Claiming that he had twisted and strained his back while working
for respondent on its ship, a seaman sued respondent for damages
based on the negligence of respondent and the unseaworthiness of
the ship and for a smaller amount based on respondent's failure to
provide him with medical attention, maintenance and cure and wages.
He demanded a jury trial on all the claims. The trial judge granted
a jury trial on the Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims, but he
held the question of recovery under maintenance and cure in
abeyance to try himself after jury trial of the other issues. The
jury returned a verdict for respondent on the negligence and
unseaworthiness claims. After hearing testimony in addition to that
presented to the jury, the judge awarded the seaman a small amount
for maintenance and cure. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals
affirmed by a divided vote.
Held: a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones
Act claim must be submitted to the jury when both arise out of one
set of facts. In this case, the seaman is entitled to a jury trial
as of right on his maintenance and cure claim, even though the
Jones Act claim was decided against him and this Court declined to
review that claim on certiorari. Pp.
374 U. S.
16-22.
306 F.2d 461, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Andres San Martin, a seaman, brought this action in the District
Court for the Southern District of New York against the respondent
United States Lines Company.
Page 374 U. S. 17
His complaint alleged that he had twisted and strained his back
while working for respondent on its ship. He claimed $75,000
damages based on the negligence of respondent and on the
unseaworthiness of the ship and $10,000 based on respondent's
failure to provide him with medical attention, maintenance and
cure, and wages as required by law. [
Footnote 1] Martin's negligence claim invoked a remedy
created by Congress in § 33 of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688,
which explicitly provides that a seaman can have a jury trial as of
right; but the actions for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and
cure are traditional admiralty remedies which, in the absence of a
statute, do not ordinarily require trial by jury. The complainant
here did demand a jury, however, for all the issues growing out of
the single accident. The trial judge granted a jury trial for the
Jones Act and the unseaworthiness issues, but held the question of
recovery under maintenance and cure in abeyance to try himself
after jury trial of the other two issues. The jury returned a
verdict for United States Lines on the negligence and
unseaworthiness issues; the court then, after hearing testimony in
addition to that presented to the jury, awarded Martin $224 for
maintenance and cure. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, four judges stating that it would be
improper to submit a maintenance and cure claim to the jury, two
believing it to be permissible but not required, and three
maintaining that a seaman is entitled, as of right, to a jury trial
of a maintenance and cure claim joined with a Jones Act claim. 306
F.2d 461. The lower courts are at odds on this issue. [
Footnote 2] We granted certiorari to
decide it. [
Footnote 3] 371
U.S. 932
Page 374 U. S. 18
.
For years, it has been a common, although not uniform, [
Footnote 4] practice of District Courts
to grant jury trials to plaintiffs who join in one complaint their
Jones Act, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure claims when
all the claims, as here, grow out of a single transaction or
accident. [
Footnote 5] This
practice of requiring issues arising out of a single accident to be
tried by a single tribunal is by no means surprising. Although
remedies for negligence, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure
have different origins, and may on occasion call for application of
slightly different principles and procedures, they nevertheless,
when based on one unitary set of circumstances, serve the same
purpose of indemnifying a seaman for damages caused by injury,
depend in large part upon the same evidence, and involve some
identical elements of recovery. Requiring a seaman
Page 374 U. S. 19
to split up his lawsuit, submitting part of it to a jury and
part to a judge, unduly complicates and confuses a trial, creates
difficulties in applying doctrines of
res judicata and
collateral estoppel, and can easily result in too much or too
little recovery. [
Footnote 6]
The problems are particularly acute in determining the amount of
damages. For example, all lost earnings and medical expenses are
recoverable on a negligence count, but, under the Jones Act, they
are subject to reduction by the jury if the seaman has been
contributorily negligent. These same items are recoverable in part
on the maintenance and cure count, but the damages are measured by
different standards [
Footnote
7] and are not subject to reduction for any contributory
negligence. It is extremely difficult for a judge, in trying a
maintenance and cure claim, to ascertain, even with the use of
special interrogatories, exactly what went into the damages awarded
by a jury -- how loss of earning power was calculated, how much was
allowed for medical expenses and pain and suffering, how much was
allowed for actual lost wages, and how much, if any, each of the
recoveries was reduced by contributory negligence. This raises
needless problems of who has the burden of proving
Page 374 U. S. 20
exactly what the jury did. [
Footnote 8] And even if the judge can find out what
elements of damage the jury's verdict actually represented, he must
still try to solve the puzzling problem of the bearing the jury's
verdict should have on recovery under the different standards of
the maintenance and cure claim. In the absence of some statutory or
constitutional obstacle, an end should be put to such an
unfortunate, outdated, and wasteful manner of trying these cases.
