The United States sued to restrain appellee, the sole American
manufacturer of household zigzag sewing machines, from conspiring
with two of its competitors, an Italian manufacturer and a Swiss
manufacturer, to restrain interstate and foreign trade in the
importation, sale and distribution of such machines in this
country. The evidence showed a course of dealings between these
three manufacturers, including the cross-licensing of their patents
on a nonexclusive, world-wide and royalty-free basis and ultimately
the sale and assignment to appellee of an American patent owned by
the Swiss manufacturer, in order that it could be enforced more
effectively in the United States against Japanese manufacturers of
such machines, who were underpricing appellee and the Italian and
Swiss manufacturers. The District Court dismissed the
complaint.
Held: on this record, there was a conspiracy to exclude
Japanese competitors, in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, and
the judgment is reversed. Pp.
374 U. S.
175-197.
(a) In concluding that no conspiracy was established on this
record, the District Court applied the wrong standard as a matter
of law. Pp.
374 U. S.
192-193.
(b) The course of dealings disclosed by this record shows that
appellee and the Italian and Swiss manufacturers had a common
purpose to suppress the competition of Japanese machines in the
United States through the use of the patent which appellee obtained
from the Swiss manufacturer and under which the Swiss and Italian
manufacturers were the sole licensees. Implicit in such a course of
dealings was a conspiracy which violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Pp.
374 U. S.
192-196.
205 F.
Supp. 394, reversed.
Page 374 U. S. 175
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a direct appeal from the judgment of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York,
205 F.
Supp. 394, dismissing a civil antitrust action brought by the
United States against the Singer Manufacturing Company to prevent
and restrain alleged violations of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2. The complaint alleged that Singer combined
and conspired with two competitors, Gegauf of Switzerland and
Vigorelli of Italy, to restrain and monopolize and that Singer
unilaterally attempted to monopolize interstate and foreign trade
in the importation, sale and distribution of household zigzag
sewing machines. The District Court dismissed after an extended
trial, concluding that the charges were without merit. The United
States appealed under § 2 of the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29,
but has abandoned its claim as to attempted monopolization. We
noted probable jurisdiction in light of the fact that, unless we
did so, the parties would be deprived of any appellate review in
the case. 371 U.S. 918. We have examined the record (1,723 pages)
in detail, as is necessary in these direct appeals, [
Footnote 1] and, upon consideration of it as
well as the briefs and argument of counsel, have concluded that
there was a conspiracy to exclude Japanese competitors in household
zigzag sewing machines, and that the judgment must be reversed.
Page 374 U. S. 176
I
The details of the facts are long and complicated. The amended
and corrected opinion of the District Court includes not only a
description of the sewing machines involved and their operation,
but also an analysis of the patents covering them. We shall,
therefore, not relate the facts in detail, but satisfy ourselves
with the overriding ones.
A. As the District Court stated, this action
"concerns only the United States trade and commerce arising from
the importation into the United States of a particular type of
household sewing machine known as the 'machine-carried multi-cam
zigzag machine.' 205 F. Supp. at 396. The zigzag stitch machine
produces various ornamental and functional zigzag stitches, as well
as straight ones. The automatic multi-cam zigzag machine, unlike
the manually operated zigzag and the replaceable cam machine, each
of which requires hand manipulation or insertion, operates in
response to the turning of a knob or dial on the exterior of the
machine. While the multi-cam machines involved here function in
slightly different ways, all are a variant of the same basic
principle."
B. Singer is the sole United States manufacturer of household
zigzag sewing machines. In addition to the multi-cam variety at
issue here, it produces replaceable cam machines, but not the
manually operated zigzag. Singer sells these machines in this
country through a wholly owned subsidiary, and in various foreign
countries through independent distributors. Singer's sales
comprised approximately 61.4% of all domestic sales in multi-cam
zigzag machines in the United States in 1959. During the same year,
some 22.6% were imported from Japan, and about 16% from Europe. In
1958, Singer's percentage was 69.6%, Japanese imports 20.7%, and
European imports 9.7%. Further, Singer's 1959 and
Page 374 U. S. 177
1960 domestic sales of multi-cam machines amounted to
approximately $46 million per year, in each of which years such
sales accounted for about 45% of all its domestic sewing machine
sales.
C. It appears that Singer, by April 29, 1953, through its
experimental department, had completed a design of a multiple cam
zigzag mechanism in what it calls the Singer "401" machine. It is
disclosed in Singer's Johnson Patent. In 1953, Singer was also
developing its Perla Patent, as used in its "306" replaceable cam
machine, and, in 1954, its "319" machine-carried multiple cam
machine. In September of 1953, Vigorelli, an Italian corporation,
introduced in the United States a sewing machine incorporating a
stack of cams with a single follower. Singer concluded that
Vigorelli had on file applications covering its machine in the
various patent offices in the world, and that the Singer design
would infringe. On June 10, 1955, Singer bought for $8,000 a patent
disclosing a plurality of cams with a single cam follower from Carl
Harris, a Canadian. It was believed that this patent, filed June 9,
1952, might be reissued with claims covering the Singer 401 as well
as its 319 machine, and that the reissued patent would dominate the
Vigorelli machine a well as a Japanese one introduced into the
United States in September, 1954, by Brother International
Corporation. Thereafter, Singer concluded that litigation would
result between it and Vigorelli unless a cross-licensing agreement
could be made, and this was effected on November 17, 1955. The
license was nonexclusive, world-wide and royalty free. The trial
court found that Singer's only purpose was to effect a
cross-licensing, but certain correspondence does cast some shadow
upon these negotiations. [
Footnote
2] The agreement
Page 374 U. S. 178
also contained provisions by which each of the parties agreed
not to bring any infringement action against the other "in any
country," or institute against the other any opposition, nullity or
invalidation proceedings in any country. In accordance with this
agreement, Singer withdrew its opposition to Vigorelli's patent
application in Brazil, and Vigorelli later (1958) abandoned a
United States interference to the Johnson application which cleared
the way for the Johnson Patent to issue on December 2 of that
year.
