The Chattanooga Building Trades Council comprises numerous
building trades unions, including the Hod-Carriers Union and its
Local 846, two of the petitioners. Respondent Rea Construction Co.,
a large North Carolina building contractor, was engaged by
respondent Jafco, Inc., as general contractor to erect a shopping
center on a site in Tennessee. Rea operated an open shop, and
workers on the project were paid lower wages than the union scale.
The Council authorized the Hod-Carriers to place a picket at the
site in protest, and petitioner Liner began peaceful picketing,
whereupon construction workers on the job promptly ceased work. On
the same day, Jafco sought an
ex parte injunction from a
Tennessee state court, which ordered the injunction to issue upon
the execution and filing of an injunction bond. The next day, Jafco
filed a bond to indemnify petitioners in damages if the injunction
was "wrongfully" sued out. Petitioners' motion in the state court
to dissolve the injunction was denied, the injunction was made
permanent by a final decree, and, on appeal, the decree was
affirmed. Pending decision on the appeal, construction at the site
was completed. The State Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Held: the issuance of the injunction was beyond the
power of the Tennessee courts, and the judgment is reversed. Pp.
375 U. S.
304-310.
(a) This Court is not bound by the state appellate court's
holding that this case was rendered moot by the completion of
construction, since, in this case, the question of mootness is
itself a question of federal law upon which this Court must
pronounce final judgment. P.
375 U. S.
304.
(b) The petitioners plainly have a substantial stake in the
judgment, deriving from the respondent's undertaking in the
injunction bond, which survives the completion of construction. P.
375 U. S.
305.
(c) Since a holding of mootness would frustrate national labor
policy and encourage interference with the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Labor Relations Board, the Court should be astute
to avoid hindrances in the way of reviewing the state court's
adverse decision on the claim of federal preemption. Pp.
375 U. S.
306-308.
(d) Whether the facts showed a "labor dispute" within the
meaning of 29 U.S.C. §152(9) is at least arguable, wherefore
the
Page 375 U. S. 302
state courts had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or to
adjudicate the controversy, which lay within the exclusive powers
of the National Labor Relations Board. Pp.
375 U. S.
309-310.
Reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Chattanooga Building Trades Council, AFL, is composed of 17
building trades unions, including Hod-Carriers Building and Common
Laborers' Union of America and its Local 846, two of the
petitioners. Respondent Rea Construction Company, a large North
Carolina building contractor, was engaged by respondent Jafco,
Inc., as general contractor to erect a shopping center on a site in
Cleveland, Tennessee. Rea operated an open shop, and workers on the
project were paid lower wages than the union scale. The Council
authorized the Hod-Carriers to place a single picket at the site in
protest. The petitioner Liner, carrying a sign which read "Rea
Construction Co., not under contract with Chattanooga Building
Trades Council, A.F. of L.," began peaceful picketing on August 8,
1960. Construction workers on the job promptly ceased work. On the
same day, respondent Jafco, Inc., sought an
ex parte
injunction against the picketing from the Tennessee Chancery Court,
which ordered the injunction to issue upon the execution and filing
of an injunction bond.
See 5 Tenn.Code Ann., 1955, §
23-1901. The next day, August 9, Jafco filed a bond providing that,
if the injunction action failed, Jafco
"shall well and truly pay and satisfy the said [petitioners] all
such costs, damages, interest, and other sums
Page 375 U. S. 303
as may be awarded and recovered against the said Jafco, Inc. in
any suit or suits which may be hereafter broyght [
sic] for
wrongfully suing out said Injunction. . . ."
Thereupon, the
ex parte injunction issued, [
Footnote 1] the picketing ceased in
compliance with it, and work on the project was resumed.
The petitioners moved promptly in the Chancery Court to dissolve
the injunction on the ground that the state court was without
jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy because the subject
matter of the picketing was exclusively within the cognizance of
the National Labor Relations Board. The motion was denied on
September 29 by an order which recited,
"There is no
bona fide labor dispute between the
parties in this litigation, and therefore the state court has
jurisdiction of the matter and the same has not [been] preempted by
the National Labor Relations Board. [
Footnote 2]"
Following a hearing, the injunction was made permanent by a
final decree entered on June 16, 1961. Petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Section, which affirmed on
January 12, 1962. The opinion, not officially reported, is reported
in 49 L.R.R.M. 2585. Pending decision on the appeal, construction
at the site had been completed. Noting this fact, the court stated,
"In the first
Page 375 U. S. 304
place, the questions in this case have become moot." However,
the court went on to say, "Further, we concur with the Chancellor's
finding that a
bona fide labor dispute did not exist." 49
L.R.R.M. at 2587. The Supreme Court of Tennessee, by an unreported
order, denied certiorari. We brought the case here, 371 U.S. 961,
to consider the validity of the injunction in light of our decision
in Local No. 438,
Local 438, Construction Laborers v.
Curry, 371 U. S. 542. We
hold that the issuance of the injunction was beyond the power of
the Tennessee courts, and therefore reverse the judgment.
