Under the laws of Virginia in relation to lands of which the
debtor has an actual seizin, although there is no statute in
Virginia which expressly makes a judgment or lien on the lands of
the debtor, yet during the existence of the right of the plaintiff
to take out an
elegit, the lien of the judgment is
universally acknowledged.
All the authorities, ancient and modern, agree in this
proposition that a reversion after an estate for life is assets,
or, as some of the books express it,
quasi-assets, in the
hands of the heir, in regard to the bond of the ancestor, binding
heirs, and that in such case the plaintiff may take judgment of it,
quando acciderit. Upon principle, it would seem to be
clear that whatever estate descended to the heir which was liable
as assets to the bond debt of the ancestor must be bound by a
judgment obtained against the ancestor in his lifetime.
There is a current of authorities going to prove that a
reversion after an estate for life is bound by a judgment obtained
against the ancestor, from whom it immediately descended. So far
from its being proper for a court to hesitate about decreeing a
sale of an interest because it is reversionary, the character of
the interest affords a stronger reason for such a decree. For
although in regard to property in present actual possession, the
elegit, although tardy in its operation, yet is in some
degree an effective remedy, inasmuch as the creditor will by that
means annually receive something towards his debt, whereas in the
case of a dry reversion, if the outstanding life estate should
continue during half a century, the creditor might look on in
hopeless despondency, without the possibility of receiving a cent
from that source, except through the interposition of a court of
equity in decreeing a sale.
It is the very nature and essence of a lien that no matter into
whose hands the property goes, it passes
cum onere. If
this were not the case, it would cease to be a lien.
The case, as stated in the opinion of the Court, was as
follows:
"In the month of June, 1827, Smith and Kennedy obtained a
judgment in the circuit court against Reuben Burton for $1,348.75,
with interest from 14 of October, 1823, and costs. On this judgment
an
elegit was issued on 31 December, 1827. On 12 August in
the same year, Reuben Burton by deed conveyed his real estate to
certain trustees in trust to sell the same for the benefit of his
creditors; amongst many other debts enumerated in the deed, the
judgment already mentioned, recovered by Smith and Kennedy, was
included."
"These last mentioned creditors, the appellees, never assented
to or accepted anything under the trust deed. Burton having died,
the only trustee who accepted the trust, on 21 December, 1829,
sold, under the deed, all the estate, both real and personal,
conveyed by it, and at that sale, Sarah Burton, by her agent,
purchased, at the price of $1,000, the interest of Reuben Burton,
that is two-fifth parts of a certain tract of land called
Springfield, supposed to contain about five hundred acres, and also
his interest in certain coal pits on the same tract. The character
of Reuben Burton's interest in the Springfield tract of land, as
appears from the record, was that of a reversion in fee after an
estate for life. And the character
Page 38 U. S. 465
of his interest in the coal pits, as appears from an agreement
in the record, was this:"
"The heirs of Daniel Burton, of whom Reuben Burton was one, were
to have, during the widow's life, the right of occupying, using,
and working the coal pits, and the right and power of sinking
shafts, and searching for coal on any part of the land except the
yard, &c., paying to the widow during her life the yearly sum
of $200 for her dower interest. The same agreement will show his
interest in a mineral spring included in the decree."
"After the death of Reuben Burton, the appellees, finding that
there was no personal estate to satisfy their debt, in September,
1834, filed their bill to enforce the lien created by their
judgment, making, amongst others, Sarah Burton a defendant as
purchaser of the interest of Reuben Burton before described in the
Springfield tract of land and coal pits."
She answered saying that the property conveyed to her was not
purchased for her own benefit, but for the benefit of her son
Thomas O. Burton, the appellant. She insisted in her answer that
the appellees had no right to enforce their judgment, as more than
five years has elapsed since the death of Reuben Burton. She denied
that the judgment created any lien on the property purchased by her
which was valid against her. She insisted that the appellees were
entitled to no relief in equity, and that at all events a sale
should not be decreed.
An amended bill was thereupon filed making Thomas O. Burton a
defendant. He filed an answer insisting on the grounds taken by
Sarah Burton.