D. While Singer was negotiating the cross-license agreement with
Vigorelli, it learned that Gegauf, a Swiss corporation, had a
patent covering a multiple cam mechanism. This placed an additional
cloud over Singer's Harris reissue plan, because the Gegauf patent
enjoyed an effective priority date in Italy of May 31, 1952. This
was nine days earlier than Singer's Harris patent filing date in
the United States. In December, 1955, Singer learned that Gegauf
and Vigorelli had entered a cross-licensing agreement covering
their multiple cam patents similar to the Vigorelli-Singer
agreement. In January, 1956, Singer found that Gegauf had pending
an application in the United States Patent Office, and assumed that
it was based on the same priority date,
i.e.,
Page 374 U. S. 179
May 31, 1952. If this was true, Singer could use its Harris
reissue patent only to oppose through interference the allowance of
broad claims to Gegauf. It therefore made preparation to negotiate
with Gegauf, first approaching Vigorelli in order to ascertain how
the latter had induced Gegauf to grant him a royalty-free license
and drop any claim of infringement. Singer made direct arrangements
for a conference with Gegauf for April 12, 1956, and the license
agreement was made April 14, 1956.
The setting for this meeting was that Gegauf had a dominant
Swiss patent with applications in Germany, Italy, and the United
States, all prior to Singer. In addition, Singer's counsel had
examined Gegauf's Swiss patent and advised that it was valid.
Singer opened conversation with indications of coming litigation on
the Harris patent, concealing the Johnson and Perla applications.
Gegauf felt secure in his patent claims, but insecure with
reference to the inroads the Japanese machines were making on the
United States market. It was this "lever" which Singer used to
secure the license, pointing out that, without an agreement, Gegauf
and Singer might litigate for a protracted period; that they should
not be fighting each other, as that would only delay the issue of
their respective patents; and, finally, that they should license
each other and get their respective patents "so they could be
enforced by whoever would own the particular patent." Singer, in
the discussions, worked upon these Gegauf fears of Japanese
competition "because one of the strong points" of its argument was
that an agreement should be made
"in order to fight against this Japanese competition in their
building a machine that in any way reads on the patents of
ourselves and of Bernina [Gegauf] which are in conflict. [
Footnote 3]"
The trial judge found that the only purpose
Page 374 U. S. 180
"disclosed to Gegauf, and in fact the very one used to convince
Gegauf of the advisability of entering into an agreement" was
to
"obtain protection against the Japanese machines which might be
made under the Gegauf patent; this sprang from a fear which Singer
had good reason to believe to be well founded."
205 F. Supp. at 413. While he found Singer's
"underlying, dominant and sole purpose . . . was to settle the
conflict in priority between the Gegauf and Harris patents and to
secure for Singer a license right under the earlier patent,"
ibid., it is significant that no such overriding
purpose was found to have been disclosed to Gegauf.
The license agreement covered (1) the Singer-Harris patent and
its reissue application in the United States and nine corresponding
foreign ones, and (2) the Gegauf Swiss, Italian and German patents,
as well as the United States and German applications covering the
same. The parties agreed in the first paragraph of the
agreement
"not to do anything, either directly or indirectly and in any
country, the result of which might restrict the scope of the claims
of the other party relating to the subject matter of the above
mentioned patents and patent applications."
In addition,
"each undertakes, in accordance with the laws and regulations of
the Patent Office concerned, to facilitate the allowance in any
country of claims as broad as possible, as regards the subject
matter of the patents and patent applications referred to
above."
The parties also agreed not to sue one another on the basis of
any of the patents or applications. Singer agreed not to make a
"slavish" copy of Gegauf's machine, and to give Gegauf
"the amical assistance of its patent attorneys for the defense
of any of the above mentioned Gegauf patents or patent applications
against an action in cancellation."
The agreement made no mention of Singer's Perla or Johnson
applications, the existence of which Singer did not wish Gegauf to
know.
Page 374 U. S. 181
E. Approximately one week after the Gegauf cross-license
agreement, Singer met with Vigorelli at Milan, Italy at the
latter's request. Vigorelli at this meeting suggested that Singer,
Gegauf and Vigorelli, having arrived at their respective
agreements, should act in concert in prosecuting their patents
against all others in the field. This was out of the question,
Singer immediately replied, advising that
"what appeared to us to be proper action was for each one to
prosecute his own patents and take care of any cases of
infringement that might appear. [
Footnote 4]"
The subsequent conversations at the meeting are reported from
the same source as follows:
"Upon learning that there could be no joint action by the three
companies who have been mentioned in prosecuting patents against
all others in the field, that subject was dropped. . . ."
"At this point, it should perhaps be mentioned that Mr. Stanford
and I have discussed between ourselves whether we should say
anything to Mr. Gegauf about our feeling that we could prosecute
his patents that will be issued sometime within the next few months
in the United States better than perhaps he could if we owned them,
but we had decided not to say anything to Mr. Gegauf about this at
this time."
"In talking with Mr. Vigorelli's lawyer, Mr. Stanford dropped
this view to him. The point was immediately understood, and the
question was raised if we would have any objection if they were to
pass the word on to Mr. Gegauf that they were raising this point.
We said that, of course, we would have no objection but that we
ourselves did not wish to do this, and we would not want the
suggestion coming to Mr. Gegauf at this time as from us. If they
wanted to suggest it, it was all right. We would, of
Page 374 U. S. 182
course, under such an arrangement, have to give a license to
Gegauf under the patent that he would turn over to us. Mr. Stanford
believes that he would be able, before the patent is issued, to
rewrite the claims and make it stronger than it now is, and that it
is a fact that, being in the United States, we would be better able
to prosecute any claims against this patent than would Mr.
Gegauf."
While the testimony of Mr. Stanford, Singer's patent attorney,
varies somewhat from this memorandum of Mr. Waterman, it is
substantially the same. [
Footnote
5] That the approach to Gegauf was not casually laid is shown
by a May 7, 1956, letter from Mr. Stanford to Patent Department
employees of Singer, in which he said,
"When in Italy, we laid careful plans for Gegauf to be advised
by a third
Page 374 U. S. 183
party that Singer could best handle the patent situation if we
owned the Gegauf U.S. Patent. Think it will bear fruit. This
suggestion, with the U.S. attorney situation, is pressure in the
right direction."
