The brig
Hope, with a cargo, bound from Alexandria, in
the District of Columbia, for Barbados, insured in Alexandria, was
assailed, while standing down the Chesapeake Bay, by a storm which
soon after blew to almost a hurricane. The vessel was steered
towards a point in the shore for safety, and was anchored in three
fathoms water; the sails were furled and all efforts were made by
using the cables and anchors to prevent her going on shore. The
gale increased, the brig struck adrift, and dragged three miles;
the windlass was ripped up, the chain cable parted, and the vessel
commenced drifting again, the whole scope of both cables being paid
out. The brig then brought up below Craney Island in two and a half
fathoms water, where she thumped or struck on the shoals on a bank,
and her head swinging round brought her broadside to the sea. The
captain finding no possible means of saving the vessel and cargo
and preserving the lives of the crew, slipped her cables, and ran
her on shore for the safety of the crew and preservation of the
vessel and cargo. The vessel was run far up on a bank, where, after
the storm, she was left high and dry, and it was found impossible
to get her off. The lives of all the persons were saved; the whole
cargo of the value of $5,335, insured for $4,920, was taken out
safely, and the vessel, her tackle, &c., were sold for $256.
Held that the insurers of the cargo were liable for a
general average.
The question of contribution cannot depend upon the amount of
the damage sustained by the sacrifice of the property, for that
would be to say that if a man lost all his property for the common
benefit, he should receive nothing, but if he last a part only, he
should receive full compensation. No such principle is applied to
the case of goods sacrificed for the common safety; why then,
should it be applied to the total loss of the ship for the like
purpose? It is the deliverance from an immediate impending peril by
a common sacrifice which constitutes the essence of the claim. It
is the safety of the property, and not the voyage, which
constitutes the foundation of general average.
A consultation by the captain with the officers of the vessel
before running her on shore with a view to her preservation and
that of the passengers and cargo may be highly proper in cases
which admit of delay and deliberation, to prevent the imputation of
rashness and unnecessary stranding by the master. But if the
propriety and necessity of the act are otherwise sufficiently made
out, no objection can be made to it.
The freight of a vessel totally lost by being run on shore for
her preservation and that of the crew and cargo ought to be allowed
to the owner of the vessel as the subject of general average, the
cargo of the vessel having been saved by the stranding.
This was an action instituted in the Circuit Court of the United
States against the Columbian Insurance Company for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the plaintiffs, Ashby and Stribling and Peter
Hewit, were entitled to recover against the cargo of the brig
Hope, for a contribution for an average loss. The
Columbian Insurance Company was the underwriter on the cargo, and
an agreement was made between the parties to the cause before the
trial that "without regard to form, the real question between them
should be contested." Under this agreement the cause was tried and
the jury found the following special verdict.
"We of the jury find that on 27 May, 1825, the brig
Hope sailed from Alexandria on a voyage to Barbados,
that
Page 38 U. S. 332
on the said vessel standing down the Chesapeake Bay, the weather
became thick and foggy, and that it appearing in the then state of
the weather imprudent to proceed to sea, the captain kept away for
Sewall's Point for the purpose of making a harbor, where he
anchored, with the best bower anchor in three fathoms water; that
all sails were furled and a good scope of cable paid out, the wind
then blowing very fresh from the northeast; that at ten o'clock
P.M. on the 3d day of June, he let the small bower anchor under
foot and payed out the best bower anchor until both cables bore a
strain; that the gale still increasing, the kedge anchor was let
go; that about midnight, the vessel struck adrift; that then the
whole scope of the cables were paid out till they all bore a
strain, when she fetched up; that the gale continued on the
following day to increase, and the sea being very heavy, at one
o'clock she struck adrift again and dragged three miles, when she
brought up; that the gale then increased to almost a hurricane, she
ripped up the windlass, parted the chain cable, and commenced
drifting again, the whole scope of both cables being paid out. That
she then between eleven and twelve o'clock brought up about three
quarters of a mile below Craney Island in two and a half fathoms
water, amongst and in sight of a number of other vessels, that she
then thumped or struck on the shoals on a bank, and her head
swinging around to the westward, brought her broadside to the wind
and heavy sea; that the captain, in this situation, finding no
possible means of saving the vessel or cargo and preserving the
crew, slipped his cables and ran her on shore for the safety of the
crew and preservation of the vessel and cargo, that the vessel ran
far upon the bank, where, after the storm, she was left high and
dry and it was found impracticable to get her off."