The cause coming on to be heard, the court held the reversionary
interest of Reuben Burton in the Springfield tract of land, and his
interest in the right of occupying and working the coal pits
thereon, and also his interest in the mineral spring thereon, with
the twenty-five acres of land adjoining thereto, liable to the
appellees' judgment, and decreed a moiety of Reuben Burton's
interest to be sold.
From this decree an appeal was taken.
Page 38 U. S. 477
MR. JUSTICE BARBOUR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The case was this:
In the month of June, 1827, Smith and Kennedy obtained a
judgment in the circuit court against Reuben Burton for $1,348.75,
with interest from 14 October, 1823, and costs. On this
judgment
Page 38 U. S. 478
an
elegit was issued on 31 December, 1827. On 12 August
in the same year, Reuben Burton, by deed conveyed his real estate
to certain trustees in trust to sell the same for the benefit of
his creditors; amongst many other debts enumerated in the deed, the
judgment already mentioned, recovered by Smith and Kennedy, was
included.
These last mentioned creditors, the appellees, never assented
to, or accepted anything under the trust deed. Burton having died,
the only trustee who accepted the trust, on 21 December, 1829,
sold, under the deed, all the estate, both real and personal
conveyed by it, and at that sale Sarah Burton, by her agent,
purchased at the price of $1,000 the interest of Reuben Burton --
that is, two-fifth parts in a certain tract of land called
Springfield, supposed to contain about five hundred acres, and also
his interest in certain coal pits on the same tract. The character
of Reuben Burton's interest in the Springfield tract of land, as
appears from the record, was that of a reversion in fee after an
estate for life. And the character of his interest in the coal
pits, as appears from an agreement in the record, was this: the
heirs of Daniel Burton, of whom Reuben was one, were to have,
during the widow's life, the right of occupying, using, and working
the coal pits and the right and power of sinking shafts and
searching for coal on any part of the land except the yard,
&c., paying to the widow during her life the yearly sum of $200
for her dower interest. The same agreement will show his interest
in a mineral spring, also included in the decree.
After the death of Reuben Burton, the appellees, finding that
there was no personal estate to satisfy their debt, in September,
1834, filed their bill to enforce the lien created by their
judgment, making, amongst others, Sarah Burton a defendant, as
purchaser of the interest of Reuben Burton, before described, in
the Springfield tract of land, and coal pits.
She answered saying that the property conveyed to her was not
purchased for her own benefit, but for the benefit of her son,
Thomas O. Burton, the appellant. She insisted in her answer that
the appellees had no right to enforce their judgment, as more than
five years had elapsed since the death of Reuben Burton; she denied
that the judgment created any lien on the property purchased by her
which was valid against her; she insisted that the appellees were
entitled to no relief in equity, and that at all events a sale
should not be decreed.
An amended bill was thereupon filed making Thomas O. Burton a
defendant. He filed an answer insisting upon the grounds taken by
Sarah Burton.
The cause coming on to be heard, the court held the reversionary
interest of Reuben Burton in the Springfield tract of land, and his
interest in the right of occupying and working the coal pits
thereon, and also his interest in the mineral spring thereon, with
the twenty-five acres of land adjoining thereto, liable to the
appellees' judgment,
Page 38 U. S. 479
and decreed a moiety of Reuben Burton's interest to be sold.
From that decree this appeal is taken.
Upon this state of facts two questions arise: 1st, whether the
judgment created a lien on the reversionary interest of Reuben
Burton in the land in question, and 2d, whether it was competent to
the court to decree a sale of his interest with a view to
accelerate the payment of the debt, or whether the appellees should
have been left to such remedy as they had at law.
As to the first point. In relation to lands of which the debtor
has the actual seizin, there is no doubt but that the judgment
creates a lien. Upon this subject this Court said, in the case of
United States v.
