An employee brought suit in a state court against his employer,
seeking damages for breach of a collective bargaining contract
between his union and the employer. He alleged that the employer
had violated a clause in the contract prohibiting discrimination
against any employee because of his membership or activity in the
union. It was conceded that such conduct would constitute an unfair
labor practice prohibited by § 8 of the National Labor Relations
Act.
Held: the suit could be maintained by an individual
employee, and the state court's jurisdiction was not preempted
under the rule of
San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236. Pp.
371 U. S.
195-201.
362 Mich. 350,
106 N.W.2d
785, reversed.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioner is a building maintenance employee of respondent
Evening News Association, a newspaper publisher engaged in
interstate commerce, and is a member of the Newspaper Guild of
Detroit, a labor organization having a collective bargaining
contract with respondent. Petitioner, individually and as assignee
of 49 other similar employees who were also Guild members, sued
respondent for breach of contract in the Circuit Court of
Page 371 U. S. 196
Wayne County, Michigan. [
Footnote 1] The complaint stated that, in December, 1955,
and January, 1956, other employees of respondent, belonging to
another union, were on strike, and respondent did not permit
petitioner and his assignors to report to their regular shifts,
although they were ready, able and available for work. [
Footnote 2] During the same period,
however, employees of the editorial, advertising and business
departments, not covered by collective bargaining agreements, were
permitted to report for work and were paid full wages even though
there was no work available. Respondent's refusal to pay full wages
to petitioner and his assignors while paying the nonunion
employees, the complaint asserted, violated a clause in the
contract providing that "there shall be no discrimination against
any employee because of his membership or activity in the
Guild."
The trial court sustained respondent's motion to dismiss for
want of jurisdiction on the ground that the allegations, if true,
would make out an unfair labor practice under the National Labor
Relations Act, and hence the subject matter was within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The
Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, 362 Mich. 350,
106 N.W.2d
785, relying upon
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, and
like preemption cases. [
Footnote
3] Certiorari was granted, 369 U.S. 827, after the decisions of
this Court in
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U. S. 95, and
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.
S. 502.
Page 371 U. S. 197
Lucas Flour and
Dowd Box, as well as the later
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.
S. 238, were suits upon collective bargaining contracts
brought or held to arise under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, [
Footnote 4]
and, in these cases, the jurisdiction of the courts was sustained
although it was seriously urged that the conduct involved was
arguably protected or prohibited by the National Labor Relations
Act and therefore within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Board. In
Lucas Flour as well as in
Atkinson, the Court expressly refused to apply the
preemption doctrine of the
Garmon case, and we likewise
reject that doctrine here, where the alleged conduct of the
employer, not only arguably, but concededly, is an unfair labor
practice within the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board. [
Footnote 5] The
authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which
also violates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by
§ 301, but it is not exclusive, and does not destroy the
jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301. If, as respondent
strongly urges, there are situations in which serious problems will
arise from both the courts and the Board having jurisdiction over
acts
Page 371 U. S. 198
which amount to an unfair labor practice, we shall face those
cases when they arise. This is not one of them, in our view, and
the National Labor Relations Board is in accord. [
Footnote 6]
We are left with respondent's claim that the predicate for
escaping the
Garmon rule is not present here, because this
action by an employee to collect wages in the form of damages is
not among those "suits for violation of contracts between an
employer and a labor organization . . . ," as provided in § 301.
There is support for respondent's position in decisions of the
Courts of Appeals, [
Footnote 7]
and, in
Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v.
Westinghouse Corp., 348 U. S. 437, a
majority of the Court, in three separate opinions, concluded that §
301 did not give the federal courts jurisdiction over a suit
brought by a union to enforce employee rights which were variously
characterized as "peculiar in the individual benefit which is their
subject matter", "uniquely personal" and arising "from separate
hiring contracts between the employer and each employee."
Id. at
348 U. S.
460-461,
348 U. S.
464.