"We find that the plaintiffs in this action were the owners of
the said brig; the value of the said brig was $3,000; that
one-third part of the brig had been insured by the said Columbian
Insurance Company; that no insurance had been effected for the
remaining two-thirds. We further find that the whole of the cargo
on board said brig was of the value of $5,335, of which the said
Columbian Insurance Company insured $4,920. We further find that
the cargo was afterwards taken out safely, and that the vessel, her
tackle, &c., were sold for the sum of $256.40. If, on the
matter aforesaid, the law be for the plaintiffs, then we find for
the plaintiffs and assess their damages to the sum of fifteen
hundred dollars, and if the law be for the defendants, then we find
for the defendants."
In August, 1825, the circuit court gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs for $1,249, and the defendants prosecuted this writ of
error.
Page 38 U. S. 337
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
There are many irregularities in the proceedings on the record,
but as in our judgment they are all waived or cured by the
agreement of the counsel spread upon the record, which is, as to
the matters in controversy in the suit, conclusive upon the parties
and constituted the basis of the proceedings at the trial and of
the special verdict on which the judgment was given for the
original plaintiffs in the court below, it is unnecessary to
discuss their intrinsic force or validity. The main question in the
case is whether the voluntary stranding of a ship in a case of
imminent peril, for the preservation of the crew, the ship, and
cargo, followed by a total loss of the ship, constitutes a general
average for which the property saved is bound to contribution. We
say that this is the main question because the special verdict
finds that there was a voluntary running on shore of the brig
Hope; that there was no other possible means of preserving
the crew, the ship, and the cargo; that the running ashore was for
this express object; and that, after the storm was over, the brig
was left high and dry and it was found impracticable to get her
off, so that the facts are sufficiently precise and full to present
the question of general average in its most simple and
comprehensive form. Accordingly our attention will in the first
instance be addressed to the consideration of it.
Upon this question the maritime jurists of continental Europe
are not entirely agreed in opinion, and our own jurisprudence
presents conflicting adjudications. It becomes the duty of this
Court, therefore, to examine and weigh these opposing opinions and
to ascertain, as far as it may, the true principle which ought to
govern us on the present occasion.
It is admitted on all sides that the rule as to general average
is derived to us from the Rhodian law, as promulgated and adopted
in
Page 38 U. S. 338
the Roman jurisprudence. The Digest states it thus.
If goods are thrown overboard in order to lighten a ship, the
loss incurred for the sake of all shall be made good by the
contribution of all.
Lege Rhodia cavetur, ut si levandae navis
grati a jactus mercium factus est, omnium contributione sarciatur,
quod pro omnibus datum est. Dig.lib. 14, tit. 2, c. 1. That
the case of jettison was here understood to be put as a mere
illustration of a more general principle is abundantly clear from
the context of the Roman law, where a ransom paid to pirates to
redeem the ship is declared to be governed by the same rule.
Si
navis a piratis redempta sit -- omnes conferre debere.
Dig.lib. 14, tit. 2, c. 2, s. 3. The same rule was applied to the
case of cutting away or throwing overboard of the masts or other
tackle of the ship to avert the impending calamity, Dig.lib. 14,
tit. 2, c. 3, c. 5, s. 2, and the incidental damage occasioned
thereby to other things. Without citing the various passages from
the Digest which authorize this statement, it may be remarked that
the Roman law fully recognized and enforced the leading limitations
and conditions to justify a general contribution, which have been
ever since steadily adhered to by all maritime nations.
First, that the ship and cargo should be placed in a common
imminent peril; secondly, that there should be a voluntary
sacrifice of property to avert that peril; and thirdly that by that
sacrifice the safety of the other property should be presently and
successfully attained. Hence, if there was no imminent danger or
necessity for the sacrifice, as if the jettison was merely to
lighten a ship too heavily laden by the fault of the master in a
tranquil sea, no contribution was due.
See Abbott on
Shipp. 3, ch. 8, s. 2. 1 Emerig.Assur. ch. 12, s. 39, art. 7. 604;
id. s. 40, 605. So if the ship was injured or disabled in
a storm without any voluntary sacrifice or if she foundered or was
shipwrecked without design, the goods saved were not bound to
contribution. Dig.lib. 14, tit. 2, c. 2, s. 1;
id. c. 7; 1
Emerig. on Assur. ch. 12, s. 39, 601-603. On the other hand, if the
object of the sacrifice was not attained, as if there was a
jettison to prevent shipwreck or to get the ship off the strand,
and in either case it was not attained, as there was no deliverance
from the common peril, no contribution was due. Dig.lib. 14, tit.
