At a trial in a state court at which he was not represented by
counsel, petitioner was convicted of burglary and sentenced to
imprisonment for 15 years. No appeal was taken, and the State
Supreme Court denied without a hearing a petition for habeas corpus
which he filed later and in which he alleged,
inter alia,
that: he was 20 years old, uneducated and inexperienced in court
trials. He was represented by counsel at an earlier trial for the
same offense which resulted in a hung jury. He was then placed in
solitary confinement, pending a new trial of which he was not
notified until the day before it began. Meanwhile, his counsel had
withdrawn from the case and his mother had made several
unsuccessful attempts to obtain other counsel. At the trial, he was
denied both the appointment of counsel for his defense and a
continuance to enable him to obtain counsel. His conviction was
based largely on the testimony of an alleged accomplice who pleaded
guilty and testified for the State -- not only regarding the crime
for which petitioner was being tried, but also regarding other
alleged crimes.
Held: if petitioner's allegations be true, he was
denied the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and it was incumbent on the state courts to determine
what the true facts were. Pp.
358 U. S.
633-638.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The petitioner is serving a 15-year prison sentence imposed by a
Florida court after conviction by a jury of
Page 358 U. S. 634
burglary. [
Footnote 1] He
was not represented by counsel at the trial. No appeal was taken,
and the Supreme Court of Florida denied without a hearing a
petition for habeas corpus which he later filed. [
Footnote 2] Certiorari was granted to
determine whether the circumstances alleged in the habeas corpus
petition make this a case where the denial of counsel's assistance
at the trial operated to deprive the defendant of the due process
of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 357 U.S. 904. For
reasons to be stated, we hold that this is such a case.
The record here consists only of the habeas corpus petition and
the Florida Supreme Court's bare order of denial. With the case in
that posture, the factual allegations of the petition must, for
present purposes, be accepted as true.
Hawk v. Olson,
326 U. S. 271,
326 U. S. 273.
Composed in the penitentiary, the petition, like many such
documents, is heavily larded with irrelevant innuendos, unsupported
conclusions, and pretentious legalisms. Within its confines,
however, are to be found allegations of a chain of events which we
now relate.
On December 6, 1954, the petitioner, an uneducated farm boy of
20, was first tried by a jury on the burglary charge. At that
trial, he was represented by experienced counsel of his own choice.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury was unable to agree on
a verdict, and a mistrial resulted.
The petitioner was then immediately placed in solitary
confinement, where he remained awaiting retrial. He first learned
on the evening of February 20, 1955, that his new trial was to take
place the next day. Only a few days earlier, he had learned through
a prison official that his former lawyer had withdrawn from the
case. The
Page 358 U. S. 635
petitioner's mother on his behalf had tried to engage a number
of other lawyers to represent him, but they had all refused,
telling her that the fee she could offer was inadequate, and the
time for preparation too short.
At the opening of the second trial, the petitioner asked the
court for a continuance to give him time to employ a new lawyer,
or, in the alternative, that the court appoint counsel for him. In
making these requests, the petitioner called the trial judge's
attention to his youth, his lack of education and courtroom
experience, and the sudden withdrawal of prior counsel. [
Footnote 3] The requests were denied,
and the trial proceeded at once, with the petitioner left to
conduct his own defense. [
Footnote
4]
His codefendant, Allen, an alleged accomplice, pleaded guilty
and testified for the State. Allen stated, among other things, that
he and the petitioner, in the company of two others, had
burglarized stores, stolen a truck, and engaged in a running gun
battle with police. He further testified that he (Allen) had
"pulled a $180,000 robbery" in New Orleans with two of the
petitioner's older brothers,
Page 358 U. S. 636
in which the petitioner had taken no part, and that one of these
brothers had also participated in the crime for which the
petitioner was on trial. Physical evidence was introduced,
including a revolver stolen from the store the petitioner was
charged with burglarizing, which had been found in Allen's
possession. No evidence in the case except Allen's testimony
connected Allen and the petitioner. It is not clear what, if any,
objections were made to Allen's testimony, or whether he was
cross-examined. [
Footnote
5]
On conviction, the petitioner, a first offender, was sentenced
to the 15-year prison term he is now serving. Allen, an ex-convict,
was sentenced to 10 years, but placed on probation. No charges were
brought against the petitioner's brother or the fourth person named
by Allen as a participant in the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted.
In the 17 years that have passed since its decision in
Betts
v. Brady, 316 U. S. 455,
this Court, by a traditional process of inclusion and exclusion,
has, in a series of decisions, indicated the factors which may
render state criminal proceedings without counsel so apt to result
in injustice as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. [
Footnote 6] The
Page 358 U. S. 637
alleged circumstances of the present case so clearly make it one
where, under these decisions, federal organic law required the
assistance of counsel that it is unnecessary here to explore the
outer limits of constitutional protection in this area.
"Where the gravity of the crime and other factors such as the
age and education of the defendant, the conduct of the court or the
prosecuting officials, and the complicated nature of the offense
charged and the possible defenses thereto render criminal
proceedings without counsel so apt to result in injustice as to be
fundamentally unfair,"
the Constitution requires that the accused must have legal
assistance at his trial.