Page 371 U. S. 199
However, subsequent decisions here have removed the
underpinnings of
Westinghouse, and its holding is no
longer authoritative as a precedent. Three of the Justices in that
case were driven to their conclusion because, in their view, § 301
was procedural only, not substantive, and therefore grave
constitutional questions would be raised if § 301 was held to
extend to the controversy there involved. [
Footnote 8] However, the same three Justices observed
that if, contrary to their belief,
"Congress has itself defined the law or authorized the federal
courts to fashion the judicial rules governing this question, it
would be self-defeating to limit the scope of the power of the
federal courts to less than is necessary to accomplish this
congressional aim."
Id. at
348 U. S. 442.
Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.
S. 448, of course, has long since settled that § 301 has
substantive content, and that Congress has directed the courts to
formulate and apply federal law to suits for violation of
collective bargaining contracts. There is no constitutional
difficulty, and § 301 is not to be given a narrow reading.
Id. at
348 U. S. 456,
348 U. S. 457.
Section 301 has been applied to suits to compel arbitration of such
individual grievances as rates of pay, hours of work and wrongful
discharge,
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,
supra; General Electric Co. v. Local 205, 353 U.
S. 547; to obtain specific enforcement of an
arbitrator's award ordering reinstatement and back pay to
individual employees,
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593; to
recover wage increases in a contest over the validity of the
collective bargaining contract,
Charles Dowd Box Co. v.
Courtney, supra; and to suits against individual union members
for violation of a
Page 371 U. S. 200
no-strike clause contained in a collective bargaining agreement.
Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., supra.
The concept that all suits to vindicate individual employee
rights arising from a collective bargaining contract should be
excluded from the coverage of § 301 has thus not survived. The
rights of individual employees concerning rates of pay and
conditions of employment are a major focus of the negotiation and
administration of collective bargaining contracts. Individual
claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery,
are to a large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests,
and many times precipitate grave questions concerning the
interpretation and enforceability of the collective bargaining
contract on which they are based. To exclude these claims from the
ambit of § 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having
the administration of collective bargaining contracts accomplished
under a uniform body of federal substantive law. This we are
unwilling to do.
The same considerations foreclose respondent's reading of § 301
to exclude all suits brought by employees instead of unions. The
word "between," it suggests, refers to "suits," not "contracts,"
and therefore only suits between unions and employers are within
the purview of § 301. According to this view, suits by employees
for breach of a collective bargaining contract would not arise
under § 301, and would be governed by state law, if not preempted
by
Garmon, as this one would be, whereas a suit by a union
for the same breach of the same contract would be a § 301 suit
ruled by federal law. Neither the language and structure of § 301
nor its legislative history requires or persuasively supports this
restrictive interpretation, which would frustrate, rather than
serve, the congressional policy expressed in that section.
"The possibility that individual contract terms might have
different meanings
Page 371 U. S. 201
under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive
influence upon both the negotiation and administration of
collective agreements."
Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., supra, at
369 U. S.
103.
We conclude that petitioner's action arises under § 301, and is
not preempted under the
Garmon rule. [
Footnote 9] The judgment of the Supreme Court of
Michigan is reversed, and the cause remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
[
Footnote 1]
There was no grievance arbitration procedure in this contract
which had to be exhausted before recourse could be had to the
courts.
Compare Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
370 U. S. 238;
Drake Bakeries Inc. v. Local 50, American Bakery Workers,
370 U. S. 254.
[
Footnote 2]
A small number of these employees were permitted to do some work
during the strike.
[
Footnote 3]
Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.
S. 485;
Weber v. Anheuser Busch, 348 U.
S. 468.
[
Footnote 4]
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties."
Labor Management Relations Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. §
185(a).
[
Footnote 5]
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization. . . ."
National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).
An unfair labor practice charge could have been filed under § 10,
but that remedy was not pursued, and the present proceeding was
commenced after the six-month limitation period prescribed in §
10(b) had expired.