We must first consider respondents' challenge to our
jurisdiction to review the Tennessee courts' rejection of the
petitioners' federal preemption claim. The argument is that we are
bound by the state appellate court's holding that this case was
rendered moot by the completion of construction. We think, however,
that, in this case, the question of mootness is itself a question
of federal law upon which we must pronounce final judgment.
Love v. Griffith, 266 U. S. 32. In
that case, a Texas trial court dismissed a suit to enjoin the
enforcement of an allegedly unconstitutional rule which barred
Negroes from voting in a single Houston Democratic primary
election. An appeal from the dismissal was, in turn, dismissed by
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals on the ground that, since the
election was, at that time, long since past, the cause of action
had ceased to exist. This Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Holmes, implicitly denied that the state court's finding of
mootness precluded our independent determination of that question,
saying,
"When, as here, there is a plain assertion of federal rights in
the lower court, local rules as to how far it shall be reviewed on
appeal do not necessarily prevail.
Davis v. Wechsler,
263 U. S.
22,
263 U. S. 24. Whether the
right was denied or not given due recognition by the Court of Civil
Appeals is a question as to which
Page 375 U. S. 305
the plaintiffs are entitled to invoke our judgment.
Ward v.
Love County, 253 U. S. 17,
253 U. S.
22."
266 U.S. at
266 U. S. 33-34.
The Court did not, however, think that the action of the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals prejudiced the appellants' constitutional
rights. Since the election had been held, any order reversing the
trial court and ordering the injunction to issue would have been
futile; an injunction could not at that date redress the alleged
constitutional injury. The Court said:
"If the case stood here as it stood before the court of first
instance, it would present a grave question of constitutional law,
and we should be astute to avoid hindrances in the way of taking it
up. But that is not the situation. The rule promulgated by the
Democratic Executive Committee was for a single election only that
had taken place long before the decision of the Appellate Court. No
constitutional rights of the plaintiffs in error were infringed by
holding that the cause of action had ceased to exist. The bill was
for an injunction that could not be granted at that time. There was
no constitutional obligation to extend the remedy beyond what was
prayed."
266 U.S. at
266 U. S. 34.
In contrast, the prejudice to the petitioners from the action of
the Tennessee Court of Appeals in affirming the injunction which
did issue in the instant case is clear. The petitioners plainly
have "a substantial stake in the judgment . . . ,"
Fiswick v.
United States, 329 U. S. 211,
329 U. S. 222,
which exists apart from and is unaffected by the completion of
construction. Their interest derives from the undertaking of
respondent Jafco, Inc., in the injunction bond to indemnify them in
damages if the injunction was "wrongfully" sued out. Whether the
injunction was wrongfully sued out turns solely upon
Page 375 U. S. 306
the answer to the federal question which the petitioners have
pressed from the beginning. If the answer of the Tennessee Court of
Appeals to that question may not be challenged here, the
petitioners have no recourse against Jafco on the bond. Thus,
unlike
Love v. Griffith, supra, the federal issues remain
of operative importance to the parties as they come to this Court;
here it may be said that the Tennessee courts have, in substance
and effect, denied a federal right, and the completion of
construction cannot be deemed a hindrance to our review of the
federal question. This is not a case where this Court's decision on
the merits of that question "cannot affect the rights of the
litigants in the case before it."
St. Pierre v. United
States, 319 U. S. 41,
319 U. S. 42.
[
Footnote 3]
Moreover, this is particularly a case in which "we should be
astute to avoid hindrances in the way of taking" up that question.
Despite the completion of construction, our superintendence of a
state court injunction against conduct alleged to be cognizable
exclusively by the National Labor Relations Board is desirable "if
the danger of state interference with national policy is to be
averted,"
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U. S. 236,
359 U. S. 245.
This controversy involves the fundamental question of whether the
Tennessee courts had any power whatever to adjudicate the dispute
between the parties. Congress has invested the National Labor
Relations Board with the exclusive power to adjudicate conduct
arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act.
San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra.
If the peaceful picketing complained
Page 375 U. S. 307
of in this case is such conduct, Congress has ordained -- to
further uniform regulation and to avoid the inconsistencies which
would result from the application of disparate state remedies --
that only the federal agency shall deal with it.
Weber v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U. S. 468. The
issuance of the state injunction in this case tended to frustrate
this federal policy. This would be true even if the picketing were
prohibited conduct. For, although the National Labor Relations
Board is not barred from granting appropriate remedies by the fact
that the challenged conduct has ceased,
Labor Board v. Mexia
Textile Mills, Inc., 339 U. S. 563, or
that the construction has been completed,
Local 74, Carpenters
Union v. Labor Board, 341 U. S. 707,
charges of unfair labor practices must be filed within six months
of their occurrence, [
Footnote
4] and an employer armed with a state injunction would have no
incentive to initiate Board proceedings. It would encourage such
interference with the federal agency's exclusive jurisdiction if a
state court's holding of mootness based on the chance event of
completion of construction barred this Court's review of the state
court's adverse decision on the claim of federal preemption.
