1. In this suit under the Jones Act based on unseaworthiness and
negligence, seeking damages for personal injuries sustained by a
seaman who fell as he went to his post in the crow's nest,
Held: it was error for the Court of Appeals to order a
new trial on the ground that a jury could not determine, in the
absence of supporting testimony by an expert in naval architecture,
a claim that the shipowner had failed to equip the ship with
necessary and feasible safety devices to prevent such a mishap. Pp.
370 U. S.
31-37.
2. The evidence in this record provides no support for the trial
court's award to the seaman of future maintenance for three years.
Pp.
370 U. S.
37-38.
293 F.2d 121 affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The first question to be decided the seaman's personal injury
suit for damages on the grounds of unseaworthiness and negligence
under the Jones Act [
Footnote
1] is whether the jury should have been allowed to determine,
in the absence of supporting testimony by an expert in naval
architecture, a claim that the shipowner failed to equip his ship
with necessary and feasible safety devices to prevent the mishap
which befell the seaman.
The trial judge submitted for the jury's determination various
bases of respondent's alleged liability, including
Page 370 U. S. 32
the claim resting on the failure to provide certain safety
devices. Because the jury returned a general verdict for the
seaman, it cannot be said what basis of liability the jury found to
exist. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Judge Smith
dissenting, reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that, in
the absence of expert evidence, it was error to have allowed the
jury to consider the failure to provide safety devices. 293 F.2d
121, 123-124. Since the question whether supporting expert
testimony is needed is important in litigation of this type, we
granted certiorari. 368 U.S. 811. We hold that the Court of Appeals
erred.
Petitioner was a lookout on the S.S. United States. He was
injured as he moved from a ladder to a platform leading to his post
in the crow's nest. The crow's nest was housed in a "bubble" half
way up a hollow aluminum radar tower which rose 65 feet from the
bridge deck. The ladder extended the full height of the tower along
the inside of its after side. At various levels inside the tower
were horizontal platforms, at the after ends of which were access
openings slightly larger than manholes, through which the ladder
passed straight up. The tower was more than six feet from fore to
aft at the crow's nest level, and tapered from four to three feet
in width. There was only a narrow ledge around three-quarters of
the opening in the platform at that level; the platform proper was
toward the bow, and led to the door in the crow's nest. As a seaman
climbed the ladder to the crow's nest, he faced astern until his
feet were approximately level with the platform. To get from the
ladder to the platform proper, he had to pivot, putting one foot on
the starboard or port ledge, follow it with the other foot,
complete his pivot and step forward along the ledge to the platform
proper. Although the respondent describes the crow's nest and its
approach as "purposely constructed
Page 370 U. S. 33
so as to provide maximum protection and safety for members of
the crew having to use it," there were no devices intended to
facilitate safe maneuvering from ladder to platform; for support
during this maneuver, the seaman could grasp one of the thin
vertical beams located at intervals along the port and starboard
sides, or a vertical, bulky rectangular pipe enclosing a radar
cable and near the starboard side, or a horizontal stiffener or
ledging that ran at shoulder-height around the tower. Respondent
argues that the seaman also could simply spread his arms to brace
himself against the sides of the tower.
On the night of February 15-16, 1958, as the United States went
at high speed and rolled in rough seas, the tower was plunged into
darkness, just as the petitioner was executing the movement to the
crow's nest platform from the ladder. Illumination within the tower
was provided by five electric lights at various levels, but these
burned out frequently. Two had been out for a long period, and two
others had gone out a few hours before the accident, leaving as the
only light that which was at the crow's nest platform. At some
point after petitioner had begun the maneuver from ladder to
platform, but before he reached a place on the platform proper and
away from the access opening, that last light went out. An instant
later petitioner fell backwards across the opening and struck his
head against the ladder and his lower back against the fore edge of
the opening, leaving his body suspended in the opening. He grasped
the ladder rungs and called for help from the lookout on duty in
the crow's nest. With the lookout's aid, he was able to seat
himself on the starboard ledge with his legs hanging down through
the opening and his right arm around the cable pipe. The lookout
returned to the crow's nest to phone the bridge for help. In his
absence, the petitioner became dizzy and fell through the opening
to a place eight feet below the platform.
Page 370 U. S. 34
The only issue before us on this phase of the case is whether
the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they might find
the respondent liable for unseaworthiness or negligence for having
failed to provide "railings or other safety devices" at the crow's
nest platform. The Court of Appeals held that it was error to
submit that question to the jury because
"[t]here was no expert testimony that proper marine architecture
required the additional provision of railings or other safety
devices on such a ladder or platform enclosed within a tower
leading to a crow's nest. Should the jury, under these conditions,
have been permitted to decide whether proper marine architecture
required railings or other safety devices? In two recent cases,
this court has held that a jury should not be permitted to
speculate on such matters in the absence of expert evidence.
