Proceeding under a Missouri statute, the Governor of Missouri
proclaimed that the public interest, health and welfare were
jeopardized by a threatened strike against a public transit company
in the State, and issued executive orders taking possession of the
company and directing that it continue operations. However, the
employees of the company did not become employees of the State; the
State did not pay their wages, nor supervise their work; the
property of the company was not transferred to the State; and the
State did not participate in the actual management of the company.
Pursuant to the statute, a state court enjoined the strike, and the
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed. After an appeal to this Court
had been initiated by the filing of a jurisdictional statement, the
Governor issued an executive order terminating his seizure order,
but reciting that the labor dispute "remains unresolved."
Held:
1. Termination of the Governor's seizure order did not render
the case moot.
Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803, and
Oil
Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U. S. 363,
distinguished. Pp.
374 U. S.
77-78.
2. The state statute involved here is in conflict with § 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act, and it cannot stand under the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
Bus Employees v.
Wisconsin Board, 340 U. S. 383. Pp.
374 U. S.
78-83.
(a) The State's actual involvement under the Governor's seizure
order fell far short of creating a state owned and operated utility
whose labor relations are, by definition, excluded from the
coverage of the National Labor Relations Act. P.
374 U. S.
81.
(b) Neither the designation of the state statute as "emergency
legislation" nor the purported "seizure" by the State could make a
peaceful strike against a public utility unlawful in direct
conflict with § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, which
guarantees the right to strike against a public utility, as against
any employer engaged in interstate commerce. Pp.
374 U. S.
81-82.
361 S.W.2d
33, reversed.
Page 374 U. S. 75
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE STEWART, announced by MR.
JUSTICE WHITE.
The appellant union is the certified representative of a
majority of the employees of Kansas City Transit, Inc., a Missouri
corporation which operates a public transit business in Kansas and
Missouri. A collective bargaining agreement between the appellant
and the company was due to expire on October 31, 1961, and, in
August of that year, after appropriate notices, the parties
commenced the negotiation of an amended agreement. An impasse in
these negotiations was reached, and, in early November, the
appellant's members voted to strike. The strike was called on
November 13.
The same day, the Governor of Missouri, acting under the
authority of a state law known as the King-Thompson
Page 374 U. S. 76
Act, [
Footnote 1] issued a
proclamation that the public interest, health and welfare were
jeopardized by the threatened interruption of the company's
operations, and, by an executive order, purported to take
possession
"of the plants, equipment, and all facilities of the Kansas City
Transit, Inc., located in the State of Missouri, for the use and
operation by the State of Missouri in the public interest."
A second executive order provided in part that
"All rules and regulations . . . governing the internal
management and organization of the company, and its duties and
responsibilities, shall remain in force and effect throughout the
term of operation by the State of Missouri."
Pursuant to a provision of the Act which makes unlawful any
strike or concerted refusal to work as a means of enforcing demands
against the utility or the State after possession has been taken by
the State, the State petitioned the Circuit Court of Jackson County
for an injunction on November 15, 1961. [
Footnote 2] A temporary restraining order was issued on
that day, and the strike and picketing were discontinued that
evening. After a two-day trial, the order was continued in effect,
and the Circuit Court later entered a permanent injunction barring
the continuation of the strike "against the State of Missouri."
Page 374 U. S. 77
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Missouri, the appellants
argued that the King-Thompson Act is in conflict with and is
preempted by federal labor legislation, and that it abridges rights
guaranteed by the First, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Reaffirming its earlier decisions in cases arising under the Act,
[
Footnote 3] the Supreme Court
of Missouri rejected these arguments and affirmed the issuance of
the injunction.
361 S.W.2d
33. We noted probable jurisdiction. 371 U.S. 961.
We are met at the threshold with the claim that this controversy
has become moot, and that we are accordingly foreclosed from
considering the merits of the appeal. The basis for this contention
is the fact that, after the appellants' jurisdictional statement
was filed in this Court, the Governor of Missouri issued an
executive order which, although reciting that the labor dispute
between Kansas City Transit, Inc., and the appellant union "remains
unresolved," nevertheless terminated the outstanding seizure order,
upon the finding that "continued exercise by me of such authority
is not justified in the circumstances of the aforesaid labor
dispute." Reliance for the claim of mootness is placed upon this
Court's decisions in
Harris v. Battle, 348 U.S. 803, and
Oil Workers Unions v. Missouri, 361 U.
S. 363. In the
Oil Workers case, the Court
declined to consider constitutional challenges to the King-Thompson
Act, and, in the
Harris case, declined to rule on the
constitutionality of a similar Virginia statute, on the ground that
the controversies had become moot. In both of those cases, however,
the underlying labor dispute had been settled, and new collective
bargaining agreements concluded by the time the litigation
reached
Page 374 U. S. 78
this Court. Here, by contrast, the labor dispute remains
unresolved. There thus exists in the present case not merely the
speculative possibility of invocation of the King-Thompson Act in
some future labor dispute, but the presence of an existing
unresolved dispute which continues subject to all the provisions of
the Act.
