The United States, by donation from the State of Louisiana and
other state sources, acquired fee simple title to a tract of land
for a military base, state law providing that, except for civil and
criminal process, the United States should have the "right of
exclusive jurisdiction" over any land it "purchased or condemned,
or otherwise acquired." The Government granted petitioners oil and
gas leases on parts of the land, and the State levied an
ad
valorem tax on their pipelines and equipment.
Held: the United States has exclusive jurisdiction over
the land, and the State has no jurisdiction to levy the tax. Pp.
376 U. S.
370-374.
(a) The United States acquires exclusive jurisdiction over land
which a State donates for a purpose enumerated in Article I, § 8,
cl. 17, of the Constitution, even though it did not "purchase" the
land in a narrow trading sense.
Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v.
Lowe, 114 U. S. 525,
followed. Pp.
376 U. S.
370-372.
(b) The United States did not lose its exclusive jurisdiction by
leasing portions of the property.
S.R.A., Inc. v.
Minnesota, 327 U. S. 558,
distinguished. Pp.
376 U. S.
372-373.
(c) Payments by the Government to state agencies for public
utility services for the base and for educating children of
servicemen living on the base wholly fail to show a rejection by
the Government of exclusive jurisdiction over the base. P.
376 U. S.
373.
(d) Abandonment of exclusive federal jurisdiction cannot be
inferred from a standard provision in the oil and gas leases for
payment by the lessees of state and federal taxes, even if the
federal agency making the leases had power to waive the
Government's exclusive jurisdiction, which is by no means sure. P.
376 U. S.
374.
151 So. 2d 575, reversed and remanded.
Page 376 U. S. 370
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
The common question these cases present is whether the United
States has such exclusive jurisdiction over a 22,000-acre tract of
land in Louisiana on which the Barksdale Air Force Base is located
that Louisiana is without jurisdiction to levy an
ad
valorem tax on privately owned property situated on the tract.
The District Court and Court of Appeal of Louisiana upheld such a
tax laid on certain oil drilling equipment and pipelines owned,
used and kept by the petitioners on this federal enclave. La.App.,
151 So. 2d 575. The Supreme Court of Louisiana denied review. 244
La. 463, 467, 152 So. 2d 561, 562. We granted certiorari to
consider this federal question important to the United States. 375
U.S. 878. [
Footnote 1]
The United States acquired a fee simple title to the entire
tract in 1930 by donations from the State of Louisiana, [
Footnote 2] the City of Shreveport, and
the Bossier Levee District, a state agency, for the purpose of
using the land as
Page 376 U. S. 371
a military base. The Government has spent huge amounts of money
in creating and operating at Barksdale Field one of its most
important military posts. When the State and its agencies gave the
land to the United States, Louisiana law provided that the United
States should have "the right of exclusive jurisdiction" over any
land it
"purchased or condemned, or otherwise acquired . . . for all
purposes, except the administration of the criminal laws . . . and
the service of civil process of said State therein. . . . [
Footnote 3]"
All of the pipelines or equipment in question upon which the
State's
ad valorem tax has been imposed are, as the
Louisiana District Court stated, "situated on the United States
Military Reservation known as
Barksdale Air Force Base.' . .
."
Article I, § 8, cl. 17, of the United States Constitution
permits the United States to obtain exclusive jurisdiction over
lands within a State. It provides:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever . . . over all Places purchased
by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings. . . ."
Louisiana contends that the United States cannot "exercise
exclusive Legislation" here because the land for the military base
was donated, not "purchased," within the meaning of the
constitutional provision. We cannot agree to such a constricted
reading of that provision. Louisiana concedes that, as we pointed
out in our recent
Page 376 U. S. 372
holding in
Paul v. United States, 371 U.
S. 245,
371 U. S. 264,
the Government could, with the State's consent, have acquired
exclusive jurisdiction by condemning the land.
See also James
v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U. S. 134,
302 U. S.
141-142. This common sense reading of the constitutional
provision simply follows the interpretation given it long ago in
Fort Leavenworth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.
S. 525,
114 U. S.
538:
"The essence of that provision is that the state shall freely
cede the particular place to the United States for one of the
specific and enumerated objects."
In accordance with this construction, the Court in that case
went on to emphasize that, although the United States had not
"purchased" Fort Leavenworth in the narrow trading sense of the
term, the crucial question was whether Kansas had ceded exclusive
jurisdiction over the fort. Likewise, we hold here that, under Art.