[
Footnote 2]"
293 F.2d at 123. There was evidence in the form of testimony and
photographs, from which the jury might clearly see the construction
at the
Page 370 U. S. 35
crow's nest level which we have described. If the holding of the
Court of Appeals is only that, in this case, there are peculiar
fact circumstances which made it impossible for a jury to decide
intelligently, we are not told what those circumstances are, and
our examination of the record discloses none. [
Footnote 3] If the holding is that claims which
might be said to touch upon naval architecture can never succeed
without expert evidence, neither the Court of Appeals nor the
respondent refers us to authority or reason for any such broad
proposition.
This is not one of the rare causes of action in which the law
predicates recovery upon expert testimony.
See Wigmore,
Evidence (3d ed. 1940), §§ 2090, 2090a. Rather, the general rule is
as stated by Mr. Justice Van Devanter, when circuit judge, that
expert testimony not only is unnecessary, but indeed may properly
be excluded in the discretion of the trial judge
"if all the primary facts can be accurately and intelligibly
described to the jury, and if they, as men of common understanding,
are as capable of comprehending the primary facts and of drawing
correct conclusions from them as are witnesses possessed of special
or peculiar training, experience, or observation in respect of the
subject under investigation. . . ."
United States Smelting Co. v. Parry, 166 F. 407, 411,
415. Furthermore, the trial judge has broad discretion in the
matter of the admission or exclusion of expert evidence, and his
action is to be sustained unless manifestly erroneous.
Spring
Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. 645,
99 U. S.
658.
This Court has held, in a factual context similar to this, that
there was no error, let alone manifest error, in having a jury
decide without the aid of experts.
Spokane & Inland Empire
R. Co. v. United States, 241 U. S. 344,
Page 370 U. S. 36
was an action by the United States to recover penalties for
violation of the Safety Appliance Act provision requiring handholds
or grab-irons to be placed on the ends of railroad cars used in
interstate commerce. [
Footnote
4] The defendant railroad offered expert testimony to establish
that the substitutes provided on its cars would accomplish the
statute's purposes. The jury had inspected the cars, and the expert
evidence was excluded when the United States objected that this
"was a matter of common knowledge." We held that
"the court was clearly right in holding that the question was
not one for experts, and that the jury, after hearing the testimony
and inspecting the [cars] were competent to determine the issue. .
. ."
241 U.S. at
241 U. S. 351.
[
Footnote 5]
In sum, we agree with Judge Smith in dissent below:
"There was before the jury sufficient evidence, both from oral
testimony and from photographs, for it to visualize the platform on
and from which plaintiff fell and to determine whether some railing
or hand hold in addition to the structures present was reasonably
necessary for the protection of a seaman passing from the ladder to
the platform in the swaying mast."
". . . [There is no] blanket proposition that any and all
theories of negligence and/or unseaworthiness which might touch on
the broad field of 'naval architecture' may be properly submitted
to a jury only if supported by expert testimony. Here the potential
danger was fairly obvious, and a jury should be perfectly competent
to decide whether the handholds furnished were sufficient to
discharge the owner's
Page 370 U. S. 37
duty to provide his seamen with a safe place to work. Such a
determination hardly requires expert knowledge of naval
architecture. . . ."
293 F.2d at 126.
Indeed,
"if there was a reason hidden from the ordinary mind why this
condition of things must have existed, those facts called upon the
defendant to make that reason known."
Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Williams, 103 Tex. 228,
231, 125 S.W. 881, 882;
and see Poignant v. United States,
225 F.2d 595, 602 (concurring opinion). [
Footnote 6]
There is another question to be decided. The petitioner also
sought maintenance and cure. The trial judge awarded past
maintenance, which the respondent has not disputed, and also future
maintenance for three years. The Court of Appeals set aside the
award of future maintenance, saying:
"There does not appear to be any sufficient basis, by opinion
evidence or otherwise, for the finding that three years is the
period reasonably to be
Page 370 U. S. 38
expected for Salem to reach maximum improvement."
293 F.2d at 125. The trial judgment made no findings. We have
therefore examined the evidence on the question in the light of
what was said in
Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.
S. 525,
303 U. S.
531-532:
". . . [A]mounts [for future maintenance should be such] as may
be needful in the immediate future for the maintenance and cure of
a kind and for a period which can be definitely ascertained."
We agree that the evidence provides no support under that test
for the award of three years' future maintenance.
We affirm as respects maintenance, but otherwise reverse the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. Since other grounds of reversal
urged by the respondent were not reached by that court, the case is
remanded to it for further proceedings in conformity with this
opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the decision of this
case.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688.
[
Footnote 2]
The majority quoted from
Martin v. United Fruit Co.,
272 F.2d 347, as follows:
"Finally, we reject the plaintiff's contention that the trial
court committed error in not permitting the jury to determine
whether the placement of the hinge at the bottom of the deadlight
was an improper method of ship construction so as to make the
vessel unseaworthy. Surely this is a technical matter in which an
expert knowledge of nautical architecture is required in order to
form an intelligent judgment. Since no expert testimony was
introduced, it was correct to exclude this matter from the jury's
consideration."
293 F.2d at 123. The majority also quoted from
Fatovic v.
