Where a case is certified from a circuit court of the United
States, the judges of the circuit court having differed in opinion
upon questions of law which arose on the trial of the cause, the
Supreme Court cannot be called upon to express an opinion on the
whole facts of the case instead of upon particular points of law,
growing out of the case.
Upon a letter of guarantee addressed to a particular person or
to persons generally for a future credit to be given to a party in
whose favor the guarantee is drawn, to charge the guarantor, notice
is necessarily to be given to him that the person giving the credit
has accepted or acted upon the guarantee, and has given credit on
the faith of it. This is not an open question in this Court after
the decisions which have been made in
Russell v.
Clarke, 7 Cranch. 69, 2 Cond. 417;
Edmondston
v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624;
Douglass
v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113, and
Lee v.
Dick, 10 Pet. 482.
The defendant, Calvin Jones, was attached by a writ of
capias ad respondendum issued on 22 May, 1835, to answer
Adams, Cunningham & Company, they claiming from him the sum of
fifteen hundred and twenty five dollars for goods furnished to Miss
Betsey Miller under the following letter of guarantee.
"Mr. WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS: "
"SIR -- On this sheet you have the list of articles wanted for
Miss Betsey Miller's millinery establishment, which you were so
very good as to offer to purchase for her. I will be security for
the payment, either to you, or the merchants in New York of whom
you may purchase, and you may leave this in their hands or
otherwise, as may be proper. I hope to your favor and view will be
added all possible favor by the merchants to the young lady, in
quality and prices of goods, as I have no doubt she merits as much,
by her late knowledge of her business, industry, and pure conduct
and principles, as any whatever."
"CALVIN JONES"
Mr. Williams, the person named in the guarantee, purchased the
articles, according to the list furnished, from the plaintiffs, who
were
Page 37 U. S. 208
merchants of New York, on 28 October, 1832. The goods were
furnished on the faith of the guarantee, which was left with the
plaintiffs.
During the progress of the cause, and whilst the same was before
the jury, it occurred as a question "whether the plaintiffs were
bound to give notice to the defendant, that they had accepted or
acted upon the guarantee, and given credit on the faith of it."
Upon which question, the opinions of the judges were opposed,
whereupon, on motion of the plaintiffs, by their attorney, that the
point on which the disagreement hath happened, may be stated, under
the direction of the judges, and certified under the seal of the
court, to the Supreme Court, to be finally decided. It was ordered
that a statement of the pleadings and a statement of facts, which
was made under the direction of the judges, be certified, according
to the request of the plaintiffs, and the law in that case made and
provided.
Page 37 U. S. 212
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This cause comes before us upon a certificate of division of
opinion of the judges of the Circuit Court of West Tennessee. The
plaintiffs, Adams and others, brought an action against the
defendant, Jones, for the amount of certain goods supplied by them
upon the credit of the following letter of guarantee:
"Raleigh, September 25, 1832"
"MR. WILLIAM A. WILLIAMS: "
"SIR -- On this sheet you have the list of articles wanted for
Miss Betsey Miller's millinery establishment, which you were so
very good as to offer to purchase for her. I will be security for
the payment, either to you or to the merchants in New York of whom
you may purchase, and you may leave this in their hands or
otherwise, as may be proper. I hope to your favor and view will be
added all possible favor by the merchants to the young lady, in
quality and prices of goods, as I have no doubt she merits as much,
by her late knowledge of her business, industry, and pure conduct
and principles as any whatever."
"CALVIN JONES"
"After the compliment that is paid me above, I should hardly be
willing to place my name so near it, was I not told it was
necessary and proper the merchants should know my handwriting
generally, and particularly my signature."
"ELIZABETH A. MILLER"
The list of the articles was appended to the letter.
Upon the trial of the cause upon the general issue before the
jury, it occurred as a question "whether the plaintiffs were bound
to give notice to the defendant, that they had accepted or acted
upon the guarantee, and given credit on the faith of it." Upon
which question the opinions of the judges were opposed, and
thereupon, according to the act of Congress, on motion of the
plaintiffs, by their attorney, the point has been certified to this
Court. A statement of the pleadings, and also a statement of facts
made under the direction of the judges, have been certified as a
part of the record. Some diversity of opinion has existed among the
judges, as to the true nature and extent of the question certified;
whether it meant to ask the opinion of this Court, whether, under
all the circumstances disclosed in the evidence, any personal
notice to the defendant, or any other notice than what was
Page 37 U. S. 213
made known to Williams, was necessary to fix the liability of
the defendant, or whether it meant only to put the general question
of the necessity of notice in cases of guarantee. If the former
interpretation were adopted, it would call upon this Court to
express an opinion upon the whole facts of the case, instead of
particular points of law growing out of the same; a practice which
is not deemed by the majority of the Court to be correct, under the
act of Congress on this subject. Act of 1802, ch. 31 sec. 6. The
latter is the interpretation which we are disposed to adopt, and
the question which, under this view, is presented is whether upon a
letter of guarantee addressed to a particular person or to persons
generally for a future credit to be given to the party in whose
favor the guarantee is drawn, notice is necessary to be given to
the guarantor that the person giving the credit has accepted or
acted upon the guarantee, and given the credit on the faith of it.
We are all of opinion that it is necessary, and that this is not
now an open question in this Court, after the decisions which have
been made in
Russell v.
Clarke, 7 Cranch 69;
Edmondson
v. Drake, 5 Pet. 624;
Douglass
v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 113;
Lee v.
Dick, 10 Pet. 482, and again recognized at the
present term in the case of
Reynolds v. Douglass. It is in
itself a reasonable rule, enabling the guarantor to know the nature
and extent of his liability; to exercise due vigilance in guarding
himself against losses which might otherwise be unknown to him, and
to avail himself of the appropriate means in law and equity, to
compel the other parties to discharge him from future
responsibility. The reason applies with still greater force to
cases of a general letter of guarantee, for it might otherwise be
impracticable for the guarantor to know to whom, and under what
circumstances the guarantee attached, and to what period it might
be protracted. Transactions between the other parties, to a great
extent, might from time to time exist, in which credits might be
given, and payments might be made, the existence and due
appropriation of which might materially affect his own rights and
security. If, therefore, the question were entirely new, we should
not be disposed to hold a different doctrine, and we think the
English decisions are in entire conformity to our own.
It is highly probable that the real questions intended to be
raised before this Court, upon the certificate of division, were
whether, upon the whole evidence, Williams was not to be treated as
the agent of the defendant as well as of Miss Miller, in the
Page 37 U. S. 214
procurement of this credit from the plaintiffs, and if so,
whether the knowledge of Williams of the credit by the plaintiffs
to Miss Miller, upon the faith of the guarantee, was not full
notice also to the defendant, and thus dispensed with any further
and other notice to the defendant. These were matters of fact, very
proper for the consideration of the jury at the trial, and, if
satisfactorily established, would have dispensed with any farther
notice, but are by no means matters of law upon which we are called
on the present occasion to give any opinion.
A certificate will be sent to the circuit court in conformity to
this opinion.
MR. JUSTICE BALDWIN dissented.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record
from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of
West Tennessee, and on the point and question on which the judges
of the said circuit court were opposed in opinion and which was
certified to this Court for its opinion, agreeably to the act of
Congress in such case made and provided, and was argued by counsel.
On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this Court "That the
plaintiffs were bound to give notice to the defendant that they had
accepted or acted upon the guarantee, and given credit on the faith
of it." Whereupon it is now here adjudged and ordered by this Court
that it be so certified to the said circuit court.
