Petitioners, when employees of a California County, were
subpoenaed by and appeared before a Subcommittee of the House
Un-American Activities Committee, but, in violation of specific
orders of the County Board of Supervisors and the requirements of
§1028.1 of the Government Code of California, refused to answer
certain questions concerning subversion. The County discharged them
on grounds of insubordination and violation of §1028.1. Nelson, a
permanent employee, was given a Civil Service Commission hearing,
which resulted in confirmation of his discharge. Globe, a temporary
employee, was denied a hearing, since he was not entitled to it
under the applicable rules. Both sued for reinstatement, contending
that §1028.1 and their discharges violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, but their discharges were affirmed by
a California State Court.
Held:
1. In Nelson's case, the judgment is affirmed by an equally
divided Court. P.
362 U. S. 4.
2. Globe's discharge did not violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the judgment in his case is affirmed.
Pp.
362 U. S. 4-9.
(a) Globe's discharge was not based on his invocation before the
Subcommittee of his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments; it
was based solely on insubordination and violation of §1028.1. P.
362 U. S. 6.
Page 362 U. S. 2
(b) Under California law, Globe had no vested right to county
employment, and was subject to summary discharge. P.
362 U. S. 6.
(c) Globe's discharge was not arbitrary and unreasonable.
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.
S. 551, distinguished.
Beilan v. Board of
Education, 357 U. S. 399, and
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468,
followed. Pp.
362 U. S. 6-8.
(d) The remand on procedural grounds required in
Vitarelli
v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535, has
no bearing on this case. Pp.
362 U. S. 8-9.
163 Cal. App.
2d 607, 329 P.2d 978, affirmed by an equally divided Court.
163 Cal. App.
2d 595, 329 P.2d 971, affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners, when employees of the County of Los Angeles,
California, were subpoenaed by and appeared before a Subcommittee
of the House Un-American Activities Committee, but refused to
answer certain questions concerning subversion. Previously, each
petitioner had been ordered by the County Board of Supervisors to
answer any questions asked by the Subcommittee relating to his
subversive activity, and § 1028.1 of the Government Code of the
State of California [
Footnote
1] made it the duty of any public
Page 362 U. S. 3
employee to give testimony relating to such activity on pain of
discharge "in the manner provided by law." Thereafter, the County
discharged petitioners on the ground of insubordination and
violation of § 1028.1 of the Code. Nelson, a permanent social
worker employed by the County's Department of Charities, was, upon
his request, given a Civil Service Commission hearing which
resulted in a confirmation of his discharge. Globe was a temporary
employee of the same department, and was denied a hearing on his
discharge on the ground that, as such, he was not entitled to a
hearing under the Civil Service Rules adopted pursuant to the
County Charter. Petitioners then filed these petitions for mandates
seeking
Page 362 U. S. 4
reinstatement, contending that the California statute and their
discharges violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Nelson's discharge was affirmed by the District Court of
Appeal,
163 Cal. App.
2d 607, 329 P.2d 978, and Globe's summary dismissal was
likewise affirmed,
163 Cal. App.
2d 595, 329 P.2d 971. A petition for review in each of the
cases was denied without opinion by the Supreme Court of
California, three judges dissenting. 163 Cal. App. 2d 614, 329 P.2d
983; 163 Cal. App. 2d 606, 329 P.2d 978. We granted certiorari. 360
U.S. 928. The judgment in Nelson's case is affirmed by an equally
divided Court, and will not be discussed. We conclude that Globe's
dismissal was valid.
On April 6, 1956, Globe was served with a subpoena to appear
before the Subcommittee at Los Angeles. On the same date, he was
served with a copy of an order of the County Board of Supervisors,
originally issued February 19, 1952, concerning appearances before
the Subcommittee. This order provided, among other things, that it
was the duty of any employee to appear before the Subcommittee when
so ordered or subpoenaed, and to answer questions concerning
subversion. The order specifically stated that any
"employee who disobeys the declaration of this duty and order
will be considered to have been insubordinate . . . , and that such
insubordination shall constitute grounds for discharge. . . .
