The
Josepha Secunda was condemned for a violation of
the laws of the United States prohibiting the slave trade, and by a
decree the Supreme Court of Louisiana allowed the claim of the
collector, the surveyor, and naval officer, who had prosecuted for
the forfeiture, to a portion of the proceeds of the sale of the
property condemned. This decree was afterwards reversed, and the
whole proceeds adjudged to the United States, on an appeal to the
Supreme Court. William Emerson, the surveyor, afterwards died, and
in 1831, Congress passed an act for the relief of the collector,
the heirs of William Emerson, and the heirs of the naval officer,
under the authority of which the sums which had been adjudged to
those officers, and which had remained in the District Court of
Louisiana, were by an order of the court paid to them according to
the provisions of the law. One of the creditors of William Emerson
claimed the sum so paid to his legal representatives, as assets for
the payment of his debt.
Held that the payment made by
order of the district court to the minor children of William
Emerson, as his legal heirs, was rightfully made, and that the same
cannot be considered in their hands as assets for the payment of
the debts of their father.
The prosecution of the Josepha Secunda by the officers of the
customs of Louisiana was not done under the authority of any law,
or by any authority, and these acts imposed no obligation, either
in law or equity, on the government to compensate them. The claim
for those services could not have been set up either as an
equitable or a legal offset to any demand of the government against
them, or either of them, while, under the rules of law, any
specific demand on the government which imposed on it even an
equitable obligation, might be set up as an offset.
Services rendered under the requirements of law, or of contract,
for which a compensation is fixed, constitute a legal demand on the
government. Services rendered under an authority which is casual,
or in some degree discretionary, may constitute an equitable claim.
No individual can be made a debtor against his will. Voluntary
benefits may be conferred on him, which may excite his gratitude;
or which in the exercise of his generosity he may suitably reward.
But this depends on his own volition. It would constitute a
singular item under the law of assets, to raise a charge against an
individual for
a benefit conferred by some voluntary act of kindness. The rule
is the same, whether the benefit be conferred on the government or
an individual.
A claim against a foreign government for spoliations is not of
this character. The demand in such a case is founded on the law of
nations, and the obligation is perfect on the offending
government.
In 1829, Charles H. Hall, residing in New York, presented a
petition to the Court of Probates of the City and Parish of New
Orleans, stating that the estate of William Emerson, deceased, was
indebted to him in the sum of seventeen hundred dollars and
upwards, with interest, and he prayed the court that Charles Byrne,
the tutor and curator of the children of William Emerson, should be
decreed to allow the debt, and to pay the same.
Mr. Byrne, as tutor and curator of the minor heirs of William
Emerson, by his answer, denied that the estate of Emerson was in
any wise indebted to the petitioner, and on 8 February, 1830, a
decree was given in the court of probates against the estate of
Emerson for the amount of the debt claimed in the petition.
Afterwards a case was submitted to the court of probates by
the
Page 38 U. S. 410
petitioner, Charles H. Hall, and Charles Byrne, tutor and
curator, &c., by which it appeared that William Emerson died in
the year 1828; previous to that time, he, as surveyor, B. Chew, as
collector, and E. Lorrain, as naval officer of the port of New
Orleans, had, at their sole expense, the brig
Josepha
Secunda condemned in the name of the United States in the
District Court of the United States for the Louisiana District for
an infraction of the slave laws; they claimed title to the proceeds
of this seizure as the true and actual captors and seizors, who
made the last and only effectual seizure and prosecuted the same to
a final decree of condemnation. The decree of the district court
allowed the claim, but the case having been brought up before the
Supreme Court of the United States, that tribunal reversed the
judgment on the ground that Congress had made no provision for
their compensation, and they were left, in common with those who
made the military seizure, to the liberality of the government.
Thereupon the said collector and surveyor and naval officer applied
for relief to Congress, and obtained from that branch of the
government an act entitled "An act for the relief of Beverly Chew,
the heirs of William Emerson, deceased, and the heirs of Lorrain,
deceased," the same being duly approved on 3 March, 1831, and in
compliance with the provisions of said act, upon motion before the
district court, the moneys remaining in court after the payment of
costs were paid over to Beverly Chew and to the legal
representatives of both Emerson and Lorrain.