Uveges v. Pennsylvania,
335 U. S. 437,
335 U. S. 441.
Of particular relevance here are the decisions of the Court which
have held the appointment of counsel necessary to a fair trial
because of the complexity of the proceedings.
Rice v.
Olson, 324 U. S. 786;
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773;
and see Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.
S. 471,
323 U. S.
475-476.
All that stood between the petitioner and a verdict of acquittal
was a testimony of Allen, an admitted accomplice. Although Florida
law does not require corroboration of an accomplice's testimony to
sustain a conviction,
Land v. State, 59 So. 2d
370, the defendant has a right to demand that the trial judge
instruct the jury that the "evidence of an accomplice should be
received by the jury with great caution."
Varnum v. State,
137 Fla. 438, 449, 188 So. 346, 351. The Florida decisions also
establish the right to cross-examine an accomplice witness as to
whether he is testifying under an agreement for leniency, and
even
Page 358 U. S. 638
as to whether he believes that his testimony will be in his best
interest.
Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897;
Henderson v. State, 135 Fla. 548, 555, 185 So. 625, 627
(concurring opinion). A layman would hardly be familiar with these
rights.
Moreover, Allen's testimony concerning the petitioner's
commission of other crimes and the commission of a crime by the
petitioner's brother, who allegedly also participated in the
burglary which was the subject of the trial, if not inadmissible in
its entirety, certainly raised serious questions under Florida law.
As the Florida Supreme Court has recently noted, "There are
literally thousands of cases in this country discussing the
admission of such evidence."
Padgett v.
State, 53 So. 2d 106,
108. The problems which this testimony raised were thus beyond the
ken of a layman, and it was clearly the kind of testimony that
could seriously damage a defendant in the eyes of a jury. Finally,
the transcript of the petitioner's previous trial would have
offered a lawyer opportunities for impeachment of prosecution
witnesses, opportunities of which we cannot assume that a layman
would be aware. [
Footnote
7]
For these reasons, the requirements of due process made
necessary the assistance of a lawyer if the circumstances alleged
in the habeas corpus petition are true. On the present record,
there is no way to test their truth. But the allegations themselves
made it incumbent upon the Florida courts to determine what the
true facts were. [
Footnote
8]
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
A noncapital offense in Florida, punishable in this case by a
maximum prison term of 20 years. Fla.Stat.1955, § 810.01.
[
Footnote 2]
The petition was originally filed in that court in accordance
with state procedure explained in
Sneed v.
Mayo, 66 So. 2d
865, 874.
[
Footnote 3]
On this point, the allegations of the petition are as
follows:
"Petitioner explained to the Court that he was not capable of
representing himself, that he was only 20 years of age and was
uneducated and had never heard a court trial except the one time he
was tried on the same charge, and then he was represented by Mr.
Carr, and that he did not know court procedure or how to conduct
his defense, and told the court he had been closely confined in
solitary at the Florida State Prison at Raiford, up until the night
before, and therefore he had no opportunity to employ new counsel,
since the Court had permitted his chosen counsel to abandon him in
the face of trial, and it was an absolute necessity that the court
grant a continuance, or, in the alternative, for the court to
remedy the situation by appointing counsel to represent the
petitioner."
[
Footnote 4]
Under Florida law a trial court has an absolute duty to provide
counsel only for an indigent defendant on trial for a capital
offense.
Sneed v. Mayo, 66 So. 2d
865;
Johnson v. Mayo, 158 Fla. 264, 28 So. 2d 585;
Fla.Stat., 1955, § 909.21.
[
Footnote 5]
The habeas corpus petition incorporates, among other things,
excerpts from a newspaper account of the trial, a form of pleading
to which the Florida Attorney General makes no objection in the
present case. An excerpt from this newspaper account reads as
follows:
"While making objections and inquiring of the Judge and
witnesses, Cash appeared unsure of himself. On several occasions,
he would start a sentence, then stop to rephrase it or start on
another subject. Before making objections, Cash raised his hand to
attract the attention of the Judge, then, in a halting manner,
would make his statement."
[
Footnote 6]
See Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786;
Canizio v. New York, 327 U. S. 82;
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U. S. 663;
Foster v. Illinois, 332 U. S. 134;
Gayes v. New York, 332 U. S. 145;
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640;
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U. S. 672;
Gryger v. Burke, 334 U. S. 728;
Townsend v. Burke, 334 U. S. 736;
Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U. S. 437;
Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U. S. 773;
Quicksall v. Michigan, 339 U. S. 660;
Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U. S. 134;
Massey v. Moore, 348 U. S. 105;
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.
S. 116;
Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.
S. 155.
[
Footnote 7]
The very fact that the jury failed to convict at the first
trial, when the petitioner was represented by counsel, is at least
some practical indication of the difference a lawyer's help at the
second trial might have made.
[
Footnote 8]
Counsel has advised us that a transcript of the trial
proceedings can be made available by the court reporter.