1. Under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, an
employer sued an international union and its local union in a
Federal District Court for damages for a strike or work stoppage
caused by them in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
The agreement provided for grievance procedures culminating, if
requested by the union, in compulsory, final, and binding
arbitration of employee grievances regarding wages, hours and
working conditions, and the union promised not to strike over such
matters. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on various
grounds and to stay the action, for the reasons that (1) all of the
issues in the suit were referable to arbitration under the
contract, and (2) important issues in the suit were also involved
in certain grievances filed by employees and said to be in
arbitration under the contract.
Held: this count of the complaint should not be
dismissed or stayed. Pp.
370 U. S.
241-245.
(a) This count of the complaint properly states a cause of
action under § 301, and is to be governed by federal law. P.
370 U. S.
241.
(b) The contract here involved is not susceptible to a
construction binding the employer to arbitrate its claim for
damages against the union for breach of the undertaking not to
strike. Pp.
370 U. S.
241-243.
(c) It does not appear from the record that the arbitrator's
award on pending employee grievances would determine any
significant issue in the damage suit. Pp.
370 U. S.
243-245.
2. Basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, the
employer, in another count of the same complaint, also sought
damages for the same strike or work stoppage from 24 individual
employees, each of whom was alleged to have been an agent of the
union and to have been acting in a representative capacity when he
allegedly fomented or assisted and participated in the strike or
work stoppage in violation of the collective bargaining
contract.
Held: under § 301, this count of the complaint was
governed by federal, not state, law, and it was properly dismissed
for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted,
since it actually was based
Page 370 U. S. 239
on the union's breach of its contract, and a union's officers or
members cannot be held personally liable for the union's actions.
Pp.
370 U. S.
245-249.
290 F.2d 312 affirmed in part and reversed in part.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent company employs at its refinery in East Chicago,
Indiana, approximately 1,700 men, for whom the petitioning
international union and its local are bargaining agents, and 24 of
whom are also petitioners here. In early February, 1959, the
respondent company docked three of its employees at the East
Chicago refinery a total of $2.19. On February 13 and 14, 999 of
the 1,700 employees participated in a strike or work stoppage, or
so the complaint alleges. On March 12, the company filed this suit
for damages and an injunction, naming the international and its
local as defendants, together with 24 individual union member
employees.
Court I of the complaint, which was in three counts, stated a
cause of action under § 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act against the
international and its local. It alleged an existing collective
bargaining agreement between the international and the company
containing, among other matters, a promise by the union not to
strike over any cause which could be the subject of a grievance
under other provisions of the contract. It was
Page 370 U. S. 240
alleged that the international and the local caused the strike
or work stoppage occurring on February 13 and 14, and that the
strike was over the pay claims of three employees in the amount of
$2.19, which claims were properly subject to the grievance
procedure provided by the contract. The complaint asked for damages
in the amount of $12,500 from the international and the local.
Count II of the complaint purported to invoke the diversity
jurisdiction of the District Court. It asked judgment in the same
amount against 24 individual employees, each of whom was alleged to
be a committeeman of the local union and an agent of the
international, and responsible for representing the international,
the local, and their members. The complaint asserted that, on
February 13 and 14, the individuals,
"contrary to their duty to plaintiff to abide by said contract,
and maliciously confederating and conspiring together to cause the
plaintiff expense and damage, and to induce breaches of the said
contract, and to interfere with performance thereof by the said
labor organizations and the affected employees, and to cause
breaches thereof, individually and as officers, committeemen and
agents of the said labor organizations, fomented, assisted and
participated in a strike or work stoppage. . . ."
Court III of the complaint asked for an injunction, but that
matter need not concern us here, since it is disposed of in
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson ante, p.
370 U. S. 195.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on
various grounds and a motion to stay the action for the reasons (1)
that all of the issues in the suit were referable to arbitration
under the collective bargaining contract and (2) that important
issues in the suit were also involved in certain grievances filed
by employees and said to be in arbitration under the contract. The
District Court denied the motion to dismiss Court I, dismissed
Count II, and denied the motion to stay (187 F.Supp.
Page 370 U. S. 241
225). The Court of Appeals upheld the refusal to dismiss or stay
Count I, but reversed the dismissal of Count II (290 F.2d 312), and
this Court granted certiorari (368 U.S. 937).