Morrison, 4 Pet. 124, there is no statute in
Virginia which expressly makes a judgment a lien upon the lands of
the debtor. As in England, the lien is the consequence of a right
to take out an
elegit. During the existence of this right,
the lien is universally acknowledged. That right unquestionably
existed in this case, because an
elegit did actually issue
within the year after the judgment was rendered. There would then
be no sort of difficulty upon the question of a lien if the debtor
had had actual seizin of the land, but the difficulty is suggested
that his interest was reversionary only. Let us inquire whether
this interposes any obstacle. All the authorities, ancient and
modern, agree in this proposition that a reversion after an estate
for life is assets, or, as some of the books express it,
quasi-assets, in the hands of the heir, in regard to the
bond of his ancestor, binding heirs, and that in such case, the
plaintiff may take judgment of it
quando acciderit. Dyer
373; Carthew 129; 1 Lord Ray. 53; Chitty on Descents 336. In Dyer,
ubi supra, the form of the judgment in such case is given.
It is "that he should recover the debt and damages of the aforesaid
reversion, to be levied when it shall fall in." And it is added
that a special writ shall issue to extend the whole. The doctrine
upon this subject is laid down very clearly by the Master of the
Rolls in the case of
Tyndale v. Warre, 3 Jacob. 217, 218.
There are, says he, three cases of reversions; if it be a reversion
dependant upon a term of years, the law does not consider the term
as anything, and judgment is given against the heirs, if he plead
reins per descent. But if the creditor take out an
elegit, he is stopped by the term, which is a good defense
for the lessee in ejectment, and so there is a
cesset
executio during the term. If it be a reversion after an estate
for life, the heir must plead specially, stating that he has no
assets except this and setting forth what it is; the creditor may
then take judgment
quando acciderit. In the case of a
reversion after an estate tail, the authorities say that the heir
may plead generally
reins per descent, distinguishing this
from the plea in the case of a reversion after an estate for life.
The plaintiff may then reply that there is this reversion descended
to the defendant, and he may then have a judgment
quando
acciderit the same as in the case of a reversion after an
estate for life.
Page 38 U. S. 480
Now upon principle it would seem to be clear that whatever
estate descended to the heir which was liable as assets to the bond
debt of the ancestor must be bound by a judgment obtained against
the ancestor in his lifetime.
But this is not left to rest upon deductions from general
principles or analogy to the case of assets descended to the heir.
Whatever may be the doctrine as to reversions after estates tail,
about which there has been some doubt, as appears from the case
before cited, from Jacob's Reports, there is a current of authority
going to prove that a reversion after an estate for life is bound
by a judgment against the ancestor from whom it immediately
descends.
The statute of Virginia giving to a party the right, at his
election, to have an
elegit is almost a transcript of the
statute of Westminster the second. The writ itself commands the
officer to deliver to the plaintiff a moiety of all the lands and
tenements whereof the debtor, at the time of obtaining the
judgment, was seized or at any time afterwards.
Lands and tenements, then, are the subject on which the writ is
to operate.
Now in Comyn's Digest, title Grant, E. 2, it is said that by
grant of all lands and tenements, a reversion passes. In the same
book, title Estate, B. 12, it is said if a man grant the land
itself the reversion passes. So in Moore's Reports 36, a reversion
is said to be a tenement. Thus it appears that a reversion falls
within each of the terms lands and tenements. But the party must
have been seized at the time of obtaining the judgment or
afterwards.
Now let us see what is meant by the seizin spoken of in the
statute. And the authorities are clear that it is not confined to
actual corporeal possession. In Gilbert on Executions, pages 38 and
39, it is said that the judgment binds not only the lands and
tenements of which the defendant is actually seized, but also the
reversions on leases for lives, as well as for years, for although
the words of the
elegit are that without delay you cause
to be delivered a moiety of all the lands and tenements of which
the aforesaid B. was seized, &c., yet the intent of the writ
extends to whatever lands and tenements were actually vested in the
defendant, because the statute is a moiety of the land, which
extends to reversions, which are comprised under the name lands,
since they are lands returning to the defendant when the particular
estate ceases.