I, § 8, cl. 17, the United States acquired exclusive jurisdiction
when the land was ceded to it with consent of the State (except for
the State's express reservation as to civil and criminal process),
just as if the United States had acquired its title by negotiation
and payment of a money consideration.
Relying on the fact that the United States has leased the right
to exploit parts of the reservation for oil and gas and for an oil
pipeline, Louisiana contends that the Federal Government has
thereby lost its power to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over
those parts of the area. We cannot agree. We did hold in
S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.
S. 558, that where the United States, while retaining
what was in substance a mortgage, had sold land and buildings
formerly used for governmental purposes, it thereby, in effect,
surrendered its former exclusive jurisdiction, leaving that
property taxable by the State. But that case does not control the
present situation, for here, the Government continues to hold all
the land subject to
Page 376 U. S. 373
its primary jurisdiction and control. [
Footnote 4] This Court has previously held that
exclusive federal jurisdiction was not lost either by lease of
property for commercial purposes within an enclave,
Arlington
Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, or
by conveying a right of way to a railroad across a reservation,
United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.
S. 138. And, in holding that exclusive jurisdiction was
not lost over a part of a reservation used for farming, this Court
recognized the responsibility of the Executive Department of the
Government to determine what land it will acquire and hold for
military purposes.
Benson v. United States, 146 U.
S. 325,
146 U. S. 331.
There is no evidence here which would justify a court in deciding
that the Government does not need to keep all of this tract intact,
ready for use when needed for the highly important military
purposes to which it has been dedicated.
Louisiana further contends that this record shows that the
Government did not intend to accept exclusive jurisdiction here. It
is the established rule that a grant of jurisdiction by a State to
the Federal Government need not be accepted, and that a refusal to
accept may be proved by evidence.
Atkinson v. State Tax
Comm'n, 303 U. S. 20,
303 U. S. 23;
Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n, 302 U.
S. 186,
302 U. S.
207-209. The State's contention is based chiefly on a
statement that Barksdale Air Force Base buys public utility
services from the State or a state instrumentality at its gate, and
pays to the State's school system a per capita charge for each
child of a serviceman attending the State's schools. We think these
circumstances wholly fail to show a rejection by the Government of
the State's cession of exclusive jurisdiction over the base.
[
Footnote 5]
Page 376 U. S. 374
Nor do we think it possible to find a refusal or an abandonment
of exclusive federal jurisdiction from the fact that the oil and
gas leases provided that the companies should
"pay when due, all taxes lawfully assessed and levied under the
laws of the State or the United States upon improvements, oil and
gas produced from the lands hereunder, or other rights, property,
or assets of the lessee. . . ."
It is by no means sure that a federal agency making an oil and
gas lease could waive the Government's exclusive jurisdiction over
a federal reservation, but, even if it could, we see nothing more
in this standard contractual provision than a precaution on the
Government's part to guard itself against liability for payment of
any state taxes "lawfully assessed" against its lessee.
Cf.
United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.
S. 174,
322 U. S. 189.
A contractual requirement to pay taxes lawfully owing, standing
alone, cannot be read as manifesting a purpose of the Government to
abandon exclusive jurisdiction over one of its important military
enclaves. When Congress has wished to allow a State to exercise
jurisdiction to levy certain taxes within a federal enclave, it has
specifically so stated, as in the Buck Act, 4 U.S.C. §§
104-110.
The judgments are reversed, and the cases remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
* Together with No. 354,
Natural Gas & Oil Corp. et al.
v. Waggonner, Sheriff, also on certiorari to the same
court.
[
Footnote 1]
No issue concerning immunity of federal instrumentalities from
state taxation, apart from the question of lack of state
jurisdiction to tax within a federal enclave, has been raised
here.
[
Footnote 2]
Act No. 4, Louisiana Legislature 1930.
[
Footnote 3]
Act No. 12, Louisiana Legislature, 1892, subsequently amended by
Act No. 31, Louisiana Legislature, 1942, La.Rev.Stat.1950, Tit. 52,
c. 1, § 1. The deed to the United States was for a fee simple, and,
unlike that in
Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.
S. 399, the authorizing statute contained no conditions,
and reserved only "the administration of the criminal laws . . .
and the service of civil process."
[
Footnote 4]
The fact that the oil and gas leases were issued by the
Department of the Interior, rather than the Department of the Air
Force, does not affect the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States.
[
Footnote 5]
But cf. International Business Machines Corp. v. Ott,
230 La. 666, 701-702, 89 So. 2d 193, 205-206.