I
We have concluded that Count I should not be dismissed or
stayed. Count I properly states a cause of action under § 301, and
is to be governed by federal law.
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour
Co., 369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S.
102-104;
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448.
Under our decisions, whether or not the company was bound to
arbitrate, as well as what issues it must arbitrate, is a matter to
be determined by the Court on the basis of the contract entered
into by the parties.
"The Congress . . . has, by § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act, assigned the courts the duty of determining whether
the reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. For
arbitration is a matter of contract, and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit."
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U. S. 574,
363 U. S. 582.
See also United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U. S. 564,
363 U. S.
570-571 (concurring opinion). We think it unquestionably
clear that the contract here involved is not susceptible to a
construction that the company was bound to arbitrate its claim for
damages against the union for breach of the undertaking not to
strike.
While it is quite obvious from other provisions of the contract
[
Footnote 1] that the parties
did not intend to commit all
Page 370 U. S. 242
of their possible disputes and the whole scope of their
relationship to the grievance and arbitration procedures
established in Article XXVI, [
Footnote 2] that article itself is determinative of the
issue in this case, since it precludes arbitration boards from
considering any matters other than employee grievances. [
Footnote 3] After defining a grievance
as
"any difference regarding wages, hours or working conditions
between the parties hereto or between the employer and an employee
covered by the working agreement,"
Article XXVI provides that the parties desire to settle employee
grievances fairly and quickly, and that therefore a stated
procedure "must be followed." The individual employee is required
to present his grievance to his foreman, and, if not satisfied
there, he may take his grievance to the plant superintendent, who
is to render a written decision. There
Page 370 U. S. 243
is also provision for so-called Workmen's Committees to present
grievances to the local management. If the local superintendent's
decision is not acceptable, the matter is to be referred for
discussion between the President of the International and the
Director of Industrial Relations for the company (or their
representatives), and for decision by the Director alone. If the
Director's decision is disputed, then, "upon request of the
President or any District Director" of the international, a local
arbitration board may be convened and the matter finally decided by
this board.
Article XXVI then imposes the critical limitation. It is
provided that local arbitration boards
"shall consider only individual or local employee or local
committee grievances arising under the application of the currently
existing agreement."
There is not a word in the grievance and arbitration article
providing for the submission of grievances by the company. Instead,
there is the express, flat limitation that arbitration boards
should consider only employee grievances. Furthermore, the article
expressly provides that arbitration may be invoked only at the
option of the union. At no place in the contract does the union
agree to arbitrate at the behest of the company. The company is to
take its claims elsewhere, which it has now done.
The union makes a further argument for a stay. Following the
strike, and both before and after the company filed its suit, 14 of
the 24 individual defendants filed grievances claiming
reimbursement for pay withheld by the employer. The union argues
that, even though the company need not arbitrate its claim for
damages, it is bound to arbitrate these grievances, and the
arbitrator, in the process of determining the grievants' right to
reimbursement, will consider and determine issues which also
underlie the company's claim for damages. Therefore, it is said
that a stay of the court action is appropriate.
We are not satisfied from the record now before us, however,
that any significant issue in the damage suit
Page 370 U. S. 244
will be presented to and decided by an arbitrator. The
grievances filed simply claimed reimbursement for pay due employees
for time spent at regular work or processing grievances. Although
the record is a good deal less than clear, and although no answer
has been filed in this case, it would appear from the affidavits of
the parties presented in connection with the motion to stay that
the grievants claimed to have been disciplined as a result of the
work stoppage, and that they were challenging this disciplinary
action. The company sharply denies in its brief in this Court that
any employee was disciplined. In any event, precisely what
discipline was imposed, upon what grounds it is being attacked by
the grievants, and the circumstances surrounding the withholding of
pay from the employees are unexplained in the record. The union's
brief here states that the important issue underlying the
arbitration and the suit for damages is whether the grievants
instigated or participated in a work stoppage contrary to the
collective bargaining contract. This the company denies, and it
asserts that no issue in the damage suit will be settled by
arbitrating the grievances.