So in 2 Williams' Saun. 68f it is said judgment binds not only
lands of which defendant is actually seized, but also reversions on
leases for lives or years, and therefore a moiety of a reversion
may be extended, and plaintiff will have a moiety of the rent. So
in Chitty on Descents 338 it is said that if judgment be had in the
debtor's lifetime, it will bind the property, though no execution
be taken out till the property descends to others. Nay, in case of
a judgment, it is said to bind even where it is against a person
from whom the estate does not immediately descend, as if it were
against
Page 38 U. S. 481
a remainderman or reversioner, whereas the contrary would be the
case of a bond on which no judgment had been rendered in the
debtor's lifetime who stood in the same relation.
The author last cited, in page 54, quoting Watkins on Descents
40-41, speaking of the subject of seizin of reversions, remarks
that the confusion seems to have been created by the different
meanings which have been attached to the word "seizin" by being
used in a general sense when it should properly have been confined
in its acceptation, or by being confined when it should have been
taken in a general sense. And in pages 53-54, he thus sums up the
doctrine. We must here remember that the expressions or terms of a
seizin in law and a seizin in deed refer only to the present and
actual corporeal possession of the premises, and not to the fixture
of an interest which is to come into actual enjoyment in some
future event, and here the word "seizin" is used in its strict
sense, and though we frequently use the term "seizin" of a
remainder or reversion expectant upon a freehold, yet this
signifies no more than that the property in them is fixed in the
owner, and that such owner is placed in the tenancy. The particular
estates, and those expectant upon them, form in law only one
estate, and the delivery of possession to the person taking first
extends to all. All therefore may be said to be seized, all being
placed in the tenancy, and the property being thus fixed in all. It
is upon these principles that the authorities lay down the doctrine
that a judgment binds a reversion after an estate for life.
We are therefore satisfied that the judgment of the appellees
bound the reversionary interest in the land in question, and as to
the other property embraced in the decree, there is no room for
doubt or difficulty. And then the question is whether the court
ought to have decreed a sale with a view to accelerate the payment
of the debt, or whether the appellees should have been left to such
remedy as they had at law. Upon the subject of the power of a court
of equity in this respect the authorities are decisive. More than a
century ago, in the case of
Robinson v. Tong, 3 Viner's
Abr. Assets A, pl. 28, 145, an advowson was decreed to be sold, at
the instance of creditors, as assets descended, and the decree was
affirmed in the House of Lords. That is supposed to have been the
case not of judgment, but bond creditors. In
Stileman v.
Ashdown, 2 Atk. 607, Lord Hardwicke decreed a sale of a moiety
of the land to satisfy a judgment creditor. He confined the decree
to a moiety because the judgment only bound a moiety at law. On
that occasion he said that whilst equity could not change the
rights of the parties, it might accelerate the payment by directing
the sale of a moiety, and not let the creditor wait until he was
paid out of the rents and profits. The principle was asserted by
Lord Redesdale in 2 Sch. & Lef. 138, and in the same book, 13,
and such he stated to be the settled doctrine in Ireland. In the
first of these cases he said:
"Although this Court has been in the habit of selling to pay
judgment debts, where it was ascertained that they were
Page 38 U. S. 482
legal liens on the land, the foundation of that was the legal
right. The only equity the creditor had was to render his remedy
more effectual by getting a sale, instead of levying his debt out
of rents and profits, which was the only execution the common law
gave."
These cases are cited and relied upon, and the doctrine of them
approved, in 2 Leigh 30, and in page 58 of that volume, Judge Green
says:
"This principle, so far as I am informed, has been uniformly
practiced on in Virginia, in the cases of heirs bound by the
obligations of their ancestors. And although I cannot see clearly
the foundation of this equity to sell, where the law only
authorizes an extent, or a personal judgment, or decree against the
heir for the value of the assets descended, whether aliened by him
or not (
see the statute of fraudulent devises), yet I
think we are bound by the practice founded on these precedents, so
long acquiesced in."
