In this suit against a railroad under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act by a waitress in the grill car of one of the
railroad's trains to recover damages for injuries allegedly
sustained when an emergency application of the brakes brought the
train to a sudden stop,
held: the proofs were insufficient
to submit to the jury the question whether employer negligence
played a part in the emergency application of the brakes which
allegedly produced the injury.
272 F.2d 153, reversed.
PER CURIAM.
The respondent was a waitress in the grill car of one of
petitioner's trains. She brought this action under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. ยง 51
et seq., for
damages for injuries allegedly sustained when an emergency
application of the brakes brought the train to a sudden stop. A
jury which heard the case in the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts returned a verdict for respondent. The trial judge
denied the petitioner's motions for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and for a new trial. The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed, 272 F.2d 153. We granted certiorari, 362 U.S.
967.
The train was pulling into petitioner's station at Providence,
Rhode Island, for a scheduled stop. One Montell,
Page 364 U. S. 442
apparently to commit suicide, stepped on the track from the
station platform as the train approached alongside the platform.
The engineer made the emergency application of the brakes in an
unsuccessful effort to stop the train before it reached Montell. We
have examined the trial record, and hold that the proofs were
insufficient to submit to the jury the question whether employer
negligence played a part in the emergency application of the brakes
which allegedly produced the respondent's injury.
See Herdman
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 352 U. S. 518.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the cause
remanded to the District Court with direction to enter judgment for
the petitioner notwithstanding the verdict.
It is so ordered.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK and MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS dissent. They believe
there was evidence of negligence sufficient for the jury, as
summarized by Judge Woodbury, speaking for a unanimous Court of
Appeals. 272 F.2d 153. They also dissent from the direction to
enter judgment for the petitioner, since they are of the view that,
if there is a reversal, there should be a new trial.
See
Galloway v. United States, 319 U. S. 372,
319 U. S. 396
(dissenting opinion).
For the reasons set forth in his opinion in
Rogers v.
Missouri Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 500,
352 U. S. 524,
MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER is of the view that the writ of certiorari
was improvidently granted.