Mr. Majnoni reported in June, 1956, that he had the "opportunity
of talking to the Patent Attorneys of Mr. F. Gegauf on a number of
occasions" concerning
"the question of the advantage of the American Singer Company's
being in possession of the different patents which might be useful
in defence of sewing machines with multiple cams. . . ."
He stated that "the particular character of the question,"
i.e., "the possibility and advantage that the Gegauf
patent application in the States be assigned to Singer," required
that the approach be in "such a way as to prompt an initiative to
this end by Gegauf." He was hopeful that this had been
accomplished. Thereafter on September 19, Dr. S. Lando, Singer
representative in Milan, reported that Majnoni advised that
Gegauf
"is today effectively willing to transfer his patent application
in the U.S. to the Singer, without regard or with little regard to
the financial side of the matter."
This was brought about, he said, by discussions between
Vigorelli and Gegauf concerning a United States Van Tuyl patent and
its effect upon the validity of the Gegauf German patent; that
Gegauf had
"made informally known to Mr. Vigorelli that the withdrawing of
the Vigorelli application in the U.S. would be greatly appreciated,
to prevent the issuance of a printed patent wherein the fact that
the Van Tuyl patent exists will be made known to third
parties;"
that Vigorelli had agreed to withdraw his application, and that,
as a consequence, Vigorelli would
"drop any direct means adapted to protect his machines in the
U.S., but he is quite sure that Singer will take care of the
protection of the machines of the general type of interest by
making use of the owned Harris and Gegauf patents. "
Page 374 U. S. 184
In the summer of 1956, Mr. F. Gegauf, Jr., and his sister
attended a sewing machine convention at Kansas City. On returning
home, they met with Singer (Messrs. Waterman & Stanford) in
Singer's office in New York City. Gegauf expressed concern over the
number of Japanese machines that he had seen at the convention.
Singer again found opportunity to employ the Japanese problem, and
stressed to Gegauf, Jr., the difficulties of enforcing a patent in
the United States -- namely, large number of importers, size of the
country, number of judicial circuits, etc. Singer emphasized that
these all presented problems to the owner of a United States
patent. Singer, being in the United States, could, they said,
enforce the patent better than Gegauf could. They asked Gegauf,
Jr., whether he thought his father would be interested in selling
the patent to Singer. Thereafter, on September 3, Gegauf, Jr.,
wrote Mr. Waterman that Singer's suggestion had been taken up with
Gegauf, Sr., and "we might be interested in such an agreement." The
closing paragraph says:
"We agree that something should be done against Japanese
competition in your country, and maybe South America, and are
therefore looking forward to your early reply."
Waterman replied on September 7 that he and Mr. Stanford would
be in Germany on September 18 through 25; he asked that Gegauf's
United States patent attorney be directed to meet with Stanford in
New York City with authorization to disclose the content of the
Gegauf patent application so that time might he saved in Europe.
Mr. Waterman closed with the belief "that it may be possible that
we can both strengthen our positions with respect to the Japanese
competition which you mention. . . ." The conference was set for
September 23, at which time Gegauf demanded $250,000 for the
patent, and negotiations broke off. Singer wrote Dr. Lando, its
Milan agent, on October 9, informing him. The letter closed with
this paragraph:
Page 374 U. S. 185
"I thought you would like to have this information if the
subject should come up in talking with Mr. Vigorelli or his
attorney." And, on October 24, Singer wrote Mr. Gegauf advising
that the United States Patent Office had declared an interference
between their patent applications; that their cross-license
agreement provided that this interference be settled in accordance
with the patent laws of the United States; that,
"since . . . interference proceedings are usually time-consuming
and costly to the parties involved, it would appear that it would
be advantageous for us to settle the interference between
ourselves, rather than to continue the proceeding and rely on the
United States Patent Office finally to award a priority;"
and, finally, Singer suggested that the attorneys for the
parties in the United States get together with a view to settling
the interference. Singer abandoned its interference on March 15,
1957, and the Gegauf claim was taken verbatim from the Singer
Harris reissue claim.
Nothing more was done by Singer toward securing the Gegauf
application until September 12, 1957, when Singer wrote Gegauf that
its Harris application was about to be issued as a patent. It also
anticipated that several other patents relating to ornamental
stitch machines would soon be issued to it, and presumed Gegauf's
application would soon be granted. Then followed this
paragraph:
"When I had the pleasure of meeting you last fall, we had some
discussion relative to the procedures that might be followed to
enforce the patents . . . , when issued, against infringing
manufacturers who primarily are manufacturers in other countries
seeking markets in the United States, and more and more throughout
the entire world. These manufacturers are bringing out a large
variety of ornamental stitch machines which would appear to come
within the
Page 374 U. S. 186
terms of claims which may be awarded in the United States with
respect of the aforementioned Singer and Gegauf patents. A proper
enforcement of these patents may make it necessary to instigate
patent suits against each of the importers in the United States, of
whom there will perhaps be many. I think you will agree with me
that neither one of us alone can protect himself most effectively.
[
Footnote 6]"
This letter brought on a meeting of the parties in Zurich on
October 16, 1957. Gegauf's position was that, as the trial court
found,
"while it had no objection 'to making an agreement with Singer,
in order to stop as far as possible Japanese competitors in the
United States market,' it was willing to do so only under certain
conditions."
205 F. Supp. at 416. Finally, as the trial court found, Gegauf
demanded $125,000 plus certain conditions declaring that it
"was cheap, and that it could not go lower, since it could get
more money if it licensed the invention. Kirker [of Singer] replied
that there was no comparison since a sale to Singer was insurance
against common competitors,
Page 374 U. S. 187
and that was why Singer was willing to pay."