In 6 Leigh 196, which was a suit in equity brought by creditors
to marshal assets, the same authorities were again cited with
approbation, and the same doctrine reasserted by the judges in
their reasoning upon the case. In pages 219-220 of this latter
case, Judge Carr went into a review of English cases, which he said
seemed to him to establish beyond question the regular and long
established course there of selling the lands of deceased persons
to pay their debts, binding the land, or to marshal their assets,
and he added that it struck him as a novelty when, in the course of
the argument of the case, he heard a doubt suggested of the power
of the court to decree a sale in such cases. In the case of
Tyndale v. Warre, 3 Jacob 212, this subject was
extensively considered by Sir Thomas Plumer, Master of the Rolls,
who held in that case a reversion expectant upon an estate for
life, and even upon estates tail, limited to unborn children, to be
assets for the payment of specialty debts, and accordingly he
decreed it to be sold for that purpose. This last has a peculiar
analogy to and bearing upon the case before us, because it sustains
in the fullest and most decisive manner both the grounds on which
the decree of the circuit court rests -- that is, it proves first
that a reversion after an estate for life, or even after estates
tail limited to unborn children, is assets liable to the specialty
debt, and, of necessary consequence, to the judgment of the
ancestor from whom it immediately descends, and secondly that a
court of equity will decree such a reversion to be sold, in order
to accelerate the payment of the debt.
The liability of a reversion after a life estate to be sold was
at once conceded by the counsel for the heir; their effort was to
maintain that the reversion in that case could not be sold, because
it was after an estate tail. It was strongly said by the Master of
the Rolls in that case that the reversion was a part of the real
estate of the ancestor, and according to all general principles,
every part of the real estate of the debtor, except copyhold, is
considered as applicable to the payment of his specialty debts.
There is another part of the reasoning of the Master of the Rolls
which has a most cogent application to this. It having being urged
that a sale ought not to be decreed, out of consideration to the
heir, that a higher price might be obtained,
Page 38 U. S. 483
he said:
"But I think that such considerations ought not to weigh, for
the question is to whom does the property belong? It is not the
habit of the court to consider the interest of the heir when
opposed to that of the creditors. They ought to have the fullest
remedy. And upon what principle can the court refuse to give them
the benefit of a sale because another person, whose interest is
secondary and entirely subject to theirs, may be benefited by
delay?"
So far from its being proper for a court to hesitate about
decreeing the sale of an interest because it is reversionary, we
think that the character of the interest affords a stronger reason.
For in regard to property in present actual possession, the
elegit, although a tardy remedy in its operations, yet is
in some degree an effective remedy, inasmuch as the creditor will
by that means annually receive something towards his debt, whereas
in the case of a dry reversion, as the one in the present case is,
if the outstanding life estate should continue during half a
century, the creditor might look on in hopeless despondency,
without the possibility of receiving one cent from that source,
except through the interposition of a court of equity, in decreeing
a sale. Now if the acceleration of a tardy remedy be cause enough
to justify the helping hand of equity,
a fortiori it ought
to be extended to him who during the life of the tenant for life is
without any remedy at all. As to the objection that the judgment
did not bind the land in the hands of the appellant because he was
a purchaser, we consider it wholly untenable. We have already said
that the judgment created a lien; now it is of the very nature and
essence of a lien that no matter into whose hands the property
goes, it passes
cum onere; if this were not the case, it
would cease to be a lien. If this proposition stood in need of
authority to support it, we find it abundantly in the case of
United States v.
Morrison, 4 Pet. 124. In that case, the judgment of
the United States rendered in 1822 was held to overreach several
deeds of trust executed in 1823; although the United States having
issued a
fieri facias, whilst that execution was in the
marshal's hands, the agent of the Treasury, at the instance of the
defendants, instructed the marshal to forbear levying it on
condition of the defendants' paying the costs, and accordingly the
marshal did not make a levy, but made a return within the year 1822
that all further proceedings were suspended in pursuance of said
instructions, and that suspension was continued until the year
1825.
A very strong application of this doctrine was made in the case
of
Mutual Assurance Society v. Stanard, 4 Munf. 539. In
that case, a deed of trust bearing date 28 April, 1808, was held to
be overreached by a judgment rendered on 6 May, the court applying
the legal fiction that the judgment in contemplation of law related
back to the commencement of the term, which was before the
execution of the deed.
A still stronger application of the doctrine was made by the
same court in the case of
Coutts v. Walker, 2 Leigh, 268.
