Certain persons who were slaves in the State of Louisiana were
by their owners taken to France as servants, and after some time
were by their own consent sent back to New Orleans, some of them
under declarations from their proprietors that they should be free
and one of them, after her arrival, was held as a slave. The ships
in which these persons were passengers were, after arrival in New
Orleans, libeled for alleged breaches of the Act of Congress of
April 20, 1818, prohibiting the importation of slaves into the
United States.
Held that the provisions of the act of
Congress do not apply to such cases. The object of the law was to
put an end to the slave trade and to prevent the introduction of
slaves from foreign countries. The language of the statute cannot
properly be applied to persons of color who were domiciled in the
United States and who are brought back to their place of residence
after their temporary absence.
The French ship
Garonne, from Havre, and the ship
Fortune, also from Havre, were libeled, by several
proceedings, by the United States at New Orleans, in the District
Court of the United States, January, 1836, under the provisions of
the first section of the Act of Congress, passed April 20, 1818,
entitled
"An act in addition to an act to prohibit the introduction of
slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United
States, from and after the first day of January, 1808, and to
repeal certain parts of the same."
The ship
Garonne had arrived in New Orleans, about 21
November, 1835, having on board a female, Priscilla, who had been
born a slave in Louisiana, the property of the widow Smith, a
native of that state, and resident in New Orleans. Mrs. Smith and
her daughter, being in ill health, went from New Orleans, with her
family, in 1835, to Havre, taking with her, as a servant,
Priscilla, having previously obtained from the mayor of the city a
passport for the slave, to prove that she had been carried out of
the state, and that she should again be admitted into the same.
Priscilla being desirous of returning to New Orleans, from Paris,
was sent back on board the
Page 36 U. S. 74
Garonne, under a passport from the
charge des
affaires of the United States, in which she was described as a
woman of color, the servant of a citizen of the United States. On
the arrival of the ship, the baggage of the girl was regularly
returned as that of the slave of Mrs. Smith.
The facts of the case of the ship
Fortune were as
follows: Mr. Pecquet, a citizen of New Orleans, went to France, in
1831, taking with him two servants, who were his slaves, as was
alleged in the testimony, with an intention to emancipate them.
They remained with the family of Mr. Pecquet in France for some
time, and returned to New Orleans, at their own instance, in the
ship
Fortune in 1835, as was asserted, as free persons.
The passport of the American legation represented these females as
domestics of Mr. Pecquet, of New Orleans, a citizen of the United
States. After their return to New Orleans, it did not appear, that
they were claimed or held by the agent of Mr. Pecquet, or by any
person, as slaves, but no deed of emancipation for either of them
had been executed. On the arrival of the
Fortune, in the
list of passengers which was certified under the oath of the
master, these persons, by name, were stated to be the slaves of Mr.
Pecquet. The declarations of Mr. Pecquet that these persons were
brought back as free, and that it was his intention that they
should be free, were in evidence.
The District Court of Louisiana dismissed both the libels, and
the United States prosecuted these appeals.
Page 36 U. S. 76
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TANEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
These two cases are appeals from decrees of the District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana, upon libels filed by the
district attorney, against these said ships, their tackle, apparel
and furniture, for alleged breaches of the Act of Congress of April
20, 1818, 3 Stat. 450, prohibiting the importation of slaves into
the United States.
In the case of the ship
Garonne, the facts were
admitted by the
Page 36 U. S. 77
parties in the court below, and are in substance, as
follows:
Priscilla, a person of color born in Louisiana, was a slave, the
property of the widow Smith, who was a native of the same state.
Mrs. Smith and her daughter, Madame Couchain, being in an ill state
of health, left New Orleans with her family for France in 1835,
taking with her as a servant the above-mentioned girl. Priscilla
being desirous of returning to New Orleans, Mr. Couchain, the
son-in-law of Mrs. Smith, through the intervention of a friend,
procured for her a passage in the ship
Garonne from Havre
to New Orleans, and since her arrival at that place, she has lived
at the house of Mrs. Smith, and is held as her slave.