Ibid. In another exchange, Gegauf
"advanced the argument that, if stopped by Singer in the United
States, the Japanese manufacturers would run to Europe; to this,
Singer answered that a greater risk was run in Europe if Singer
were not permitted to first stop infringements in the United
States. . . . Singer continued 'to drive home the point' that
Gegauf stood to benefit more by enforcement of the patents in the
United States because the 'Brother Pacesetter' machine, a big
selling and patent infringing Japanese-made machine, was in direct
competition with the Gegauf machine, for both machines were of the
free arm type."
205 F. Supp. at 417.
Finally, Gegauf assigned to Singer its application and all
rights in the invention claimed and to all United States patents
which might be granted under it for $90,000. The accompanying
agreement provided that (1) Singer would grant Gegauf a
nonexclusive royalty-free license to sell in the United States
sewing machines made in Gegauf's factory in Switzerland; (2) Singer
would not institute, without the consent of Gegauf, legal
proceedings asserting the patents when issued against Pfaff in
Germany or Vigorelli in Italy with respect to machines manufactured
in their home factories; and (3) Singer would not make a "slavish"
copy of Gegauf's Bernina machine.
F. The Gegauf patent issued on April 29, 1958, and Singer filed
two infringement suits against Brother, the largest domestic
importer of Japanese machines. It also sued two other distributors
of multi-cam machines, those actions terminating in consent
decrees. Finally, in January, 1959, eight months after the patent
was issued, Singer brought a proceeding before the United States
Tariff Commission under § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19
U.S.C.
Page 374 U. S. 188
§ 1337. It sought an order of the President of the United States
excluding all imported machines coming within the claims of the
Gegauf patent for the term of the patent, naming European as well
as Japanese infringers. Singer alleged that the tremendous volume
of imports from Japan of household sewing machines, other than
automatic zigzag, had eliminated all domestic manufacturers save
itself and one small straight stitch part-time concern. It further
alleged that the increasing volume of infringing imports similarly
threatened to result in the curtailment and ultimate cessation of
manufacturing operations in the United States in automatic zigzags,
with heavy loss of highly paid and skilled labor and large capital
investment. At the time of the filing, Singer alleged, foreign-made
machines, "primarily from Japan," were being imported to the extent
of 50% of the entire Singer sales of automatic zigzag machines in
this country; it represented that the automatic zigzag machine is
its most important product, and that it sells for a minimum price
of $300; that infringers from Japan sell at no firm price, the
average being $100 less than Singer's price, but often far below
that figure; and that the minimum price in Japan for export is $40
to $54.
During the hearing on its complaint, Singer was asked whether
Pfaff was licensed under the Gegauf patent. Singer replied in the
negative, but became skeptical, and, believing that it might "have
a better chance of prevailing before the Tariff Commission,"
decided to ask Gegauf to revise the agreement, which originally
excepted Pfaff and Vigorelli from enforcement proceedings, except
on consent of Gegauf. The latter agreed on condition that Phoenix,
a German manufacturer which was a party-defendant in the
proceedings, be substituted.
Upon commencement of this action by the United States, the
Commission stayed the proceedings, and they are now in abeyance
pending our disposition of this case.
Page 374 U. S. 189
II
First, it may be helpful to set out what is not involved in this
case. There is no claim by the Government that it is illegal for
one merely to acquire a patent in order to exclude his competitors;
or that the owner of a lawfully acquired patent cannot use the
patent laws to exclude all infringers of the patent; or that a
licensee cannot lawfully acquire the covering patent in order
better to enforce it on his own account, even when the patent
dominates an industry in which the licensee is the dominant firm.
Therefore, we put all these matters aside without discussion.
What is claimed here is that Singer engaged in a series of
transactions with Gegauf and Vigorelli for an illegal purpose,
i.e., to rid itself and Gegauf, together, perhaps, with
Vigorelli, of infringements by their common competitors, the
Japanese manufacturers. The Government claims that, in this
respect, there were an identity of purpose among the parties and
actions pursuant thereto that, in law, amount to a combination or
conspiracy violative of the Sherman Act. It claims that this can be
established under the findings of the District Court.
We note from the findings that the importation of Japanese
household multi-cam zigzag sewing machines first came to notice in
the United States in 1954 with the introduction of such a machine
by the Brother International Corporation. It incorporated the
mechanism of the Vigorelli zigzag and the Singer 401 machines. By
1959, importations of all Japanese household sewing machines
reached 1,100,000, while importations of European machines reached
only 100,000. Moreover, it appears that all but two domestic
manufacturers were put out of business in three to four years after
the Japanese machines first appeared. The two remaining domestic
manufacturers were Singer and a company not specializing in
sewing
Page 374 U. S. 190
machines, which manufactured only straight stitch machines on
order for a single domestic customer.
The trial court found that no mention was made of the Japanese
machines during the negotiations covering the Vigorelli
cross-licensing agreement with Singer. It first appeared during the
Gegauf licensing negotiations, where, at those meetings, Singer
used "protection against the Japanese" as "one of the strong
points" on the cross-licensing of the Gegauf and Harris patents and
applications. Here, though the trial court stated that the
"dominant and sole purpose of the license agreement was to settle
the conflict in priority," it specifically, in the next paragraph
of its opinion, found a "secondary" purpose,
i.e.,
protection against the Japanese machines which were infringing the
Gegauf patent. In this connection, it is most important to note
another finding of the trial court, namely, that this purpose to
exclude the Japanese "was the only one disclosed to Gegauf, and in
fact the very one used to convince Gegauf of the advisability of
entering into an agreement." 205 F. Supp. at 413. Under these
findings, it cannot be said that settlement of the conflict in
priority was the "dominant and sole purpose" of Singer. Indeed, the
two findings are in direct conflict. Furthermore, the fact that the
cross-license agreement provided that Singer and Gegauf would
facilitate the allowance to each other of claims "as broad as
possible" indicates a desire to secure as broad coverage for the
patent as possible, the more effectively to stifle competition, the
overwhelming percentage of which was Japanese. This effect was
accomplished, for when the Patent Office placed the Harris (Singer)
and Gegauf patents in interference, Singer abandoned the
proceeding, thus facilitating the issuance of broad claims to
Gegauf. [
Footnote 7]
Page 374 U. S. 191
We now come to the assignment of the Gegauf patent to Singer.