The District Court must decide whether the company is entitled
to damages from the union for breach of contract. The arbitrator,
if arbitration occurs, must award or deny reimbursement in whole or
in part to all or some of the 14 employees. His award, standing
alone, obviously would determine no issue in the damage suit. If he
awarded reimbursement to the employees, and if it could be
ascertained with any assurance [
Footnote 4] that one of his subsidiary findings was that
the 14 men had not participated in a forbidden work stoppage -- the
critical issue, according to the union's brief -- the company would
nevertheless not be foreclosed in court since, even if it were
Page 370 U. S. 245
bound by such a subsidiary finding made by the arbitrator, it
would be free to prove its case in court through the conduct of
other agents of the union. In this state of the record, the union
has not made out its case for a stay. [
Footnote 5]
For the foregoing reasons, the lower courts properly denied the
union's motion to dismiss Count I or stay it pending arbitration of
the employer's damage claim.
II
We turn now to Count II of the complaint, which charged 24
individual officers and agents of the union with breach of the
collective bargaining contract and tortious interference with
contractual relations. The District Court held that under § 301
union officers or members cannot be held personally liable for
union actions, and that therefore "suits of the nature alleged in
Count II are no longer cognizable in state or federal courts." The
Court of Appeals reversed, however, ruling that "Count II stated a
cause of action cognizable in the courts of Indiana and, by
diversity, maintainable in the District Court."
We are unable to agree with the Court of Appeals, for we are
convinced that Count II is controlled by federal law, and that it
must be dismissed on the merits for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.
Page 370 U. S. 246
Under § 301, a suit for violation of the collective bargaining
contract in either a federal or state court is governed by federal
law (
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U. S.
95,
369 U. S.
102-104;
Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U. S. 448),
and Count II, on its face, charges the individual defendants with a
violation of the no-strike clause. After quoting verbatim the
no-strike clause, Count II alleges that the 24 individual
defendants "contrary to their duty to plaintiff to abide by" the
contract, fomented and participated in a work stoppage in violation
of the no-strike clause. The union itself does not quarrel with the
proposition that the relationship of the members of the bargaining
unit to the employer is "governed by" the bargaining agreement
entered into on their behalf by the union. It is universally
accepted that the no-strike clause in a collective agreement, at
the very least, establishes a rule of conduct or condition of
employment the violation of which by employees justifies discipline
or discharge (
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. Labor Board,
350 U. S. 270,
350 U. S. 280
& n. 10;
Labor Board v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,
345 U. S. 71,
345 U. S. 80;
Labor Board v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.
S. 332;
Labor Board v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d
199 (C.A. 4th Cir.);
United Biscuit Co. of America v. Labor
Board, 128 F.2d 771 (C.A.7th Cir.);
see R. R. Donnelley
& Sons Co., 5 Lab.Arb. 16; Ford Motor Co., 1 Lab.Arb.
439). The conduct charged in Count II is therefore within the scope
of a "violation" of the collective agreement.
As well as charging a violation of the no-strike clause by the
individual defendants, Count II necessarily charges a violation of
the clause by the union itself. The work stoppage alleged is the
identical work stoppage for which the union is sued under Count I,
and the same damage is alleged as is alleged in Count I. Count II
states that the individual defendants acted "as officers,
committeemen and agents of the said labor organizations" in
breaching
Page 370 U. S. 247
and inducing others to breach the collective bargaining
contract. Count I charges the principal, and Count II charges the
agents for acting on behalf of the principal. Whatever individual
liability Count II alleges for the 24 individual defendants, it
necessarily restates the liability of the union which is charged
under Count I, since, under § 301(b), the union is liable for the
acts of its agents, under familiar principles of the law of agency
(
see also § 301(e)). Proof of the allegations of Count II
in its present form would inevitably prove a violation of the
no-strike clause by the union itself. Count II, like Count I, is
thus a suit based on the union's breach of its collective
bargaining contract with the employer, and therefore comes within §
301(a). When a union breach of contract is alleged, that the
plaintiff seeks to hold the agents liable instead of the principal
does not bring the action outside the scope of § 301. [
Footnote 6]
Under any theory, therefore, the company's action is governed by
the national labor relations law which Congress commanded this
Court to fashion under § 301(a). We hold that this law requires the
dismissal of Count II for failure to state a claim for which relief
can be granted -- whether the contract violation charged is that of
the union or that of the union plus the union officers and
agents.
