Respondent company, indicted for antitrust violations in an
Illinois district, filed a motion to transfer the prosecution to
the district of Minnesota under Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which provides for the transfer of a
multi-venue case where it would be "in the interest of justice."
The trial judge denied the motion, enumerating ten separate
factors, including the difficulty which he felt existed of
obtaining a fair and impartial jury in Minnesota. On respondent's
petition for a writ of mandamus, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the improper finding as to a fair and impartial jury was the
"most important" factor in the trial judge's denial of the
transfer; made its own evaluation of the factors bearing on
transfer; and ordered the transfer, having also decided that a
criminal defendant has a right to be prosecuted in the district
where he resides.
Held:
1. The District Court's use of an inappropriate factor in
denying the transfer to another district of a criminal prosecution
does not empower the Court of Appeals to make a
de novo
examination of the record and exercise a discretionary function,
which Rule 21(b) commits to the trial judge, by ordering the
transfer itself. Pp.
376 U. S.
243-245.
2. In determining proper venue in a multi-venue criminal case,
the location of the main office or "home" of a corporate defendant
has no independent significance in determining whether transfer to
that district would be "in the interest of justice." Pp.
376 U. S.
245-246.
314 F.2d 369, reversed and remanded.
Page 376 U. S. 241
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Rule 21(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that where it appears that an offense was committed in more than
one district or division and the court "is satisfied that in the
interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred" to
another such district or division than the one wherein it is filed,
the court shall, upon motion, transfer the case. The respondent
filed such a motion to transfer this antitrust prosecution from the
Eastern District of Illinois to the District of Minnesota. After a
hearing, the trial judge denied this motion on the ground that the
factors of convenience, expense and early trial, together with the
fact that it "would be more difficult (for the Government) to get a
fair and impartial jury in the Minnesota District," convinced him
that "the interest of justice" would not be promoted by a transfer.
The respondent then petitioned the Court of Appeals to issue a writ
of mandamus [
Footnote 1]
directing the transfer. The Court of Appeals found that the trial
judge had treated the factor of a fair and impartial trial as the
"most important item" [
Footnote
2] in his decision, and that this was not an appropriate
criterion. It concluded that, in addition to "the essential
elements of convenience, expense and early trial, constituting
interest of justice' in a civil case," a criminal case was
"impressed with the fundamental historical right of a defendant to
be prosecuted in its own environment or district. . . ." [Footnote 3] Upon reviewing the record,
the Court of Appeals substituted its own findings for those of the
trial judge, and ordered the case transferred. 314 F.2d 369. Chief
Judge Hastings dissented.
Page 376 U. S.
242
We granted the petition for certiorari in view of the
importance of the questions to the prosecution of multi-venue
cases. 374 U.S. 825. We believe that the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the transfer, and therefore vacate its judgment and remand
the case for further consideration by the District Court.
I
A grand jury sitting at Danville, in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Illinois, returned an indictment
charging the respondent with violating §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. The indictment charged an attempt to monopolize and a
conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign
commerce in pressure-sensitive tape, magnetic recording media and
aluminum pre-sensitized lithographic plates. The offense was
alleged to have been committed in part in the Eastern District of
Illinois, which includes both Danville and East St. Louis. It is
agreed that the indictment could have been returned in the District
of Minnesota, as well as several other districts.
The Court of Appeals found, in contradiction to the finding of
the District Court, that a trial in the Eastern District of
Illinois would result in unjustifiable increased expenses to the
respondent of
"at least $100,000, great inconvenience of witnesses, serious
disruption of business and interference of contact between the
[respondent's] executives and its trial attorneys. . . . [
Footnote 4]"
It also found that respondent had no office, plant, or other
facility in the Eastern District, and that there was less
congestion in the docket of the Minnesota District than in the
Eastern District of Illinois. The court concluded that this was
a
"demonstration by proof or admission of the essential elements
of convenience, expense and early trial, constituting
Page 376 U. S. 243
'interest of justice' in a civil case, [
Footnote 5]"
which, augmented by the additional consideration that this was a
criminal action, compelled the granting of the motion to
transfer.
In awarding the mandamus, the Court of Appeals placed particular
weight on the trial judge's finding that it "would be more
difficult to get a fair and impartial jury in the Minnesota
District than in the Eastern District of Illinois." The Court of
Appeals stated that this finding, if true (which it doubted),
"would not justify a refusal to make a transfer otherwise proper
under rule 21(b) . . . ," [
Footnote
6] and concluded that
"it would be an unsound and dangerous innovation in our federal
court system for a judge in any district to appraise or even
speculate as to the efficacy of the operations of a federal court
of concurrent jurisdiction in another district. It follows that no
order in any way based upon such reasoning can stand, even under
the guise of an exercise of discretion. [
Footnote 7]"
The Court of Appeals, by way of footnote, then characterized the
consideration of this factor by the trial judge as "the most
important item," [
Footnote 8]
despite the trial judge's statement in his answer to the rule to
show cause that it "was but one of a number of factors, . . . which
led respondent to his conclusion."