The trial court found: (1) that six days after the license
agreement was made with Gegauf, Singer proceeded to Italy, where a
conference was held with Vigorelli. At this meeting two events took
place that led to the later acquisition of the patent by Singer.
The first was Vigorelli's proposal that Singer, Gegauf, and himself
act "in concert against others" in enforcing the patent. This was
rejected by Singer's representatives, who said it was best for each
"to prosecute his own patents." At the same meeting, however,
Singer proposed to Vigorelli that it could prosecute the Gegauf
patent in the United States better than Gegauf and, after Vigorelli
agreed, solicited his help in getting Gegauf to agree to assign the
patent. (2) Vigorelli went to Gegauf "acting as Singer's agent,"
205 F. Supp. at 414, and convinced the latter sufficiently for him
to write Singer that he favored the idea of doing something
"against Japanese competition." (3) Singer replied to Gegauf by
letter that an arrangement could be reached "equally advantageous
to both." (4) Singer went to Europe, but was not able to agree on
Gegauf's terms, and thereafter, in September, 1957, wrote the
latter that "their mutual interests required that something be done
to protect themselves from the Japanese infringing machines." (5)
Gegauf replied that he would be happy to meet Singer to discuss
"mutual enforcement" of its United States application and the
Harris reissue. Then, (6) in the final conferences in Europe,
Gegauf told Singer that he had no objection "to making an agreement
with Singer in order to stop as far as possible Japanese
competitors in the United States market." Further, the trial court
found that Singer assured Gegauf that "Singer was insurance
Page 374 U. S. 192
against common competitors" and Gegauf's fears that, if Singer
stopped the Japanese infringements in the United States, they (the
Japanese) would go to Europe, where Gegauf was not in as good a
position to stop them, were unfounded because a greater risk was
run in Europe if Singer were not permitted to first stop
infringements in the United States. Finally, the court found that
(7) Singer was determined "to drive home the point" that Gegauf
stood to benefit more by enforcement of the patents in the United
States because the "Brother Pacesetter" machine, a big selling and
patent infringing Japanese-made machine, was in direct competition
with the Gegauf machine in the United States. As the trial court
put it, "[t]he point apparently reached home" -- Gegauf ultimately
assigned the patent for only $90,000, much less than its original
asking price and much less than Gegauf believed it would realize
annually from a license grant. Gegauf's beliefs as to the
inadequacy of the
monetary consideration were well
founded, since Singer received more than twice that amount in a
two-year period from the one license it granted under the Gegauf
patent. That license, incidentally, was to Sears, Roebuck &
Company, which imported machines from Europe.
III
As we have noted with reference to the cross-license agreement,
the trial court decided that
"[t]he undisputed facts support no conclusion other than that
the underlying, dominant and sole purpose of the license agreement
was to settle the conflict in priority between the Gegauf and
Harris patents. . . ."
We have rejected this conclusion on the trial court's own
finding in the next paragraph of the opinion that Singer's
"secondary" purpose, the only one disclosed to Gegauf, was its
"desire to obtain protection against the Japanese machines which
might be made under the Gegauf patent." Likewise, we reject,
Page 374 U. S. 193
as a question of law, the court's inference that the attitude of
suspicion, wariness and self-preservation of the parties negated a
conspiracy.
See United States v. Line Material Co.,
333 U. S. 287,
333 U. S. 297
(1948);
United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.
S. 265,
316 U. S.
280-281 (1942);
United States v. General Electric
Co., 80 F. Supp.
989, 997-998 (S.D.N.Y.1948).
The trial court held that the fact that Singer had a purpose,
which "Gegauf well knew," of enforcing the patent upon its
acquisition, that the enforcement "would most certainly include
Japanese manufacturers, who were the principal infringers," and
"that Gegauf shared with Singer a common concern over Japanese
competition" did not establish a conspiracy. 205 F. Supp. at 419.
Given the court's own findings and the clear import of the record,
it is apparent that its conclusions were predicated upon "an
erroneous interpretation of the standard to be applied. . . ."
Thus,
"[b]ecause of the nature of the District Court's error, we are
reviewing a question of law, namely, whether the District Court
applied the proper standard to essentially undisputed facts."
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U. S.
29,
362 U. S. 44
(1960). There, in a discussion of a like problem, we held that "the
inference of an agreement in violation of the Sherman Act" is not
"merely limited to particular fact complexes,"
ibid.,
citing
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U. S. 707
(1944), and
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co.,
257 U. S. 441
(1922). "Both cases," the Court continued, "teach that judicial
inquiry is not to stop with a search of the record for evidence of
purely contractual arrangements. . . ."
Ibid. Whether the
conspiracy was achieved by agreement, by tacit understanding, or by
"acquiescence . . . coupled with assistance in effectuating its
purpose is immaterial."
United States v. Bausch & Lomb,
supra, at
321 U. S. 723.
Here, the patent was put in Singer's hands to
Page 374 U. S. 194
achieve the common purpose of enforcement "equally advantageous
to both" Singer and Gegauf and to Vigorelli as well. [
Footnote 8] What Singer had refused
Vigorelli,
i.e., acting "in concert against others," was
thus achieved by the simple expedient of transferring the patent to
Singer.
Thus, by entwining itself with Gegauf and Vigorelli in such a
program, Singer went far beyond its claimed purpose of merely
protecting its own 401 machine -- it was protecting Gegauf and
Vigorelli, the sole licensees under the patent at the time, under
the same umbrella. This the Sherman Act will not permit. As the
Court held in
Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
256 U. S. 208,
256 U. S. 210
(1921), the conspiracy arises implicitly from the course of dealing
of the parties, here resulting in Singer's obligation to enforce
the patent to the benefit of all three parties. While there was no
contract so stipulating, the facts as found by the trial court
indicate a common purpose [
Footnote
9] to suppress the Japanese machine competition
Page 374 U. S. 195
in the United States through the use of the patent, which was
secured by Singer on the assurances to Gegauf and its co-licensee,
Vigorelli, that such would certainly be the result.