2, c. 5, c. 7; 1 Emerig. on Assur. ch. 12, s. 41, 612, 616. The
language of the Digest upon this last point is very expressive.
Amissae navis damnum collationis consortio non sarcitur
perieos, qui merces suas naufragio liberarunt -- nam hujus
aequitatem tunc admitti placuit, cum jactus remedio caeteris in
communi periculo, salva, nave, consultum est. It is this
language which seems in a great measure to have created the only
doubt among the commentators as to the extent and operation of the
rule, some of them having supposed that the safety of the ship
(salva nave) for the voyage was in all cases indispensable
to found a claim to contribution, whereas others, with far more
accuracy and justness of interpretation, have held it to apply as a
mere illustration of the general doctrine to a jettison made in the
particular case for the very purpose of saving the ship
Page 38 U. S. 339
and the residue of the cargo.
In truth, the Roman law does not proceed upon any distinction as
to the property sacrificed, whether it be ship or cargo, a part or
the whole, but solely upon the ground that the sacrifice is
voluntary, to avert an imminent peril and that it is in the event
successful by accomplishing that purpose. And therefore Bynkershoek
has not hesitated to declare the general principle to be that
whatever damage is done for the common benefit of all is to be
contributed for by all, and that as this obtains in a variety of
cases, so especially by the Rhodian law it obtains in cases of
jettison.
Generaliter placere potest, damnum pro utilitate
communi factum, commune esse, utque in variis speciebus id obtinere
aliunde constat, sic ex lege Rhodia, cum maxime obtinet in
jactu. Bynker.Quest.Priv.Juri. lib 4, ch. 24, introd.
These remarks seem proper to be made in order to meet the
suggestions thrown out at the argument with reference to the actual
bearings of the Roman law on the question before the court, and
they may also serve in some measure to explain the true principles
by which the question ought to be decided.
In examining the foreign jurists, it will be found that there is
far less disagreement among them than has been generally supposed.
All of them that have come within our own researches or those of
counsel admit that a voluntary stranding of the ship constitutes a
case of general average if there is not a total loss of the ship.
Emerigon in one passage lays down the doctrine in the following
broad language.
"It sometimes happens that to escape from an enemy or to avoid
an absolute shipwreck, the ship is run on shore in a place which
appears the least dangerous. The damage suffered on this account is
a general average, because it has been done for the common
safety."
1 Emerigon Assur. ch. 12, s. 13, 408. And for this he relies
upon the Consolato del Mare, upon Roccus, Targa, Caseregis, and
Valin. It is true that in another place he says, "The damages which
happen by stranding are a simple average for the account of the
proprietors," citing the French ordinance, and then adds
"But it will be a general average if the stranding has been
voluntarily made for the common safety, provided always that the
ship be again set afloat, for if the stranding be followed by
shipwreck, then it is save who can."
1 Emerigon Assur. ch. 12, s. 13, 614. And he then refers to the
case of jettison, where the ship is not saved thereby, in which
case there is no contribution. Emerigon Assur. ch. 12, s. 13,
616.
Now the analogy between the two cases is far from being so clear
or so close as Emerigon has supposed. In the case of the jettison
to avoid foundering or shipwreck, if the calamity occurs, the
object is not attained. But in the case of the stranding, whatever
is saved is saved by the common sacrifice of the ship, although the
damage to her may have been greater than was expected. Surely the
question of contribution cannot depend upon the amount of the
damage sustained by the sacrifice, for that would be to say that if
a man lost all his property for the common benefit, he should
receive nothing, but if he
Page 38 U. S. 340
lost a part only, he should receive full compensation. No such
principle is applied to the total loss of goods sacrificed for the
common safety. Why then should it be applied to the total loss of
the ship for the like purpose? It may be said that unless the ship
is got off, the voyage cannot be performed for the cargo, and the
safety and prosecution of the voyage are essential to entitle the
owner to a contribution. But this principle is nowhere laid down in
the foreign authorities, and certainly it has no foundation in the
Roman law. It is the deliverance from an immediate impending peril
by a common sacrifice which constitutes the essence of the
claim.