When Congress passed § 301, it declared its view that only the
union was to be made to respond for union
Page 370 U. S. 248
wrongs, and that the union members were not to be subject to
levy. Section 301(b) has three clauses. One makes unions suable in
the courts of the United States. Another makes unions bound by the
acts of their agents according to conventional principles of agency
law (
cf. § 301(e)). At the same time, however, the
remaining clause exempts agents and members from personal liability
for judgments against the union (apparently even when the union is
without assets to pay the judgment). The legislative history of §
301(b) makes it clear that this third clause was a deeply felt
congressional reaction against the
Danbury Hatters case
(
Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274;
Lawlor v. Loewe, 235 U. S. 522),
and an expression of legislative determination that the aftermath
(
Loewe v. Savings Bank of Danbury, 236 F. 444 (C.A.2d
Cir.)) of that decision was not to be permitted to recur. In that
case, an antitrust treble damage action was brought against a large
number of union members, including union officers and agents, to
recover from them the employer's losses in a nationwide,
union-directed boycott of his hats. The union was not named as a
party, nor was judgment entered against it. A large money judgment
was entered, instead, against the individual defendants for
participating in the plan "emanating from headquarters" (235 U.S.
at
235 U. S.
534), by knowingly authorizing and delegating authority
to the union officers to do the acts involved. In the debates,
Senator Ball, one of the Act's sponsors, declared that § 301,
"by providing that the union may sue and be sued as a legal
entity, for a violation of contract, and that liability for damages
will lie against union assets only, will prevent a repetition of
the
Danbury Hatters case, in which many members lost their
homes."
(93 Cong.Rec. 5014).
See also 93 Cong.Rec. 3839, 6283;
S.Rep.No.105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16.
Consequently, in discharging the duty Congress imposed on us to
formulate the federal law to govern
Page 370 U. S. 249
§ 301(a) suits, we are strongly guided by, and do not give a
niggardly reading to, § 301(b). "We would undercut the Act and
defeat its policy if we read § 301 narrowly" (
Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. at
353 U. S.
456). We have already said in another context that §
301(b) at least evidences
"a congressional intention that the union as an entity, like a
corporation, should, in the absence of agreement, be the sole
source of recovery for injury inflicted by it [
Lewis v.
Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U. S. 459,
361 U. S.
470]."
This policy cannot be evaded or truncated by the simple device
of suing union agents or members, whether in contract or tort, or
both, in a separate count or in a separate action for damages for
violation of a collective bargaining contract for which damages the
union itself is liable. The national labor policy requires, and we
hold, that when a union is liable for damages for violation of the
no-strike clause, its officers and members are not liable for these
damages. Here, Count II, as we have said, necessarily alleges union
liability, but prays for damages from the union agents. Where the
union has inflicted the injury, it alone must pay. Count II must be
dismissed. [
Footnote 7]
The case is remanded to the District Court for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
Page 370 U. S. 250
[
Footnote 1]
The no-strike clause (Article III) provides that
"[T]here shall be no strike . . . (1) For any cause which is or
may be the subject of a grievance . . . or (2) For any other cause,
except upon written notice by Union to Employer. . . ."
Article XXVII, covering "general disputes," provides that
disputes which are general in character or which affect a large
number of employees are to be negotiated between the parties; there
is no provision for arbitration. Moreover, the management
prerogative clause (Article XXXI) recognizes that
"operation of the Employer's facilities and the direction of the
working forces, including the right to hire, suspend or discharge
for good and sufficient cause and pursuant to the seniority Article
of this agreement, the right to relieve employees from duties
because of lack of work, are among the sole prerogatives of the
Employer; provided, however, that . . . such suspensions and
discharges shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration
clause. . . ."
[
Footnote 2]
Article XXVI is set out in full
infra, p.
370 U. S. 250
as an Appendix.
[
Footnote 3]
We do not need to reach, therefore, the question of whether,
under the contract involved here, breaches of the no-strike clause
are "grievances,"
i.e., "difference[s] regarding wages,
hours or working conditions," or are "grievances" in the more
general sense of the term.
See Hoover Motor Express Co. v.
Teamsters Local, No. 327, 217 F.2d 49 (C.A.6th Cir.). The
present decision does not approve or disapprove the doctrine of the
Hoover case or the Sixth Circuit cases following it
(
e.g., Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 289
F.2d 103;
United Auto Aircraft v. Benton Harbor Malleable
Indus., 242 F.2d 536).
See also cases collected in
Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1717, 299
F.2d 882, 883-884 n. 5, 6 (C.A.3d Cir.). In
Drake Bakeries,
Inc. v. Local 50, post, p.