See Federal
Trade Comm'n v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., supra. Singer cannot,
of course, contend that it sought the assignment of the patent
merely to assure that it could produce and sell its machines, since
the preceding cross-license agreement had assured that right. The
fact that the enforcement plan likewise served Singer is of no
consequence, the controlling factor being the overall common
design,
i.e., to destroy the Japanese sale of infringing
machines in the United States by placing the patent in Singer's
hands the better to achieve this result. It is this concerted
action to restrain trade, clearly established by the course of
dealings, that condemns the transactions under the Sherman Act. As
we said in
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., supra,
362 U.S. at
362 U. S. 44,
"whether an unlawful combination or conspiracy is proved is to be
judged by what the parties actually did, rather than by the words
they used."
Moreover this overriding common design to exclude the Japanese
machines in the United States is clearly illustrated by Singer's
action before the United States Tariff Commission. Less than eight
months after the patent was issued, it started this effort to bar
infringers in one sweep. As an American corporation, it was the
sole company of the three that was able to bring such an
action.
Page 374 U. S. 196
When it appeared that the references to Pfaff in the assignment
agreement threatened the success of the Tariff Commission
proceeding, Gegauf consented to the deletion of Pfaff from the
agreement. This maneuver was for the purpose, as the trial court
found, of giving Singer "a better chance of prevailing before the
Tariff Commission" in its efforts to exclude infringing machines.
205 F. Supp. at 427. While the tariff application was leveled
against nine European, as well as the Japanese, competitors, the
allegations were clearly beamed at the infringing Japanese
machines, to which Singer attributed the destruction of all
American domestic household sewing machine companies save itself.
As the parties to the agreements and assignment well knew, and as
the trial court itself stated, "by far the largest number of
infringers of the Gegauf patent and invention were the Japanese."
205 F. Supp. at 418.
It is strongly urged upon us that application of the antitrust
laws in this case will have a significantly deleterious effect on
Singer's position as the sole remaining domestic producer of zigzag
sewing machines for household use, the market for which has been
increasingly preempted by foreign manufacturers. Whether economic
consequences of this character warrant relaxation of the scope of
enforcement of the antitrust laws, however, is a policy matter
committed to congressional or executive resolution. It is not
within the province of the courts, whose function is to apply the
existing law. It is well settled that, "[b]eyond the limited
monopoly which is granted, the arrangements by which the patent is
utilized are subject to the general law,"
United States v.
Masonite Corp., supra, 316 U.S. at
316 U. S. 277,
and it
"is equally well settled that the possession of a valid patent
or patents does not give the patentee any exemption from the
provisions of the Sherman Act beyond the limits of the patent
Page 374 U. S. 197
monopoly. By aggregating patents in one control, the holder of
the patents cannot escape the prohibitions of the Sherman Act."
United States v. Line Material Co., supra, at
333 U. S. 308.
That Act imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities in
which patent owners may lawfully engage,
see United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364
(1948);
United States v. Line Material Co., supra; United
States v. National Lead Co., 63 F.
Supp. 513,
aff'd, 332 U. S. 332 U.S.
319 (1947), and those limitations have been exceeded in this
case.
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is
remanded for the entry of an appropriate decree in accordance with
this opinion.
It is so ordered.
[
Footnote 1]
Whatever may have been the wisdom of the Expediting Act in
providing direct appeals in antitrust cases at the time of its
enactment in 1903, time has proven it unsatisfactory.
See,
e.g., Gesell, A Much Needed Reform -- Repeal the Expediting
Act for Antitrust Cases, in 1961 N.Y. State Bar Ann. Antitrust
L.Sym. 98 (CCH). Direct appeals not only place a great burden on
the Court, but also deprive us of the valuable assistance of the
Courts of Appeals.
[
Footnote 2]
"Unless we are able to come to some agreement with Vigorelli, we
will, of course, institute proceedings in Italy in due time,
seeking to invalidate such patent as Vigorelli has received, and we
will do the same thing in France and other countries in accordance
with the proper procedure in each country. This litigation will
undoubtedly result either in the cancelling of their patent and
patent applications, or, at any rate, severely limit the claims. On
the other hand, if we were to refrain from instituting such
proceedings, and if we were to withdraw the Brazilian opposition,
their applications might develop into rather broad patents which
would have a dominating position in the industry. We ourselves hold
some patents and have patent applications pending which would make
trouble for Vigorelli if we were engaged in litigation with them,
or which would greatly strengthen and broaden the patent situation
if our position and theirs could be pooled by some mutual
agreement."
Letter from M. C. Lightner, Singer President, to W. P. Evans of
Singer's Italian Corporation, September 12, 1955.
[
Footnote 3]
Memorandum from M. L. Waterman, Singer Vice President, to M. C.
Lightner, April 13, 1956.
[
Footnote 4]
M. L. Waterman, notes dictated at Milan, April 20, 1956.
[
Footnote 5]
Mr. Stanford testified that a Mr. Majnoni, patent attorney
present for Vigorelli, came over to him as the discussions (which
were in Italian and English, as some participants spoke only their
native tongue) were more or less over, and said that he would like
to speak in English. He asked "about the situation here in the
United States between Gegauf and the Harris patent. . . ." Stanford
replied
"that they would probably be locked in interference very
shortly; that Gegauf was ahead of us, and that I was very much
afraid that Gegauf was going to win the interference; that I was
sorry, because I felt that, if we had the claims and were able to
keep them in the Harris patent, we would be able to enforce them
better than could [Gegauf] if he had a patent. . . ."
Stanford told Majnoni that Singer had made no approaches to
Gegauf, because the price would "go sky high"; Majnoni said that he
knew Mr. Gegauf's attorney, had "frequent contacts with him," and
offered to approach him. Stanford said he "didn't think that would
do any good; that I thought that would be just as bad." Majnoni
replied that he would let him think it came directly from him. "I
think," he added, "it would be advantageous . . . if Singer owned
the claims. . . ." Stanford interpreted this to mean that Majnoni
thought it would be better for Vigorelli
"if Singer, who was a corporation in the United States, owned
the Gegauf patent, and they would rather have Singer own it than
have Gegauf, because they thought that we could enforce it better,
or were in a better position to enforce it."
