It was a violation of § 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations
Act for an employer, shortly before a representation election, to
confer economic benefits on its employees for the purpose of
inducing them to vote against the union. Pp.
375 U. S.
408-409.
(a) Section 8(a)(1), which makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "interfere with" the protected right of employees to
organize, prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises, but
also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken
with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice
for or against unionization, and is reasonably calculated to have
that effect. P.
375 U. S.
409.
(b) The absence of conditions or threats pertaining to the
particular benefits conferred would be of controlling significance
only if it could be presumed that no question of additional
benefits or renegotiation of existing benefits would arise in the
future; and no such presumption is tenable. P.
375 U. S.
410.
304 F.2d 368 reversed.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents a question concerning the limitations which §
8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 452 (1935),
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), places on the right of an
employer to confer economic
Page 375 U. S. 406
benefits on his employees shortly before a representation
election. The precise issue is whether that section prohibits the
conferral of such benefits, without more, where the employer's
purpose is to affect the outcome of the election. We granted the
National Labor Relations Board's petition for certiorari, 373 U.S.
931, to clear up a possible conflict between the decision below and
those of other Courts of Appeals [
Footnote 1] on an important question of national labor
policy. For reasons given in this opinion, we conclude that the
judgment below must be reversed.
The respondent, Exchange Parts Company, is engaged in the
business of rebuilding automobile parts in Fort Worth, Texas. Prior
to November, 1959, its employees were not represented by a union.
On November 9, 1959, the International Brotherhood of Boilermakers,
Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers and Helpers, AFL-CIO,
advised Exchange Parts that the union was conducting an
organizational campaign at the plant and that a majority of the
employees had designated the union as their bargaining
representative. On November 16, the union petitioned the Labor
Board for a representation election. The Board conducted a hearing
on December 29, and on February 19, 1960, issued an order directing
that an election be held. The election was held on March 18,
1960.
At two meetings on November 4 and 5, 1959, C. V. McDonald, the
Vice-President and General Manager of Exchange Parts, announced to
the employees that their "floating holiday" in 1959 would fall on
December 26, and that there would be an additional "floating
holiday" in 1960. On February 25, six days after the Board issued
its election order, Exchange Parts held a dinner for employees at
which Vice-President McDonald told the employees
Page 375 U. S. 407
that they could decide whether the extra day of vacation in 1960
would be a "floating holiday" or would be taken on their birthdays.
The employees voted for the latter. McDonald also referred to the
forthcoming representation election as one in which, in the words
of the trial examiner, the employees would "determine whether . . .
[they] wished to hand over their right to speak and act for
themselves." He stated that the union had distorted some of the
facts, and pointed out the benefits obtained by the employees
without a union. He urged all the employees to vote in the
election.
On March 4, Exchange Parts sent its employees a letter which
spoke of "the
Empty Promises of the Union" and "the fact
that
it is the Company that puts things in your envelope.
. . ." After mentioning a number of benefits, the letter said: "The
Union can't put any of those things in your envelope --
only
the Company can do that." [
Footnote 2] Further on, the letter stated: " . . . [I]t
didn't take a Union to get any of those things, and . . . it won't
take a Union to get additional improvements in the future."
Accompanying the letter was a detailed statement of the benefits
granted by the company since 1949 and an estimate of the monetary
value of such benefits to the employees. Included in the statement
of benefits for 1960 were the birthday holiday, a new system for
computing overtime during holiday weeks which had the effect of
increasing wages for those weeks, and a new vacation schedule which
enabled employees to extend their vacations by sandwiching them
between two weekends. Although Exchange Parts asserts that the
policy behind the latter two benefits was established earlier, it
is clear that the letter of March 4 was the first general
announcement of the changes to the employees. In the ensuing
election, the union lost.
Page 375 U. S. 408
The Board, affirming the findings of the trial examiner, found
that the announcement of the birthday holiday and the grant and
announcement of overtime and vacation benefits were arranged by
Exchange Parts with the intention of inducing the employees to vote
against the union. It found that this conduct violated § 8(a)(1) of
the National Labor Relations Act, and issued an appropriate order.