The question for the decision of the Court was whether the money
received by the minor children, as the legal representatives of
William Emerson, by virtue of the Act of Congress of 3 of March,
1831, could be made liable for the payment of the debts of their
father.
The judge of the court of probates decreed that the judgment
rendered in favor of the petitioner should be satisfied out of
those moneys or any other assets belonging to the estate in the
hands of the curator or in those of the heirs of the deceased.
Mr. Byrne, as curator and tutor, appealed from this decree, to
the Supreme Court of Louisiana, by which court the decree of the
court of probate was affirmed.
This appeal, under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789, was prosecuted on behalf of the heirs of William Emerson.
Page 38 U. S. 411
MR. JUSTICE McLEAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The defendant here, as plaintiff in the court of probate at New
Orleans, recovered a judgment in 1830 against the estate of William
Emerson for seventeen hundred and eighty-eight dollars and
sixty-two cents, and the question in this case is whether the heirs
of Emerson shall be held responsible for the payment of this
judgment under the following circumstances.
In April, 1818, Emerson, being surveyor of the port of New
Orleans, with B. Chew, the collector, and E. Lorrain, the naval
officer, seized the brig
Josepha Secunda, for a violation
of the laws which prohibit the importation of salves, and
instituted proceedings against her, which resulted in the
condemnation of the vessel and slaves. This judgment being
pronounced by the District Court of the United States for
Louisiana, was affirmed on an appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States.
On the cause's being remanded to the district court, the negroes
having been sold as well as the vessel, a question was raised by
several claimants as to the distribution of the proceeds of the
sale, and the district court, dismissing the claims of others,
allowed those of the collector, the surveyor, and the naval
officer. From this decree there was an appeal to this Court. And as
appears from
23 U. S. 10
Wheat. 331, this Court decided that the proceeds, under the laws of
the United States, should not be paid to the custom house officers
who made the seizure, but that they vested in the United States.
The decree of the district court making the allowance was therefore
reversed, and that part of it which dismissed the petition of other
claimants was affirmed.
In 1828, Emerson died, leaving heirs.
On 3 March, 1831, an act entitled "An act for the relief of
Beverly Chew the heirs of William Emerson, deceased, and the heirs
of Edward Lorrain, deceased" was passed by Congress.
The preamble of this act states
"Whereas the brig
Josepha Secunda was condemned in the
name of the United States in the District Court of the United
States for the Louisiana District in the year 1818 on the seizure
and prosecution and at the sole expense of Beverly Chew, collector
of the District of Mississippi, William Emerson, deceased,
surveyor, and Edwin Lorrain, deceased, naval officer of the port of
New Orleans, for an infraction of the slave laws, and whereas the
one-half of the proceeds of the said brig and her cargo are now
deposited, subject to the order of the said court, which half would
have been payable to the said Beverly Chew, William Emerson, and
William Lorrain but for an omission in the laws heretofore passed
on that subject, therefore be it enacted, &c., that the
district court of the United States be authorized and directed
Page 38 U. S. 412
to order the proceeds of the said seizure now deposited, subject
to the order of said court, be paid over to the said Beverly Chew
and the legal representatives of the said William Emerson and Edwin
Lorrain respectively."
The question whether the sum of money received by the heirs of
Emerson under this law was assets in their hands and liable to his
debts was first raised in the court of probate, which decided that
it was so liable, and this judgment was, on an appeal to the
supreme court of the state, affirmed.
In the seizure and prosecution of the vessel for a violation of
law, Emerson, with those who co-operated with him, rendered a
meritorious service to the public. But he acted under no law nor by
virtue of any authority. And his acts imposed no obligation, either
in law or equity, on the government to compensate him for his
services. Had he been prosecuted on a debt due to the government,
he could not have set up these services, either as an equitable or
legal offset. And this he might do, under the rules of law, of any
specific demand he might have on the government which imposed on it
even an equitable obligation.