Upon this statement of facts, the question is presented whether
Mrs. Smith, a resident of Louisiana, going abroad, and sojourning
for a time in a foreign country, and taking with her one of her
slaves, as an attendant, may lawfully bring or send her back to her
home with intent to hold her as before in her service. It does not
appear from the evidence or admissions in the case whether the laws
of France gave the girl a right to her freedom upon her
introduction into that country. But this omission is not material
to the decision. For even assuming that by the French law she was
entitled to freedom, the Court is of opinion that there is nothing
in the act of Congress under which these proceedings were had to
prevent her mistress from bringing or sending her back to her place
of residence and continuing to hold her as before, in her
service.
The object of the law in question was to put an end to the slave
trade and to prevent the introduction of slaves into the United
States from other countries. The libel in this case was filed under
the first section of the act, which declares
"That it shall not be lawful to import or bring in any manner
into the United States or territories thereof, from any foreign
kingdom, place or country, any negro, mulatto or person of color
with intent to hold, sell or dispose of such negro, mulatto or
person of color as a slave or to be held to service or labor,"
and then proceeds to make the vessel liable to forfeiture which
shall be employed in such importation. The language of the law
above recited is obviously pointed against the introduction of
negroes or mulattoes who were inhabitants of foreign countries, and
cannot properly be applied to persons of color who are domiciled in
the United States and who are brought back to their place of
residence after a temporary absence. In the case before the Court,
although the girl had been staying for a time in
Page 36 U. S. 78
France in the service of her mistress, yet in construction of
law, she continued an inhabitant of Louisiana, and her return home
in the manner stated in the record was not the importation of a
slave into the United States, and consequently, does not subject
the vessel to forfeiture.
If the construction we have given to this section of the law
needed confirmation, it will be found in the exception contained in
the fourth section of the law in relation to persons of color who
are "inhabitants, or held to service by the laws of either of the
states or territories of the United States." This section prohibits
our own citizens and all other persons resident in the United
States from taking on board of any vessel or transporting from any
foreign country or place any negro or mulatto "not being an
inhabitant, nor held to service by the laws of either of the states
or territories of the United States." Under this section, the mere
act of taking or receiving on board the colored person in a foreign
country with the intent to sell or hold such person in slavery
constitutes the offense. But inasmuch as Priscilla was an
inhabitant of New Orleans and held to service by the laws of
Louisiana, if the master of an American vessel had taken her on
board at Havre, for the purpose of transporting her to Louisiana,
there to be held in slavery, it is very clear that by reason of the
exception above-mentioned, the act of receiving her in his vessel
for such a purpose would have been no offense, while the taking on
board of a negro or mulatto who was the inhabitant of any other
country would have been a high misdemeanor and subjected the party
to severe punishment and the vessel to forfeiture. It would be
difficult to assign a reason for this discrimination, if the
persons of color described in the exception could not be brought to
this country without subjecting the vessel to forfeiture, and the
exception made in this section in relation to those who are
inhabitants or held to service by the laws of either of the states
or territories of the United States proves that Congress did not
intend to interfere with persons of that description, nor to
prohibit our vessels from transporting them from foreign countries
back to the United States.
The principles above stated decide also the case of
United
States v. Ship Fortune. We think there is enough in the record
to show that the persons of color therein mentioned were sent to
New Orleans, the place of their residence, for the purpose of being
there manumitted, and not to be held in slavery. But it is
Page 36 U. S. 79
unnecessary to go into an examination of the evidence on this
point, because in either case, the bringing them home was not an
offense against the act of Congress, and the vessel in which they
returned is not on that account liable to seizure and condemnation.
The decree of the district court must therefore be
Affirmed in each of these cases.
These causes came on to be heard, on the transcripts of the
record from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, and were argued by counsel. On consideration
whereof it is now here ordered and decreed by this Court that the
decree of the said district court in each of the causes be and the
same is hereby affirmed.