Cf. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 219 U. S. 498,
219 U. S.
514-516;
United States v. W. T. Grant Co.,
345 U. S. 629,
345 U. S. 632.
The situation here is thus quite different from that presented in
the
Harris and
Oil Workers Unions cases, and we
hold that the merits of this controversy are before, us and must be
decided.
The King-Thompson Act defines certain public utilities as "life
essentials of the people," and declares it to be the policy of the
State that
"the possibility of labor strife in utilities operating under
governmental franchise or permit or under governmental ownership
and control is a threat to the welfare and health of the people.
[
Footnote 4]"
The Act imposes requirements in connection with the duration and
renewal of collective bargaining agreements, [
Footnote 5]
Page 374 U. S. 79
and creates a State Board of Mediation and public hearing panels
whose services are to be invoked whenever the parties cannot
themselves agree upon the terms to be included in a new agreement.
[
Footnote 6] And where, as
here, the recommendations of these agencies are not accepted, and
the continued operation of the utility is threatened as a result,
the Governor is empowered to "take immediate possession of" the
utility "for the use and operation by the state of Missouri in the
public interest." [
Footnote
7]
Page 374 U. S. 80
In
Bus Employees v. Wisconsin Board, 340 U.
S. 383, this Court held that the Wisconsin Public
Utility Anti-Strike Law, which made it a misdemeanor for public
utility employees to engage in a strike which would cause an
interruption of an essential public utility service, conflicted
with the National Labor Relations Act, and was therefore invalid
under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
of Missouri in the present case rejected the appellants' argument
that the
Wisconsin Board decision was determinative of the
unconstitutionality of the Missouri statute here in issue. The
court held that the provisions of the King-Thompson Act dealing
with the mediation board and public hearing panels were severable
from the remainder of the statute, and refused to pass on any but
those provisions which authorize the seizure and the issuance of
injunctions against strikes taking place after seizure has been
imposed. These provisions, the court ruled, do not -- as in the
Wisconsin Board case -- provide a comprehensive labor code
conflicting with federal legislation, but rather represent
"strictly emergency legislation" designed solely to authorize use
of the State's police power to protect the public from threatened
breakdowns in vital community services.
Page 374 U. S. 81
Emphasizing that the company was not a party to the injunction
suit, the court concluded that, although the State did not actively
participate in the management of the utility's operations, the
Governor's executive order had been sufficient to convert the
strike into one against the State, and that an injunction barring
such a strike is therefore not barred by the provisions of federal
labor legislation. 361 S.W.2d at 44, 46, 48-52.
We disagree. None of the distinctions drawn by the Missouri
court between the King-Thompson Act and the legislation involved in
Wisconsin Board seem to us to be apposite. First, whatever
the status of the title to the properties of Kansas City Transit,
Inc., acquired by the State as a result of the Governor's executive
order, the record shows that the State's involvement fell far short
of creating a state-owned and operated utility whose labor
relations are by definition excluded from the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act. [
Footnote 8] The employees of the company did not become
employees of Missouri. Missouri did not pay their wages, and did
not direct or supervise their duties. No property of the company
was actually conveyed, transferred, or otherwise turned over to the
State. Missouri did not participate in any way in the actual
management of the company, and there was no change of any kind in
the conduct of the company's business. As summed up by the Chairman
of the State Mediation Board: "So far as I know, the company is
operating now just as it was two weeks ago before the strike."
Secondly, the
Wisconsin Board case decisively rejected
the proposition that a state enactment affecting a public utility
operating in interstate commerce could be saved from a challenge
based upon a demonstrated conflict with
Page 374 U. S. 82
the standards embodied in federal law simply by designating it
as "emergency legislation." There, the Court said that where
"the state seeks to deny entirely a federally guaranteed right
which Congress itself restricted only to a limited extent in case
of national emergencies, however serious, it is manifest that the
state legislation is in conflict with federal law."
340 U.S. at
340 U. S.
394.
The short of the matter is that Missouri, through the fiction of
"seizure" by the State, has made a peaceful strike against a public
utility unlawful, in direct conflict with federal legislation which
guarantees the right to strike against a public utility, as against
any employer engaged in interstate commerce. [
Footnote 9] In forbidding a strike against an
employer covered by the National Labor Relations Act, Missouri has
forbidden the exercise of rights explicitly protected by § 7 of
that Act. [
Footnote 10]
Collective bargaining, with the right to strike at its core, is the
essence of the federal scheme. As in
Wisconsin Board, a
state law which denies that right cannot stand under the Supreme
Clause of the Constitution.