It is true the payment of a debt cannot be enforced against the
government by suit, but claims against it are not less legal or
equitable on that account. Services rendered under the requirements
of law or of contract for which a compensation is fixed constitute
a legal demand. Services rendered under an authority which is
casual or in some degree discretionary may constitute an equitable
claim. An individual, by timely efforts, may save from destruction,
by fire or otherwise, a large amount of public property. This would
be a highly meritorious act, but would it constitute a claim on the
government for compensation?
From motives of public policy, the government might bestow a
suitable reward on the individual in such a case, but this would be
a gratuity on its part. And if this reward were given to the heirs
of such an individual, could it be reached by his creditors?
Numerous pensions have been given by law to heirs for the military
services of their ancestors, and are these pensions liable to the
debts of the ancestors? Under all the provisions of this kind, has
it ever been supposed that the pension, though given to the legal
representatives of the deceased and on the ground of military
services, should be paid to his administrators? No individual can
be made a debtor against his will. Voluntary benefits may be
conferred on him which may excite his gratitude and which, in the
exercise of his generosity, he may suitably reward. But this
depends on his own volition.
It would constitute a singular item under the law of assets to
raise a charge against an individual for a benefit conferred on him
by some voluntary act of kindness. To find an obligation in such a
case, we must look into those writers on ethics who speak of
imperfect obligations which cannot be enforced. The rule is the
same
Page 38 U. S. 413
whether the voluntary benefit be conferred on an individual, or
on the government.
Had Emerson become insolvent and made an assignment, would this
claim, if it may be called a claim, have passed to his assignees?
We think clearly it would not. Under such an assignment, what could
have passed? The claim is a nonentity. Neither in law nor in equity
has it any existence. A benefit was voluntarily conferred on the
government, but this was not done at the request of any officer of
the government or under the sanction of any law or authority,
express or implied. And under such circumstances, can a claim be
raised against the government which shall pass by a legal
assignment or go into the hands of an administrator as assets?
If in this form debts could be originated against the government
or an individual, there would be no security against such demands.
One party, without the consent of the other, makes the contract and
assigns it to his creditors. For if there be even an equitable
claim, it arises out of a contract express or implied. A claim
against a foreign government for spoliations is not of this
character. The demand is in such case founded upon the law of
nations, and the obligation is perfect on the offending government.
It is true, remuneration cannot be recovered against the government
by action at law, but if justice be not done, the government of the
injured citizen, in the exercise of its discretion, will protect
and enforce his rights.
In the case of
Comeygs v.
Vasse, 1 Pet. 193, this Court held that the
assignees of a bankrupt are entitled to a share of the indemnity
for unjust spoliation provided for under the treaty of 1819 with
Spain. But that case is not analogous to the one under
consideration. By the law of nations, Spain was bound to indemnify
the owners of foreign vessels which had been illegally captured and
condemned under her authority.
A claim having no foundation in law, but depending entirely on
the generosity of the government, constitutes no basis for the
action of any legal principle. It cannot be assigned. It does not
go to the administrator as assets. It does not descend to the heir.
And if the government, from motives of public policy or any other
considerations, shall think proper under such circumstances to make
a grant of money to the heirs of the claimant, they receive it as a
gift or pure donation. A donation made, it is true, in reference to
some meritorious act of their ancestor, but which did not
constitute a matter of right against the government.
In the present case, the government might have directed the
money to be paid to the creditors of Emerson or to any part of his
heirs. Being the donor, it could, in the exercise of its
discretion, make such distribution or application of its bounty as
circumstances might require. And it has, under the title of an act
"for the relief of the heirs or Emerson," directed, in the body of
the act, the money to be paid to his legal representatives. That
the heirs were
Page 38 U. S. 414
intended by this designation is clear, and we think the payment
which has been made to them under this act has been rightfully made
and that the fund cannot be considered as assets in their hands for
the payment of debts.
As the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is not in
accordance with this view the judgment of that court is
Reversed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana and was argued by
counsel. On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment of the said supreme court in this
cause be and the same is hereby reversed with costs, and that this
cause be and the same is hereby, remanded to the said supreme court
that further proceedings may be had therein in conformity to the
opinion of this Court.
