's material misstatement resulted in a tax
deficiency. Thus, there is no disputed issue of fact concerning the
existence of an element required for conviction of § 7201 but not
required for conviction of § 7207. Given petitioner's material
misstatement which resulted in a tax deficiency, if, as the jury
obviously found, petitioner's act was willful in the sense that he
knew that he should have reported more income than he did for the
year 1957, he was guilty of violating both §§ 7201 and 7207. If his
action was not willful, he was guilty of violating neither. As was
true with § 7203, on the facts of this case, §§ 7201 and 7207
"covered precisely the same ground,"
Berra v. United States,
supra, at
351 U. S. 134,
and thus petitioner was not entitled to a lesser included offense
charge based on § 7207.
Petitioner makes one final contention. He argues that he could
have been acquitted of attempting to evade or defeat his 1957
taxes, in violation of § 7201, but still have been convicted for
willfully failing to pay his tax when due in violation of § 7203 or
willfully filing a fraudulent return in violation of § 7207, if the
jury believed his statement contained in the government-introduced
affidavit that, although he knew that profit on the sale in
question was reportable for 1957 and that tax was due thereon, he
intended to report the sale and pay the 1957 tax at some
unspecified future date. The basic premise of this argument
Page 380 U. S. 354
is that, although all three sections require willfulness, on the
facts here, the contents of these willfulness requirements differ.
T he argument is made that, while an intent to report and pay the
tax in the future does not vitiate the willfulness requirements of
§§ 7203 and 7207, it does constitute a defense to a willful attempt
"in any manner to evade or defeat any tax imposed by" the Internal
Revenue Code, in violation of § 7201. While we agree that the
intent to report the income and pay the tax sometime in the future
does not vitiate the willfulness required by §§ 7203 and 7207, we
cannot agree that it vitiates the willfulness requirement of §
7201.
No defense to a § 7201 evasion charge is made out by showing
that the defendant willfully and fraudulently understated his tax
liability for the year involved, but intended to report the income
and pay the tax at some later time. As this Court has recognized, §
7201 includes the offense of willfully attempting to evade or
defeat the assessment of a tax as well as the offense of willfully
attempting to evade or defeat the payment of a tax.
Lawn v.
United States, supra. The indictment here charged an attempt
to evade income taxes by defeating the assessment for 1957. The
fact that petitioner stated to a revenue agent that he intended to
report his 1957 income in some later year, even if taken at face
value, would not detract from the criminality of his willful act
defeating the 1957 assessment. That crime was complete as soon as
the false and fraudulent understatement of taxes (assuming, of
course, that there was in fact a deficiency) was filed.
See
United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U. S.
43,
344 U. S. 46.
See also Spies v. United States, supra, at
317 U. S.
498-499.
In sum, it is clear here that there were no disputed issues of
fact which would justify instructing the jury that it could find
that petitioner had committed all the elements
Page 380 U. S. 355
of either or both of the §§ 7203 and 7207 misdemeanors without
having committed a violation of the § 7201 felony. This being the
case, the petitioner was not entitled to a lesser included offense
charge, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent, believing
that there was evidence sufficient to require the Court to charge
the jury, as petitioner requested, that they could acquit him on
this felony charge of having willfully attempted to evade or defeat
taxes in violation of § 7201 but still convict him of the lesser
misdemeanor offenses included in the felony charge.
See Berra
v. United States, 351 U. S. 131,
351 U. S. 135
(dissenting opinion).
Cf. Achilli v. United States,
353 U. S. 373,
353 U. S. 379
(dissenting opinion).
[
Footnote 1]
Petitioner was charged with a violation of § 7201 for 1956 in
addition to the charge for 1957. The jury acquitted him with
respect to the 1956 charge, which is consequently not involved in
this case.
[
Footnote 2]
Section 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
"Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the Secretary
or his delegate any list, return, account, statement, or other
document, known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as to any
material matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned
not more than 1 year, or both."
[
Footnote 3]
Section 7203 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides:
"Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax
or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under
authority thereof to make a return (other than a return required
under authority of section 6015 or section 6016), keep any records,
or supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such
estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or
supply such information, at the time or times required by law or
regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law,
be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or
both, together with the costs of prosecution."
[
Footnote 4]
The full instructions requested by petitioner were as
follows:
No. 1.
"Under the law, you may find a defendant guilty of a lesser
crime than the crimes charged in the indictment."
"A statute upon which a lesser crime is based (Section 7203 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954), omitting that part of the Act
which does not apply in this case, reads as follows:"
" Any person required under this title to pay any . . . tax, . .
. who willfully fails to pay such tax, . . . at the time or times
required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor."
"and then the statute provides for the penalty."
"Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that (with
respect to either or both of the counts in this indictment) the
defendant willfully failed to pay the correct tax to the United
States at the time of the filing of his return, but you further
find that the defendant did not willfully attempt to defeat and
evade his income taxes by the filing of a false and fraudulent
return, you will in your verdict say 'Guilty of violating a lesser
included offense.'"
"If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant
willfully failed to pay the correct tax when filing his income tax
return or returns under any count or counts of this indictment, you
will resolve the doubt in favor of the defendant and acquit him of
the lesser included offense as to such count or counts."
No. 2.
"As I have said previously, the law permits the jury to find a
defendant guilty of any lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the crime charged. The offense charged in the
indictment here necessarily includes a lesser offense based upon
the following statute (Section 7207 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954), omitting that part of the Act which does not apply in this
case; it reads as follows:"
" Any person who willfully delivers or discloses to the
Secretary [of the Treasury] or his delegate any . . . return, . . .
or other document known by him to be fraudulent or to be false as
to any material matter,"
"and then the statute provides for the penalty."
"Therefore, if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that (with
respect to either or both of the counts in this indictment) the
defendant willfully delivered to the District Director of Internal
Revenue at St. Louis, Missouri his and his wife's federal joint
income tax return or returns for the years 1956 and 1957 which were
known by him to be fraudulent or false as to any material matter,
but you further find that the defendant did not willfully attempt
to defeat and evade his income tax by the filing of a false and
fraudulent return, you will in your verdict say 'Guilty of
violating a lesser included offense.'"
"If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant
willfully so delivered under any count or counts of this indictment
his and his wife's federal joint income tax return or returns which
were known by him to be fraudulent or false as to a material
matter, you will resolve the doubt in favor of the defendant and
acquit him of the lesser included offense as to such count or
counts."
[
Footnote 5]
This issue divided the Court of Appeals, with two judges holding
that § 7207 does not apply to false income tax returns and one
judge, concurring in result, dissenting on this point.
[
Footnote 6]
This Court has long recognized that to hold otherwise would only
invite the jury to pick between the felony and the misdemeanor so
as to determine the punishment to be imposed, a duty Congress has
traditionally left to the judge.
See Sparf v. United States,
supra, at
156 U. S. 63-64;
Berra v. United States, supra, at
351 U. S. 135.
This general principle is particularly applicable in this area. In
commenting on § 7201, the House Ways and Means Committee expressly
stated that minimum penalties were omitted from § 7201 in order to
make it "possible for the judges to better fix the penalties to fit
the circumstances." H.R.Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 108.
The lack of minimum penalties also, of course, denies to the
prosecutor an unbridled discretion as to the penalty to be imposed
upon particular defendants by deciding whether, on the same facts,
to charge a felony or a misdemeanor.