A subpoena in chancery was issued in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Louisiana District on 15 July, 1837,
returnable to the next term of the court to be holden in November.
Some of the defendants appeared, and an affidavit was filed stating
that upwards of two hundred persons were named as defendants in the
bill, and that owing to the epidemic in New Orleans and at
LaFayette and the absence of many of the defendants, it had been
impossible for the defendants to prepare for a defense to the bill;
for this and for other reasons, an extension of the time for their
appearance was essentially necessary for their proper defense,
&c., and that the application was not made for delay. The
circuit court, on this affidavit, laid a rule on the complainants
to show cause why the defendants should not be allowed to the next
term to make their appearance and defense, and that in the meantime
no further proceeding should be had in the case. The solicitors for
the complainants moved that the cause should be placed on the rule
docket of the court, that the complainants might proceed in the
cause according to the chancery practice. This motion was overruled
by the circuit court. The complainants moved the Supreme Court for
a rule on the circuit court to show cause why a mandamus in the
nature of a
procedendo should not issue commanding the
court to send the case to the rule docket of the court. By the
Court
"We can perceive nothing in the proceedings of the circuit court
to warrant the rule to show cause, which has been asked for in
behalf of the complainants; on the contrary, judging from the
evidence contained in the record, the conduct of the court in
relation to the cause in question appears to have been strictly
conformable to the practice and principles of a court of
equity."
The statements contained in a petition addressed to the Supreme
Court asking for "a rule to show cause why a mandamus in the nature
of a writ of
procedendo should not be issued," not being
verified by affidavit; they cannot, under the decisions and
practice of the court, be considered.
Every court of equity possesses the power to mould its rules in
relation to the time and manner of appearing and answering, so as
to prevent the rule from working injustice. And it is not only in
the power of the court but it is its duty to exercise a sound
discretion upon this subject and to enlarge the time whenever it
shall appear that the purposes of justice require it. The rules in
chancery proceedings in the circuit courts prescribed by this Court
do not and were not intended to deprive the courts of the United
States of this well known and necessary power.
Page 37 U. S. 473
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court:
This case comes before us upon a motion on the part of the
complainants for a rule upon the judges of the Circuit Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana to show cause why a mandamus in
the nature of a writ of
procedendo should not issue from
this Court commanding the circuit court to "remand this suit to the
rule docket of the court, so that the complainants may proceed
therein according to chancery practice."
The copy of the record upon which this motion is founded shows
that a bill in equity was filed in the circuit court by the above
named complainants against the above named defendants on 15 July,
1837, and that subpoenas thereupon issued returnable to the next
term of the circuit court, to be holden on the third Monday in
November in the same year. On the return of the subpoenas, some of
the defendants appeared and an affidavit was filed on behalf of a
great number of them stating that upwards of two hundred persons
were named as defendants in the bill; that owing to the epidemic
which had prevailed in the City of New Orleans and City of La
Fayette and the absence of many persons and the recent service of
the process upon many of the defendants, it had been impossible for
the greater part of them, until within a short time before, to take
the steps which they deemed necessary to their defense; that they
had but recently been able to engage counsel, and had been informed
by them that it was wholly out of their power, with a due regard to
the rights of their clients, to ascertain the facts necessary to
enable them to decide upon the nature and mode of defense at that
term; that there was some uncertainty as to the proper mode of
proceeding in equity in the circuit court on account of recent
decisions on the subject, and that on account of the great
importance of the matters to be tried, an extension of time for the
appearance of the defendants was essentially necessary to their
proper defense and to obtain the ends of justice, and that the
affidavit was not made for delay, but solely for the ends of
justice.
Upon this affidavit, the court laid a rule upon the complainants
to show cause on the next day, 21 November, why the defendants
should not be allowed until the first day of the next term to make
their appearance and defense, and in the meantime that no further
step or proceeding be had in the case.
On 15 December at the same term, the complainants, by their
solicitors, moved the court
"to enter an order directing the
Page 37 U. S. 474
clerk of the court to place the cause upon the rule docket of
the court so that the complainants might proceed in the cause
according to the chancery practice."
This motion was overruled by the court. It does not appear
whether the time asked for by the defendants was given or not, nor
is there any further order or proceeding in the case in the
certified copy of the record from the circuit court filed here by
the complainants. An attested copy of a rule of proceeding in civil
cases, adopted by the circuit court on 20 November, 1837,
accompanies the record, but it does not appear that anything has
been done or omitted to be done under this rule in the suit now in
question.
The statements contained in the petition addressed to this Court
not being verified by affidavit, they cannot, under the decisions
and practice of the Court, be considered in the matter before
us.
We perceive nothing in the proceedings of the circuit court to
warrant the rule to show cause which has been asked for in behalf
of the complainants. On the contrary, judging from the evidence
contained in the record, the conduct of the court in relation to
the cause in question appears to have been strictly conformable to
the practice and principles of a court of equity.
The particular object of the motion made by the complainants in
the circuit court is not distinctly stated. It did not ask for any
specific order or process, but appears to have been made in
opposition to the previous motion of the defendants for time to
answer. And from the terms used in the motion of the complainants,
we suppose they desired the court to deny the motion of the
defendants and to allow the complainants to proceed at the rules to
be held by the clerk without any extension of the time to
answer.
The rules of chancery practice mentioned in the motion of the
complainants must, of course, mean the rules prescribed by this
Court for the government of the courts of equity of the United
States under the Act of Congress of May 8, 1792, ch. 137, s. 2,
which are undoubtedly obligatory on the circuit courts. But if the
order had been made pursuant to the motion, and the case
transferred to the rules, under the direction of the clerk, the
time asked for by the defendants would in effect have been refused,
and under the 6th rule of practice prescribed for the circuit
courts, the complainants would have been entitled to proceed on
their bill as confessed if the defendants did not appear and file
their answer within three months after the day of appearance
limited by these rules. We think the
Page 37 U. S. 475
court did right in refusing this motion. Every court of equity
possesses the power to mould its rules in relation to the time and
manner of appearing and answering so as to prevent the rule from
working injustice, and it is not only in the power of the Court but
it is its duty to exercise a sound discretion upon this subject and
to enlarge the time whenever it shall appear that the purposes of
justice require it. The rules prescribed by this Court do not and
were not intended to deprive the courts of the United States of
this well known and necessary power, and the facts stated in the
affidavit before referred to certainly presented a case in which it
was proper to exercise it.
In expressing our opinion on the conduct of the court, we do not
mean to intimate that a mandamus would have been the proper remedy
if we had found that the court had fallen into error. It is not our
purpose on this occasion to express any opinion as to the cases in
which it would be fit for this Court to exercise such a power. In
the evidence exhibited by the complainants we perceive no just
ground of complaint against the decision of the circuit court, and
have therefore felt it to be our duty to say so; but at the same
time to refrain from expressing any opinion upon questions which do
not belong to the case.
The motion for the rule to show cause why a mandamus should not
issue is therefore
Overruled.
On motion for a rule on the judges of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, to show cause,
&c.
On consideration of the motion made in this cause on a prior day
of the present term of this Court, to-wit, on Monday, 5 February,
A.D. 1838, by Mr. Crittenden, of counsel for the petitioners, for a
rule on the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for
the Eastern District of Louisiana to show cause why a writ of
mandamus should not be awarded to them directed commanding them,
the said judges, to make an order remanding the above suit to the
rules docket of the said circuit court so that the petitioners
therein may proceed according to chancery practice, and of the
arguments of counsel thereupon had, it is now here ordered and
adjudged by this Court that the said motion be and the same is
hereby overruled.