370 U. S. 254, the
question of arbitrability of a damages claim for breach of a
no-strike clause is considered and resolved in favor of arbitration
in the presence of an agreement to arbitrate
"all complaints, disputes or grievances arising between them
[
i.e., the parties] involving . . . any act or conduct or
relation between the parties."
[
Footnote 4]
Arbitrators generally have no obligation to give their reasons
for an award.
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U. S. 593,
363 U. S. 598;
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.
S. 198,
350 U. S. 203.
The record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a
court trial.
Ibid.
[
Footnote 5]
The union also argues that the preemptive doctrine of cases such
as
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.
S. 236, is applicable, and prevents the courts from
asserting jurisdiction. Since this is a § 301 suit, that doctrine
is inapplicable.
Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U. S. 95,
369 U. S. 101
n. 9.
We put aside, since it is unnecessary to reach them, the
questions of whether the employer was excused from arbitrating the
damage claim because it was over breach of the no-strike clause
(
see Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, post, p.
370 U. S. 254) and
whether the underlying factual or legal determination, made by an
arbitrator in the process of awarding or denying reimbursement to
14 employees, would bind either the union or the company in the
latter's action for damages against the union in the District
Court.
[
Footnote 6]
Swift & Co. v. United Packinghouse
Workers, 177 F.
Supp. 511 (D.Colo.).
Contra, Square D Co. v. United Elec.,
Radio & Machine Workers, 123 F.
Supp. 776, 779-781 (E.D.Mich.).
See also Morgan Drive Away,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 166 F.
Supp. 885 (S.D.Ind.), concluding, as we do, that the complaint
should be dismissed because of §§ 301(b) and 301(e), but for want
of jurisdiction, rather than on the merits. Our holding, however,
is that the suit is a § 301 suit; whether there is a claim upon
which relief can be granted is a separate question.
See Bell v.
Hood, 327 U. S. 678.
[
Footnote 7]
In reaching this conclusion, we have not ignored the argument
that Count II was drafted in order to anticipate the possible union
defense under Count I that the work stoppage was unauthorized by
the union, and was a wildcat strike led by the 24 individual
defendants acting not in behalf of the union, but in their personal
and nonunion capacity. The language of Count II contradicts the
argument, however, and we therefore do not reach the question of
whether the count would state a proper § 301(a) claim if it charged
unauthorized, individual action.
|
370
U.S. 238app|
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT
Article XXVI provides:
"
GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRATION PROCEDURE"
"
Definition"
"1. A grievance is defined to be any difference regarding wages,
hours or working conditions between the parties hereto or between
the Employer and an employee covered by this working agreement
which might arise within any plant or within any region of
operations."
"
Grievance Procedure"
"It is the sincere desire of both parties that employee
grievances be settled as fairly and as quickly as possible.
Therefore, when a grievance arises, the following procedure must be
followed:"
"2. For the purpose of adjusting employee grievances and
disputes as defined above, it is agreed that any employee,
individually or accompanied by his committeeman, if desired
shall:"
"(a) Seek direct adjustment of any grievance or dispute with the
foreman under whom he is employed. Such meeting will be without
loss of time to the employee and/or his committeeman during regular
working hours for time spent in conference with the foreman. The
foreman shall reply to said employee within three (3) working days
(Saturday, Sunday and Holidays excluded) from the date on which the
grievance was first presented to him;"
"(b) If the question is not then settled, the employee may
submit his grievance in writing, on forms supplied by Union, to a
committee selected as hereinafter provided for the particular plant
or region in which such employee is employed. Such committee shall
investigate said complaint and if in its opinion the grievance has
merit it shall have the right to meet with the local company
superintendent or his representative, who shall receive the
committee for this purpose. Written decisions shall be made by the
local superintendent or his representative within ten (10) days
after meeting with the committee, provided that prior to the time
of or at the meeting with the committee such complaint or grievance
has been submitted in writing to the local superintendent or his
representative."
"(c) In exceptional cases, Workmen's Committees shall have the
right to institute grievances concerning any alleged violation of
this Agreement by filing written complaint with the official
locally in charge. "
Page 370 U. S. 251
"(d) Any grievance filed with or by the local Workmen's
Committee can only be withdrawn with the Workmen's Committee's
consent."
"3. No complaint or grievance shall be considered hereunder
unless it is presented to the superintendent or official locally in
charge within sixty (60) days from the date on which the complaint
or grievance arose, or from the date on which the employee or
employees concerned first learned of the cause of complaint."