Nederlandsch-Ameridaansche Stoomvaart, Maatschappij, 275 F.2d
188, in which the question was whether a stopping arrangement could
feasibly be made part of a ton-and-a-half boom to keep it from
swinging freely:
"In any event, the question was one of nautical architecture
about which jurors lack the knowledge to form an intelligent
judgment in the absence of expert testimony. Martin. . . . Since
there was no expert testimony on the matter, it should not have
been submitted to the jury."
293 F.2d at 123-124. Whatever may have required that the jury
have the aid of expert testimony in those cases, no showing is made
of the necessity here.
[
Footnote 3]
Compare Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Watson,
190 U. S. 287,
190 U. S. 290,
in which there may have been peculiar difficulties impeding
installation of any truly effective safety device.
[
Footnote 4]
27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. § 4.
[
Footnote 5]
Although it was later held that the Safety Appliance Act has no
room for the doctrine of equivalent, substitute devices,
St.
Joseph & Grand Island R. Co. v. Moore, 243 U.
S. 311, the authority of
Spokane on jury
competence is unimpaired.
[
Footnote 6]
The value of an expert's testimony to explain what the best
safety device might be is clear, but the question here is simply
whether some such device should have been provided.
Zinnel v.
United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp., 10 F.2d
47, 48. Nor would expert testimony about customary equippage be
essential,
Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60, 71; nor,
even if offered, would it have concluded the questions of
unseaworthiness or negligence.
Wabash R. Co. v. McDaniels,
107 U. S. 454,
107 U. S.
460-461;
Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Richardson,
91 U. S. 454,
91 U. S.
469-470;
The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737;
Kennair v. Mississippi Shipping Co., 197 F.2d 605;
June T., Inc. v. King, 290 F.2d 404.
Although the law favors the aid of experts if the problem is not
one "upon which the lay or uneducated mind is capable of forming a
judgment,"
Milwaukee & St. P. R. Co. v. Kellogg,
94 U. S. 469,
94 U. S. 472,
if the matter is only arguably beyond common experience, expert
testimony will be admitted with care. The rule reflects the
consideration of avoidance of unnecessarily prolonged trials and
attendant expense and confusion.
Winans v.
New York & Erie R. Co., 21 How. 88,
62 U. S.
100-101;
and see Thorn v. Worthing Skating Rink
Co. (1876), reported in
Plimpton v. Spiller, 6 Ch.D.
412, footnote at 415-418 (1877).
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting in part and concurring in
part.
I do not read the Court of Appeals' opinion either as holding
that, because of "peculiar fact circumstances," petitioner's claims
respecting the alleged faulty construction of the radar tower
required "
supporting expert testimony" (
ante, pp.
370 U. S. 35,
370 U. S. 32)
(emphasis added), or as establishing a general proposition that
such testimony is needed in every instance where a seaman claims to
have been injured because of his employer's failure to equip a ship
with safety devices.
Page 370 U. S. 39
Taking its opinion in light of the record, I think it apparent
that the Court of Appeals held no more than that reversal was
required because
"there was no evidence of
any kind in the record to
support the view that railings or other safety devices could
feasibly be constructed, or that failure to provide them
constituted negligence or made the ship unseaworthy."
293 F.2d at 123. (Emphasis added.) To me, it seems clear that
the court referred to expert testimony simply as an example of the
kind of evidence that the petitioner might have offered on this
score. Consequently, the District Court's charge that the jury
could find the respondent negligent "in failing to provide railings
or other safety devices" had injected into the case a theory of
liability which had not been presented to the jury by the evidence
introduced at the trial. This has uniformly been held to constitute
reversible error.
E.g., Mandel v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 291
F.2d 433;
Smith v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 247 F.2d 761,
766;
see Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. , 205 U. S.
60, 205 U. S.
78-79.
The trial transcript, insofar as it has been reproduced in the
record before this Court, bears out the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that evidence with respect to the alleged failure to
maintain appropriate safety devices was entirely lacking.
Petitioner's evidence, apart from medical testimony concerning the
extent of his injuries, related almost entirely to the alleged
slippery condition of the platform leading to the crow's nest, the
inadequate and defective lighting, and the negligence of the
lookout. Petitioner himself did testify that there was no "grip" or
"handrails" at the crow's nest level, and photographs that were
introduced into evidence confirm this undisputed assertion.
With nothing more before the jury than this, the trial court's
instruction certainly left the jury entirely at large
Page 370 U. S. 40
to reach an uninformed conclusion as to what would have
constituted reasonable conduct on the part of the respondent with
respect to the equipping of this part of the ship. No evidence of
any kind was introduced to show whether radar towers on vessels of
this sort ordinarily were equipped with safety devices, or whether
seamen assigned thereto had need of such equipment in the ordinary
course of their activities. Expert testimony would have served this
purpose, as would any other evidence bearing probatively on the
reasonableness of respondent's conduct in failing to equip its
vessel with these devices. In the absence of any such evidence, the
Court of Appeals was entirely justified in holding that the
District Court's instruction amounted to reversible error.
I agree with this Court's holding as to future maintenance. I
would affirm.