[
Footnote 6]
This letter is substantially the same as the proposed letter
which Mr. Stanford sent Mr. Waterman for transmittal to Gegauf,
except that the quoted paragraph was phrased more directly in the
proposed letter:
"You are no doubt aware that, recently, the many Japanese sewing
machine manufacturers have brought out a large variety of
ornamental stitch machines which would appear to come within the
terms of claims which may be awarded in the United States with
respect of the above Gegauf and Singer patents. We have reason to
believe that all of the very many United States sewing machine
importers will wish to deal in such Japanese ornamental stitch
machines, and that patent suits against each of these importers may
be necessary if our respective patents are to be enforced."
"Your [
sic] may agree with us that, under the terms of
our present agreement, neither party is in a position effectively
to protect itself through patents in the United States with respect
to this threatened competition, particularly when the competing
machines are copies after both Bernina and Singer models."
[
Footnote 7]
Since we have concluded that the entire course of dealings
between the parties, including the cross-license agreement,
establishes a conspiracy or combination in violation of the Sherman
Act, we need not and do not pass on the Government's contention
that the cross-license agreement and the interference settlement
are illegal apart from the other circumstances present here. As to
this question,
see Note, 31 Geo.Wash.L.Rev. 643
(1963).
[
Footnote 8]
In addition, though the parties do not discuss the effect of the
final arrangement, it would permit both Gegauf and Vigorelli to
sell machines under the patent in the United States. The fact that
this might be consequential is indicated by the statistic that, in
1959, Europe furnished 16% of the machines sold in the United
States.
[
Footnote 9]
The trial court's findings, as we have noted, are inconsistent
in some respects. The court repeatedly described the role of the
parties' "mutual interests" in the achievement of an agreement to
assign the Gegauf patent to Singer. It also found that "Gegauf
shared with Singer a common concern over Japanese competition," 205
F. Supp. at 419, and that both parties knew that Singer wanted the
patent in order to enforce it against their common competitors, the
Japanese. Still, at one point, the court states that "their
dealings were characterized by an absence of unity or identity of
any common purpose or motive." 205 F. Supp. at 418. Insofar as that
conclusion derived from the court's application of an improper
standard to the facts, it may be corrected as a matter of law.
Insofar as the conclusion is based on "inferences drawn from
documents or undisputed facts, . . . Rule 52(a) of the Rules of
Civil Procedure is applicable."
United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364,
333 U. S. 394
(1948). The rule was there stated that
"[a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when, although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire
evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed."
Id. at
333 U. S. 395.
The evidence here, including many findings of the trial court,
clearly compels the conclusion that the parties' concerted
activities were motivated by a common purpose, and the court's
conclusion to the contrary must be regarded as clearly erroneous.
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra; see Pacific
Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d
541 (C.A.9th Cir. 1949).
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring.
There are two phases to the Government's case here: one, the
conspiracy to exclude the Japanese from the market, and the other,
the collusive termination of a Patent Office interference
proceeding pursuant to an agreement between Singer and Gegauf to
help one another to secure as broad a patent monopoly as possible,
invalidity considerations notwithstanding. The Court finds a
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act in the totality of Singer's
conduct, and intimates no views as to either phase of the
Government's case standing alone. Since, in my view, either branch
of the case is sufficient to warrant relief, I join the Court's
opinion, except for
footnote 1
with which I disagree.
As to the conspiracy to exclude the Japanese, there is involved,
as the Court points out, more than the transfer of the patent from
one competitor to another; implicit in the arrangement is Singer's
undertaking to enforce the patent on behalf of both itself and
Gegauf. Moreover, Singer was the dominant manufacturer in the
American sewing machine industry, and was acquiring a patent
Page 374 U. S. 198
which dominated the multi-cam field, an aspect of this case
which in itself raises serious questions, in my view, and which is
saved by the Court for future consideration.
See p.
374 U. S. 189,
supra.
More must be said about the interference settlement. In 1956,
Singer's "Harris" multi-cam zigzag reissue-patent application was
pending in the United States Patent Office; Gegauf had an
application pending at the same time covering substantially the
same subject matter, but enjoying a nine-day earlier priority date.
See 35 U.S.C. § 119. In the circumstances, it appeared to
Singer that, between Singer and Gegauf, Gegauf would have a better
claim to a patent on the multi-cam zigzag, at least on the broad
and thus more valuable claims. But it was by no means certain that
either of them would get the patent. In cases where several
applicants claim the same subject matter, the Patent Office
declares an "interference." This is an adversary proceeding between
the rival applicants, primarily for the purpose of determining
relative priority. But a party to an interference also can, by
drawing additional prior art to the attention of the Patent Office
which will require the Office to issue no patent at all to anyone,
see 37 CFR §§ 1.232, 1.237(a);
cf. 35 U.S.C. §§
101-102, prevent his rival from securing a patent which, if
granted, might exclude him from the manufacture of the subject
matter. 35 U.S.C. § 154. Gegauf, after Singer approached it to
negotiate an agreement before the Office declared an interference,
feared that Singer might, in self-defense, draw to the attention of
the Patent Office certain earlier patents the Office was unaware
of, and which might cause the Gegauf claims to be limited or
invalidated; Singer "let them know that we thought we could knock
out their claims, but that, in so doing, we were probably going to
hurt both of us."
The result was that, in April, 1956, Singer and Gegauf entered a
general cross-licensing agreement providing that
Page 374 U. S. 199
the parties were not to attack one another's patent applications
"directly or indirectly," not to do anything to restrict one
another's claims in patents or applications, and to facilitate the
allowance to one another of "claims as broad as possible." In
August, 1956, the Patent Office declared the anticipated
interference. Singer and Gegauf settled the interference pursuant
to their prior agreement: Singer withdrew its interfering claims
and, in April, 1957, the Patent Office dissolved the interference
proceeding before it had ever reached the litigation stage. 37 CFR
§ 1.262. Eventually, the Gegauf patent issued, and was sold to
Singer as part of the concerted action to exclude the Japanese
which is involved in the first branch of the case,
supra,
p.