"4. The committee above mentioned shall be selected from among
and by employees of the Employer who are members of the Union. No
official, foreman, or employee having authority to hire or
discharge men shall serve on the committee."
"5. In case of discharge or lay-off, employees who may desire to
file complaints must present such complaints within one (1) week
after the effective date of discharge or lay-off to the committee
mentioned in this Article. Before any such employee is to be
discharged for cause, other than flagrant violation of rules, or is
to be laid off, he shall be given a written notice, dated and
signed by his foreman or other representative of the Employer,
setting forth the reason for such discharge or lay-off. In the
event an employee has been discharged for a flagrant violation of a
company rule, he shall subsequently, upon request, be given a
written notice, dated and signed by his foreman or other
representative of the Employer setting forth the reason for such
discharge. The Workmen's Committee will be furnished with a copy of
the statement furnished to the employee, both where the discharge
or lay-off is for cause or for flagrant violation of a Company
rule. Any grievance to be filed under this section must be filed
within forty (40) days from the effective date of the discharge or
lay-off."
"6. In the event the decision of the superintendent or his
representative shall not be satisfactory to the committee, it is
agreed that the President of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, or someone designated by him, shall,
not later than forty-five (45) days after such decision, have the
right to confer with the Director of Industrial Relations for the
Sinclair Companies, or someone designated by him, for the purpose
of discussing grievances or disputes and of obtaining decisions
thereon. It is agreed that the Director of Industrial Relations for
the Sinclair Companies, or someone designated by him, shall render
a decision to the President of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, AFL-CIO, within twenty (20) days after
grievances or disputes have been so submitted to him in writing.
"
Page 370 U. S. 252
"7. If such decision is not satisfactory, then, upon request of
the President or any District Director of the Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers International Union, AFL-CIO, and within sixty (60)
days from the posting date of the final appeal answer, there shall
be set up a local Arbitration Board, and such grievances and
disputes submitted to it within ten (10) days after formation of
such Board. Such local boards may be set up at each refinery to
deal with cases arising therefrom; cases arising from Sinclair Oil
& Gas Company shall be heard and determined at Tulsa, Oklahoma;
Fort Worth, Texas; Midland, Texas; or Casper, Wyoming; cases
arising from Sinclair Pipe Line Company shall be heard and
determined at the cities previously named or at Kansas City,
Missouri; Toledo, Ohio; Houston, Texas; Chicago, Illinois;
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; or Independence, Kansas. These local
Arbitration Boards shall consider only individual or local employee
or local committee grievances arising under the application of the
currently existing agreement, or supplements thereto, and local
wage and classification disputes submitted on the initiative of the
President or any District Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. In this connection, Employer
agrees to give consideration to local classification rate inequity
complaints existing by reason of a comparison with the average of
competitive rates of pay for like jobs having comparable duties and
responsibilities being paid by agreed-upon major competitive
companies in the local area. Such requests for adjustments of
classification rate inequities, if any, shall be made not more
frequently than twice annually, to be effective on February 1st and
August 1st. Such requests to be submitted at least thirty (30) days
prior to such semi-annual dates."
"8. The above mentioned local Arbitration Board shall be
composed of one person designated by Employer and one designated by
the President or District Director of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union, AFL-CIO. The board shall be requested
by both parties to render a decision within seven (7) days from
date of submission. Should the two members of the board, selected
as above provided, be unable to agree within seven (7) days, or to
mutually agree upon an impartial third arbitrator, an impartial
third member shall be selected within seven (7) days thereafter by
the employer or employee member of the Arbitration Board, or such
two parties jointly, requesting the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service to submit a panel of arbitrators from which
the third member of the board will be selected in accordance with
the procedure of such Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
"
Page 370 U. S. 253
"9. The decision of the Board aforesaid, as provided in Section
8 hereof, shall be final. However, if the rules and conditions
existing at the time a given case originated are subsequently
changed, it is understood that the arbitration award rendered under
former rules and conditions shall not act to prohibit consideration
of a complaint originating under the changed rules and
conditions."
"10. Cases arising from the Gasoline Plants shall be considered
as coming within the Producing Division in which they are
located."
"11. The fee and expense of the impartial arbitrator selected as
above provided shall be divided equally between the parties to such
arbitration. The Parties agree to attempt to hold the arbitrator's
fees to a reasonable basis."