The settled construction given by the Supreme Court to the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789 is that, to bring a case
within the reach of that section, it must appear on the face of the
record of the state court, either by express terms or by clear and
necessary intendment, that the question of the construction of a
clause of a statute of the United States did actually arise in the
state court, not that it might have arisen or have been applicable
to the case, and that the question was actually decided, not that
it might have been decided by the state court against the title,
right, privilege, or exemption set up by the party. If, therefore,
the decision made by the state court upon the face of the record is
entirely consistent with the construction of the statute contended
for by the party appellant, no case is made out for the exercise of
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court on the decisions of state courts, the Supreme Court is not at
liberty to resort to forced inferences and conjectural reasonings,
or possible, or even probable suppositions of the points raised and
actually decided by those courts. The court must see plainly that
the decision was either directly made of some matter within the
purview of the 25th section of the act of 1789 or that the decision
could not have been such as it was without necessarily involving
such matter.
It is to the record and to the record alone that the Supreme
Court can resort to ascertain its appellate jurisdiction in cases
decided in the supreme or superior court of a state.
A policy of insurance on a vessel sailing under a register which
has been obtained without conforming to the requisitions of the
laws of the United States relative to the registry and enrolling of
vessels of the United States is not void, and an action may be
maintained on such a policy to recover a loss sustained by the
assured. The policy may not have been designed to aid, assist, or
advance any unlawful purpose, and was a lawful contract in itself,
and only remotely connected with the use of the certificate of
registry. There are cases in which a contract may be valid
notwithstanding it is remotely connected with an independent
illegal transaction, which, however, it is not designed to aid
or
promote. Suppose a vessel had been actually forfeited for some
antecedent illegal act -- are all contracts for her future
employment void although there is no illegal object in view and the
forfeiture may never be enforced?
The original action was assumpsit on a policy of insurance,
dated July 17, 1833, upon the schooner called the
Mary and
owned by said Polleys, for the term of one year, commencing on the
11th of said July -- sum insured $3,000. The schooner during the
said year, on June 10, 1834, was totally lost. The general issue
was pleaded.
It appeared on the trial that a sloop was built in 1816, and was
enrolled by the name of the
Sophronia, and was again
enrolled in the custom house in Portland by the same name March 24,
1822. That schooner
Mary was built upon the keel, floor
timbers and naval timbers of the said sloop
Sophronia, and
the size enlarged nearly twelve tons, and the name of the
Mary given to her after being so enlarged, and that this
was known to the defendants at the time of executing the policy,
and that the certificate of Mark Leavit was procured by said
Polleys and presented to the custom house to obtain the enrollment
of the schooner Mary without any fraudulent intent to deceive or
defraud, but with a fair and honest intention, as the jury
believed. But that the enrollment of the sloop
Page 38 U. S. 158
Sophronia was not first surrendered and delivered up at
the custom house before the issuing of the enrollment of the
Mary, which was on 3 June, 1833.
The counsel for the original defendant, on the trial, objected
to the admission in evidence of the enrollment of June 3, 1833, as
contrary to the laws of the United States, but the judge overruled
the objection and it was admitted, and the counsel further insisted
that schooner on the voyage in which she was lost was sailing under
circumstances rendering her liable to forfeiture for a violation of
the laws of the United States, and that therefore a policy on a
vessel pursuing such a voyage was not valid or legal and binding;
but the judge also overruled this objection as insufficient to bar
the action. The cause was thereupon submitted to the jury, which
returned a verdict for the original plaintiff.
The defendant prosecuted this writ of error.