[
Footnote 6]
The view of the National Labor Relations Board, made known to
this Court in an
amicus curiae brief filed by the
Solicitor General, is that ousting the courts of jurisdiction under
§ 301 in this case would not only fail to promote, but would
actually obstruct, the purposes of the Labor Management Relations
Act.
The Board has, on prior occasions, declined to exercise its
jurisdiction to deal with unfair labor practices in circumstances
where, in its judgment, federal labor policy would best be served
by leaving the parties to other processes of the law.
See,
e.g., Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 694;
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080.
[
Footnote 7]
E.g., Local Lodge 2040, I.A.M. v. Servel, Inc., 268
F.2d 692 (C.A.7th Cir.);
Copra v. Suro, 236 F.2d 107
(C.A.1st Cir.);
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor
Co., 194 F.2d 997 (C.A.7th Cir.).
See also Dimeco v.
Fisher, 185 F.
Supp. 213 (D.N.J.) and cases cited therein.
[
Footnote 8]
Two other Justices, in a separate opinion, concluded that, under
§ 301, a union as a party plaintiff may not enforce the wage claims
of individual employees.
[
Footnote 9]
The only part of the collective bargaining contract set out in
this record is the no-discrimination clause. Respondent does not
argue here, and we need not consider, the question of federal law
of whether petitioner, under this contract, has standing to sue for
breach of the no-discrimination clause, nor do we deal with the
standing of other employees to sue upon other clauses in other
contracts.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.
I would affirm the Michigan Supreme Court's holding that
Michigan courts are without jurisdiction to entertain suits by
employees against their employers for damages measured by "back
pay" based on discrimination, which discrimination § 8(a) of the
National Labor Relations Act makes an unfair labor practice and
which § 10(b) and (c) subject to the jurisdiction of the Labor
Board with power after hearings to award "back pay." It is true
that there have been expressions in recent cases which indicate
that a suit for the violation of a collective bargaining contract
may be brought in a state or federal court even though the conduct
objected to was also arguably an unfair labor practice within the
Labor Board's jurisdiction. [
Footnote
2/1] It seems clear to me that these expressions of
Page 371 U. S. 202
opinion were not necessary to the decisions in those cases,
[
Footnote 2/2] and that neither
these prior decisions nor § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act requires us to hold that either employers or unions can be made
to defend themselves against governmental regulation and sanctions
of the same type for the same conduct by both courts and the Labor
Board. Such duplication of governmental supervision over industrial
relationships is bound to create the same undesirable confusion,
conflicts, and burdensome proceedings that the National Labor
Relations Act was designed to prevent, as we have interpreted that
Act in prior cases like
San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U. S. 236
(1959).
One example is enough to show how Congress' policy of confining
controversies over unfair labor practices to the Labor Board might
well be frustrated by permitting unfair labor practice claimants to
choose whether they will seek relief in the courts or before the
Board. Section 10(b) of the Act provides that
"no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice
occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board. . . ."
In contrast, the statute of limitations in Michigan governing
breach of contract suits like this is six years. [
Footnote 2/3] The Court's holding thus opens up a
way to
Page 371 U. S. 203
defeat the congressional plan, adopted over vigorous minority
objection, to expedite industrial peace by requiring that both the
complaining party and the Board act promptly in the initiation of
unfair labor practice proceedings. [
Footnote 2/4] Instead, by permitting suits like this one
to be filed, it is now not only possible but highly probable that
unfair labor practice disputes will hang on like festering sores
that grow worse and worse with the years. [
Footnote 2/5] Of course, this Court could later, by
another major statutory surgical operation, apply the six-months
Labor Board statute of limitations to actions for breach of
collective bargaining contracts under § 301. But if such drastic
changes are to be wrought in the Act that Congress passed, it seems
important to me that this Court should wait for Congress to perform
that operation.