The Roman law clearly shows this, for by that law it was
expressly declared that if by a jettison in a tempest the ship was
saved from the impending peril and afterwards was submerged in
another place, still contribution was due from all the property
which might be fished up and saved from the calamity.
"
Sed si navis, quae intempestate jactio mercium unius
mercatoris, levata est, in alio loco submersa est, et aliquorum
merces per urinatores extractae sunt, data mercede, rationem haberi
debere ejus, cujus merces in navigatione levandae navis causa
jactae sunt ab his, qui postea sua per urinatores
servaverunt."
Digest lib. 14, tit. 2, l4, s. 1. Boucher Instit. au Droit
Maritime (1805) 449. Abbott on Shipp. part 3, ch. 8, s. 13. And
besides, in a case like that now before us, the cargo might be
transshipped in another vessel and the voyage be successfully
performed. But in truth it is the safety of the property, and not
of the voyage, which constitutes the true foundation of general
average. If the whole cargo were thrown overboard to insure the
safety of the ship, the voyage might be lost, but nevertheless the
ship must contribute to the jettison. Why, then, if the ship is
totally sacrificed for the safety of the cargo, should not the same
rule apply?
Suppose a ship with a cargo of cotton on board is struck by
lightning and set on fire and it becomes indispensable for the
salvation of the cargo to sink the ship on a rocky bottom, and she
is thereby totally lost -- would not this constitute a case of
contribution? Suppose a cargo of lime were accidentally to take
fire in port, and it became necessary in order to save the ship
that she should be submerged, and the cargo was thereby totally
lost, but the ship was saved with but a trifling injury -- would it
not be a case of contribution?
As far as we know, Emerigon stands alone among the foreign
jurists in maintaining the qualification that it is necessary to a
general average that the ship should be got afloat again after a
voluntary stranding. Valin certainly does not support it, for he
only states that if to avoid a total loss by shipwreck or capture
the master runs his vessel ashore, the damage which he shall suffer
on that account, and the expenses and the charge of putting her
afloat again, are general average, and he gives the reason because
all has been done for the common safety. 2 Valin, Com. 168;
id. 205, 207, 209.
See also 2 Bell.Com. 589, 5
edit. 1826. Beyond all doubt, Valin is correct in this statement,
but then he was merely discussing the
Page 38 U. S. 341
point whether the expenses of getting the ship afloat was, when
she was got off, a subject of general average, and not the point
whether, if the ship was totally lost, the whole loss was not a
general average. His reasoning was
diverso intuitu.
On the other hand, the Consolato del Mare, one of the earliest
and most venerable collections of maritime law, lays down the
general rule, without any such qualification. Consolato del Mare,
ch. 192, 193; Boucher, Consult de la Mer, ch. 195, 196, s. 487-494;
as also does Roccus, in his Treatise de Navibus et Naut. Roccus de
Nav. et Naut. n. 60. Indeed, it may be found stated in the same
general form in the Roman law, where it is said, without referring
to the manner and extent of the damage, that the whole damage
voluntarily done to the ship for the common good, must be borne by
a common contribution.
Sed si voluntate vectorum, vel propter
aliquem metum id detrimentum factum sit, hoc ipsum sarciri
oportet. Dig. Lib. 14. tit. 2, c. 2, s. 1, c. 3, l. 5, s. 1.
And Vinnius in his commentary, after speaking of an involuntary
shipwreck, in which case there shall be no contribution, adds that
the damage suffered by a sacrifice made for the good of all, to
avoid a common danger, is to be made good by the contribution of
all. Vinnius Packium ad Legem Rhodiam, c. 5. Voet, in his
commentary on the Digest, is far more explicit, and asserts that if
the ship is voluntarily run on shore for the common safety, and
thus has perished, the goods being saved, contribution is due. Voet
ad Pand. lib. 14, tit. 2, s. 5. Bynkershoek has treated the very
question in his usual clear and luminous manner. After citing a
decision of certain maritime judges of Amsterdam, who held that if
a cable of the ship was voluntarily cut to avert a peril, and
thereby the anchor as well as the cable was lost, contribution
should not be made for the anchor, because there could not be said
to be a voluntary jettison; and who, also, for the like reason,
held that if the ship was run on shore and lost, the goods should
not contribute, because there could be no contribution unless the
ship was saved
(quia nihil contribuitur nisi salva nave),
he expressed his pointed disapprobation of the decision, saying
that it exhibited very little acuteness, for in all such cases the
goods cannot otherwise be saved, and the peril compels us to the
act, and the safety of the ship, in case of a jettison, is not
otherwise sought than, the ship being saved, the goods may thereby
be saved; and, therefore, the goods saved, and the damage
occasioned thereby, ought to be subject to contribution. And he
accordingly holds that the loss of the ship, like the loss of her
tackle, is to be deemed a general average, wherever she is
sacrificed by a voluntary stranding for the general safety,
insisting that this doctrine is fully supported by other
authorities cited by him.