On the Board's petition for enforcement of the order, the Court of
Appeals rejected the finding that the announcement of the birthday
holiday was timed to influence the outcome of the election. It
accepted the Board's findings with respect to the overtime and
vacation benefits, and the propriety of those findings is not in
controversy here. However, noting that
"the benefits were put into effect unconditionally on a
permanent basis, and no one has suggested that there was any
implication the benefits would be withdrawn if the workers voted
for the union,"
304 F.2d 368, 375, the court denied enforcement of the Board's
order. It believed that it was not an unfair labor practice under §
8(a)(1) for an employer to grant benefits to its employees in these
circumstances.
Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." Section 7
provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3)."
49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
Page 375 U. S. 409
We think the Court of Appeals was mistaken in concluding that
the conferral of employee benefits while a representation election
is pending, for the purpose of inducing employees to vote against
the union, does not "interfere with" the protected right to
organize.
The broad purpose of § 8(a)(1) is to establish "the right of
employees to organize for mutual aid without employer
interference."
Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB,
324 U. S. 793,
324 U. S. 798.
We have no doubt that it prohibits not only intrusive threats and
promises, but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which
is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their
freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably
calculated to have that effect. In
Medo Photo Supply Corp. v.
NLRB, 321 U. S. 678,
321 U. S. 686,
this Court said:
"The action of employees with respect to the choice of their
bargaining agents may be induced by favors bestowed by the employer
as well as by his threats or domination."
Although in that case there was already a designated bargaining
agent and the offer of "favors" was in response to a suggestion of
the employees that they would leave the union if favors were
bestowed, the principles which dictated the result there are fully
applicable here. The danger inherent in well timed increases in
benefits is the suggestion of a fist inside the velvet glove.
Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source of
benefits now conferred is also the source from which future
benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged.
[
Footnote 3] The danger may be
diminished if,
Page 375 U. S. 410
as in this case, the benefits are conferred permanently and
unconditionally. But the absence of conditions or threats
pertaining to the particular benefits conferred would be of
controlling significance only if it could be presumed that no
question of additional benefits or renegotiation of existing
benefits would arise in the future; and, of course, no such
presumption is tenable.
Other Courts of Appeals have found a violation of § 8(a)(1) in
the kind of conduct involved here.
See, e.g., NLRB v. Pyne
Molding Corp., supra; Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB,
supra. It is true, as the court below pointed out, that, in
most cases of this kind, the increase in benefits could be regarded
as "one part of an overall program of interference and restraint by
the employer," 304 F.2d at 372, and that, in this case, the
questioned conduct stood in isolation. Other unlawful conduct may
often be an indication of the motive behind a grant of benefits
while an election is pending, and, to that extent, it is relevant
to the legality of the grant; but when, as here, the motive is
otherwise established, an employer is not free to violate § 8(a)(1)
by conferring benefits simply because it refrains from other more
obvious violations. We cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that
enforcement of the Board's order will have the "ironic" result of
"discouraging benefits for labor." 304 F.2d at 376. The beneficence
of an employer is likely to be ephemeral if prompted by a threat of
unionization which is subsequently removed. Insulating the right of
collective organization from calculated goodwill of this sort
deprives employees of little that has lasting value.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
See, e.g., Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202
F.2d 613 (C.A.7th Cir.);
NLRB v. Pyne Molding Corp., 226
F.2d 818 (C.A.2d Cir.).
[
Footnote 2]
The italics appear in the original letter.
[
Footnote 3]
The inference was made almost explicit in Exchange Parts' letter
to its employees of March 4, already quoted, which said: "The Union
can't put any of those . . . [benefits] in your envelope --
only the Company can do that." (Original italics.) We
place no reliance, however, on these or other words of the
respondent dissociated from its conduct. Section 8(c) of the Act,
61 Stat. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c), provides that the
expression or dissemination of "any views, argument, or
opinion"
"shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."