The proceedings of the courts of the State of Maryland, and the
laws of that state prior to the passing of laws by Congress
providing for the government of the District of Columbia, were in
full force and operation in that part of the District ceded by the
State of Maryland until Congress had legislated for the government
of the District of Columbia, and the decree of the Court of
Chancery of Maryland affecting property in the District of Columbia
in a cause entertained in that Court operated in the District until
Congress tools upon itself the government of the District.
The State of Maryland and the United States both intended that
the suits pending in the Courts of Maryland should be proceeded in
until the rights of the parties should be definitively decided, and
that the judgments and decrees there made should be as valid and
conclusive as if the sovereignty had not been transferred.
Congress, by the 13th section of the Act of February 27, 1801,
placed judgments and decrees thereafter to be obtained in the state
courts of the state of which the District of Columbia had formed a
part on the same footing with judgments and decrees rendered
before.
If a guardian appointed by the court of the State of Maryland in
a cause instituted after Congress had legislated for the District
of Columbia had been ordered by a decree of the Court to make a
decd of lands within the District, and had died or had refused to
make the conveyance as ordered, the court of the District would, on
application, have been bound to appoint another person to execute
the deed, and would not have been authorized to open again and
reexamine the questions which had been decided in the Maryland
Court.
A deed was executed and acknowledged "W. M. Duncanson, guardian
for Marcia Burnes," and acknowledged by the guardian "to be his act
and deed as guardian aforesaid, and thereby the act and deed of the
said Marcia." This is a good execution and acknowledgment.
The Acts of the Assembly of Maryland prescribing the mode in
which deeds should be acknowledged for the conveyance of real
property were adopted by Congress in the act assuming jurisdiction
in the District of Columbia, together with the other laws of
Maryland then in force. The Acts of the Assembly of Maryland
relating to the acknowledgment of deeds do not require that
justices of the peace or other officers who have authority to take
acknowledgments shall describe in their certificates their official
character. Whenever it is established by proof that the
acknowledgment was made before persons authorized to take it, it
must be presumed to have been taken by them in their official
capacity.
The soundest reasons of justice and policy seem to demand that
every reasonable intendment should be made to support the titles of
bona fide purchasers of real property.
In the declaration in ejectment, various demises were laid, and
the verdict of this jury, and the judgment of the circuit court
were entered on one of the demises only, and it was contended that
the court ought not to have entered a judgment on the issue found
for the plaintiff, but should have awarded a
venire de
novo, and that this irregularity might be taken advantage of
upon a writ of error.
Held that if this objection had been
made in the circuit court on a motion in arrest of judgment, the
plaintiff would have been permitted to strike out all the demises
for the declaration but that on which the verdict was given. The
omission to strike out these demises was only, therefore, an
omission of form, and the Act of Congress of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 32,
expressly provides that no judgment shall be reversed for any
defect or want of form, but that the courts of the United States
shall proceed and give judgment according as the right of the cause
and matter in law shall appear to them, without regarding any
imperfections, defects, or want of form in the judgment or course
of proceeding except that specially demurred to.
This case came before the court from the District of
Columbia.
Page 38 U. S. 18
The case is fully stated in the following opinion of the Court,
delivered by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY.
This case comes before the Court upon a writ of error directed
to the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia,
sitting for the County of Washington.
It is an action of ejectment brought by the Bank of the United
States to recover sundry lots of ground in the City of Washington.
The declaration contains four demises purporting to have been made
for the same premises by different lessors. The jury found for the
plaintiff upon one of the demises, but said nothing of the other
three, and the judgment of the court is entered in like manner upon
the particular demise on which the jury found for the plaintiff,
and without taking any notice of the others.
At the trial in the circuit court it was admitted that David
Burnes was seized in fee of the premises in controversy in his
lifetime, and that he died seized thereof, intestate, leaving
Marcia Burnes his only child and heiress at law. The plaintiff in
the court below then offered in evidence the exemplification of a
record from the Court of Chancery of Maryland, duly certified, by
which it appeared that a certain Isaac Pollock, on 17 May, 1800,
filed his bill in the said court against Marcia Burnes, then an
infant, in order to obtain the conveyance of a large number of lots
in the City of Washington, among which are the lots now in
controversy, and claiming the same under a contract made with David
Burnes in his lifetime which had not been carried into execution by
proper conveyances at the time of his death. It further appeared by
the said record from the court of chancery that after various
proceedings in the case, the chancellor, on 1 November, 1800,
decreed that upon the complainant's securing the purchase money to
the satisfaction of the chancellor, the infant defendant, Marcia
Burnes, should, by William Mayne Duncanson, who had been appointed
her guardian
ad litem, convey the said lots to Pollock in
fee. Afterwards, further proceedings having been had, the court, on
26 October, 1801, passed another decree approving the security
which Pollock offered (which was security on other real property)
and directing that, upon the complainant's executing mortgages for
the said real property to the said Marcia to secure the payment of
the purchase money, she should make the conveyance by her guardian
as directed by the former decree. It is unnecessary to state more
in detail the proceedings in the Maryland court, because it is
admitted that they were fully warranted by the laws of that state.