[
Footnote 5] We have given
significant weight to the vital importance of preventing state
injunctions from frustrating federal
Page 375 U. S. 308
labor policy in situations which the Congress has ordained shall
be dealt with exclusively by the Board. In
Construction
Laborers v. Curry, supra, we considered whether a state court
temporary injunction in a labor dispute should be considered to be
a final judgment for purposes of our review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.
We held that the temporary injunction should be deemed a final
judgment,
"particularly when postponing review would seriously erode the
national labor policy requiring the subject matter of respondents'
cause to be heard by the National Labor Relations Board, not by the
state courts,"
and said further,
"The truth is that authorizing the issuance of a temporary
injunction, as is frequently true of temporary injunctions in labor
disputes, may effectively dispose of petitioner's rights and render
entirely illusory his right to review here, as well as his right to
a hearing before the Labor Board."
371 U.S. at
371 U. S.
550.
In
Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co.,
317 U. S. 173, a
patent licensee defended against a suit for unpaid royalties by
attacking the validity under the Sherman Act of a price-fixing
stipulation in his license. The lower courts held that, having
accepted the license with the price-fixing stipulation, the
licensee was estopped to deny the validity of the stipulation. This
Court reversed. The question presented was
"whether the doctrine of estoppel, as invoked below, is so in
conflict with the Sherman Act's prohibition of price-fixing that
this Court may resolve the question even though its conclusion be
contrary to that of a state court."
317 U.S. at
317 U. S. 175.
We held that local rules of estoppel would not be permitted to
thwart the purposes of statutes of the United States. We said, 317
U.S. at
317 U. S.
176:
"It is familiar doctrine that the prohibition of a federal
statute may not be set at naught, or its benefits denied, by state
statutes or state common law rules. In such a case, our decision is
not controlled
Page 375 U. S. 309
by
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U. S.
64. There, we followed state law because it was the law
to be applied in the federal courts. But the doctrine of that case
is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which
the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal
statutes that legal relations which they affect must be deemed
governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, rather
than by local law. . . . When a federal statute condemns an act as
unlawful, the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the
condemnation, though left by the statute to judicial determination,
are nevertheless federal questions, the answers to which are to be
derived from the statute and the federal policy which it has
adopted. To the federal statute and policy, conflicting state law
and policy must yield. Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2; . . ."
If, in
Sola, a state substantive rule of law had to
yield to the federal statute and policy, even more so here -- where
the claim is that the federal statute and policy oust state courts
of any power whatever to deal with the conduct in question -- local
rules which purport to preclude state appellate court adjudication
of the federal preemption claim cannot conclusively render the case
moot for the purposes of this Court's review.
We turn then to the merits. Our discussion need not be extended,
for, in our view, the case is squarely governed by our decision in
Construction Laborers v. Curry, supra. Whether or not the
facts showed a "labor dispute" within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. §
152(9) [
Footnote 6] is
certainly at least
Page 375 U. S. 310
arguable. Consequently, as we said in
Curry,
"the state court had no jurisdiction to issue an injunction or
to adjudicate this controversy, which lay within the exclusive
powers of the National Labor Relations Board."
371 U.S. at
371 U. S.
546-547.
The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
The respondent Rea Construction Company was added as a party
complainant by an amended and supplemental bill filed August 10,
1960.
[
Footnote 2]
In its opinion on making the injunction perpetual, the trial
court also found
"that the erection of the shopping center does not involve
Interstate Commerce. It is a localized action, and by no definition
of the term can it be said that this operation amounts to
Interstate Commerce."
The respondents do not support this finding in this Court. The
proof was that, before the hearing, Rea Construction Company
purchased outside Tennessee and brought to the site materials
costing $147,099.67. This meets the direct inflow standards set by
the National Labor Relations Board for the exercise of its
jurisdiction.
See 23 N.L.R.B.Ann.Rep. 8 (1958).
[
Footnote 3]
Our lack of jurisdiction to review moot cases derives from the
requirement of Article III of the Constitution under which the
exercise of judicial power depends upon the existence of a case or
controversy.
See Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction to Decide
Moot Cases, 94 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 125 (1946); Note, 103 U. of
Pa.L.Rev. 772 (1955).
[
Footnote 4]
29 U.S.C. § 160(b).
[
Footnote 5]
The petitioners sought to advance the hearing and decision of
their appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals. The court said, 49
L.R.R.M. at 2587:
"The [petitioners], in brief filed June 22nd, 1961, in which
they were seeking to advance the cause for hearing, stated:"
" In the instant case, the right of picketing will become moot
by August 1, 1961, as the construction will be completed and the
building ready for occupancy. Appellants know that they desire to
picket one of the complainants, Rea Construction Company, this
coming fall on a project which will require approximately six or
eight months of construction. Without judicial review of this case,
they can only expect the same Trial Court to act the same, and
again they cannot possibly get the case to the appellate court for
a decision within that time."
[
Footnote 6]
"The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or concerning the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of
employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employer and employee."