The plaintiff in error had, by an agreement in writing, hired a
steamboat to be put "on the route" from Washington, in the District
of Columbia, to Potomac Creek until another steamboat then building
should be prepared and be put "on the route." The plaintiff in
error was the contractor for carrying the mail of the United
States, which was carried in a steamboat to Potomac Creek, except
in winter, when the navigation of the River Potomac was interrupted
by ice, when the mail was carried by land. The steamboat so hired
was employed in carrying the mail. The ice prevented the use of the
steamboat, and the owners claimed under the contract the hire of
the boat during the time her
employment was thus interrupted. The circuit court refused to
allow parol evidence to be given to show the purpose for which the
steamboat was employed, and to explain the meaning of the terms
used in the contract, and of other matters conducing to show the
meaning of the contract. The court held that the evidence was
admissible.
It is a principle recognized and acted upon as a cardinal rule
by all courts of justice in the construction of contracts that the
intention of the parties is to be inquired into, and, if not
forbidden by law, is to be effectuated.
Extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain a patent
ambiguity -- that is, one apparent on the face of the instrument --
but it is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity -- that is, one
not apparent on the face of the instrument, but one arising from
extrinsic evidence; that is but to remove the ambiguity by the same
kind of evidence as that by which it is created.
Extrinsic parol evidence is admissible to give effect to a
written instrument by applying it to its proper subject matter, by
proving the circumstances under which it was made whenever, without
the aid of such evidence, the application could not be made in the
particular case.
This was an action on the case, brought in the circuit court on
24 December, 1834, by the defendants in error. The claim of the
plaintiffs was for two thousand seven hundred and sixty-five
dollars, alleged to be due on 7 February, 1832, for the hire of the
steamboat
Franklin before that time let and delivered by
the plaintiffs to the defendant, now the plaintiff in error.
The cause was tried in 1838, and the jury, under the directions
of the court, found a verdict for the plaintiffs. The defendant
tendered a bill of exceptions to the opinion of the court on the
matters in controversy, which was duly signed and sealed. The court
entered a judgment for the plaintiffs according to the verdict, and
the defendant prosecuted this writ of error.
The bill of exceptions stated that the plaintiffs gave in
evidence and read to the jury the following paper, dated 19
November, 1831, signed by William A. Bradley, as follows:
"I agree to hire the steamboat
Franklin until the
Sydney is placed on the route, to commence tomorrow, 20th
instant at ($35) thirty-five dollars per day, clear of all
expenses, other than the wages of Captain Nevitt."
"W. A. BRADLEY."
"19 Nov., 1831 "
Page 38 U. S. 90
"On the part of the Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown
Steam Packet Company, I agree to the terms offered by William A.
Bradley, Esqr., for the use of the steamboat
Franklin
until the Sydney is placed on the route to Potomac Creek; which is
thirty-five dollars per day, clear of all expenses other than the
wages of Capt. Nevitt, which are to be paid by our company."
"W. GUNTON
President"
"Washington City, Nov. 19, 1831"
"PISHEY THOMPSON, Esqr. Washington City, Dec. 5, 1831"
"DEAR SIR -- I will thank you to advise the president and
directors of Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet
Company that, the navigation of the Potomac being closed by ice, we
have this day commenced carrying the mail by land under our winter
arrangement, and have therefore no further occasion for the
steamboat
Franklin, which is now in Alexandria in charge
of Capt. Nevitt."
"The balance due your company for the use of the
Franklin under my contract with Dr. Gunton will be paid on
the presentation of a bill and receipt therefor. With great
respect,"
"Your obedient servant,"
"W. A. BRADLEY"
"PISHEY THOMPSON, Esqr. Present"
In reply to this letter, the president of the Steam Packet
Company wrote to the defendant as follows:
"Washington, Dec. 6, 1831"
"SIR -- Your letter of the 5th instant to Mr. Pushy Thompson has
been this afternoon submitted to the board of directors of the
Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown Steam Packet Company at a
meeting holden for the purpose. After mentioning that the
navigation of the Potomac is closed by ice and that you had
commenced carrying the mail by land under your winter arrangement,
you have therein signified you have no further occasion for the
steamboat
Franklin, and that she was then in Alexandria in
charge of Captain Nevitt."
"The agreement entered into by you contains no clause making its
continuance to depend on the matters you have designated, but on
the contrary, an unconditional stipulation to 'hire the
Franklin until the
Sydney is placed on the
route,' and I am instructed to inform you that the board cannot
admit your right to terminate the agreement on such grounds, and
regard it as being still in full force, and the boat as being in
your charge."
"However disposed the board might have been to concur with you
in putting an end to the agreement under the circumstances you have
described, if the company had not been already in litigation with
you and your colleague for the recovery of a compensation for the
use of the
Franklin under another contract, to the strict
letter of which a rigid adherence is contended for on your part,
notwithstanding
Page 38 U. S. 91
it had undergone a verbal modification, the board could not but
recollect this and be influenced thereby,"
"Yours, respectfully,"
"WM. A. BRADLEY, Esq."
