At petitioner's trial in a state court in which he was convicted
of murder, the principal state witness, an accomplice then serving
a 199-year sentence for the same murder, testified in response to a
question by the Assistant State's Attorney that he had received no
promise of consideration in return for his testimony. The Assistant
State's Attorney had in fact promised him consideration, but he did
nothing to correct the witness' false testimony. The jury was
apprised, however, that a public defender had promised "to do what
he could" for the witness.
Held: The failure of the prosecutor to correct the
testimony of the witness which he knew to be false denied
petitioner due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Pp.
360 U. S.
265-272.
(a) The established principle that a State may not knowingly use
false testimony to obtain a tainted conviction does not cease to
apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the
credibility of the witness. Pp.
360 U. S.
269-270.
(b) The fact that the jury was apprised of other grounds for
believing that the witness may have had an interest in testifying
against petitioner was not sufficient to turn what was otherwise a
tainted trial into a fair one. Pp.
360 U. S.
270-271.
(c) Since petitioner claims denial of his rights under the
Federal Constitution, this Court was not bound by the factual
conclusion reached by the Illinois Supreme Court, but reexamined
for itself the evidentiary basis on which that conclusion was
founded. Pp.
360 U. S.
271-272.
13 Ill. 2d
566,
150 N.E.2d
613, reversed.
Page 360 U. S. 265
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, delivered the opinion of the
Court.
At the murder trial of petitioner, the principal state witness,
then serving a 199-year sentence for the same murder, testified in
response to a question by the Assistant State's Attorney that he
had received no promise of consideration in return for his
testimony. The Assistant State's Attorney had, in fact, promised
him consideration, but did nothing to correct the witness' false
testimony. The jury was apprised, however, that a public defender
had promised "to do what he could" for the witness. The question
presented is whether, on these facts, the failure of the prosecutor
to correct the testimony of the witness which he knew to be false
denied petitioner due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
The record in this Court contains testimony from which the
following facts could have been found. The murder in question
occurred early in the morning of August 21, 1938, in a Chicago,
Illinois, cocktail lounge. Petitioner Henry Napue, the witness
George Hamer, one Poe, and one Townsend entered the dimly lighted
lounge and announced their intention to rob those present. An
off-duty policeman, present in the lounge, drew his service
revolver and began firing at the four men. In the melee that
followed, Townsend was killed, the officer was fatally wounded, and
the witness Hamer was seriously wounded. Napue and Poe carried
Hamer to the car, where a fifth man, one Webb, was waiting. In due
course, Hamer was apprehended, tried for the murder of the
policeman, convicted on his plea of guilty, and sentenced to 199
years. Subsequently, Poe was apprehended, tried, convicted,
sentenced to death, and executed. Hamer was not used as a
witness.
Thereafter, petitioner Napue was apprehended. He was put on
trial, with Hamer being the principal witness
Page 360 U. S. 266
for the State. Hamer's testimony was extremely important,
because the passage of time and the dim light in the cocktail
lounge made eyewitness identification very difficult and uncertain,
and because some pertinent witnesses had left the state. On the
basis of the evidence presented, which consisted largely of Hamer's
testimony, the jury returned a guilty verdict, and petitioner was
sentenced to 199 years.
Finally, the driver of the car, Webb, was apprehended. Hamer
also testified against him. He was convicted of murder, and
sentenced to 199 years.
Following the conviction of Webb, the lawyer who, as former
Assistant State's Attorney, had prosecuted the Hamer, Poe, and
Napue cases filed a petition in the nature of a writ of error
coram nobis on behalf of Hamer. In the petition, he
alleged that, as prosecuting attorney, he had promised Hamer that,
if he would testify against Napue, "a recommendation for a
reduction of his [Hamer's] sentence would be made, and, if
possible, effectuated." [
Footnote
1] The
Page 360 U. S. 267
attorney prayed that the court would effect "consummation of the
compact entered into between the duly authorized representatives of
the State of Illinois and George Hamer."
This
coram nobis proceeding came to the attention of
Napue, who thereafter filed a post-conviction petition in which he
alleged that Hamer had falsely testified that he had been promised
no consideration for his testimony, [
Footnote 2] and that the Assistant State's Attorney
handling the case had known this to be false. A hearing was
ultimately held at which the former Assistant State's Attorney
testified that he had only promised to help Hamer if Hamer's story
"about being a reluctant participant" in the robbery was borne out,
and not merely if Hamer would testify at petitioner's trial. He
testified that in his
coram nobis petition on Hamer's
behalf he "probably used some language that [he] should not have
used" in his "zeal to do something for Hamer," to whom he "felt a
moral obligation." The lower court denied petitioner relief on the
basis of the attorney's testimony.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed on different
grounds over two dissents.