The plaintiff in the circuit court offered also in evidence,
together with this record, the deeds of mortgage executed by the
said Pollock pursuant to the aforesaid decree, and also a deed of
conveyance for the said lots from Marcia Burnes to Pollock executed
by William Mayne Duncanson as her guardian. This deed is dated
Page 38 U. S. 19
January 12, 1802, after Congress had assumed the government of
this District. The defendant in the circuit court objected to the
admissibility and competency of all the evidence above stated, but
the objection was overruled by the court, and this forms the first
exception.
In the further progress of the trial in the circuit court,
various other deeds were offered in evidence on the part of the
plaintiff in order to show a title derived from Isaac Pollock, and
among the deeds thus offered was one from Walter Smith to Benjamin
Stoddart, dated March 5, 1807, acknowledged before Richard Parrott
and Thomas Corcoran. This acknowledgment was dated "District of
Columbia, Washington County, to-wit," but it was not stated in the
acknowledgment, nor did it appear by that instrument, that Parrott
and Corcoran were justices of the peace for Washington County. In
point of fact, however, they were such justices, and it is so
admitted in the exception. The defendant objected to the
admissibility of this deed, and this forms the substance of the
second exception, for although other papers are mentioned as
objected to at the time, the only point raised here is upon the
acknowledgment of this deed.
Upon the first exception. the plaintiffs in error insist that
the deed of conveyance from Marcia Burnes to Pollock of the 12
January, 1802, executed by her guardian as above mentioned,
pursuant to the decree of the Maryland Court of Chancery, conveyed
no title; that the sovereignty of Maryland over Washington County,
in this District, having terminated on 27 February, 1801, when
Congress assumed the jurisdiction, the decree of the state court
could not be executed without filing an exemplification of the
record according to the 13th section of the act of Congress, which
provided for the government of the territory, and obtaining an
order for the execution of the decree from the chancery court of
this District.
This objection cannot be sustained. The Act of Assembly of
Maryland of 1791, ch. 45, which ceded the territory to the United
States, provided
"That the jurisdiction of the laws of the state over the persons
and property of individuals residing within the limits of the
cession should not cease or determine until Congress should by law
provide for the government thereof under their jurisdiction."
The United States accepted the cession made by this law of the
state, and the conditions above mentioned therefore formed a part
of the contract between the parties, and consequently the laws of
Maryland and the jurisdiction of its courts continued in full force
until Congress took upon itself the government of the District, and
as it was uncertain at what time the United States would assume the
jurisdiction, it must have been foreseen that whenever that event
should happen, many suits would be found pending and undetermined
in the state courts. It was certainly not the intention of the
parties to the cession that such suits should abate and
Page 38 U. S. 20
that individuals who had rightfully instituted proceedings in
the tribunals of the state and incurred the expense and delays
which are unavoidable in such cases should, immediately upon the
assumption of jurisdiction by the United States, be compelled to
abandon the state courts and to begin anew in the courts of the
District. There could be no reason of policy or justice for
adopting such a measure, and without stopping to inquire what, upon
general principles of law, would be the effect of a cession of
territory, upon suits then pending in the courts of the ceding
sovereignty, it is evident that in this case the state and the
United States both intended that the suits then pending in the
Maryland tribunals should be proceeded in until the rights of the
parties should be finally decided, and that the judgments and
decrees there made should be as valid and conclusive as if the
sovereignty had not been transferred.
We have already stated the provisions of the act of assembly of
Maryland, and Congress, in assuming the jurisdiction, recognized
the rights of the state courts, and by the 13th section of the Act
of February 27, 1801, placed judgments and decrees thereafter to be
obtained in the state courts, in suits then pending, upon the same
footing with judgments and decrees rendered before. In either case,
upon filing an exemplification of the proceedings had in the state
courts, it authorized process of execution from the District court
of the United States in the same manner as if the judgment or
decree had been there rendered. It makes no exception in regard to
real property situated in the District; and the rights to such
property then in litigation are placed on the same ground with
rights to personal property and personal rights, and like them, are
left to the final adjudication of the courts of the states. And
although upon a strict and technical construction of the 13th
section of the act of Congress before referred to, it may be
doubted whether this decree falls within that description of
judgments and decrees for which provision is there made, yet when
the conditions upon which the cession was made by Maryland and
accepted by Congress are considered, it is very clear that if the
guardian appointed by the state court had died or had refused to
make the conveyance as ordered, the court of this District would,
upon the application of Pollock have been bound to appoint another
person to execute the deed, and would not have been authorized to
open again and reexamine the questions which had been decided in
the Maryland court. And in such a case the conveyance to Pollock by
the infant heiress of Burnes would have owed its validity
altogether to the decree of the state tribunal, and the title of
the guarantee would have received no additional strength from the
order of the District court. We can therefore see no necessity for
an order from that court when the guardian appointed was willing to
execute it and did execute it in obedience to the decree of the
Maryland court.