"W. GUNTON, President"
The plaintiffs also proved that the steamboat
Sydney
was in Baltimore in November, 1831, and continued there until 26
January, 1832, and that she left there and arrived in the Potomac,
and was put "on the route" to Potomac Creek on 6 February of that
year. She had not been able to start from Baltimore until 25
January, 1832. The plaintiffs claimed the hire of the Franklin from
20 November, 1831, to 6 March, 1832, at thirty-five dollars per
day.
The defendant, to support the issue on his part, offered to
prove by competent witnesses that for several years immediately
preceding the date of the contract, he had been and was still
contractor for the transportation of the United States mail from
Washington to Fredericksburg; that the customary route of said mail
was by steamboat from Washington to Potomac Creek, thence by land
to Fredericksburg, in which steamboat passengers were also usually
transported on said route; that during all that time, the defendant
had used a steamboat belonging to himself on said route; that he
also kept an establishment of horses and stages for the
transportation of said mail all the way by land from Washington to
Fredericksburg, at seasons when the navigation of steamboats was
stopped by ice, and had been obliged, for a considerable portion of
every winter during the time he had been so employed in the
transportation of the mail, to use his said stages and horses for
the transportation of the mails all the way by land to
Fredericksburg, in the meantime laying up his steamboat. That just
before the date of said contract, the defendant's own steamboat,
usually employed as aforesaid on said route, had been disabled, and
the defendant was at the time about completing a new boat, called
the
Sydney, which had been built at Washington and sent
round to Baltimore for the purpose of being fitted with her engine
and other equipments necessary to complete her for running on said
route, and that she lay at Baltimore in the hands of the workmen
there at the date of said contract; that on the morning of 5
December, 1831, Captain Nevitt, the commander of the said steamboat
Franklin, refused to go on the said route of the
defendants to Fredericksburg in consequence of the ice then forming
in the river unless he was directed to do so by the plaintiffs;
that application was then made to Doctor Gunton, the president of
the company, and he directed the said captain to proceed as
required and obey the orders of the defendant; that the said
captain did then proceed on the said route, and returned as far as
Alexandria, where he stopped, and sent up the mail by land, and
although required to do so by the agent of the said defendant, he
refused to come up to the City of Washington with the boat in
consequence of the ice which had formed in
Page 38 U. S. 92
the river; and that said boat lay at Alexandria, frozen up in
the harbor, from that time till 5 February, 1832; that at the same
time the navigation of the Potomac River became obstructed as
aforesaid, the navigation at and from Baltimore became also
obstructed from the same cause, and the said steamboat
Sydney was also frozen up in the basin at Baltimore before
she had been completely equipped with her engine; that at the time
she was frozen up, she wanted nothing to complete her equipment but
the insertion of two pipes, a part of her engine, which pipes had
been made but not then put in place, the completing of which would
not have required more than two days, and the boat would have been
in complete order for being sent round to Washington, and put upon
said route; but the ice having interposed, it was deemed by the
workmen and those in charge of the boat that the insertion of said
pipes ought to be postponed till the navigation was clear; that in
January, 1832, the said pipes were inserted, and the said boat
being completely equipped for her voyage, left Baltimore for
Washington as soon as the state of the ice made it practicable to
attempt that voyage; was again stopped by the ice, and obliged to
put in at Annapolis, whence she proceeded to Washington as soon as
the ice left it practicable to recommence and accomplish the
voyage, and arrived at Washington on 6 February, 1832, and was the
next day placed by defendant on said route; that during the whole
of the period from the first stopping of the navigation as
aforesaid until the said 6 February, the defendant had abandoned
the said route to Potomac Creek and prosecuted the land route from
Washington to Fredericksburg.
2. That it was known to and understood by plaintiffs at the time
the contract in question was made, and was a matter of notoriety,
that as soon as the navigation should be closed by ice, the United
States mail from Washington to Fredericksburg would have to be
transported all the way by land carriage, instead of being
transported by steamboat to Potomac Creek and thence by land to
Fredericksburg, and that the said steamboat
Franklin would
not be required by defendant, and could not be used under said
contract when the navigation should be closed.
3. That it was communicated to the plaintiffs by defendant or
his agent before the time of making said contract that the
defendant intended to keep said steamboat in use under said
contract so long as the navigation remained open, and no
longer.
To the admissibility of which evidence the said plaintiffs by
their counsel objected, and the court refused to permit the same to
go to the jury, but, at the instance of plaintiffs, gave the
following instruction,
viz.:
That if the jury shall believe from the evidence aforesaid that
the said defendant did, on 19 November, 1831, write to said
plaintiffs the said paper of that date, bearing his signature, and
that said plaintiff did accept the same by the said paper of the
same date, and that said defendant and plaintiffs did
respectively
Page 38 U. S. 93
write to each other the papers bearing date 5 and 6 December,
1831, and that the said steamboat
Sydney did in fact first
arrive in the Potomac River on 6 February, 1832, and was placed on
the route to Potomac Creek, mentioned in the said evidence, on 7
February, 1832; that then the said plaintiffs are entitled to
recover, under said contract so proved as aforesaid, at the rate of
thirty-five dollars
per diem, from the said 20 November,
1831, to the said 6 February, 1832, both inclusive.