[
Footnote 2]"
At the appointed time, Globe appeared before the Subcommittee
and was interrogated by its counsel concerning his familiarity with
the John Reid Club. He claimed that this was a matter which was
entirely his "own business," and, upon being
Page 362 U. S. 5
pressed for an answer, he stated that the question was
"completely out of line as far as my rights as a citizen are
concerned, [and] I refuse to answer this question under the First
and Fifth Amendments of the Constitution of the United States."
On the same grounds, he refused to answer further questions
concerning the Club, including one relating to his own membership.
Upon being asked if he had observed any Communist activities on the
part of members of the Club, Globe refused to answer, and suggested
to committee counsel "that you get one of your trained seals up
here and ask them." He refused to testify whether he was "a member
of the Communist Party now" "on the same grounds" and "as
previously stated for previous reasons." On May 2, by letter, Globe
was discharged, "without further notice," on "the grounds that [he
had] been guilty of insubordination and of violation of Section
1028.1 of the Government Code of the State of California. . . ."
The letter recited the fact that Globe had been served with a copy
of the Board order relating to his "duty to testify as a County
employee . . . before said committee," and that, although appearing
as directed, he had refused to answer the question, "Are you a
member of the Communist Party now?" Thereafter, Globe requested a
hearing before the Los Angeles County Civil Service Commission, but
it found that, as a temporary employee, he was not entitled to a
hearing under the Civil Service Rules. [
Footnote 3] This the petitioner does not dispute.
Page 362 U. S. 6
However, Globe contends that, despite his temporary status, his
summary discharge was arbitrary and unreasonable, and therefore
violative of due process. He reasons that his discharge was based
on his invocation before the Subcommittee of his rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments. But the record does not support even an
inference in this regard, and both the order and the statute upon
which the discharge was based avoided it. In fact, California's
court held to the contrary, saying,
"At no time has the cause of petitioner's discharge been alleged
to be anything but insubordination and a violation of section
1028.1, nor indeed, under the record before us, could it be."
163 Cal. App. 2d at 599, 329 P.2d at 974. Moreover, this finding
is buttressed by the language of the order and of California's
statute. Both require the employee to answer any interrogation in
the field outlined. Failure to answer "on any ground whatsoever any
such questions" renders the employee "guilty of insubordination,"
and requires that he "be suspended and dismissed from his
employment in the manner provided by law." California law in this
regard, as declared by its court, is that Globe "has no vested
right to county employment, and may therefore be discharged
summarily." We take this interpretation of California law as
binding upon us.
We, therefore, reach Globe's contention that his summary
discharge was nevertheless arbitrary and unreasonable. In this
regard, he places his reliance on
Slochower v. Board of
Education, 350 U. S. 551
(1956). However,
Page 362 U. S. 7
the New York statute under which Slochower was discharged
specifically operated
"to discharge every city employee who invokes the Fifth
Amendment. In practical effect, the questions asked are taken as
confessed, and made the basis of the discharge."
Id., at
350 U. S. 558.
This "built-in" inference of guilt, derived solely from a Fifth
Amendment claim, we held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. But the
test here, rather than being the invocation of any constitutional
privilege, is the failure of the employee to answer. California has
not predicated discharge on any "built-in" inference of guilt in
its statute, but solely on employee insubordination for failure to
give information which we have held that the State has a legitimate
interest in securing.
See Garner v. Board of Public Works of
Los Angeles, 341 U. S. 716
(1951);
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.
S. 485 (1952). Moreover, it must be remembered that here
-- unlike
Slochower -- the Board had specifically ordered
its employees to appear and answer.
We conclude that the case is controlled by
Beilan v. Board
of Education of Philadelphia, 357 U.
S. 399 (1958), and
Lerner v. Casey,
357 U. S. 468
(1958). It is not determinative that the interrogation here was by
a federal body, rather than a state one, as it was in those cases.
Globe had been ordered by his employer as well as by California's
law to appear and answer questions before the federal Subcommittee.