In that case, the court held that a judgment creditor had a lien in
equity upon
Page 38 U. S. 484
the equitable estate of the debtor in like manner as he had a
lien in law upon his legal estate, and a deed of trust having been
executed by the debtor conveying his equitable estate to a trustee,
and that too for the benefit of creditors between the commencement
of the term, and the day on which the judgment was obtained; the
same relation of the judgments to the first day of the term as in
the case previously cited was held to exist, and thus the trust
deed was overreached by the judgment.
It is argued that the judgment in this case was barred by the
act of limitations of Virginia. That act provides that no action of
debt shall be brought against any executor or administrator upon a
judgment obtained against his testator, or intestate, nor shall any
scire facias be issued against any executor, or
administrator, to revive such judgment after the expiration of five
years from the qualification of his executor or administrator. The
facts in the record furnish a decisive answer to this argument. It
appears from them that the administration on Reuben Burton's estate
was granted on 9 December, 1829, and this suit was brought on 15
September, 1834. So that five years had not elapsed from the time
of the qualification of the administrator.
This view renders it unnecessary to examine whether the
appellees would not have been within the saving of the statute, as
contended for by their counsel.
Furthermore, it is objected that there should have been an
account taken of the administration of Reuben Burton's personal
estate. Without stopping to inquire whether that would be necessary
in any case where the suit is brought merely to enforce a legal
lien, it is a sufficient answer to this objection to say that there
is abundant evidence in the record, that there was no personal
estate -- nothing therefore could have been more unnecessary or
unprofitable than to have ordered an account to be taken.
The last objection is that an account should have been ordered
of the rents and profits of the coal property.
Here too the record furnishes a satisfactory answer. Assuming
for the purpose of meeting this objection that by analogy to the
case of marshaling assets, a court of equity would not decree a
sale of real estate to satisfy a judgment where the rents and
profits would discharge it in a reasonable time, as was held by the
court in the case of
Tennent's Heirs v. Patton, 2 Leigh
196, yet the facts of this case utterly repel the application of
that principle to it. In that case it will be seen that the debts
of the ancestor were said by one of the judges to amount to $820,
and the annual value of the land was ascertained to be $400.
In that case, therefore, the debt would be satisfied by the
rents and profits in a short time. In this case the facts are
these. There was an outstanding life estate in all the Springfield
tract of land, except the coal pits and the mineral spring. Reuben
Burton's interest in the coal pits was two-fifths, in the privilege
of working them during the lifetime of the tenant for life, she
receiving annually two hundred dollars
Page 38 U. S. 485
for the whole. Reuben Burton's real interest, then, is only
two-fifths of any surplus which might remain after deducting
two-fifths of the annual rent to be paid. But the parties
themselves seem to have considered $200 per annum as the full value
of the whole privilege of working them. If the agreement of the
parties were to be taken as the standard of the annual value, his
interest would really be worth nothing, because he would have to
pay precisely the same proportion of the rent which he received of
the profits, and it must be assumed that they were worth more than
the parties fixed as the value, in order to make any surplus at
all. But at all events there is nothing in the case to justify the
belief that there would be any surplus that would discharge the
judgment in a reasonable time, or even in a long time, for at the
date of the decree, the whole debt, including principal, interest,
and costs, amounted to about $2,500, and the principal being
$1,348.75, there would be an annually accruing interest of about
$80, besides the annual payment of two-fifths of the $200 for rent,
which would be $80 more. Thus it will appear that his interest of
two-fifths must produce $160 annually in order even to prevent the
debt from being increased. To allow $160 for his two-fifths would
require that the whole should be worth annually $400, which is
precisely double the sum at which the parties fixed the rent.
This, then, seems to us to be emphatically a case in which the
established principles of equity justify the sale of the property
with a view to accelerate the payment of a debt due to a judgment
creditor.
In every respect in which we have viewed the case, we think that
the decree of the circuit court is correct, and it is therefore
Affirmed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Virginia and was argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof it is adjudged and decreed by this Court that the decree of
the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby
affirmed with costs.