A three-judge Federal District Court dismissed a complaint under
the Civil Rights Act and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 alleging violations of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment by New York State's constitutional and statutory
provisions governing apportionment of State Senate and Assembly
districts.
Held: the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded
for further consideration in the light of
Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186. Pp.
370 U. S.
190-191.
Reported below:
202 F.
Supp. 741.
PER CURIAM.
On January 11, 1962, the three-judge District Court dismissed
the complaint alleging violation of the Constitution of the United
States by New York State's constitutional and statutory provisions
governing apportionment of State Senate and Assembly Districts.
202 F.
Supp. 741. The three judges filed separate opinions, no two of
which supported the judgment of dismissal on identical grounds. One
opinion expressed the view that the action should be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, want of
Page 370 U. S. 191
justiciability, and want of equity. 202 F. Supp. at 742. A
second opinion expressed the view that, since the apportionment was
not alleged to effect a discrimination against any particular
racial or religious group, but merely a geographical
discrimination, jurisdiction should be exercised, but only to
dismiss. 202 F. Supp. at 754. A third opinion rested on the ground
that the action was not justiciable and expressed no view on the
merits. 202 F. Supp. at 755.
On March 26, 1962, we held in
Baker v. Carr,
369 U. S. 186,
that a justiciable federal constitutional cause of action is stated
by a claim of arbitrary impairment of votes by means of invidiously
discriminatory geographic classification. Our well established
practice of a remand for consideration in the light of a subsequent
decision therefore applies. As in
Scholle v. Hare,
369 U. S. 429, we
believe that the court below should be the first to consider the
merits of the federal constitutional claim, free from any doubts as
to its justiciability and as to the merits of alleged arbitrary and
invidious geographical discrimination. The judgment is vacated and
the case is remanded for further consideration in the light of
Baker v. Carr, supra.
The motions to substitute Paul R. Screvane in the place of Abe
Stark, and Eugene H. Nickerson in the place of A. Holly Patterson,
as parties appellee are granted.
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, dissenting.
For reasons given in my dissent in
Scholle v. Hare,
369 U. S. 429,
369 U. S. 430,
I would affirm or, failing that, note probable jurisdiction. The
complaint in this case squarely tenders the issue as to whether the
Equal Protection
Page 370 U. S. 192
Clause of the Federal Constitution is violated by a state
apportionment of seats in both its legislative chambers on other
than a substantially proportional populational basis. As in
Scholle, the lower court considered this claim on the
merits and rejected it by holding that the existing distribution of
New York State legislators (founded on principles embodied in the
State Constitution since 1894) violated no federal constitutional
right.
I read the opinions below quite differently than does the Court.
The first opinion is that of Judge Levet, which the Court states
"expressed the view that the action should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim, want of justiciability, and want of equity."
After first holding that the Court had jurisdiction over the
action, Judge Levet held that "the complaint fails to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted" (202 F.Supp. at 753), in that
"[t]here is no authoritative indication that the relative weight
accorded individual votes in elections for the state legislature,
pursuant to the applicable provisions of the State Constitution,
is protected by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In fact, the contrary seems true."
Id. at 749. (Emphasis added.) He then proceeded
further:
"If the insufficiency of the complaint be not adequate to
require dismissal of the complaint, as I believe it is, then the
want of equity in the relief sought, or, to view it slightly
differently, want of justiciability, clearly demands
dismissal."
Id. at 753.
The second opinion is that of Judge Ryan, described by the Court
as expressing
"the view that since the apportionment was not alleged to effect
a discrimination against any particular racial or religious group,
but merely a geographical discrimination, jurisdiction should be
exercised, but only to dismiss."
Actually, however, Judge Ryan agreed with Judge Levet, stating
at the outset of his separate opinion:
"I concur with Judge Levet and the conclusions
Page 370 U. S. 193
he has reached that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
this suit and that the complaint should be dismissed
on its
merits."
Id. at 754. (Emphasis added.) He went on to state:
"The complaint is that the method of apportionment gives rise
solely to territorial or purely geographical discrimination which
grossly dilutes the vote of urban dwellers. Judicial interference
by federal courts with the power of the state to create internal
political or geographical boundaries affecting the right of
suffrage cannot be supported by mere territorial discrimination and
nothing more."
Ibid. While this language, taken in connection with
some of that which precedes it (
ibid.), might lend itself
to the view that Judge Ryan was thinking only in terms of
"justiciability," I do not think it is properly so read. Judge Ryan
nowhere suggests that he disagrees with Judge Levet's further, and
distinctive, ground for dismissal, that the complaint failed to
state a federal constitutional claim.
The third opinion, that of Judge Waterman, did, as the Court
says, turn only on "nonjusticiability." Judge Waterman declined
to
"express any views with reference to whether the present
legislative apportionment in the State of New York violates the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,"
id. at 755, thereby evincing his understanding that his
colleagues had also rested decision on a ground which he found
unnecessary to reach.
For me, it thus seems clear that two members of the three-judge
court dismissed the action on two alternative grounds: (1) that the
matter was not "justiciable"; (2) that the complaint stated no
cause of action, in that the "territorial discrimination" existing
under New York's legislative apportionment did not give rise to a
claim cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter ground
was precisely the issue that was avoided in
Baker
Page 370 U. S. 194
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186,
369 U.S. 330 (dissenting
opinion);
see also id. at
369 U.S. 265 (concurring opinion).
It is unfortunate that the Court, now for the second time, has
remanded a case of this kind without first coming to grips itself
with this basic constitutional issue, or even indicating any
guidelines for decision in the lower courts.
Baker v. Carr,
supra, of course did neither.