These mandates made no reference to Fifth Amendment privileges. If
Globe had simply refused, without more, to answer the
Subcommittee's questions, we think that, under the principles of
Beilan and
Lerner, California could certainly
have discharged him. The fact that he chose to place his refusal on
a Fifth Amendment claim puts the matter in no different posture,
for, as in
Lerner, supra, at
357 U. S. 477,
California did not employ that claim as the basis for drawing an
inference of guilt. Nor do we think that this discharge
Page 362 U. S. 8
is vitiated by any deterrent effect that California's law might
have had on Globe's exercise of his federal claim of privilege. The
State may nevertheless legitimately predicate discharge on refusal
to give information touching on the field of security.
See
Garner and
Adler, supra. Likewise, we cannot say as a
matter of due process that the State's choice of securing such
information by means of testimony before a federal body [
Footnote 4] can be denied. Finally, we
do not believe that California's grounds for discharge constituted
an arbitrary classification.
See Lerner, id. at
357 U. S. 478.
We conclude that the order of the County Board was not invalid
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor do we believe that the remand on procedural grounds required
in
Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U. S. 535
(1959), has any bearing here. First, we did not reach the
constitutional issues raised in that case. Next, Vitarelli was a
Federal Department of Interior employee who "could have been
summarily discharged by the Secretary at any time without the
giving of a reason."
Id. at
359 U. S. 539.
The Court held, however, that, since Vitarelli was dismissed on the
grounds of national security, rather than by summary discharge, and
his dismissal "fell substantially short of the requirements of the
applicable departmental regulations," it was "illegal and of no
effect."
Id. at
359 U. S. 545.
But petitioner here raises no such point, and clearly asserts that
"whether or not petitioner Globe was accorded a hearing is not the
issue here." [
Footnote 5] He
bases his whole case on the claim
"that due process affords petitioner Globe protection against
the State's depriving him of employment on this
Page 362 U. S. 9
arbitrary ground"
of his refusal on federal constitutional grounds to answer
questions of the Subcommittee. Having found that, on the record
here, the discharge for "insubordination" was not arbitrary, we
need go no further.
We do not pass upon petitioner's contention as to the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, since it was
neither raised in nor considered by the California courts. The
judgments are
Affirmed.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN took no part in the consideration or
decision of this case.
[
Footnote 1]
California Government Code, § 1028.1:
"It shall be the duty of any public employee who may be
subpoenaed or ordered by the governing body of the state or local
agency by which such employee is employed, to appear before such
governing body, or a committee or subcommittee thereof, or by a
duly authorized committee of the Congress of the United States or
of the Legislature of this State, or any subcommittee of any such
committee, to appear before such committee or subcommittee, and to
answer under oath a question or questions propounded by such
governing body, committee or subcommittee, or a member or counsel
thereof, relating to:"
"(a) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the forceful
or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of
any state."
"(b) Present knowing membership in any organization now
advocating the forceful or violent overthrow of the Government of
the United States or of any state."
"(c) Past knowing membership at any time since October 3, 1945,
in any organization which, to the knowledge of such employee,
during the time of the employee's membership advocated the forceful
or violent overthrow of the Government of the United States or of
any state."
"(d) Questions as to present knowing membership of such employee
in the Communist Party or as to past knowing membership in the
Communist Party at any time since October 3, 1945."
"(e) Present personal advocacy by the employee of the support of
a foreign government against the Unites States in the event of
hostilities between said foreign government and the United
States."
"Any employee who fails or refuses to appear or to answer under
oath on any ground whatsoever and such questions so propounded
shall be guilty of insubordination and guilty of violating this
section, and shall be suspended and dismissed from his employment
in the manner provided by law."
[
Footnote 2]
This original order was the forerunner of § 1028.1 of the
California Government Code, enacted in 1953, which, with certain
refinements, embodied the requirements of the order into state law.
It is against this section that petitioner levels his claims of
unconstitutionality.
See note 1 supra.
[
Footnote 3]
"19.07.
Probationary Period Following First
Appointment."
"An employee who has not yet completed his first probationary
period may be discharged or reduced in accordance with Rule 19.09
by the appointing power by written notice, served on the employee
and copy filed with the Commission, specifying the grounds and the
particular facts on which the discharge or reduction is based. Such
an employee shall be entitled to answer, explain, or deny the
charges in writing within ten business days, but shall not be
entitled to a hearing, except in case of fraud or or discrimination
because of political or religious opinions, racial extraction, or
organized labor membership."
"19.09.