The doctrine of the Amsterdam judges upon the principal point
before them has been utterly repudiated by all maritime nations in
later times, as it seems to have had no foundation in any
antecedent adjudications.
See Cleirac Us et Coutumes de la
Mer, art. 21-23. Indeed there are early positive ordinances of some
of the maritime states which positively provide
Page 38 U. S. 342
for the very case of a total loss of the ship by a voluntary
stranding as a general average (as for example the ordinance of
Konigsburg), and others in which it is not usually, if not
necessarily, implied.
See 2 Magens, 200, &c., It
deserves consideration also that the modern maritime writers,
Jacobsen, Benecke, and Stevens, all admit this is to be the result
of the foreign jurisprudence and ordinances. Jacobsen Sea Laws, by
Frick, b. 4, ch. 2, 358. Benecke on Insur. 219-221. Stevens on
Average, 33, 34, edit. 1824.
See 2 Bell's Com. 589, 5th
edit. 1826. Stevens also, notwithstanding his own opposition to the
rule, admits that it appears to have been the practice at Lloyd's,
as far back as the time of Mr. Weskett, and that recent opinions of
eminent counsel in England, taken on the very point, fully admit
and confirm it. Stevens on Average, 33-35, edit. 1824. Dr. Browne,
in his Treatise on the Civil and Admiralty Law, adopts the same
opinion, saying,
"It has been disputed whether, when a ship was voluntarily run
ashore and lost, but the cargo saved, it should contribute, because
the rule was that no contribution took place when the ship was
lost. But it was truly held that the rule would be absurdly applied
to a case where the ship was grounded purposely to save the
merchandise, and that with success."
2 Browne's Civil & Adm.Laws, 199
From this review of some of the leading opinions in foreign
jurisprudence, brief and imperfect as it is, it seems to us that
the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the present claim
for general average.
In respect to domestic authorities, we have already had occasion
to intimate that there are conflicting adjudications. In
Bradhurst v. Columbian Insurance Company, 9 Johns. 9, the
supreme court of New York held that where a ship is voluntarily run
ashore for the common good, and she is afterwards recovered, and
performs the voyage, the damages resulting from this sacrifice, are
to be borne as a general average. But that where the ship is
totally lost, it is not a general average. The ground of this
opinion, as pronounced by Mr. Chief Justice Kent seems mainly to
have been that this was the just exposition of the Rhodian and
Roman law, and that the weight of authority among foreign jurists
clearly supported it. With great respect for the learned court, we
have felt ourselves compelled to come to an opposite conclusion as
to the true interpretation of the Roman text, and of the
continental jurists. We agree with the learned court that when a
ship is voluntarily run ashore, it does not, of course, follow that
she is to be lost. The intention is not to destroy the ship, but to
place her in less peril, if practicable, as well as the cargo. The
act is hazardous to the ship and cargo, but it is done to escape
from a more pressing danger such as a storm, or the pursuit of an
enemy, or pirate. But, then the act is done for the common safety,
and if the salvation of the cargo is accomplished thereby, it is
difficult to perceive why, because from inevitable calamity the
damage has exceeded the intention or expectation of the parties,
the whole sacrifice should be borne by
Page 38 U. S. 343
the ship owner, when it has thereby accomplished the safety of
the cargo. If one mast is cut away, and thereby another mast is
unexpectedly and unintentionally also carried away by the falling
of the former, it has never been supposed that both did not come
into the common contribution. If, in the opening of the hatches,
and the jettison of some goods to lighten the ship, other goods are
unexpectedly and unintentionally, but accidentally, injured or
destroyed, it has never been doubted that the latter were to be
brought into contribution, to the extent of the loss or damage done
to them. It is not like the case of saving from a fire,
tamquam
ex incendio, save who can. But it is like the saving of the
cargo from destruction by fire by the scuttling and submersion of
the ship. Upon principle, therefore, we cannot say that we are
satisfied that the doctrine of the supreme court of New York can be
maintained, for the general principle certainly is that whatever is
sacrificed voluntarily for the common good, is to be recompensed by
the common contribution of the property benefited thereby.