13 Ill. 2d
566,
150 N.E.2d
613. It found, contrary to the trial court, that the attorney
had promised Hamer consideration if he would testify at
petitioner's trial, a finding which the State does not contest
here. It further found that the Assistant State's Attorney knew
that Hamer had lied in denying that
Page 360 U. S. 268
he had been promised consideration. It held, however, that
petitioner was entitled to no relief, since the jury had already
been apprised that someone whom Hamer had tentatively identified as
being a public defender "was going to do what he could" in aid of
Hamer, and "was trying to get something did" for him. [
Footnote 3] We granted certiorari
Page 360 U. S. 269
to consider the question posed in the first paragraph of this
opinion. 358 U.S. 919.
First, it is established that a conviction obtained
through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives
of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment,
Mooney
v. Holohan, 294 U. S. 103;
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U. S. 213;
Curran v. Delaware, 259 F.2d 707.
See New York ex rel.
Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U. S. 688, and
White v. Ragen, 324 U. S. 760.
Compare Jones v. Kentucky, 97 F.2d 335, 338,
with In
re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805, 809.
Cf. Mesarosh v.
United States, 352 U. S. 1. The
same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.
Alcorta
v. Texas, 355 U. S. 28;
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763;
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815;
United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp.
382.
See generally annotation, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1575.
The principle that a State may not knowingly use false evidence,
including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, implicit
in any concept of ordered liberty, does not cease to apply merely
because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the
witness. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of
a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,
and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible interest of the
witness in testifying falsely that a defendant's life or liberty
may depend. As stated by the New York Court of Appeals in a case
very similar to this one,
People v. Savvides, 1 N.Y.2d
554, 557, 154 N.Y.S.2d 885, 887, 136 N.E.2d 853, 854-855:
"It is of no consequence that the falsehood bore upon the
witness' credibility, rather than directly upon defendant's guilt.
A lie is a lie, no matter
Page 360 U. S. 270
what its subject, and, if it is in any way relevant to the case,
the district attorney has the responsibility and duty to correct
what he knows to be false and elicit the truth. . . . That the
district attorney's silence was not the result of guile or a desire
to prejudice matters little, for its impact was the same,
preventing, as it did, a trial that could in any real sense be
termed fair."
Second, we do not believe that the fact that the jury
was apprised of other grounds for believing that the witness Hamer
may have had an interest in testifying against petitioner turned
what was otherwise a tainted trial into a fair one. As Mr. Justice
Schaefer, joined by Chief Justice Davis, rightly put it in his
dissenting opinion below,
13 Ill. 2d
566, 571,
150 N.E.2d
613, 616:
"What is overlooked here is that Hamer clearly testified that no
one had offered to help him except an unidentified lawyer from the
public defender's office."
Had the jury been apprised of the true facts, however, it might
well have concluded that Hamer had fabricated testimony in order to
curry the favor of the very representative of the State who was
prosecuting the case in which Hamer was testifying, for Hamer might
have believed that such a representative was in a position to
implement (as he ultimately attempted to do) any promise of
consideration. That the Assistant State's Attorney himself thought
it important to establish before the jury that no official source
had promised Hamer consideration is made clear by his redirect
examination, which was the last testimony of Hamer's heard by the
jury:
"Q. Mr. Hamer, has Judge Prystalski [the trial judge] promised
you any reduction of sentence? "
Page 360 U. S. 271
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Have I promised you that I would recommend any reduction of
sentence to anybody?"
"A. You did not. [That answer was false, and known to be so by
the prosecutor.]"
"Q. Has any Judge of the criminal court promised that they
[
sic] would reduce your sentence?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Has any representative of the Parole Board been to see you
and promised you a reduction of sentence?"
"A. No, sir."
"Q. Has any representative of the Governor of the State of
Illinois promised you a reduction of sentence?"
"A. No, sir."
We are therefore unable to agree with the Illinois Supreme Court
that "there was no constitutional infirmity by virtue of the false
statement."
Third, the State argues that we are not free to reach a
factual conclusion different from that reached by the Illinois
Supreme Court, and that we are bound by its determination that the
false testimony could not in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury. The State relies on
Hysler
v. Florida, 315 U. S. 411.
But, in that case, the Court held only that a state standard of
specificity and substantiality in making allegations of federal
constitutional deprivations would be respected, and this Court made
its own "independent examination" of the allegations there to
determine if they had in fact met the Florida standard. The duty of
this Court to make its own independent examination of the record
when federal constitutional deprivations are alleged is clear,
resting, as it does, on our solemn responsibility for maintaining
the Constitution inviolate.
Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304;
Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U. S. 1.
Page 360 U. S. 272
This principle was well stated in
Niemotko v. Maryland,
340 U. S. 268,
340 U. S.
271:
"In cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under
the Federal Constitution, this Court is not bound by the
conclusions of lower courts, but will reexamine the evidentiary
basis on which those conclusions are founded."