Consent of Commission."
"
* * * *"
"No consent need be secured to the discharge or reduction of a
temporary or recurrent employee."
[
Footnote 4]
It is noteworthy that the California statute requires such
information to be given before both state and federal bodies.
[
Footnote 5]
Nor does petitioner make any attack on the failure of
California's statute to afford temporary employees such as he an
opportunity to explain his failure to answer questions. It will be
noted that permanent employees are granted such a privilege.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK, whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
Section 1028.1 of the California Code, as here applied, provides
that any California public employee who refuses to incriminate
himself when asked to do so by a Congressional Committee "shall be
suspended and dismissed from his employment in the manner provided
by law." The Fifth Amendment, which is a part of the Bill of
Rights, provides that no person shall be compelled to incriminate
("to be a witness against") himself. The petitioner, Globe, an
employee of the State of California, appeared before the House
Un-American Activities Committee of the United States Congress and
claimed this federal constitutional privilege. California promptly
discharged him, as the Court's opinion says, for "insubordination
and violation of § 1028.1 of the Code." The "insubordination and
violation" consisted exclusively of Globe's refusal to testify
before the Congressional Committee; a ground for his refusal was
that his answers might incriminate him. It is beyond doubt that the
State took Globe's job away from him only because he claimed his
privilege under the Federal Constitution.
Page 362 U. S. 10
Here, then, is a plain conflict between the Federal Constitution
and § 1028.1 of the California Code. The Federal Constitution told
Globe he could, without penalty, refuse to incriminate himself
before any arm of the Federal Government; California, however, has
deprived him of his job solely because he exercised this federal
constitutional privilege. In giving supremacy to the California
law, I think the Court approves a plain violation of Article VI of
the Constitution of the United States, which makes that
Constitution "the supreme Law of the Land . . . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
I also think that this discharge under state law is a violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in its authentic
historical sense: that a State may not encroach upon the individual
rights of people except for violation of a law that is valid under
the "Law of the Land." "Law of the Land" of necessity includes the
supreme law, the Constitution itself.
The basic purpose of the Bill of Rights was to protect
individual liberty against governmental procedures that the Framers
thought should not be used. That great purpose can be completely
frustrated by holdings like this. I would hold that no State can
put any kind of penalty on any person for claiming a privilege
authorized by the Federal Constitution. The Court's holding to the
contrary here does not bode well for individual liberty in
America.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS joins,
dissenting.
This is another in the series of cases involving discharges of
state and local employees from their positions after they claim
their constitutional privilege against self-incrimination before
investigating committees.
See Slochower v. Board of Higher
Education, 350 U. S. 551;
Page 362 U. S. 11
Beilan v. Board of Public Education, 357 U.
S. 399;
Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.
S. 468. While I adhere on this matter of constitutional
law to the views I expressed in dissent in the latter two cases,
357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 417,
it is enough to say here that I believe this case to be governed
squarely by
Slochower, and on that basis I put my dissent.
Of course, this opinion is limited solely to Globe's discharge.
California has commanded that its employees answer certain broad
categories of questions when propounded to them by investigating
bodies, including federal bodies such as the Subcommittee of the
Un-American Activities Committee involved here. Cal.Government Code
§ 1028.1. Invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination
before such a body, in response to questions of those sorts, is
made a basis for discharge. [
Footnote
2/1] In the case
Page 362 U. S. 12
of a permanent employee, it is held that discharge may come only
after a hearing at which the employee is given at least an
opportunity to explain his exercise of the privilege.
Board of
Education v. Mass, 47 Cal. 2d
494, 304 P.2d 1015. But, for a temporary or probationary
employee like Globe, the state law, as interpreted authoritatively
by the California courts below, requires a discharge of the
employee upon his claim of the privilege, without further ado. 163
Cal. App. 2d at 605-606, 329 P.2d at 978. Opportunity for an
explanation by the employee or for administrative consideration of
the circumstances of the claim of privilege is foreclosed under the
state law.