Page 374 U. S. 83
It is hardly necessary to add that nothing we have said even
remotely affects the right of a State to own or operate a public
utility or any other business, nor the right or duty of the chief
executive or legislature of a State to deal with emergency
conditions of public danger, violence, or disaster under
appropriate provisions of the State's organic or statutory law.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
The King-Thompson Act is Chapter 295 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri, 1959. The section of the statute authorizing seizure is
Mo.Rev.Stat., 1959, § 295.180.
[
Footnote 2]
Missouri Rev.Stat., 1959, § 295.200, par. 1, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person, employee, or
representative as defined in this chapter to call, incite, support
or participate in any strike or concerted refusal to work for any
utility or for the state after any plant, equipment or facility has
been taken over by the state under this chapter, as means of
enforcing any demands against the utility or against the
state."
Section 295.200, par. 6, provides:
"The courts of this state shall have power to enforce by
injunction or other legal or equitable remedies any provision of
this chapter or any rule or regulation prescribed by the governor
hereunder."
[
Footnote 3]
See State ex rel. State Board of Mediation v. Pigg, 362
Mo. 798,
244 S.W.2d
75;
Rider v. Julian, 365 Mo. 313,
282 S.W.2d
484;
State v. Local No. 8-6, Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, 317 S.W.2d
309,
vacated as moot, 361 U.
S. 363.
[
Footnote 4]
§ 295.010.
"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state that heat,
light, power, sanitation, transportation, communication, and water
are life essentials of the people; that the possibility of labor
strife in utilities operating under governmental franchise or
permit or under governmental ownership and control is a threat to
the welfare and health of the people; that utilities so operating
are clothed with public interest, and the state's regulation of the
labor relations affecting such public utilities is necessary in the
public interest."
[
Footnote 5]
§ 295.090.
"All collective bargaining labor agreements hereafter entered
into between the management of a utility and its employees or any
craft or class of employees shall be reduced to writing and
continue for a period of not less than one year from the date of
the expiration of the previous agreement entered into between the
management of the utility and its employees or if there has been no
such previous agreement then for a period of not less than one year
from the date of the actual execution of the agreement. Such
agreement shall be presumed to continue in force and effect from
year to year after the date fixed for its original termination
unless either or both parties thereto inform the other, in writing,
of the specific changes desired to be made therein and shall also
file a copy of such demands with the state board of mediation at
least sixty days before the original termination date or sixty days
before the end of any yearly renewal period, or sixty days before
any termination date desired thereafter."
[
Footnote 6]
Mo.Rev.Stat., 1959, §§ 295.030, 295.070, 295.080, 295.120,
295.140, 295.160, 295.170.
[
Footnote 7]
§ 295.180.
"1. Should either the utility or its employees refuse to accept
and abide by the recommendations made pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter and as a result thereof the effective operation of a
public utility be threatened or interrupted, or should either party
in a labor dispute between a utility and its employees, after
having given sixty days' notice thereof, or failing to give such
notice, engage in any strike, work stoppage or lockout which, in
the opinion of the governor, will result in the failure to continue
the operation of the public utility, and threatens the public
interest, health and welfare, or in the event that neither side has
given notice to the other of an intention to seek a change in
working conditions, and there occurs a lockout, strike or work
stoppage which, in the opinion of the governor, threatens to impair
the operation of the utility so as to interfere with the public
interest, health and welfare, then and in that case he is
authorized to take immediate possession of the plant, equipment or
facility for the use and operation by the state of Missouri in the
public interest."
"2. Such power and authority may be exercised by the governor
through such department or agency of the government as he may
designate and may be exercised after his investigation and
proclamation that there is a threatened or actual interruption of
the operation of such public utility as the result of a labor
dispute, a threatened or actual strike, a lockout or other labor
disturbance, and that the public interest, health and welfare are
jeopardized, and that the exercise of such authority is necessary
to insure the operation of such public utility; provided, that
whenever such public utility, its plant, equipment or facility has
been or is hereafter so taken by reason of a strike, lockout,
threatened strike, threatened lockout, work stoppage or slowdown,
or other cause, such utility, plant, equipment or facility shall be
returned to the owners thereof as soon as practicable after the
settlement of said labor dispute, and it shall thereupon be the
duty of such utility to continue the operation of the plant
facility, or equipment in accordance with its franchise and
certificate of public convenience and necessity."
[
Footnote 8]
29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3), 49 Stat. 450; 61 Stat. 137-138.
Compare United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.
S. 258.
[
Footnote 9]
In enacting the Taft-Hartley Act, Congress expressly rejected
the suggestion that public utilities be treated differently from
other employers. As explained by Senator Taft,
"If we begin with public utilities, it will be said that coal
and steel are just as important as public utilities. I do not know
where we could draw the line. So far as the bill is concerned, we
have proceeded on the theory that there is a right to strike, and
that labor peace must be based on free collective bargaining."
93 Cong.Rec. 3835.
[
Footnote 10]
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 158(a)(3)."
29 U.S.C. § 157, 49 Stat. 452; 61 Stat. 140.