To which refusal by the court aforesaid to admit the evidence so
offered by the said defendant, as also to the granting by the court
of the said instruction aforesaid, so prayed for by the said
plaintiffs, the said defendant by his counsel excepted.
Page 38 U. S. 94
MR. JUSTICE BARBOUR delivered the opinion of the Court.
It was an action of assumpsit brought by the defendants in error
against the plaintiff in error to recover a sum claimed for the
hire of the steamboat
Franklin.
The claim was founded upon a written contract concluded between
the parties by the following correspondence:
On 19 November, 1831, the plaintiff in error wrote to the
defendants in error a note of which the following is a copy:
"I agree to hire the steamboat
Franklin until the
Sydney is placed on the route, to commence tomorrow, 20th
instant, at ($35) thirty-five dollars per day, clear of all
expenses other than the wages of Captain Nevitt. W. A.
Bradley."
To this note W. Gunton, as president of the company, replied on
the same day in the following words:
"On the part of the Washington, Alexandria & Georgetown
Steam Packet Company, I agree to the terms offered by William A.
Bradley, Esq., for the
Page 38 U. S. 95
use of the steam boat
Franklin until the
Sydney is placed on the route to Potomac Creek, which is
thirty-five dollars per day, clear of all expenses other than the
wages of Captain Nevitt, which are to be paid by our company."
Upon the trial of the cause, on issue joined, upon the plea of
nonassumpsit, a bill of exceptions was taken by the
defendant from which it appears that the plaintiffs in the court
below, having given in evidence the correspondence already stated,
further gave in evidence a note, signed by William A. Bradley,
dated December 5, 1831, addressed to Pishey Thompson, requesting
him to advise the president and directors of the Steam Packet
Company that, the navigation of the Potomac being closed by ice,
they had that day commenced carrying the mail by land under their
winter arrangement, and had therefore no further occasion for the
steamboat
Franklin, which was then in Alexandria in charge
of Captain Nevitt, and offering to pay the balance due for the use
of the
Franklin on the presentation of a bill and receipt
therefor, and also a letter from W. Gunton addressed to Wm. A.
Bradley, dated 6 December, 1831, in which, after stating that the
letter of the fifth, from Bradley to Thompson, had been submitted
to the board of directors of the company, he informed him that the
board could not admit his right to terminate his agreement on the
grounds which he had stated in his note to Thompson, and that they
regarded it as being still in full force, and the boat as being in
his charge. The plaintiff also proved that the steamboat
Sydney was not placed on the route until 7 February, 1832;
that the
Sydney belonged to the defendant, and that she
was not finished so as to be able to start from Baltimore until 25
January. And thereupon the plaintiffs claimed the hire of the
steamboat
Franklin from 20 November, 1831, to 6 February,
1832, seventy-nine days at thirty-five dollars per day, allowing
credit for three hundred and fifty dollars paid by the defendant,
and leaving a balance of $2,415.
It appears from the bill of exceptions that after the plaintiff
had closed his evidence, defendant, among other things, offered to
prove that he for several years had been and then was contractor
for the transportation of the mail from Washington to
Fredericksburg; that the customary route of said mail was by
steamboat from Washington to the Potomac Creek, thence by land to
Fredericksburg, and that passengers were also transported on that
route; that he kept an establishment of horses and stages for the
transportation of the said mail all the way by land from Washington
to Fredericksburg at seasons when the navigation of steamboats was
stopped by ice, and had been obliged for a considerable portion of
every winter, during the time he had been so employed in the
transportation of the mail, to use his said stages and horses, for
the transportation of the mail, all the way by land to
Fredericksburg, in the meantime laying up his steamboat; that just
before the date of the contract, the defendant's own steamboat,
Page 38 U. S. 96
usually employed on said route, had been disabled, and the
defendant was at the time, about completing a new boat called the
Sydney, which had been built at Washington and sent round
to Baltimore for the purpose of being fitted with her engine and
other equipments; that in January, 1832, the
Sydney, being
completely equipped, left Baltimore for Washington as soon as the
state of the ice made it practicable to attempt the voyage, was
stopped by ice, and obliged to put in at Annapolis, whence she
proceeded to Washington as soon as the ice left it practicable;
arrived at Washington on 6 February, 1832, and was on the next day
placed by defendant on the route; that on 5 December, 1831, Captain
Nevitt, the commander of the
Franklin, refused to go on
the said route of the defendant, in consequence of the ice then
forming in the river, unless he was directed to do so by the
plaintiffs; that upon application to the president of the company,
he directed the captain to proceed as required and obey the orders
of the defendant; that the captain did then proceed on the route,
and returned as far as Alexandria, where he stopped, and sent up
the mail by land, and although required by defendant's agent,
refused to come up to Washington with the said boat in consequence
of the ice which had formed in the river, and that the said boat
lay at Alexandria, frozen up in the harbor, from that time to 5
February, 1832; that it was matter of notoriety, and known to and
understood by the plaintiffs, at the time the contract in question
was made, that as soon as the navigation should be closed by the
ice, the United States mail from Washington to Fredericksburg would
have to be transported all the way by land carriage instead of
being transported by steamboat to Potomac Creek, and thence by land
to Fredericksburg; and that the steamboat
Franklin would
not be required by defendant, and could not be used under said
contract, when the navigation should be closed.