In
Slochower, this Court had a substantially identical
situation before it. There, a local law which made a claim of the
constitutional privilege "equivalent to a resignation" was struck
down as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Only one word is necessary to add here to the Court's
statement there of its reason for voiding the provision:
"As interpreted and applied by the state courts, it operates to
discharge every [temporary] employee who invokes the Fifth
Amendment. In practical effect, the questions asked are taken as
confessed, and made the basis of the discharge. No consideration is
given to such factors as the subject matter of the questions,
remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or
justification for exercise of the privilege. It matters not whether
the plea resulted from mistake, inadvertence, or legal advice
conscientiously given, whether wisely or unwisely. The heavy hand
of the statute falls alike on all who exercise their constitutional
privilege, the full enjoyment of which every person is entitled to
receive."
350 U.S. at
350 U. S.
558.
Page 362 U. S. 13
The Court distinguished instances in which the employing
government itself might be conducting an investigation into the
"fitness" of the employee.
As applied, then, to temporary or probationary employees, the
California statute contains the identical vice of automatic
discharge for a Fifth Amendment plea made before another body, not
concerned with investigating the "fitness" of the employee
involved. It is sought here to equate Globe's case with those of
Beilan and Lerner. But, in the latter cases, the Court took the
view that the state discharges were sustainable because the
employees' pleas of self-incrimination before local administrative
agency investigations of their competence and reliability prevented
those employing bodies from having an adequate record on which to
reach an affirmative conclusion as to their competence and
reliability. This failure to cooperate fully (styled lack of
candor) within the framework of the employer's own proceeding to
determine fitness was said to be a constitutional basis for
discharge. 357 U.S. at
357 U. S.
405-408; 357 U.S. at
357 U. S.
475-479;
and see 357 U.S. at
357 U. S. 410
(concurring opinion). But here, there was not the vaguest semblance
of any local administrative procedure designed to determine the
fitness of Globe for further employment. [
Footnote 2/2] It has not been hitherto suggested that
the authorizing resolutions of the Un-American Activities Committee
extend to enabling it to perform these functions on a grant-in-aid
basis to the States. Accordingly, there is presented here the very
same arbitrary action -- the drawing of an inference
Page 362 U. S. 14
of unfitness for employment from exercise of the privilege
before another body, without opportunity to explain on the part of
the employee, or duty on the part of the employing body to attempt
to relate the employee's conduct specifically to his fitness for
employment -- as was involved in
Slochower. There is the
same announced abdication of the local administrative body's own
function of determining the fitness of its employees, in favor of
an arbitrary and
per se rule dependent on the behavior of
the employee before another body not charged with determining his
fitness.
It is said that this case differs from
Slochower
because that case involved a determination, based on his invocation
of the privilege, that the employee was guilty of substantive
misconduct, while this one simply involves a case of
"insubordination" in the employee's failure to answer questions
asked by the Congressional Committee which the employing agency has
ordered be answered. In the first place,
Slochower did not
involve any finding by the New York authorities that the employee
was guilty of the matters as to which he claimed the privilege. The
claim of the privilege was treated by the State as equivalent to a
resignation, 350 U.S. at
350 U. S. 554,
and it was only "in practical effect,"
id. at
350 U. S. 558,
that the questions asked were taken as confessed; [
Footnote 2/3] that is, the State claimed the power
to take the same action, discharge of the employee from employment,
upon a plea of the privilege, as it could have taken upon a
confession of the matters charged. The case involved an inference
of unfitness for office, then, drawn arbitrarily and without
opportunity to explain, from the assertion of the privilege. The
same is involved here, and the thin patina of "insubordination"
that the
Page 362 U. S. 15
statute encrusts on the exercise of the privilege does not
change the matter. If the state labeled as "insubordination" and
mandatory ground for discharge every failure by an employee to
respond to questions asked him by strangers on the street, its
action would be as pointless as it was arbitrary. The point of the
direction given to all employees here to answer the sort of
questions covered by the statute must have been that the State
thought that the matters involved in the questions bore some
generic relationship to the "fitness" of the employee to hold his
position. But, on this basis, the case is again indistinguishable
from
Slochower. If it is unconstitutionally arbitrary for
the State to treat every invocation of the privilege as conclusive
on his fitness and, in effect, as an automatic discharge, then the
command of the State that no temporary employee shall claim the
privilege under pain of automatic discharge must be an
unconstitutionally arbitrary command. A State could not, I suppose,
discharge an employee for attending religious services on Sunday,
see Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183,
344 U. S. 192,
and equally so it could not enforce, by discharges for
"insubordination," a general command to its employees not to attend
such services.