It is now so well settled that the Court was able to speak in
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.
S. 110,
347 U. S. 121,
of the
"long course of judicial construction which establishes as a
principle that the duty rests on this Court to decide for itself
facts or constructions upon which federal constitutional issues
rest. [
Footnote 4]"
As previously indicated, our own evaluation of the record here
compels us to hold that the false testimony used by the State in
securing the conviction of petitioner may have had an effect on the
outcome of the trial. Accordingly, the judgment below must be
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
In relevant part, his petition read as follows:
"After Hamer was sentenced, your petitioner [the Assistant
State's Attorney], well knowing that identification of Poe, Napue
and Webb, if and when apprehended, would be of an unsatisfactory
character, and not the kind of evidence upon which a jury could be
asked to inflict a proper, severe penalty, and being unable to
determine in advance whether Poe, Napue and Webb would make
confessions of their participation in the crime, represented to
Hamer that, if he would be willing to cooperate with law enforcing
officials upon the trial of [
sic] trials of Poe, Napue and
Webb when they were apprehended, that a recommendation for a
reduction of his sentence would be made, and, if possible,
effectuated."
"
* * * *"
"Before testifying on behalf of the State and against Napue,
Hamer expressed to your petitioner a reluctance to cooperate any
further unless he were given definite assurance that a
recommendation for reduction of his sentence would be made. Your
petitioner, feeling that the interests of justice required Hamer's
testimony, again assured Hamer that every possible effort would be
made to conform to the promise previously made to him."
[
Footnote 2]
The alleged false testimony of Hamer first occurred on his
cross-examination:
"Q. Did anybody give you a reward or promise you a reward for
testifying?"
"A. There ain't nobody promised me anything."
On redirect examination, the Assistant State's Attorney again
elicited the same false answer.
"Q. [By the Assistant State's Attorney.] Have I promised you
that I would recommend any reduction of sentence to anybody?"
"A. You did not."
[
Footnote 3]
The following is Hamer's testimony on the subject:
"Q. [On cross-examination.] And didn't you tell him [one of
Napue's attorneys] that you wouldn't testify in this case unless
you got some consideration for it?"
"A. . . . Yes, I did; I told him that."
"
* * * *"
"Q. What are you sentenced for?"
"A. One Hundred and ninety-nine Years."
"Q. You hope to have that reduced, don't you?"
"A. Well, if anybody would help me or do anything for me, why
certainly I would."
"Q. Weren't you expecting that when you came here today?"
"A. There haven't no one told me anything, no more than the
lawyer. The lawyer come in and talked to me a while ago, and said
he was going to do what he could."
"Q. Which lawyer was that?"
"A. I don't know; it was a Public Defender. I don't see him in
here."
"Q. You mean he was from the Public Defender's office?"
"A. I imagine that is where he was from, I don't know."
"Q. And he was the one who told you that?"
"A. Yes, he told me he was trying to get something did for
me."
"Q. . . . And he told you he was going to do something for
you?"
"A. He said he was going to try to."
"
* * * *"
"Q. And you told them [police officers] you would [testify at
the trial of Napue], but you expected some consideration for
it?"
"A. I asked them was there any chance of me getting any. The man
told me he didn't know -- that he couldn't promise me
anything."
"Q. Then you spoke to a lawyer today who said he would try to
get your time cut?"
"A. That was this Public Defender. I don't even know his name. .
. ."
[
Footnote 4]
See, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.
S. 560,
356 U. S. 562;
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U. S. 556,
347 U. S. 558;
Avery v. Georgia, 345 U. S. 559,
345 U. S. 561;
Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315,
340 U. S. 322,
340 U. S. 323,
note 4 (dissenting opinion);
Cassell v. Texas,
339 U. S. 282,
339 U. S. 283;
Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596,
332 U. S. 599;
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401,
324 U. S. 404;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143,
322 U. S. 149;
Ward v. Texas, 316 U. S. 547,
316 U. S. 550;
Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128,
311 U. S. 130;
South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.
S. 412,
289 U. S. 420.
See also, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.
S. 476,
354 U. S. 497
(dissenting opinion);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.
S. 181,
343 U. S. 190;
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378,
287 U. S. 398;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Schuyler, 227 U.
S. 601,
227 U. S. 611;
Creswill v. Grand Lodge Knights of Pythias, 225 U.
S. 246,
225 U. S.
261.
Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, recognized the
principle over 35 years ago in
Davis v. Wechsler,
263 U. S. 22,
263 U. S.
24:
"If the Constitution and laws of the United States are to be
enforced, this Court cannot accept as final the decision of a state
tribunal as to what are the facts alleged to give rise to the right
or to bar the assertion of it even upon local grounds."