The court refused to permit the evidence thus offered by the
defendant to go to the jury, and then, on the motion of the
plaintiffs, instructed the jury that if it believed from the
evidence that the defendant wrote to the plaintiffs the paper of 19
November, 1831, and that the plaintiff accepted the offer, by the
same date, and that plaintiffs and defendant respectively wrote to
each other the papers bearing date 5 and 6 December, 1831, and that
the steamboat
Sydney did in fact first arrive in the river
Potomac on 6 February, 1832, and was placed on the route to Potomac
Creek on 7 February, 1832, that then the plaintiffs were entitled
to recover, under the contract so proved, at the rate of
thirty-five dollars
per diem, from 20 November, 1831, 6
February, 1832, both inclusive.
The questions then arising upon this record are first, whether
the court erred in refusing to permit the evidence offered by the
defendant to go to the jury, and secondly whether they erred in
giving the instruction to the jury which they did give at the
instance of the plaintiffs.
Page 38 U. S. 97
As to the first question. It is a principle recognized and acted
upon by all courts of justice as a cardinal rule in the
construction of all contracts that the intention of the parties is
to be inquired into, and if not forbidden by law, is to be
effectuated. But the law has laid down certain rules, declaring by
what kind of proof in any given case this intention is to be
ascertained.
Amongst these rules, a leading one in relation to written
contracts, to which class the one in question belongs, is this:
that extrinsic evidence is not admissible to explain a patent
ambiguity -- that is, one apparent on the face of the instrument --
but that it is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity -- that is,
one not apparent on the face of the instrument, but one arising
from extrinsic evidence, for this is but to remove the ambiguity by
the same kind of evidence as that by which it is created. The rule
thus stated seems to be in itself quite plain and intelligible, and
yet much difficulty has arisen in its application. The illustration
most usually given of the operation of this rule in the admission
of extrinsic evidence is that of a description of a devisee or of
an estate in a will, where it turns out that there are two persons
or two estates of the same name and description. These, however,
are put not as measuring the extent of the rule, but as
exemplifying its application, and all other cases within the scope
of the principle are in like manner open to explanation by the same
kind of evidence.
Accordingly it is laid down in a very accurate writer on the
subject of evidence, 3 Starkie 1021, that extrinsic parol evidence
is admissible to give effect to a written instrument by applying it
to its proper subject matter.
Let us examine some of the many cases which have been decided
upon the subject of the admissibility of this evidence in relation
to written instruments.
In the first place, wherever there is a doubt as to the extent
of the subject devised by will or demised or sold, it is matter of
extrinsic evidence to show what is included under the description
as parcel of it. Accordingly, in 1 Term 701, Buller, Judge, said
whether parcel or not of the thing demised is always matter of
evidence. So where a grantor in a deed described the premises as
the farm on which he then dwelt, this was held to be a latent
ambiguity which might be explained by evidence
aliunde,
and evidence was admitted that a particular piece of land claimed
under the deed was at the time of the grant in a state of nature,
unenclosed and separate from the rest of the farm, and that the
grantor remained in possession and occupied it as his own till his
death -- to show that it was not within the grant. 4 Dav's Rep.
265.
In 8 John. 116, the case was this: A, by a written contract,
agreed to receive of B sixty shares of the Hudson Bank, on which
ten dollars per share had been paid, and to deliver B his note for
$667, and pay him the balance in cash, and also to pay five percent
advance. It was decided that this was a case of latent ambiguity,
and the nominal value of each share being fifty dollars, parol
Page 38 U. S. 98
evidence was admitted to show whether the five percent advance
was to be paid on the sum paid in only, or on the nominal
amount.
In 2 Leigh 630, the principle is laid down by the court that
parol evidence is not admissible to vary, contradict, add to, or
explain a written agreement, but in cases of equivocal written
agreements, the circumstances under which they were made may be
given in evidence to explain their meaning. In the case of
Birch v. Depeyster, 1 Starkie's Cases 210, the charter
party stipulated that the captain should receive a specific sum in
lieu of privilege and primage, and the question was whether the
terms of the contract excluded all right on the part of the captain
to use the cabin for the carriage of goods on his own account.
Gibbs, Chief Justice, said
"evidence may be received to show the sense in which the
mercantile part of the nation use the term privilege, just as you
would look into a dictionary to ascertain the meaning of a word,
and it must be taken to be used by the parties in its mercantile
and established sense."
So where a charter party stipulated that a freighter should pay
a certain sum per pound, &c., British weight, it was held that
as the word "weight" had two meanings, gross and neat, this was
such a latent ambiguity as to warrant the introduction of parol
testimony. 1 Nott and McCord 45.
