A railroad sued in the Court of Claims to recover from the
United States the difference between its "domestic rates" and its
"export rates" on certain shipments of iron and steel intended for
export but which actually were not exported because of war
conditions. The Court of Claims suspended proceedings to enable the
parties to have the Interstate Commerce Commission pass on the
reasonableness of the rates. After hearings, the Commission found
and reported that the domestic rates were "unjust and unreasonable"
as to 62 of the shipments but "just and reasonable" as to 13 of
them. The railroad then invoked the jurisdiction of a Federal
District Court under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336, 1398 and 49 U.S.C. § 17(9)
to enjoin and set aside the Commission's order, and it moved that
the Court of Claims stay its proceedings until the District Court
could pass upon the validity of the order.
Held: the railroad was entitled to have the
Commission's order judicially reviewed; only the District Court had
jurisdiction to review it; and the Court of Claims should have
stayed its proceedings pending review of the Commission's order by
the District Court. Pp.
363 U. S.
202-206.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case involves the power of District Courts to review
Interstate Commerce Commission orders determining the
reasonableness of rates.
Page 363 U. S. 203
In 1941 and 1942, the United States made 75 shipments of iron
and steel over the Pennsylvania Railroad intended for export from
the port of New York to Great Britain. War conditions prevented
exportation from New York. This caused a dispute about applicable
transportation charges, since the Pennsylvania had in effect
tariffs for "domestic rates" that were higher than "export rates."
Since the goods were not exported as planned, the Railroad billed
the United States for the higher domestic rates, which the
Government paid because required to do so by § 322 of the
Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 955, 49 U.S.C. § 66. Later,
under authority of the same section, the General Accounting Office
deducted from other bills due the Railroad the difference between
the higher and lower rates, claiming that the higher domestic rates
were inapplicable, unreasonable and unlawful. The Railroad then
brought this action in the Court of Claims to recover the amount
deducted.
Properly relying on our holding in
United States v. Western
Pacific R. Co., 352 U. S. 59,
352 U. S. 62-70,
the Court of Claims suspended proceedings to enable the parties to
have the Interstate Commerce Commission pass on the reasonableness
of the rates. After hearings, the Commission found and reported
that the domestic rates were "unjust and unreasonable" as to 62 of
the shipments, but "just and reasonable" as to 13. 305 I.C.C. 259,
265. The Railroad then took two steps to challenge that part of the
order adverse to it: (1) it invoked the jurisdiction of a United
States District Court in Pennsylvania under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1336,
1398, and 49 U.S.C. § 17(9), to enjoin and set aside the order; and
(2) it moved that the Court of Claims stay its proceedings until
the District Court could pass upon the validity of the order. The
United States objected to further stay in the Court of Claims and
asked for dismissal of the case or judgment
Page 363 U. S. 204
in its favor. It urged in support of dismissal that the Railroad
had deprived the Court of Claims of jurisdiction when it filed the
District Court action to enjoin the Commission order because 28
U.S.C. § 1500, declares that "The Court of Claims shall not have
jurisdiction of any claim for or in respect to which the plaintiff
. . . has pending in any other court any suit or process against
the United States. . . ." The Court of Claims rejected this
contention, and its action in this respect is not challenged
here.
The United States argued in support of its motion for judgment
that the order of the Commission did not require anything to be
done or not done, that it was therefore an advisory opinion only,
and consequently not the kind of "order" subject to review by 28
U.S.C. § 1336, 49 U.S.C. § 17(9), or any other provision of law.
The contention of the United States was that, although the Court of
Claims was compelled to submit the question of the reasonableness
of the rates to the Commission, neither that court nor any other
court had power to review the Commission's determination. The Court
of Claims agreed with this contention of the United States,
accordingly refused to stay the case for the District Court to pass
on the validity of the order, and entered judgment for the Railroad
for only $1,663.39, which the Commission had held to be
recoverable, instead of the $7,237.87 which the Railroad claimed.
The result is that the Railroad has been held bound by the
Commission's order although completely denied any judicial review
of that order. We granted certiorari to consider this denial. 361
U.S. 922.
The Railroad contends that it was error for the Court of Claims
to refuse to stay its proceedings while the District Court reviewed
the Commission's order. The Solicitor General concedes here that
this was error. We reach the same conclusion on the basis of our
independent consideration
Page 363 U. S. 205
of the record. We decided some years ago that, while a mere
"abstract declaration" on some issue by the Commission may not be
judicially reviewable, an order that determines a "right or
obligation" so that "legal consequences" will flow from it is
reviewable.
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States,
307 U. S. 125,
307 U. S.
131-132,
307 U. S. 143.
The record shows that the Commission order here meets this
standard. The Commission found that the Railroad's domestic rates
were "unreasonable" as to 62 shipments. This order is by no means a
mere "advisory opinion" -- its "legal consequences" are obvious,
for, if valid, it forecloses the "right" of the Railroad to recover
its domestic rates on those shipments. We have held that judicial
review is equally available whether a Commission order relates to
past or future rates, or whether its proceeding follows referral by
a court or originates with the Commission.
El Dorado Oil Works
v. United States, 328 U. S. 12.
For these reasons, we conclude that the Railroad was entitled to
have this Commission order judicially reviewed. We have already
determined, however, that the power to review such an order cannot
be exercised by the Court of Claims.
United States v.
Jones, 336 U. S. 641,
336 U. S.
651-653,
336 U. S.
670-671. That jurisdiction is vested exclusively in the
District Courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1336, 49 U.S.C. § 17(9).
See
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.
S. 118,
333 U. S. 122.
Moreover, this order is properly reviewable by a one-judge, rather
than a three-judge, District Court because it is essentially one
"for the payment of money" within the terms of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321
and 2325, which exempt such orders from the three-judge procedure
of 28 U.S.C. § 2284.
United States v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 337 U. S. 426,
337 U. S. 441,
337 U. S. 443.
It necessarily follows, of course, that, since the Railroad had a
right to have the Commission's order reviewed, and
Page 363 U. S. 206
only the District Court had the jurisdiction to review it, the
Court of Claims was under a duty to stay its proceedings pending
this review.
Other questions argued by the Government are not properly
presented by this record.
It was error for the Court of Claims to render judgment on the
basis of the Commission's order without suspending its proceedings
to await determination of the validity of that order by the
Pennsylvania District Court.
Reversed.