The National Labor Relations Board found that, during the course
of a strike, petitioner unions had violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of the
National Labor Relations Act by coercing employees of a telephone
company in the exercise of their right to refrain from or
discontinue participation in the strike, and it entered an order
requiring the unions to cease and desist from restraining or
coercing employees of the telephone company "or any other employer"
in the exercise of rights guaranteed in § 7 of the Act, though it
had not found that the unions had engaged in violations against the
employees of any employer other than the telephone company.
Held: the order is modified by striking therefrom the
words "or any other employer," and, as so modified, the judgment of
the Court of Appeals enforcing the order is affirmed. Pp.
362 U. S.
479-481.
266 F.2d 823 modified and affirmed.
PER CURIAM.
The Board found that the petitioner unions, during the course of
a strike, coerced employees of the Ohio Consolidated Telephone
Company in the exercise of their right to refrain from or
discontinue participation therein, in violation of § 8(b)(1)(A) of
the National Labor Relations
Page 362 U. S. 480
Act. [
Footnote 1] It entered
an order requiring the unions to cease and desist
"from
in any manner restraining or coercing employees
of Ohio Consolidated Telephone Company
or any other
employer in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7
of the Act."
(Emphasis supplied.) The Court of Appeals enforced the order
after deleting the words "in any manner." 266 F.2d 823. Because of
an asserted conflict with the decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in
Labor Board v. Local 926, Int. Union of
Operating Engrs., 267 F.2d 418, 421, we brought the case here.
361 U.S. 893. The only challenge here to the order as so amended is
to its validity as extended to "any other employer," as well as the
telephone company.
Petitioners were not found to have engaged in violations against
the employees of any employer other than Ohio Consolidated, and we
find neither justification nor necessity for extending the coverage
of the order generally by the inclusion therein of the phrase "any
other employer."
"It would seem . . . clear that the authority conferred on the
Board to restrain the practice which it has found . . . to have
[been] committed is not an authority to restrain
Page 362 U. S. 481
generally all other unlawful practices which it has neither
found to have been pursued nor persuasively to be related to the
proven unlawful conduct."
Labor Board v. Express Pub. Co., 312 U.
S. 426,
312 U. S. 433
(1941).
See also May Dept. Stores Co. v. Labor Board,
326 U. S. 376
(1945). That loaned employees of other affiliated companies were
included within the ambit of petitioners' coercive acts plainly
does not evidence such a generalized scheme against all telephone
employers, for it was only the employment of such employees at the
struck plant that brought them within the scope of the unions'
activities. [
Footnote 2] We
therefore conclude that the inclusion in the order of the words "or
any other employer" was unwarranted, and the order is modified by
striking the same therefrom. As so modified, the judgment is
affirmed.
Modified and affirmed.
[
Footnote 1]
That section reads in pertinent part:
"Sec. 8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization or its agents --"
"(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7. . . ."
61 Stat. 141.
Section 7 provides:
"Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form,
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as
authorized in section 8(a)(3)."
61 Stat. 140.
[
Footnote 2]
In the Court of Appeals, the Board sought to justify the breadth
of its order by relying on two compromise settlement agreements
involving activities of the International and other locals against
other employers. Neither the opinion of the Board nor that of the
Court of Appeals in this case indicates that any reliance was
placed on such agreements, and in this Court the Board disclaims
any such reliance.