In the case of
Peish v. Dickson, 1 Mason 11, it is said
by the judge that if by a written contract a party were to assign
his freight in a particular ship, it seemed to him that parol
evidence might be admitted of the circumstances under which the
contract was made to ascertain whether it referred to goods on
board the ship or an interest in the earnings of the ship, or in
other words to show in what sense the parties intended to use the
term.
Nor is this principle at all confined to mercantile contracts,
for in
Robertson v. French, 4 East 130, Lord Ellenborough,
speaking on this subject, said that the same rule which applied to
all other instruments applied also to a policy of insurance. The
admission of this kind of proof has been carried to a great extent
too with a view to a correct construction of wills. I n the case of
Shelton's Executors v. Shelton, 1 Wash. 56, it is said,
that to discover the intention of a testator, parol evidence may be
admitted of his circumstances, situation, connection with the
legatees, and his transactions between the making of his will and
his death. And this same doctrine is advanced by the same court in
3 Hen. & Mun. 283.
We will close this reference to cases with that of
Mechanic's Bank v. Bank of
Columbia, 5 Wheat. 326. In that case it was held by
this Court that where a check was drawn by a person who was the
cashier of an incorporated bank, and it appeared doubtful upon the
face of the instrument whether it was an official or a private act,
parol evidence was admissible to show that it was an official act,
and accordingly many facts and circumstances were given in evidence
to prove in what character it was drawn.
Page 38 U. S. 99
The cases which we have thus collected together from amongst the
very many which exist will serve to show in how many aspects the
question of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in relation to
written contracts has been presented and decided and in how many
forms, according to the various circumstances of the cases, the
principle which we have been considering has been applied.
Sometimes it has been applied to deeds, sometimes to wills, and
sometimes to mercantile and other contracts. In some cases it has
been resorted to to ascertain which of several persons was
intended; in others, which of several estates. In some to ascertain
the identity of the subject; in others its extent. In some to
ascertain the meaning of a term where it had acquired by use a
particular meaning; in others to ascertain in what sense it was
used where it admitted of several meanings. But in all the purpose
was the same. To ascertain by this medium of proof the intention of
the parties where without the aid of such evidence that could not
be done, so as to give a just interpretation to the contract.
Without attempting to do what others have said that they were
unable to accomplish -- that is, to reconcile all the decisions on
the subject -- we think that we may lay down this principle as the
just result. That in giving effect to a written contract by
applying it to its proper subject matter, extrinsic evidence may be
admitted to prove the circumstances under which it was made
whenever, without the aid of such evidence, such application could
not be made in the particular case.
With this principle in view, we proceed to inquire whether the
evidence offered by the defendant in this case ought to have been
received by the court.
Now had the evidence been received, it would have disclosed the
following state of facts. That the route mentioned in the contract
was one on which the plaintiff in error transported passengers, and
also the mail; that the steamboat
Sydney, mentioned in the
contract, was designed to perform this service; and that the
Franklin was wanted for the same purpose; that that
Sydney was then at Baltimore for the purpose of being
fitted with her engine and equipments; that although the
transportation of passengers and the mail was carried on by the
plaintiff in error in a steamboat whilst the river was open, yet
when the river was closed by ice so that navigation was obstructed,
the plaintiff in error then transported passengers and the mail all
the way overland to Fredericksburg; that when the river was thus
obstructed, the plaintiff in error could not and did not use a
steamboat, and that all these facts were known to the defendants in
error.
We think that this evidence ought to have been received, because
it would have tended to show, by the circumstances under which the
contract was made, what was the intention of the parties, and in
the language of the rule which we have laid down, that the
contract, without its aid, could not be applied to its proper
subject matter.
The terms used in the written contract are "for the use of
the
Page 38 U. S. 100
steamboat
Franklin until the
Sydney is placed
on the route to Potomac Creek." It is contended that this amounted
to a stipulation to keep the
Franklin in use until the
Sydney was placed on the route, no matter what length of
time may have elapsed before that was done. Suppose that the
Sydney had been accidentally consumed by fire the day
after the hiring of the
Franklin; the effect of this
construction would be to make that hiring coextensive in point of
time with the existence of the
Franklin in a condition for
use, although it is obvious that a temporary hiring only was in the
contemplation of the parties. Again, suppose the plaintiff in error
had sold the
Sydney and bought another boat, and put that
other on the route; the construction contended for would lead to
the result that the hire of the
Franklin would still have
continued to have gone on indefinitely.