The state court distinguished this case from
Slochower
on the grounds that Slochower was a state employee with tenure, but
Globe was a temporary or probationary employee, not entitled to a
hearing on discharge. On this basis, it concluded that the
requirement outlined by this Court in
Slochower -- that he
could not be discharged
ipso facto on his claim of the
privilege, but only after a more particularized inquiry
administered by his employer -- did not apply. 163 Cal. App. 2d at
601-603, 329 P.2d at 975-976. But this Court has nothing to do with
the civil service systems of the States, as such. And Globe does
not here contend that he could not have been discharged without a
hearing; but he does attack the
Page 362 U. S. 16
specified basis of his discharge. Doubtless a probationary
employee can constitutionally be discharged without specification
of reasons at all; and this Court has not held that it would offend
the Due Process Clause, without more, for a State to put its entire
civil service on such a basis if, as a matter of internal policy,
it could stand to do so. But if a State discharged even a
probationary employee because he was a Negro or a Jew, giving that
explicit reason, its action could not be squared with the
Constitution. So with Slochower's case; this Court did not reverse
the judgment of New York's highest court because it had
disrespected Slochower's state tenure rights, but because it had
sanctioned administrative action taken expressly on an
unconstitutionally arbitrary basis. So here California could have
summarily discharged Globe, and that would have been an end to the
matter; without more appearing, its action would be taken to rest
on a permissible judgment by his superiors as to his fitness. But
if it chooses expressly to bottom his discharge on a basis -- like
that of an automatic, unparticularized reaction to a plea of
self-incrimination -- which cannot by itself be sustained
constitutionally, it cannot escape its constitutional obligations
on the ground that, as a general matter, it could have effected his
discharge with a minimum of formality.
Cf. Vitarelli v.
Seaton, 359 U. S. 535,
359 U. S.
539.
For these reasons, the judgment as to Globe should be
reversed.
[
Footnote 2/1]
The Court appears to treat the fact that the California statute
is not, in terms, directed at the exercise of the privilege against
self-incrimination, but rather covers all refusals to answer, as a
factor militating in favor of its validity. The Court seems to view
the privilege against self-incrimination as a somewhat strange and
singular basis on which to decline to answer questions put in an
investigation, or, at most, as an individual private soldier in a
large army of reasons that might commonly be given for declining to
respond. I am afraid I must view the matter more realistically. But
even if the statute were taken as wholeheartedly at face value as
the Court does, the consequence would not be that it was more
reasonable, but rather that it was more arbitrary. It hardly avoids
the rationale of this Court's decision in the
Slochower
case if the State adds other constitutional privileges to the list,
exercise of which results
per se in discharge. Such a
statute would be even the more undifferentiating and arbitrary in
its basis for discharge than the one involved in
Slochower. And, of course, the crowning extent of
arbitrariness is exposed by the contention that the fact that
discharge would have followed a refusal to answer predicated on no
reason at all justifies discharge upon claim of a constitutional
privilege. It would appear of the essence of arbitrariness for the
State to lump together refusals to answer based on good reasons and
those based on no reason at all, and make discharge automatically
ensue on all. What was struck down in
Slochower as
unconstitutionally arbitrary -- undifferentiating treatment merely
among those pleading the self-incrimination privilege -- seems
almost reasonable by comparison.
[
Footnote 2/2]
In
Slochower, it was said,
"It is one thing for the city authorities themselves to inquire
into Slochower's fitness, but quite another for his discharge to be
based entirely on events occurring before a federal committee whose
inquiry was announced as not directed at 'the property, affairs, or
government of the city, or . . . official conduct of city
employees.'"
350 U.S. at
350 U. S. 558.
This distinction was asserted in
Beilan and Lerner, 357
U.S. at
357 U. S.
408.
[
Footnote 2/3]
The opinion in the New York Court of Appeals also makes it quite
clear that Slochower was not being discharged as guilty of the
matters inquired about.
Daniman v. Board of Educations,
306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 377.