Page 38 U. S. 161
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the
State of Maine. The original action was assumpsit on a policy of
insurance dated 17 June, 1833, whereby the Ocean Insurance Company
insured three thousand dollars on the schooner
Mary, owned
by Polleys, at sea or in port, for the term of one year, commencing
the risk on 11 July, 1833, at noon, and ending 11 July, 1834, at
noon. The schooner was totally lost by the perils of the sea on 10
June, 1834, while the policy was in force. At the trial, on the
general issue, it appeared in evidence that a sloop was built in
1816 and enrolled by the name of
Sophronia, and was again
enrolled in the custom house in Portland, by the same name on 24
March, 1822. The schooner
Mary was built upon the keel,
floor timbers, and naval timbers of the said sloop
Sophronia, the size was enlarged nearly twelve tons, and
the name of
Mary was given to her after being so enlarged,
and this was known to the insurance company at the time of
executing the policy. A certificate of one Mark Leavit was procured
by Polleys and presented to the custom house to obtain an
enrollment of the schooner
Mary, without any fraudulent
intent to deceive or defraud, but with
Page 38 U. S. 162
fair and honest intentions, as the jury believed. But the
enrollment of the
Sophronia was not first surrendered and
delivered up at the custom house before the issuing of the
enrollment of the
Mary on 3 June, 1833. Upon these facts,
which appear upon the bill of exceptions taken at the trial, the
counsel for the insurance company objected to the admission in
evidence of the said enrolment of the
Mary of 3 June,
1833, as contrary to the laws of the United States, but the judge
who sat at the trial overruled the objection and the enrollment was
admitted. The same counsel further insisted that the said schooner
on the voyage on which she was lost was sailing under circumstances
rendering her liable to forfeiture for a violation of the laws of
the United States, and that therefore a policy on a vessel pursuing
such a voyage was not valid or legal and binding. But the said
Judge also overruled this objection as insufficient to bar the
action. Other points arose at the trial, upon which, however, it is
unnecessary for us to dwell because they are in no shape cognizable
by this Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over
the judgments and decrees of the state courts under the 25th
section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20. The jury found a
verdict for the plaintiff, (Polleys) which was confirmed by the
whole court, and judgment passed thereon accordingly for him.
Two questions have been argued before us. The first is whether,
upon the face of the record, any case is made out for the exercise
of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under the 25th section
of the act of 1789, ch. 20. The next is whether the state court has
in fact misconstrued the laws of the United States upon the points
in controversy at the trial to the prejudice of the insurance
company.
In our judgment, it is wholly unnecessary to consider the last
question, because we are of opinion that upon the face of the
record no case is shown for the exercise of the appellate
jurisdiction of this Court. The only clause of the 25th section of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, conferring this appellate
jurisdiction which is applicable to the present case is that where
there is drawn in question in the state court the construction of a
clause of a statute of the United States and the decision of the
state court is against the title, right, privilege or exemption set
up or claimed by either party under that clause of the statute; the
settled construction of this Court is that to bring any case within
the reach of the 25th section, it must appear upon the face of the
record of the state court, either by express terms or by clear and
necessary intendment, that the question did actually arise in the
state court, not that it might have arisen or have been applicable
to the case, and that the question was actually decided, not that
it might have been decided, by the state court against the title,
right, or privilege or exemption set up by the party. If,
therefore, the decision made by the state court is upon the face of
this record entirely consistent with the construction of the
statute contended for by the party appellant, no case is made out
for the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
Page 38 U. S. 163
Let us now apply this doctrine to the circumstances of the
present case. The first objection was to the admission of the
enrollment of the
Mary as evidence to the jury upon the
ground that it was "contrary to the laws of the United States" --
meaning undoubtedly that it was obtained contrary to the
requirements of the act of Congress concerning the registering and
recording of ships or vessels passed on 31 December, 1792, ch. 45.
That act, in the 14th section, provides, among other things, that
when any ship or vessel which shall have been registered pursuant
to the act shall be altered in form or burden by being lengthened
or built upon, or from one denomination to another, by the mode or
method of rigging or fitting, the ship or vessel shall be
registered anew by her former name; otherwise she shall cease to be
deemed a ship or vessel of the United States, and upon her being
registered anew, the former certificate of registry is to be
delivered up to the collector, and if not so delivered up, except
where it is destroyed or lost or unintentionally mislaid, the owner
is made liable to the forfeiture of five hundred dollars. Now it is
observable that the present policy contains no warranty or
representation of the national character of the
Mary;, and
therefore the only assignable reason for offering the new
enrollment (as it is called) -- meaning the new certificate of
registry -- in evidence was to establish the ownership of the
vessel to be in Polleys. For this purpose it was clearly admissible
however irregularly or wrongfully this enrollment may have been
obtained at the custom house. The court might therefore very
properly have admitted the paper in evidence for this purpose, and
for aught that appears on the record actually did so, without in
the slightest degree contesting that it had been obtained contrary
to the laws of the United States. In this view, as a matter of
evidence proper for the consideration of the jury on the question
of ownership, it is clear that the decision does not fall within
the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under the 25th section of
the act of 1789, already referred to.