II
The trial judge, in his memorandum decision, listed a number of
items as pertinent in the determination of whether the case should
be transferred to Minnesota "in the interest of justice," as
required by Rule 21(b). As Chief Judge Hastings pointed out in his
dissent, these
"factors were (1) location of corporate defendant;
Page 376 U. S. 244
(2) location of possible witnesses; (3) location of events
likely to be in issue; (4) location of documents and records likely
to be involved; (5) disruption of defendant's business unless the
case is transferred; (6) expense to the parties; (7) location of
counsel; (8) relative accessibility of place of trial; (9) docket
condition of each district or division involved; and (10) any other
special elements which might affect the transfer. [
Footnote 9]"
It appears that both parties and the Court of Appeals agree that
the first nine factors enumerated were appropriate. As we have
noted, the Court of Appeals struck the fair and impartial jury
finding as not being a proper factor and the Government does not
challenge that action here. Nor has the Government challenged the
use of the extraordinary writ of mandamus as an appropriate means
to review the refusal to transfer. We shall, therefore, not
consider those matters here, assuming, without deciding, their
validity for the purposes of this case. This leaves before us the
question of whether the Court of Appeals erred in considering the
motion to transfer
de novo on the record made in the
District Court and ordering transfer to the District of
Minnesota.
III
We cannot say, as did the Court of Appeals, that "the most
important item" in the trial judge's mind when he ruled against
transfer was the finding of difficulty in the selection of a fair
and impartial jury in Minnesota. The weight that Judge Platt gave
this factor is a matter so peculiarly within his own knowledge that
it seems more appropriate to have him resolve it. He has
represented in his answer that this "was but one of a number of
factors." The District Court's use of an inappropriate factor did
not empower the Court of Appeals to order the transfer.
Page 376 U. S. 245
The function of the Court of Appeals in this case was to
determine the appropriate criteria and then leave their application
to the trial judge on remand. Extraordinary writs are "reserved for
really extraordinary causes,"
Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.
S. 258,
332 U. S. 260
(1947), and then only
"to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority
when it is its duty to do so."
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U. S.
21,
319 U. S. 26
(1943). Here, however, the Court of Appeals undertook a
de
novo examination of the record, and itself exercised the
discretionary function which the rule commits to the trial judge.
This the court should not have done, since the writ cannot be used
"to actually control the decision of the trial court."
Bankers
Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.
S. 379,
346 U. S. 383
(1953).
IV
Since the trial court must reconsider the motion, effective
judicial administration requires that we comment upon the erroneous
holding of the Court of Appeals that criminal defendants have a
constitutionally based right to a trial in their home districts.
Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution provides that "The Trial of all
Crimes . . . shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall
have been committed. . . ." The Sixth Amendment carries a like
command. As we said in
United States v. Cores,
356 U. S. 405,
356 U. S. 407
(1958):
"The Constitution makes it clear that determination of proper
venue in a criminal case requires determination of where the crime
was committed. . . . The provision for trial in the vicinity of the
crime is a safeguard against the unfairness and hardship involved
when an accused is prosecuted in a remote place."
The fact that Minnesota is the main office or "home" of the
respondent has no independent significance in determining whether
transfer to that district would be "in the interest of justice,"
although it may be considered
Page 376 U. S. 246
with reference to such factors as the convenience of records,
officers, personnel and counsel.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and
the cause is remanded to that court with instructions to vacate the
judgment of the District Court and to remand the case for
reconsideration of the motion for transfer, without reference to
the ability of the United States to receive a fair and impartial
trial in Minnesota.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The All Writs Act grants to the federal courts the power to
issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
[
Footnote 2]
314 F.2d 369, 371, n. 1.
[
Footnote 3]
Id., 314 F.2d at 375.
[
Footnote 4]
Id. at 375, n. 3.
[
Footnote 5]
Id. at 375.
[
Footnote 6]
Id. at 373.
[
Footnote 7]
Id. at 375.
[
Footnote 8]
Id. at 371, n. 1.
[
Footnote 9]
Id. at 376-377.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion with the following brief
comments.
First, for myself I wish to make explicit what is indeed
implicit in the Court's opinion, namely, that the Court of Appeals
was entirely correct in holding that the District Court's
speculation that the Government might not be able to obtain an
impartial jury in the Minnesota District was wholly out of
bounds.
Second, while the Court of Appeals' outright reversal of the
District Court understandably reflects its view that the other
factors making for a change of venue, when stripped of the
impermissible "impartial jury" consideration, are indeed strong,
such action cannot well be regarded as other than a
de
novo determination of the change of venue motion on the part
of the Court of Appeals. Such a course inescapably contravenes
accepted principles governing the exercise of appellate
jurisdiction.