If this were so, it must be upon the principle that it entered
into the contemplation of the parties as a material term of the
contract that the plaintiff in error should keep the
Franklin in use, not until he ceased to want it by having
a steamboat to take its place, but until the identical steamboat
Sydney, and no other, should take its place. We think that
the evidence offered and rejected by the court would have shown why
reference was made to the
Sydney's being placed on the
route -- that is, because she was expected to be ready for use in a
very short time. It would have shown further that the defendants in
error knew the service for which their boat was wanted; what was
the nature of that service; that whenever the river was obstructed
by ice, the
Franklin would not be wanted, because it could
not be used, and because then another mode of transportation was
resorted to. From all this it would have been competent to infer
that the words, "until the
Sydney is placed on the route"
were not intended to fix that time as the period to which the
hiring was to continue, at all events and under all circumstances,
but as being referred to because the
Sydney was then
expected to be ready for use in a very short time, and so soon as
she could be used, the
Franklin would not be wanted, even
although there should be no obstruction to navigation by ice. And
moreover it would have been competent to infer that as the
defendants knew why the
Franklin was wanted; for what
service she was wanted; the character of that service -- that is
that it would cease when she could not be used, by reason of the
river's being closed with ice; that therefore the real intention of
the parties, to be derived from the written contract and the parol
evidence taken together, was a hiring and letting to hire for so
long a time as the boat could be used -- that is until the
navigation was obstructed, subject to being terminated at any
previous time when the
Sydney was ready to take her place.
We think that the rule of law which admits extrinsic evidence for
the purpose of applying a written contract to its subject matter
justifies its admission, beyond the mere designation of the thing,
or corpus, if we may so express it, on which the contract operates,
and extends so far as to embrace the circumstances which accompany
the transaction when without the
Page 38 U. S. 101
aid of those circumstances the written contract could not be
applied to its proper subject matter.
This principle is illustrated by the cases which we have before
referred to. Take for example the case cited from 1 Mason 11. That
was assumpsit for a balance alleged to be due on consignments. In
that case, parol evidence was received of the circumstances under
which a contract was made, which contained this clause relating to
the plaintiff's goods,
viz.,
"On which goods Mr. D. [the defendant in the case] has advanced
me $5,833, for which amount he will hold for reimbursement, on the
amount and net proceeds of the sales of said goods, which are only
considered answerable, for said amount advanced, as per our
agreement"
for the purpose of showing, whether it was intended to waive any
personal claim on the plaintiff, and to restrict the defendant's
security, for the repayment of the advance, to the goods only, or
was meant merely to exempt the goods of the shippers, on freight,
from being included as a security for the advance on the
plaintiff's goods.
So we have seen, in the case from 2 Leigh 630, the proposition
is stated in terms that in equivocal written agreements the
circumstances under which they were made may be given in evidence,
to explain their meaning, and accordingly in that case the judges
relied upon the circumstances as disclosed by the parol evidence,
in connection with a written promise of indemnity, in deciding on
its legal effect.
We could suggest many cases which we think would illustrate this
principle and prove that from the necessity of the case and
consistently with the rules of law, the circumstances under which a
written contract is made must be open to proof by extrinsic
evidence in order to ascertain the intention of the parties and
thus correctly interpret it. Suppose that during the late war, a
person had been engaged by contract to transport munitions of war
to the army; that for that purpose he had hired a steamboat of
another, and had signed a written agreement by which he engaged to
take good care of the boat; suppose that, whilst he was engaged in
this transportation, the boat had been destroyed by the enemy, as
it might rightfully have been by reason of the hostile character
impressed upon it; that thereupon a suit had been brought by the
person who let it to hire upon the stipulation to take good care of
the boat. Can it be doubted that it would have been competent for
the defendant to have proven that he was a contractor with the
government to transport munitions of war, that he had hired the
boat for that express purpose, and that these facts were known to
the other party, so as to show the intention and understanding of
the parties as to the kind of danger to which the boat would
unavoidably be exposed in performing the very service for which it
was hired.
We will state only one case more, founded on the suggestion of
Mr. Chief Justice Ellsworth, in a note to 3 Dall. 421. Suppose
a
Page 38 U. S. 102
man signs a written agreement in these words,
viz., "I
will take your ship John." May not the party, as the Chief Justice
asked, go beyond the note to explain by existing circumstances the
meaning of the word "take," which, accordingly as the circumstances
might be one way or another, might equally embrace a purchase or a
charter party?
All the cases which we have cited in which extrinsic evidence
has been received, and those which we have supposed, in which we
think that it would be admissible, proceed on one principle only,
and can only be justified upon that principle. And that is this:
that the rule which admits extrinsic evidence for the purpose of
applying a written contract to its proper subject matter extends
beyond the mere designation of the thing on which the contract
operates, and embraces within its scope the circumstances under
which the contract concerning that thing was made when, without the
aid of such extrinsic evidence, such application of the written
contract to its proper subject matter could not be made. Hence Mr.
Starkie, in his third volume on evidence, p. 1021, after having
laid down the principle that extrinsic parol evidence is admissible
to give effect to a written instrument by applying it to its proper
subject matter, adds,
"and also as ancillary to the latter object [that is, the
application to its proper subject matter], for the purpose in some
instances of explaining expressions used in a peculiar sense and of
annexing customary incidents. . . ."
Let us take a case under each branch of this rule, and by this
exemplification we shall more clearly see the operation of the rule
itself and the very decided bearing which it has upon this case.