But the same question has come before other American courts, and
has there, with the full authority of the New York decision before
them, received a directly opposite adjudication. Our late brother
Mr. Justice Washington, than whom few judges had a clearer judgment
or more patient spirit of inquiry, had the very point before him in
Caze v. Reilly, 3 Wash.C.C. 298, and after the fullest
argument and the most extensive research into foreign
jurisprudence, he pronounced an opinion that there was no
difference between the case of a partial and that of a total loss
of the ship by a voluntary stranding, and that both constituted
equally a case of general average. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had a short time before, in
Sims v. Gurney, 4
Bin. 513, adopted the same doctrine; and again in
Gray v.
Waln, 2 Serg. & Rawle 229, upon a reargument of the whole
matter, with all the subsequent lights which could be brought
before it, adhered to that opinion, and this has ever since been
the established law of that court. We have examined the reasoning
in these opinions, and are bound to say that it has our unqualified
assent, and we follow without hesitation the doctrine as well
founded in authority and supported by principle that a voluntary
stranding of the ship, followed by a total loss of the ship, but
with a saving of the cargo, constitute when designed for the common
safety a clear case of general average.
Having disposed of the main question, it now remains to say a
few words as to some minor points suggested at the argument. In the
first place, as to the objection that here the stranding does not
appear to have been made after a consultation with the officers and
crew and with their advice. There is no weight in this objection. A
consultation with the officers may be highly proper in cases which
admit of delay and deliberation, to repel the imputation of
rashness and unnecessary stranding by the master. But if the
propriety and necessity of the act are otherwise sufficiently made
out,
Page 38 U. S. 344
there is an end of the substance of the objection. Indeed, in
many if not most of the acts done on these melancholy occasions,
there is little time for deliberation or consultation. What is to
be done must often, in order to be successful, be done promptly and
instantly by the master upon his own judgment and responsibility.
The peril usually calls for action and skill and intrepid personal
decision, without discouraging others by timid doubts or hesitating
movements. The very point was decided in
Sims v. Gurney, 4
Bin. 513, upon ground entirely satisfactory. And it has been well
remarked by more than one maritime jurist that too scrupulous an
adherence to forms on such occasions has justly a tendency to
excite suspicions of fraud. Targa has stated that in all his
experience of sixty years, he never knew of but five cases of
regular jettisons, all of which were suspected of fraud because the
forms had been too well observed. Abbott on Shipp. pt. 3, ch. 8,
sec. 3. 1 Emerig.Assur. ch. 12, sec. 40, 605.
The only other remaining point is whether freight ought to have
been brought into the account, either as a part of the loss or of
the contributory value. The Auditor's Report which was adopted by
the court allowed the freight as a part of the loss, and also of
the contributory value. It is perfectly clear that if a part of the
loss, the freight ought also to contribute. And it seems to us that
as by the loss of the ship, the freight was totally lost for the
voyage, it was properly included in the loss, and as a sacrifice by
the ship owner for the common benefit. The goods, if reshipped in
another vessel, must be presumed to be so for a new and
correspondent freight to be borne by the ship owner or the shipper,
according as the one or the other should seek to perform the entire
voyage for his own benefit. The shipowner could only earn the
original freight by a transshipment, and if he abandoned that
intent, the shipper must enter into a new contract and enterprise
with others. In the case of
Caze v. Reilly, 3 Wash.C.C.
298, although the objection as to freight was saved, it was
abandoned at the argument. In the case of
Gray v. Waln, 2
Serg. & Rawle 229, the freight lost was expressly allowed in
the general average. No other objections have been taken to the
auditor's report or his adjustment thereof, and therefore upon the
other particulars of that adjustment we give no opinion.
Upon the whole our opinion is that the judgment of the circuit
court ought to be
Affirmed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Alexandria, and was argued
by counsel. On consideration whereof it is ordered and adjudged by
this Court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this
cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs and damages at
the rate of six percentum per annum.