Then as to the other point. The objection made by the counsel
for the insurance company was that the schooner (
Mary) on
the voyage on which she was lost, was sailing under circumstances
rendering her liable to forfeiture for a violation of the laws of
the United States, and that therefore a policy on a vessel pursuing
such a voyage was not valid or legal and binding. But the judge
also overruled this objection as insufficient to bar the action.
The objection was founded on the 27th section of the ship registry
act of 1792, ch. 45, above referred to, which declares that if any
certificate of registry or record shall be fraudulently or
knowingly used for any ship or vessel not then actually entitled to
the benefit thereof according to the true intent of this act, such
ship or vessel shall be forfeited to the United States with her
tackle, apparel, and furniture. The objection, then, as insisted on
by the counsel for the insurance company, involved two distinct
propositions. The first was that the schooner was sailing on the
voyage under circumstances which rendered her liable to forfeiture.
The second was that the policy on
Page 38 U. S. 164
her was therefore void. Now the first might have been most fully
admitted by the court and yet the second have been denied upon the
ground that the policy was a lawful contract in itself, and only
remotely connected with the illegal use of the certificate of
registry, and in no respect designed to aid, assist, or advance any
such illegal purpose. We all know that there are cases where a
contract may be valid notwithstanding it is remotely connected with
an independent illegal transaction, which, however, it is not
designed to aid or promote. The case of
Armstrong
v. Toler, 11 Wheat. 258, presented a question of
this sort and was decided in favor of such a contract. But cases
might easily be put where the doctrine itself would admit of a far
more simple and easy illustration. Suppose the
Mary had
been repaired in port, and the shipwrights had known the
circumstances under which she had obtained the new certificate of
registry; would they in consequence of such knowledge alone have
lost their title to recover for their own work and labor? Suppose a
vessel had been actually forfeited by some antecedent illegal act,
are all contracts for her future employment void although there is
no illegal object in view and the forfeiture may never be
enforced?
In order to bring the present case within the jurisdiction of
this Court, it must clearly appear on the face of the record that
the state court did decide against the construction of the law of
the United States insisted on by the insurance company, for if the
court did decide in favor of that construction, and yet held the
policy valid upon other grounds consistently with that decision, we
have nothing to do with the latter point and have no right to
inquire whether it was a just application of the general principles
of commercial law or not. Now so far is it from appearing on the
face of the record that the state court decided against the
construction of the laws of the United States, insisted on by the
insurance company, that the contrary may be fairly inferred from
the language of the court in overruling the objection. The
objection was overruled as "insufficient to bar the action" -- that
is, the action on the policy was still maintainable notwithstanding
the
Mary "was sailing under circumstances rendering her
liable to forfeiture for a violation of the laws" of the United
States.
In the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of this Court over
the decisions of state courts, we are not at liberty to resort to
forced inferences and conjectural reasonings or possible or even
probable suppositions of the points raised and actually decided by
those courts. We must see plainly that the decision was either
directly made of some matter within the purview of the 25th section
of the act of 1798 or that the decision could not have been what it
was without necessarily involving such matter. In the present case,
we can arrive upon the record at no such conclusion. The
consequence is that the cause must be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
We have been furnished with a copy of the opinion of the learned
judges in the state court in this very case, and we are gratified
in
Page 38 U. S. 165
finding that it abundantly confirms the deductions which we have
drawn from the record. But it is proper to add that that opinion,
if it had been otherwise, could not have had any influence upon our
present opinion, since it constitutes no part of the record, and it
is to the record, and the record only that we can resort to
ascertain our appellate jurisdiction in cases of this sort.
The writ of error is accordingly
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