[
Footnote 9] Fortunately, there
is no such obstacle.
While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not
require jury trials in admiralty cases, [
Footnote 10] neither that Amendment nor any other
provision of the Constitution forbids them. [
Footnote 11] Nor does any statute of Congress or
Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, forbid jury trials in
maritime cases. Article III of the Constitution vested in the
federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases, and,
since that time, the Congress has largely left to this Court the
responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty
law. This Court has long recognized its power and responsibility in
this area, and has exercised that power where necessary to
Page 374 U. S. 21
do so. [
Footnote 12]
Where, as here, a particular mode of trial being used by many
judges is so cumbersome, confusing, and time consuming that it
places completely unnecessary obstacles in the paths of litigants
seeking justice in our courts, we should not and do not hesitate to
take action to correct the situation. Only one trier of fact should
be used for the trial of what is essentially one lawsuit to settle
one claim split conceptually into separate parts because of
historical developments. And since Congress, in the Jones Act, has
declared that the negligence part of the claim shall be tried by a
jury, we would not be free, even if we wished, to require
submission of all the claims to the judge alone. Therefore, the
jury, a time-honored institution in our jurisprudence, is the only
tribunal competent under the present congressional enactment to try
all the claims. Accordingly, we hold that a maintenance and cure
claim joined with a Jones Act claim must be submitted to the jury
when both arise out of one set of facts. The seaman in this case
was therefore entitled to a jury trial as of right on his
maintenance and cure claim.
Judgment against the seaman on the Jones Act claim was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and we declined to review it on
certiorari. The shipowner points out that, on remand, the
maintenance and cure claim would no longer be joined with a Jones
Act claim, and therefore, he argues, could be tried by a judge
without a jury. We cannot agree. Our holding is that it was error
to deprive
Page 374 U. S. 22
the seaman of the jury trial he demanded, and he is entitled to
relief from this error by having the kind of trial he would have
had in the absence of error.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
Martin died while his appeal was pending, and a public
administrator was substituted for him.
[
Footnote 2]
See notes
4 and |
4 and S. 16fn5|>5,
infra.
[
Footnote 3]
Because of our limited grant of certiorari, we do not consider
petitioner's argument that the complaint and trial record show
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and that, therefore,
plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial.
See Atlantic & Gulf
Stevedores, Inc., v. Ellerman Lines, 369 U.
S. 355,
369 U. S. 360
(1962). Nor do we find it necessary to reach petitioner's argument
that we should reconsider that part of the holding of
Romero v.
International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.
S. 354 (1959), which concluded that claims based upon
general maritime law cannot be brought in federal courts under the
federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., Jesonis v. Oliver J. Olson & Co., 238
F.2d 307 (C.A.9th Cir. 1956);
Stenduze v. The Boat Neptune,
Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 801 (D.C.Mass.1955);
cf. Jordine v. Walling, 185
F.2d 662 (C.A.3d Cir. 1950).
[
Footnote 5]
See, e.g., Nolan v. General Seafoods Corp., 112 F.2d
515 (C.A.1st Cir. 1940);
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Grubaugh,
128 F.2d 387,
modified on rehearing, 130 F.2d 25 (C.A.5th
Cir. 1942);
Bay State Dredging & Contracting Co. v.
Porter, 153 F.2d 827 (C.A.1st Cir. 1946);
Gonzales v.
United Fruit Co., 193 F.2d 479 (C.A.2d Cir. 1951);
Rosenquist v. Isthmian S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 486 (C.A.2d Cir.