Then as to the first branch, as to parol evidence for the purpose
of explaining expressions used in a peculiar sense. Let us take the
case before cited, where the question was as to the legal effect of
a written contract to receive a stipulated sum in lieu of privilege
and primage -- in other words, what was the meaning of these terms?
Parol evidence was received to show the sense in which the
mercantile part of the nation used the word "privilege," and why?
Because, the real question was not what was the meaning of the word
"privilege" in general; if that had been the question, it would
have been a patent ambiguity, and parol evidence would have been
clearly inadmissible; but the real question was what was the
meaning of the word "privilege" as used in that contract, it being
a word which had acquired in the mercantile world a peculiar
meaning, that meaning must be inquired into by parol evidence to
get at the intention of the parties, as it was a mercantile
contract. Thus it will be seen that it was necessary to go into the
mercantile sense of the word, that being the sense in which it was
used in the case stated, in order to apply the written contract to
its proper subject matter. Accordingly Mr. Starkie, in his book on
evidence, p. 1033, states that to be the reason why evidence is
admissible to prove the special and peculiar sense in which a word
is understood.
Page 38 U. S. 103
Now let us take a case to exemplify the second branch of the
rule, as to annexing customary incidents. The case of
Senior v.
Armitage will illustrate the second branch of this rule, that
of the admission of parol evidence to annex customary incidents. In
that case it was held that a custom for an away-going tenant to
provide work and labor, tillage and sowing, and all materials for
the same, in his away-going year, the landlord making him a
reasonable compensation, is not excluded by an express written
agreement between the landlord and tenant, which is consistent with
such a custom. Now here proof of the custom was considered as
necessary to apply the contract to its proper subject matter. So in
the two cases which we have supposed of the steamboat, and the
ship, we think the extrinsic evidence which we have mentioned would
be admissible, because the question would not have been the meaning
of the stipulation to take proper care of the boat, in the one
case, and to take the ship in the other, in the general sense of
these expressions; but what was the meaning of proper care, as to
that steamboat, and of the word take, as to that ship, under the
circumstances which attended the respective contracts concerning
them; neither a steamboat in the one case nor a ship in the other
was the proper subject matter of the contract, but each of them, in
connection, with its accompanying circumstances; in other words,
that steamboat under the circumstances under which it was hired,
and that ship under the circumstances under which it was taken.
And so in the case before us, upon the same principle, the
subject matter of the contract was not merely the steamboat
Franklin, but the steamboat
Franklin under the
circumstances under which it was hired. The parol evidence then, in
this case, was admissible because without its aid the written
contract could not be applied to its proper subject matter, and
therefore it was proper to prove the circumstances attending the
transaction. Having thus stated our opinion to be that evidence
ought to have been received to prove the facts stated in the bill
of exceptions on the part of the defendants, it follows as a
consequence that the court below erred in giving to the jury the
instruction which they did give at the instance of the plaintiffs
in the circuit court.
We think, therefore, that the judgment is erroneous and must be
reversed with costs. And a
venire facias de novo is
awarded, with instructions that upon the next trial, the court
shall receive parol evidence to prove the facts stated in the bill
of exceptions, to have been offered to be proved by the defendant,
at the former trial, except the fact of the communication made to
the plaintiff by the defendant or his agent before the time of
making the contract that the defendant intended to keep the
steamboat
Franklin in use under the contract, so long as
the navigation remained open, and no longer, and with the further
instruction to the court not to give the jury the instruction
stated in the exception to have been given at the former trial.
Page 38 U. S. 104
MR. JUSTICE THOMPSON.
I have not been able to concur in the opinion of a majority of
the Court in this case. I admit in the fullest extent the rule that
parol evidence is admissible to explain a latent ambiguity. But I
cannot perceive any ambiguity in the contract in this case
requiring the application of that rule. The contract is dated the
19th of November, 1831, and was for the hire of the steamboat
Franklin, to be placed on the route from Washington to
Potomac Creek until the
Sydney should be placed on the
route, and to commence on the day after the date of the contract at
the rate of thirty-five dollars per day, clear of all expenses
other than the wages of the captain, which were to be paid by the
company. The only question in the case is as to the admissibility
of the parol evidence offered on the trial. I think it was properly
rejected by the court. Whatever related to any conversations or
negotiations on the subject previous to the consummation of the
contract was merged in the final conclusion of the contract
according to the well settled rule of law. And whatever passed
between the parties after the contract was concluded was also
inadmissible because it tended to vary the contract and substitute
another for that which had been concluded between them. The
contract was for the use of the
Franklin, without any
specified limitations as to time. It was to continue until the
Sydney was placed on the route. The
Sydney was
owned by Mr. Bradley, and was at the time the contract was entered
into at Baltimore for the purpose of being fitted with her engine
and other equipments necessary to complete her. The time,
therefore, for which the
Franklin was to be employed
depended entirely upon the
Sydney's being placed upon the
route. And this was at the election of Mr. Bradley; the boat was
his, and the repairs or equipments were under his directions, and
could not be hastened by the owners of the
Franklin, and
they had it not in their power to put an end to the contract, but
were bound to keep their boat ready for the use of Mr. Bradley
until the
Sydney was placed on the route. It is not at all
probable from the date of the contract, about the middle of
November, that either party anticipated the freezing of the river
so early as it did, or some provision would have been made in the
contract for such event. The loss resulting from such an unexpected
and temporary obstruction by the ice ought to fall on the party who
is chargeable with the delay in placing the
Sydney on the
route -- and that was Mr. Bradley. The boat was his, and the
placing her on the route was at his election, and of course at his
risk.