An objection has also been taken to the manner in which this
deed is signed and acknowledged. It is signed, "W. M. Duncanson,
guardian for Marcia Burnes," and he acknowledges it "to be
Page 38 U. S. 21
his act and deed, as guardian as aforesaid, and thereby the act
and deed of the said Marcia."
It is argued that it should have been signed "Marcia Burnes, by
her guardian W. M. Duncanson," and in like manner acknowledged "as
her act and deed." This is a case where no question arises as to
the manner of executing an authority given by private persons, as
to which the case of
Lessee of Clark v.
Courtney, 5 Pet. 319,
30 U. S.
349-350, may justly apply. But is the case where an
authority is to be exercised under the decree of a court of
chancery, and therefore where a liberal construction may and ought
to prevail. These two forms of signature and acknowledgment mean
precisely the same thing, and as this deed substantially conforms
in the manner of its execution to the directions contained in the
decree, we consider it to be valid and effectual to convey the
property therein mentioned.
Upon the second exception, the plaintiff in error contends that
the acknowledgment of the deed from Walter Smith to Benjamin
Stoddart is defective and the deed inoperative because it does not
appear in the certificate of acknowledgment endorsed upon the deed
that the persons before whom it was made were at that time justices
of the peace for Washington County, and he insists that this
omission cannot be supplied by parol.
This question depends upon the construction of the acts of
assembly of Maryland which prescribe the mode in which deeds shall
be acknowledged for the conveyance of real property, those acts of
assembly having been adopted by Congress in the act assuming
jurisdiction, together with the other laws of Maryland then in
force. We perceive nothing in the Maryland acts of assembly which
requires justices of the peace or other officers to describe in
their certificates their official characters. It is no doubt usual
and proper to do so, because the statement in the certificate is
prima facie evidence of the fact where the instrument has
been received and recorded by the proper authority. But such a
statement is not made necessary by the Maryland statutes. And
whenever it is established by proof that the acknowledgment was
made before persons authorized to take it, it must be presumed to
have been taken by them in their official capacity, and when their
official characters are sufficiently shown by parol evidence or by
the admissions of the parties, we see no reason for requiring more
where the acts of the legislature have not prescribed it. On the
contrary, the soundest principles of justice and policy would seem
to demand that every reasonable intendment should be made to
support the titles of the
bona fide purchasers of real
property, and this Court is not disposed to impair their safety by
insisting upon matters of form unless they were evidently required
by the legislative authority.
If the Maryland courts had given a contrary construction to
these acts of assembly, we should of course feel it to be our duty
to follow their decision. But we do not find the point decided in
any of the Maryland reports. In the case of
Connelly v.
Bowie, 6 Har. &
Page 38 U. S. 22
John. 141, the certificate of acknowledgment did not state that
the persons by whom it was taken were justices of the peace, and
there was no evidence in the record to prove their official
character. The deed was therefore clearly inadmissible, and it was
so ruled by the Court of Appeals. But it does not follow that the
decision would have been the same if parol evidence had been given
to prove their official character, and from the language of the
court in that case it may rather be inferred that if other evidence
had been offered, it would have been deemed admissible to supply
the omission in the certificate endorsed on the deed.
The objection made to the verdict and judgment applies
altogether to the form of the proceeding, and does not in any
degree affect the merits of the controversy. The verdict and the
judgment, it appears, are upon one of the demises only, and it is
insisted that as the jury did not find all of the issues committed
to them by the pleadings, the circuit court ought not to have
entered a judgment for the plaintiff upon the issue found in his
favor, but should have awarded a
venire de novo, and that
this irregularity in the proceedings may be taken advantage of upon
a writ of error. It is not necessary to examine whether this
objection could be maintained upon the practice and decisions of
the English courts in relation to the action of ejectment. For the
Act of Congress of 1789, ch. 20, sec. 32, expressly provides, among
other things, that no judgment shall be reversed for any defect or
want of form, but that the courts shall proceed and give judgment
according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear
to them, without regarding any imperfections, defects, or want of
form in the judgment or course of proceeding except those specially
demurred to. Now the demises laid in a declaration in ejectment are
known to be fictitious and mere form, and if the appellant had
taken this objection in the circuit court in arrest of judgment,
the plaintiff would undoubtedly have been permitted to strike these
demises from the declaration, and thus obviate the objection. The
omission of the plaintiff to do this was nothing more than an
omission of a matter of form, and if therefore this proceeding in
the circuit court should be held to be irregular, it is nothing
more than an error of form, and as such furnishes no ground for the
reversal of the judgment.
The judgment of the circuit court is therefore
Affirmed with costs.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia holden in and for the County of Washington, and was argued
by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the judgment of the said circuit court
in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.