374 U. S.
197.
In itself, the desire to secure broad claims in a patent may
well be unexceptionable -- when purely unilateral action is
involved. And the settlement of an interference in which the only
interests at stake are those of the adversaries, as in the case of
a dispute over relative priority only and where possible
invalidity, because of known prior art, is not involved, may well
be consistent with the general policy favoring settlement of
litigation. But the present case involves a less innocuous setting.
Singer and Gegauf agreed to settle an interference at least in part
to prevent an open fight over validity. There is a public interest
here,
see Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co.,
320 U. S. 661,
320 U.S. 665;
United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U. S. 265,
316 U. S. 278,
which the parties have subordinated to their private ends -- the
public interest in granting patent monopolies only when the
progress of the useful arts and of science will be furthered
because as the consideration for its grant the public is given a
novel and useful invention. U.S.Const., Art. I, § 8; 35 U.S.C. §
101; Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jac. I, c. 3. When there is no
novelty and the public parts with the monopoly grant for no return,
the public has been imposed upon,
Page 374 U. S. 200
and the patent clause subverted.
United States v. American
Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315,
128 U. S. 357,
128 U. S. 370;
see Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg. Co.,
329 U. S. 394,
329 U. S.
400-401;
Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U. S. 84,
314 U. S. 92;
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment
Corp., 340 U. S. 147,
340 U. S.
154-155 (concurring opinion). Whatever may be the duty
of a single party to draw the prior art to the Office's attention,
see 35 U.S.C. § 115; 37 CFR § 1.65(a);
Bell Telephone,
supra, at
128 U. S. 356,
clearly collusion among applicants to prevent prior art from coming
to or being drawn to the Office's attention is an inequitable
imposition on the Office and on the public.
Precision
Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co.,
324 U. S. 806;
see H.R.Rep.No.1983, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 4 (Rep. on
Act of October 15, 1962 Pub.L. 87-831, 76 Stat. 958). In my view,
such collusion to secure a monopoly grant runs afoul of the Sherman
Act's prohibitions against conspiracies in restraint of trade
* -- if not bad
per se, then such agreements are at least presumptively
bad.
Compare Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181, 191-192,
24 Eng.Rep. 347, 350-351. The patent laws do not authorize, and the
Sherman Act does not permit, such agreements between business
rivals to encroach upon the public domain and usurp it to
themselves.
Page 374 U. S. 201
* The Court has already held similar agreements contrary to
public policy and unenforceable. In the "patent estoppel" cases,
the Court found that public policy favors the exposure of invalid
patent monopolies before the courts in order to free the public
from their effects. Thus, a licensee may not be prevented from
attacking the validity of his licensor's patent.
Sola Elec. Co.
v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U. S. 173;
Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.
S. 249;
Katzinger Co. v. Chicago Metallic Mfg.
Co., 329 U. S. 394;
MacGregor v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.,
329 U. S. 402;
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.
S. 364,
333 U. S.
387-388.
It should be noted that the present agreement involved a
specific promise not to attack one another's patents directly or
indirectly, in addition to a promise to cooperate in interference
proceedings.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
Although the Court reverses this case on the ground that the
District Court proceeded on erroneous legal premises, I do not
believe its opinion can serve to obscure the fact that what the
majority has really done is overturn the lower court's findings of
fact.
A mere reading of the exhaustive opinion below will show that
the District Court in dismissing the Government's case did not, as
this Court now holds, fail to recognize that a concerted use by
Singer and Gegauf of their patents in pursuit of a common purpose
to thwart Japanese competition would violate the Sherman Act.
Rather, the District Court found that such a violation had not been
made out.
The basic predicate for this Court's attributing to the District
Court the following of an erroneous legal standard is the "direct
conflict" which the majority sees between the lower court's finding
that Singer's underlying "dominant and sole purpose" in entering
into the Gegauf license agreement "was to settle the conflict"
between the Harris and the Gegauf patents, and the finding that
Singer's "secondary" purpose was its desire to obtain "protection
against the Japanese machines" which might be made under the Gegauf
patent (
ante, p.
374 U. S.
190). This is indeed a slender reed for the Court's
position. For one is left at a loss to understand how the two
findings can be deemed inconsistent. Obviously Singer wanted to
settle the "priority" issue with Gegauf in order to have solid
patent protection against all comers -- particularly, of course,
the Japanese, whose ability to manufacture these popular machines
in a cheap labor market put them in the forefront of possible
infringers. Thus, it seems to me that the findings as to Singer's
"dominant" and "secondary" purposes are entirely consistent,
Page 374 U. S. 202
and that their supposed inconsistency can be made to rest on
nothing more substantial than a play on the word "sole" in the
basic finding. The further circumstance that it was only Singer's
"secondary" purpose that was disclosed to Gegauf goes not to the
question of "consistency," but rather to the sufficiency of the
lower court's ultimate finding that no illegal concert of action
had been shown between Singer and Gegauf.
Nor does anything to which the Court points in the Gegauf patent
assignment and Tariff Commission episodes (
ante, pp.
374 U. S.
191-196) lend support to this transparent effort to
ground reversal on a question of law so as to escape the necessity
of coming to grips with the only true issue in this case: are the
District Court's findings of fact -- which, if accepted, would put
an end to the Government's case -- "clearly erroneous"? Again, the
various bits and pieces which the Court has called from this
lengthy record go not to the consistency, but to the sufficiency of
the findings.
In my opinion, the District Court's findings are invulnerable to
attack under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The mere fact that one or more of the members of this Court might
have made opposite findings if sitting at
nisi prius does
not, of course, serve to justify reversal of a District Court's
findings under the "clearly erroneous" rule.
United States v.
Yellow Cab Co., 338 U. S. 338,
338 U. S.
341-342.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.