1953);
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 265 F.2d 426
(C.A.1st Cir. 1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 362 U. S. 362 U.S.
539 (1960);
McDonald v. Cape Code Trawling
Corp., 71 F. Supp.
888, 891 (D.C.Mass.1947); Gilmore and Black, The Law of
Admiralty (1957) 262.
[
Footnote 6]
For an illuminating discussion of the practical problems, see
Jenkins v. Roderick,
156 F.
Supp. 299, 304-306 (D.C.Mass.1957) (Wyzanski, J.).
This Court has held that recovery of maintenance and cure does
not bar a subsequent action under the Jones Act,
Pacific S.S.
Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S. 130
(1928), but, of course, where such closely related claims are
submitted to different triers of fact, questions of
res
judicata and collateral estoppel necessarily arise,
particularly in connection with efforts to avoid duplication of
damages.
[
Footnote 7]
Maintenance and cure allows recovery for wages only to the end
of the voyage on which a seaman is injured or becomes ill.
The
Osceola, 189 U. S. 158,
189 U. S. 175
(1903). Medical expenses need not be provided beyond the point at
which a seaman becomes incurable.
Farrell v. United
States, 336 U. S. 511
(1949).
[
Footnote 8]
See, e.g., Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 279
F.2d 911, 915-916 (C.A.2d Cir. 1960);
Stendze v. The Boat
Neptune, Inc., 135 F.
Supp. 801 (D.C.Mass.1955). For another example of some of the
difficulties involved in separate trials,
compare Claudio v.
Sinclair Ref. Co., 160 F. Supp. 3 (D.C.E.D.N.Y.1958),
with
Lazarowitz v. American Export Lines, 87 F. Supp. 197
(D.C.E.D.Pa.1949).
[
Footnote 9]
See generally Currie, The Silver Oar and All That: A
Study of the
Romero Case, 27 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 1 (1959);
Kurland, The
Romero Case and Some Problems of Federal
Jurisdiction, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 817, 850 (1960); Note, 73 Harv.L.Rev.
138 (1959).
[
Footnote 10]
Waring v.
Clarke, 5 How. 441 (1847).
[
Footnote 11]
The Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh, 12 How. 443,
53 U. S.
459-460 (Dec. Term, 1851) (upholding constitutionality
of jury trial provision in Great Lakes Act).
[
Footnote 12]
See, e.g., The John G. Stevens, 170 U.
S. 113 (1898);
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania
Colombiana Del Caribe, S.A., 339 U. S. 684,
339 U. S.
690-691 (1950);
Warren v. United States,
340 U. S. 523,
340 U. S. 527
(1951);
Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.,
348 U. S. 310,
348 U. S. 314
(1955);
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U. S. 354,
358 U. S.
360-361 (1959);
The Tungus v. Skovgaard,
358 U. S. 588,
358 U. S. 597,
358 U. S. 611
(1959) (opinion of BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part);
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.
S. 539 (1960).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
I am wholly in sympathy with the result reached by the Court. It
is, I believe, a result that is consistent with sound judicial
administration and that will greatly simplify the conduct of suits
in which a claim for maintenance and cure is joined with a Jones
Act claim arising out of the same set of facts.
But the rule that the Court announces is, in my view, entirely
procedural in character, and the manner in which such rules must be
promulgated has been specified by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 2073.
This statute provides that rules of procedure in admiralty
"shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress
by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session
thereof . . . and until the expiration of ninety days after they
have been thus reported."
Believing that we are governed by this provision, and that the
method there prescribed for the declaration of procedural rules,
which are to be applicable in all Federal District Courts, is
exclusive, I am unable to subscribe to the opinion of the Court.
* I think the
appropriate way to achieve what in this instance is obviously a
desirable procedural reform is to deal with the matter through the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
Cf. Miner v.
Atlass, 363 U. S. 641.
Meanwhile, substantially for the reasons given in Judge Friendly's
opinion, I consider that the judgment below must be affirmed.
* The course taken by the Court is not, in my view, supported by
any of the cases cited in
note
12 of the Court's opinion None of them involved a procedural
rule.