There is another reason why I cannot agree with the Court's
disposition of this case. In the last note on the last page of its
opinion, the Court says:
"The only part of the collective bargaining contract set out in
this record is the no-discrimination clause. Respondent does not
argue here and we need not consider the question of federal law of
whether petitioner, under this contract, has standing to sue for
breach of the no-discrimination clause nor do we deal with the
standing of other employees to sue upon other clauses in other
contracts. "
Page 371 U. S. 204
Unless my reading of this note is wrong, the Court purports to
reserve the question of whether an employee who has suffered the
kind of damages here alleged arising from breach of a collective
bargaining agreement can file a lawsuit for himself under § 301.
Earlier in its opinion, the Court decides that a claim for
individual wages or back pay is within the subject matter
jurisdiction of courts under § 301 -- that is, that such a claim is
of the type that the courts are empowered to determine. The Court
then rejects respondent's argument that an individual employee can
never under any circumstances bring a § 301 suit. But it seems to
me that the Court studiously refrains from saying when, for what
kinds of breach, or under what circumstances an individual employee
can bring a § 301 action and when he must step aside for the union
to prosecute his claim. Nor does the Court decide whether the suit
brought in this case is one of the types which an individual can
bring. This puzzles me. This Court usually refrains from deciding
important questions of federal law such as are involved in this
case without first satisfying itself that the party raising those
questions is entitled (has standing) to prosecute the case. It
seems to me to be at least a slight deviation from the Court's
normal practice to determine the law that would be applicable in a
particular lawsuit while leaving open the question of whether such
a lawsuit has even been brought in the particular case the court is
deciding. This Court has not heretofore thought itself authorized
to render advisory opinions. Moreover, I am wholly unable to agree
that the right of these individuals to bring this lawsuit under §
301 was not argued here.
Finally, since the Court is deciding that this type of action
can be brought to vindicate workers' rights, I think it should also
decide clearly and unequivocally whether an employee injured by the
discrimination of either his employer or his union can file and
prosecute his
Page 371 U. S. 205
own lawsuit in his own way. I cannot believe that Congress
intended by the National Labor Relations Act, either as originally
passed or as amended by § 301, to take away rights to sue which
individuals have freely exercised in this country at least since
the concept of due process of law became recognized as a guiding
principle in our jurisprudence. And surely the Labor Act was not
intended to relegate workers with lawsuits to the status of words
either of companies or of unions.
[
Footnote 2/1]
Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co., 370 U.
S. 238,
370 U. S. 245,
n. 5 (1962);
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S. 101,
n. 9 (1962);
Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U. S. 502,
368 U. S. 513
(1962).
[
Footnote 2/2]
Atkinson v. Sinclair Rfg. Co., supra, 371
U.S. 195fn2/1|>note 1, involved a strike by union members
over pay claims, in violation of an agreement to arbitrate
grievances.
Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,
supra, 371
U.S. 195fn2/1|>note 1, concerned a strike by the union over
the discharge of an employee, in violation of an agreement to
arbitrate such disputes.
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, supra,
371
U.S. 195fn2/1|>note 1, was an action by union officers
against a company for failure to put into effect pay increases and
vacation benefits provided in a collective bargaining agreement. In
my view, none of the activities in any of these cases were even
arguably unfair labor practices subject to the Labor Board's
jurisdiction, and the Court did not suggest that they were.
[
Footnote 2/3]
Mich.Comp.Laws, 1948, § 609.13.
[
Footnote 2/4]
Compare H.R.Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 40
(1947) (majority view),
with id. at 90 (minority
view).
[
Footnote 2/5]
The Government suggests that these years be further extended by
requiring that, when cases are brought in a court, questions within
the Labor Board's competence shall be referred to the Board.
Dividing into two what should be a single proceeding will result in
a shuttling operation which prior experience shows might not be
settled for a decade.
See, e.g., the protracted litigation
which was finally concluded in
El Dorado Oil Works v. United
States, 328 U. S. 12
(1946).