MR. JUSTICE CATRON.
The contract given in evidence to sustain the action below is
free from any ambiguity on its face, and the question is can oral
evidence be resorted to -- first to raise an ambiguity, by showing
the objects of and circumstances that lead to the contract, and
second to explain the ambiguity created by the oral evidence?
Page 38 U. S. 105
I think no such ambiguity by extrinsic and inferior evidence can
be created, thereby to open the contract to explanations and
additions inconsistent with its face.
Nor can oral evidence be called in to explain the ambiguity
inferred from the circumstances and unexpressed intentions in
reference to which the parties are supposed to have contracted.
Their entire meaning is taken to be in the writing. 3 Stark.Evid.
999, 1000.
By this means, new and independent stipulations are sought, as I
apprehend, to be added
dehors the written agreement,
varying its terms plainly expressed, so that it may be made to
operate different ways according to the explanatory evidence. This
case well illustrates the effect of the doctrine. Had the ice not
closed the river, then Mr. Bradley would have had no excuse; this
is matter of proof. Had the
Sydney not been repaired, then
he would have had no excuse. This is also matter of proof. Had the
steamboat company established that it in previous winters took its
boat, the
Franklin, out of the Potomac after the ice
formed in this river and ran her in other waters not subject to
ice, and that Mr. Bradley prevented them from taking the usual
course until the boat was frozen up in the river, then all equity
and justice would have been on the side of the plaintiffs below.
Hence the rights of the parties on another trial will not depend on
the written contract, but it will operate according to the oral
proof and the conditions thus inserted into it. It is clear the
oral evidence, and not the writing, must produce the definite
effect.
I hold nothing can be added to a written agreement unless there
be a clear subsequent, independent agreement varying the former,
but not where it is matter passing at the same time with the
written agreement.
Truly where the terms of the written instrument are clear, oral
evidence is used to point the application to this or that subject
matter. It acts in aid of the written instrument to give it the
intended application, not to add to its terms by inserting new
conditions and limitations in the contemplation of the parties and
to be inferred from extrinsic circumstances existing when the
agreement was made.
To control its construction by oral proof of the objects of the
contracting parties and the purposes of the contract would lead to
the dangerous result of construing every writing not by its face,
not by the language employed, but by matters extrinsic, variant in
each case, as human testimony should make it, the construction of
necessity to be determined by the jury, and not by the court, whose
usual province it is to construe written agreements.
The controlling extrinsic circumstance invoked as an element to
construe the contract before the Court is that the boat
Franklin was hired to carry the mail, and that so soon as
the ice prevented her from running, it must be inferred the object
of Mr. Bradley (at the date of the contract) was, to surrender the
boat and carry the mail
Page 38 U. S. 106
in stages. As to this, the agreement is wholly silent, and the
oral proof may contradict the assumption; if so, no ambiguity will
be raised by the proof as a foundation for further explanation.
Suppose it to be proved that the intention of the plaintiff in
error was to carry passengers, and to have the entire
transportation on the Potomac, at the opening and close of the
session of Congress, and that he was willing to pay the price per
day for the
Franklin for the sake of the monopoly and the
power to increase the fare; that he bought out a rival, risking the
chances of the season and the number of passengers. Or suppose it
be proved that Mr. Bradley had (at the date of the agreement) taken
his horses off of the stage line, and had no reliance to carry the
mail but this boat, and that he designed to keep her until he
supplied her place, even should the river close for a time. In
these events, the written contract would be construed to mean as
the oral evidence proved Mr. Bradley intended when he made it. He
had the power to retain the
Franklin as long as he chose
to keep the
Sydney out of the river, throughout the whole
spring and summer of 1832 -- and may have so intended, had the
winter been an open one and the river not obstructed.
If Mr. Bradley had the power to elect according to a reserved
intention, and put an end to the agreement, so had the other side,
on a similar reservation, not expressed, but to be inferred from
circumstances existing at the time and in reference to which the
parties are supposed to have contracted.
I think no oral proof could be let in to raise an ambiguity nor
to explain it when raised, and that in this case, as in all others,
the parties must abide by their agreement, fairly made and plainly
expressed.
MR. JUSTICE STORY.
I had not intended to express any dissent from the opinion of
the Court in this case. But as my silence might now, under the
circumstances, lead to the conclusion that I concurred in that
opinion, I wish to state that I concur in the opinions delivered by
my Brothers CATRON and THOMPSON and for the reasons given by
them.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the circuit court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Washington and was argued
by counsel, on consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this
cause be and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this
cause be and the same is hereby remanded to the said circuit court
with directions to award a
venire facias de novo.